



A book is a journey



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Paul Mylonox.

# RUSSIA AND ITS CRISIS

BY  
PAUL MILYOUKOV

*Crane Lectures  
for 1903*



CHICAGO  
*The University of Chicago Press*

LONDON  
*T. Fisher Unwin, Paternoster Square*  
1906

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Entered at Stationers' Hall

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Published August 1905  
Second Impression August 1906

Composed and Printed by  
The University of Chicago Press  
Chicago, Illinois, U. S. A.



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## PREFACE

THIS book is not a political pamphlet written for the occasion, but a result of long years of study devoted to the explanation of the Russian present by the Russian past. The present crisis in Russia necessarily commands attention, and everything discussed in this work converges to the one aim of explaining this crisis. But the conditions which have brought on the crisis are so deeply rooted in the past, and are so closely interwoven with every aspect of Russian life, whether of religion or of politics, of doctrines or of institutions, of social forms or of the composition of society, that an explanation of the present situation, to be at all adequate, must necessarily be a general picture of Russia and a general description of the conditions under which its civilization has developed. The crisis will pass, but the conditions of civilization remain; and my ambition has been to explain, not the momentary and transient, but the permanent and lasting, elements in the political, social, and religious life of Russia.

The contents of the book are essentially the same as those of my lectures on "Russian Civilization" delivered during the summer of 1903 at the University of Chicago, on the *Charles R. Crane Foundation*. The first four chapters were put into type more than a year ago; the two following have since then been entirely recast, on a much larger scale; and chap. vii is a new addition, reproducing the contents of my lectures on "The Russian Crisis" delivered at the

Lowell Institute in Boston, in December, 1904, during my second visit to this country. In the last pages of that chapter the events occurring in Russia during the months of December, 1904, and January, 1905, have been considered. But it gives me satisfaction to state that I have had nothing to add to my conclusion, which is published just as it was written in 1903, with the addition only of a few lines mentioning the subject of chap. vii. The reader may find it advisable, before perusing the book, to make himself acquainted with this conclusion, as it contains a summary, and points out the main thread, of the argument.

I thought out and wrote this book in English, though I am fully aware how imperfect is my command of this beautiful language. Still, I think that this was a better method than to have had it translated from a Russian text. The most salient blunders have been removed by my English and American friends, and I avail myself of this opportunity to express my appreciation of the kind assistance rendered me by Miss E. M. Hughes, of England; Mr. Nott Flint and Dr. W. Muss-Arnolt, of the University of Chicago; Professor Leo Wiener, of Harvard University; and the reader of the University Press. On the other hand, I alone am answerable for such imperfections of style as may still remind the reader that the writer is a foreigner.

My system of writing Russian names will be found to differ somewhat from the usual method. For instance, I write *Keeyev*, where an English writer is accustomed to find the spelling *Kiev*; *Novoya Vrainya* instead of *Novoe Vremia*; etc. In order to explain

this difference, I must say that the only existing "scientific" system of transliterating Russian names is founded on the German pronunciation, with the addition of some diacritical signs. I have thought that an English reader is justly entitled to his own transliteration, founded on the English pronunciation; and as I have found it impracticable to employ any diacritical marks, it remained for me to adopt a merely phonetic method. I do not assert that I have been entirely consistent in this, and sometimes I have preferred to retain the usual spelling of a name which I supposed to be universally known; but I wish that my hint might be taken up by somebody more experienced than I in the orthography of foreign names.

I hope my personal attitude toward the questions I have discussed in this book will be clearly understood by every unbiased reader. I am not a "violent agitator," as one of the Chicago "yellow" papers was good enough to call me—without ever having heard me, I presume. But neither am I what a gentleman connected with the organization of the St. Louis Exposition expected me to be when he wished me to give some suggestions as to the arrangement of the Russian exhibit—suggestions that would please the Russian government. I told this gentleman that I was not the person to consult on such a subject; and I took the liberty of adding that many other Russians would likewise be perplexed to answer his question, for the reason that there exist two Russias, one quite different from the other, and what pleases one is quite sure to displease the other; so that trying to please both at once would be a hopeless task. Since that time, however,

people in America have become better aware of this important distinction; and I flatter myself with having contributed a little to this result, if I may judge from the interest taken in my discussions by the very appreciative audiences which I had the pleasure of addressing in Chicago and Boston.

Thus I am tempted once more to emphasize this distinction. Were I to label these two Russias, I should designate the one as the Russia of Leo Tolstoy, the great writer; and the other as that of Plehve, the late minister of the interior. The former is the Russia of our "intellectuals" and of the people; the latter is official Russia. One is the Russia of the future, as dreamed of by members of the liberal professions; the other is an anachronism, deeply rooted in the past, and defended in the present by an omnipotent bureaucracy. The one spells liberty; the other, despotism.

Exception may be taken to my drawing such a line of demarkation between the two Russias, on the ground that it is too contradictory and admits of no possible third. I shall not deny the element of truth in this objection, but I hope that the soundness of my distinction will become manifest after some further explanation.

To be sure, Plehve, whose name is everywhere recognized as synonymous with despotism, represents only an aggravated form of what official Russia generally is; and now that he is gone, he is even disavowed by the very people whose cause he championed and in whose defense he lost his life. In so far it would seem unfair to call the whole of official Russia by his name. Attempts, however, have already been

made by some of our political writers—and I deem them not unsuccessful—to prove not only that the policy of Plehve was logically connected with the position of official Russia, but that, under existing conditions, it was the only possible policy for the autocracy. This policy, these authors argue, was nothing but the logical outcome of a desire to continue the defense of a position which was virtually lost and avowedly untenable. I admit that Plehve was only a *reductio ad absurdum* of autocracy—autocracy gone mad; but this only because autocracy itself is reduced *ad absurdum* by the very trend of life. If it is to survive at all, there is really no other means of keeping it alive than the policy of Plehve. If this, the “only possible,” policy has proved impossible, the fault is not with Plehve. His failure is the most instructive object-lesson ever held up to autocracy; the only conclusion to be drawn from it is that not the man, but the system, should be condemned. Unhappily, the lesson does not appear to have been heeded, and as a result we are now witnessing an attempt at welding autocracy and liberalism. The successors of Plehve will soon realize the futility of this endeavor. But the country at large is tired of object-lessons and no longer needs them. The people ask for political reforms which imply a negation of autocracy. So long as autocracy does not surrender, one may feel justified in regarding the cause and methods of Plehve as identical with those of official Russia, or with those of autocracy. And for this reason we emphasize our distinction: autocracy and liberalism are incompatible and contradictory, not only according to my definition, but in life itself.

My designation of the other Russia as that of Leo Tolstoy likewise needs explanation. This, too, may seem, and with more reason, an exaggeration, a going to the opposite extreme. In Tolstoy's teachings, the idea of liberty is abstract and absolute; it is worked out and shaped into a system of Christian anarchism. Now, as a matter of fact, the Russian "intellectuals" do not care much about the Christian element in it, and no anarchism exists in Russia. We shall show that what in Russia is really opposed to officialdom and autocracy is either liberalism or collectivism. Nevertheless, Tolstoy's name stands for Russian opposition, and will continue so to stand as long as it remains a synonym for liberty in general—liberty as the absolute negation of the existing order of things.

I shall not be expected to discuss Russian affairs from the point of view of Plehveism. It is the cause of the other, the "greater Russia," that I have made mine. But, I am asked, is it seasonable, is it patriotic, to speak of two Russias at a time when they should forget their differences and unitedly face the common enemy? The question may seem a delicate one. It has of late been much debated in Russia, and has been very differently answered. Many who were friends became enemies when, in pleading for this or that solution, they discovered themselves to be at variance. Permit me to state, though not in my own words, the typical answer given in Russia. Recently, in a circle of intimate friends, I overheard what I think may be called such an answer. Curiously enough, it was a military man, a young officer, who gave expression to the general feeling. "Unpatriotic?" he exclaimed,

replying to the above question. "But are we permitted to be patriotic? What is it to be patriotic but to love one's country, to know it, and to be free to act for its best interests? Now, are we permitted to know all about Russia? Are we permitted to act for Russia? No, we are not. The censorship keeps us from knowing the truth; and never was the lack of real knowledge of current events felt more sorely than now, during this wretched war. And what about the possibility of doing something for Russia? Is not every spontaneous action doomed? Is not every public initiative cut short? Is there any room left for conscious patriotism? Has not even the humble attempt of the self-governing assemblies to unite in helping the sick and wounded been denounced as criminal, and forbidden by Plehve? What wonder, then, if the outward manifestations of our patriotism are not like those of other nations? How can it be otherwise, as long as real patriots are treated as traitors, while traitors are proclaimed patriots?"

So spoke the officer. The sympathies of a foreign public may, indeed, have been chilled by what was considered a conspicuous lack of patriotism in my countrymen; for example, by a certain, seemingly utterly unpatriotic, letter of Tolstoy's on the war. But, in justice to us, it must be borne in mind that of necessity our love of country sometimes assumes unexpected forms, and that its apparent absence in reality represents with us the very highest expression of true patriotic feeling. We may be thought a queer sort of people, but we cleave to our own ideas of patriotism; and we have no hesitancy in deciding which of the two

is the traitor and which the patriot, Plehve or Tolstoy, if we are obliged to choose between them. We do not call it patriotic to paralyze the living forces of the nation by a police régime, and to name such a destructive policy a work of pacification. We do not call it patriotic to wage war for new markets while we cannot yet control our own, and to destroy the fountain-head which makes the domestic market prosper—the purchasing power of the agricultural producer. We even go so far as not to care a whit about making other people believe what we do not believe ourselves. If such “make-believe” goes for “prestige,” then we are greatly averse to sacrificing truth to the preservation of prestige. Perhaps this sort of political recklessness is, at bottom, based on a certain self-confidence among our people. We think, indeed, that the prestige of Plehve’s Russia is once for all ruined, beyond the possibility of restoration. But we think, too, that the prestige of Tolstoy’s Russia is greater than ever, and that we do not lose anything—nay, that we gain enormously—if by the eclipse of the former sort of prestige the cause of reform is the winner.

Everybody knows a certain beautiful fairy-tale of Andersen’s. Some wise men came to a country and promised to make for its king a state robe of a gorgeous material, but such as only wise men would be able to see. The king was delighted, and the wise men set to work. The robe was soon ready, and a solemn procession on a feast-day was chosen as the occasion for trying on the new dress. The state councilors could see nothing, but as they were anxious not to be taken for fools, they expressed admiration for the



dress of the king, and went with him in the procession. The terrified throng likewise saw no garment; but they were afraid to speak. And so the procession went on in silence, until some little unsophisticated boy, too young to be terrified or to be afraid of making a fool of himself, suddenly cried out, amid the general silence: "But the king is naked!" The crowd howled and groaned; the cowardice and rascality of the councilors became manifest to everybody; and the king was ashamed and furious.

Thus it is with Russia. Serious men for years and years have worn a state robe whose beauty was clear only to a few conjuring wiseacres; and millions of men, groaning under the burden of its cost, have mournfully kept silence watching the solemn procession, until an untoward event has come, like the child in Andersen's tale, to tell the whole world that the wisdom is counterfeit and the wearers of the robe are "naked." This event is the war.

Well, the only advice we can give to these people is: Put on new clothes, and do it as soon as possible!

PAUL MILYUKOV.

CHICAGO,  
Abraham Lincoln's birthday, 1905.



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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTORY

#### RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES: A COMPARISON

IN accepting the kind invitation of the University of Chicago asking me to speak on Russian civilization, I was perfectly aware that the task was not an easy one. It is difficult, especially for a stranger, to attempt to present to you, in the short time allowed, the very complex and peculiar process of the historical development of a nation; and when that nation is one whose tastes, feelings, and habits seem to be so different from your own, the difficulty is enhanced. Moreover, it will not be possible for me to produce adequate evidence in support of all I have to say; and yet I cannot assume that the data are known to you. What I have to do, under these circumstances, is to try a shorter way than that of collecting material evidence and plunging you into the arid details of Russian history. I shall start with those conditions in Russia which are more generally known to you; and for these conditions I shall try to find a historical explanation. Great as the difference is between your country and my own, there may be found many points of contact and similarity in the general lines of social development and in the general aims which a civilized nation always strives to attain. But similar as the aims and the general drift of civilization may be, the conditions under which progress is achieved in various countries are widely different. It will be the chief

object of our study to point out what these conditions have been in Russia.

As you know, Russia is just now struggling for political and religious freedom. You may have asked yourselves whether this necessary condition of every higher civilization is likely to be fulfilled in Russia. Is the state of agitation in which we now find Russia an outward sign of her moving forward to a higher plane of existence? Or is this not rather a momentary outburst of a slavish population, suddenly thrown from fear to despair by hard times, and likely to relapse soon into its former state of abject servility and prostration? And if, as in the previous supposition, these troubles represent a necessary stage of Russian social and political evolution, why has this stage made its appearance so comparatively late? What have been the checks and obstacles which Russia has met on its path? What chances are there for the final success of the struggle for civilization?

The answer I shall give to these questions will not be discouraging, so far as the future of Russia is concerned. Though in its past and present only too many diseases will be found to exist, I am sure that one would find none of these diseases incurable. And such as one observed would be seen to be nothing but ailments of growth. For growth has always been present in Russian history, however adverse may have been at times the conditions for a normal development of the Russian nation

Rapid growth is one of the most important features in common between your country and mine. Russia and the United States are both rapidly pro-

gressing; neither has as yet attained the highest point of its possible development; both are very far from any signs of decay.

The similarity thus pointed out is far from being only an outward one. We may trace it deeper into the inward structure of the history of both nations. Rapid growth is the immediate result of recent settlement. If we study the conditions of settlement, both in Russia and in America, we shall soon discover how close the similarity is between the countries. At the same time we shall be enabled to cast a glance at such differences as have made one country achieve an amazing progress, while the other has been held back in its development for whole centuries. Let us then take the process of settlement in Russia and in America as the subject of our introductory study. And this study, though it will not furnish adequate answers to the questions formulated, will yet indicate to us the direction in which these answers should be sought.

Both Russia and the United States have been colonized, not at a prehistoric stage of their existence, but in recent historic times. Hence the settlement and the exploitation of the natural resources of the country form the very warp of their historical texture. Most of the important features of their economical, social, and political development must be referred to this process of colonization.

For our present purposes, the whole process of Russian settlement may be divided into two consecutive stages: from the earliest times till the middle of the sixteenth century, and from that time down to the present day. It is in its second stage that the process

of settlement may be compared with that of America.

Only the northern half of Russia was populated before the sixteenth century. It is poorly endowed by nature and scantily settled, and therefore may be compared with Canada.<sup>1</sup> The whole of the better and richer half of Russia—southward from the Oka River—has been colonized only since the middle of the sixteenth century. Before that time this “granary of Europe” presented the aspect of a limitless prairie, laid waste for centuries by the continual raids of Turkish and Tartar tribes. Central Asia sent forth, like a series of tidal waves, these tribes of nomads, almost without interruption, during a long period of ten centuries—from the fourth to the thirteenth. No wonder that they completely swept away the aborigines of the prairie, who had supplied Athens with grain in the olden days.

As late as the sixteenth century, life in the prairie was again made, if not entirely safe, at least possible for the settler. The Muscovite government provided the settlers with some military defense, though of a very inefficient nature, and they rushed in a flood to the virgin prairie land.<sup>2</sup> They sought new places where the resources of nature were to be had in

<sup>1</sup>One may see on the map blank places in northern Russia, which correspond to regions entirely unsettled even at the present time.

<sup>2</sup>The plan of this colonization is represented on the map by four consecutive strips which begin at the line of the military defense constructed by the government of Moscow in the middle of the sixteenth century, and proceed by centuries. The yellow strip corresponds to the settlement from the middle of the sixteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth century; the green, to that from the middle of the seventeenth to the middle of the eighteenth







- Part of Russia settled before the middle of the XVI century.
- Russian colonization from 1550 to 1650.
- Russian colonization from 1650 to 1750.
- Russian colonization from 1750 to 1850.
- Russian colonization from 1850 to 1900.

- POPULATION OTHER THAN RUSSIAN.**
- 1. Laps.
  - 2. Finns (Queens and Tavastians).
  - 3. Karelian Finns.
  - 4. Samoyeds.
  - 5. Zuzime.
  - 6. Pomorians.
  - 7. Volgaes.
  - 8. Cheremisses.
  - 9. Tartars.
  - 10. Bashkirs.
  - 11. Mordos.
  - 12. Tchuvasches.
  - 13. German Colonies.
  - 14. Kirghiz.
  - 15. Kalmycks.
  - 16. Nogais (Tartars).
  - 17. Caucasian Tribes.
  - 18. Crimean Tartars.
  - 19. Rumanians.
  - 20. Baltic Finns (Estonians and Livonians).
  - 21. Lithuanians.
  - 22. Poles.
  - 23. Turkomans.

White parts of the map show uninhabited regions.

abundance; and at the same time hoped to free themselves from the Muscovite rule—a rule they were feeling heavily just then on account of the increased taxes and the severer military service, made necessary for the defense of the southern frontier.<sup>3</sup>

The old stock of the trans-Okan population thus served to settle the prairie land, as the British and the New Englanders served to colonize the territories of North America. Of course, the general drift of immigration was differently directed. In Russia the newcomers, instead of being bound for the west, went to the south and the southeast, following the courses of the Russian rivers. The Don was their Mississippi, the Urals their Rocky Mountains. Siberia, the last section to be colonized, may be compared with Oregon and California; and it exhibits breaks in the continuity of settlement similar to those in Nevada or Utah.

The Russian colonists met with the same kind of difficulties in their settlement as the Americans. Woods had to be cleared; the virgin prairie land had to be broken; the necessities of life had to be provided. Thus the immigrants of both countries were for centuries completely absorbed in the process of utilizing the natural resources of the newly occupied land, taking possession of the riches of its rivers, of its woods, and of its luxuriant vegetation, profiting by the almost inexhaustible fertility of the soil, and at century; the orange, to the settlement of the second half of the eighteenth century; the purple, to the settlement of the nineteenth century. The black shows places which are (and for many centuries have been) occupied by the aborigines.

<sup>3</sup> See chap. vi, p. 357, where social reasons for this shifting of the population from the ancient center are shown.

last—in Russia in recent times—by the mineral wealth.

During this slow and continuous process of hard manual labor, social life in Russia assumed a shape which is not dissimilar to that in the United States. The colonists, tilling their own holdings with their own hands, formed a population that was to a high degree simple, agricultural, and democratic. To be sure, this large social foundation of rural democracy was to a great extent covered and disguised by the growth of the landed aristocracy in Russia and by the development of the commercial classes in the United States. But neither of these classes was powerful enough to eclipse the democratic spirit and the agricultural character of both nations. Moreover, in Russia the upper layer of the landed aristocracy was finally destroyed, as we shall see later (chap. v). Of course, a certain sense of class dignity, a kind of fastidiousness, such as causes the continental nobility of Europe to keep clear of every contact with the lower strata of society, is not wholly absent in the upper layers of Russian society. But in Russia as well as in your country this feeling is a comparatively recent foreign importation. There, as well as here, it serves as a kind of substitute for historical and legal distinctions between different social stations. Lacking such distinctions, the boundary lines between the different classes are very indefinite, and the intercourse between the lower and the upper classes is actually free. As a matter of fact, both are perpetually interchanging their elements. That is why social conventionalities and the outward marks of refined

culture are so eagerly preserved from final destruction in one country, and so eagerly built anew in the other. Here as well as there, this is the only means of defense against what is called by sociologists "*social capillarity*."

Thus—we say it again—the social structure, both in Russia and in the United States, is very democratic.

But here the comparison ends. The settlers who went from England to the American shore, or from New England to the American West, were entirely different from those who drifted from the old Muscovite center to the southern "black soil" prairies of Russia; and different also were the things they achieved. Ours were not the free men of Massachusetts, bringing with them into their new settlements their old habits of religious freedom and moral self-assertion, planting on new soil their ancient autonomic organization of townships, and so preparing themselves for the requirements of democratic rule. Such among the Russian settlers as wanted freedom and activity dashed through uninhabited land and prairies to the remotest borders of the country, where the state officials were quite unable to follow them. On the southern confines of the Muscovite Tsardom they lived the lives of outlaws. They worked out a military organization of their own—something between a pirate crew and a horde of nomads, banded together for economic purposes. The bulk of them lived by fishing and hunting. And they sent forth their restless youths to raid still farther southward, eastward, or westward, along the shores of the Caspian or the Black Sea, into territories inhabited by the "infidels,"

the "Bussurmans" (Mussulmans), whom they thought it no sin to rob and plunder.

The colonists of a more peaceful disposition did not go so far. They remained in the interior of the country, as close as possible to the strips of land that had been settled last, and the government followed at their heels. The state officials pressed them into compulsory organizations, instead of allowing them to found townships and to initiate a self-government at their will. Men sent out by the central authorities directed every step of the colonization. They determined the points at which the colonists were to meet to do frontier service and defend the settlement; they ordered these points to be inclosed by town walls—and thus about one-half the Russian cities were built; at the same time they distributed the parcels of land among the settlers in the districts. After this the tilling of land became obligatory for the new settlers, in order that the central government should not be obliged to send grain for their maintenance from the earlier settlements. Thus the inhabitants were compelled to leave the easier pursuits of hunting and fishing for that of agriculture, or to combine them. Of course they reluctantly complied with the orders of the Tsar; but so far as possible they shirked their agricultural work. They tilled their fertile soil superficially and carelessly, and were fully satisfied with their scanty returns.

Thus, the consequences of a like process of settlement in Russia proved to be widely different from those in the United States. Of course, the conditions of environment may partly account for the difference.

There was one particular condition at work in Russia which fettered the free play of private action and individual enterprise. This was the danger from without, which made the building of a powerful central state organization absolutely necessary. The raids of Tartars from the shores of the Black Sea, with Turkey at their back, were infinitely more dangerous for Russia than the "Indian wars" have been here. The nomad organization of the Tartar invaders admitted of incomparably more concentration of power than the tribal states of the Indians could possibly muster. Hence, the Tartar incursions were much better organized and conducted; and a more centralized military defense had to be brought into action in order to hold them in check. That is why the defenders had to be put under the stricter rule of a central government. Had American settlers been compelled to colonize Russian prairies under these conditions, they too would probably, to a certain degree, have been checked in their unlimited individual development.

But Russian settlers were not Americans. And this is the second reason for the difference in the results of their settlement. The Americans came to their new lands with a ready stock of energy, accumulated at a previous period of their history. This condition was entirely lacking in Russia. Therefore it is that quite an opposite use was made by the Russian and by the American settlers of supplies of nature equally abundant. The Russian colonists, we saw, were glad to get what nature gave them, with little labor and with still less capital. Man's work, far from adding anything new to the ready store of

nature's resources, resulted in squandering these resources, and thus impoverished the country, instead of enriching it. The woods were cut away, and thereby the soil exposed to droughts and to the free action of the winds, and this, too, in the most fertile part of Russia. Large quantities of arable land were carelessly left to be swept away by the spring torrents, and so were turned into sandy ravines. At the same time the demand for land largely increased, because of the growth of the population, and whole tracts of land could no longer be left to lie fallow for years, or even for one year, as had necessarily been done under the former systems of tillage without manure. And yet no better system was ready at hand to supplant them. The wealth of nature having been spent, Russia has stopped at a point which cannot be passed unless more artificial ways and means of cultivation are resorted to, and unless greater personal energy and initiative are applied. And in these qualities we are deficient.

We can now sum up the difference between the results of the Russian and of the American settlement. In America the exploitation of the untouched stores of the natural resources resulted in a greater exercise of the settlers' individual activity. In Russia the same abundance of supplies served only as a temporary substitute for energy and individual effort. Thus the riches of nature served there only to perpetuate the inactive and socially undeveloped type of man during a long period of four centuries. Therefore, the type of the settlers, and not the outward conditions of the



settlement, appears to be mainly responsible for the difference in the results of colonization in Russia and in America. And this brings us to a more detailed consideration of the question as to what the Russian national type really was.

Everybody knows what was the social type of the men who came from east of the Alleghanies to the West. They had at their back centuries of social struggle and co-operation. Their mental habits had long been formed; their moral character had been hammered into a definite shape by their past; their traditions, political and religious, had had time to crystallize. Thus they were enabled to set out along new paths of development which were to be unique in the world.

What now was the social type of the people who came from north of the Oka River? The question needs consideration, because there is no answer to which everybody would agree. To state at once my own conclusion on this subject, I should point to a certain amorphousness, a certain plasticity in Russian manners and character, as a chief feature in the Russian national type. This I consider to be its only inheritance from the past, negative though it be. I am quite sure that nearly everything, either good or bad, that has ever been told about the Russian national character by both foreign and native observers can be referred to this feature.

Let us take as an illustration the description of Russian character by one of the most recent and most exhaustive of English observers, who fairly represents the whole class. I mean Mr. Lanin (pseudonym), the

author of the book on *Russian Characteristics*. As is the rule with the sketches drawn by strangers, the picture Mr. Lanin gives of us is indeed not a flattering one. Still, except for the fact that Mr. Lanin's authorities are not always either trustworthy or well chosen, and that the instances he quotes are sometimes exceptional rather than characteristic,<sup>4</sup> the general impression he gives is, we must admit, not far from true. The average Russian, Mr. Lanin argues, is likely to be very unsteady in his purposes, consequently unreliable in keeping his word, apt to cherish rather lax views of the right of property, and very lenient in matters of sexual morality. He does not appreciate the value of time. He is much given to lying and cheating, and this not only for his own profit, but sometimes simply for the sake of politeness. Of course, polite manners are everywhere based on "conventional lies." But in Russia lying is not only conventional; it is sometimes a matter of sincerity and conviction. They lie there, Mr. Lanin observes, in a genuine way, in a peculiarly "childlike and easy manner," unconscious of doing ill and, accordingly, free from any hypocrisy. Indeed, Mr. Lanin observes (p. 173) that, in general, "curious combinations of religion and rascality, friendship and treachery, without the usual cement of hypocrisy," form one of the

<sup>4</sup>Mr. Lanin compiles very much of his evidence from newspapers, relating the occurrences of everyday life with more or less imaginative amplifications. Now, I think Mr. Bryce was perfectly right when he observed about the American press—and such also was my own impression in the Balkan states—that the newspapers tend always to exaggerate a nation's weaknesses in order to make fun of them.

most "conspicuous features of the Russian character."

The observation is a fine one and has a meaning which it is necessary, for our present purpose, to make clear. The cement of hypocrisy is not in the Russian mind, for the same reason that it is absent from the mind of a child. Hypocrisy becomes necessary only when a certain standard of social conduct becomes obligatory, or when it is enforced upon individual members of society by a fear of responsibility for transgressions. Then only is it that vice is to take the shape of virtue and to pay her a tribute which is called hypocrisy. Now this tribute is not paid in Russia; hypocrisy is not much practiced.

We shall soon see what inference may be drawn from this observation. Let us now complete Mr. Lanin's description by speaking of some positive traits of Russian character, observed by the same author. The link between the positive and the negative character he finds to be very close. "The Russian is so hearty," he says, "so good humored, so intensely human, that dishonesty seems in his hands only distorted virtue." I cannot abstain from quoting here a charming little story which Mr. Lanin tells us in support of his assertion.

At Saratoff on the Volga the steamer "Alexander II." was about to start. It was crowded with passengers. All the first- and second-class tickets were sold, and in the third class there was no room for an apple to fall; the passengers, so to say, sat upon each other. After the first whistle, the assistant captain, hurrying through the crowds of third-class passengers, was suddenly stopped by a peasant, who had just lodged a complaint that his money was stolen.

"Your honor, the money has been found," he said.

"Found where?"

"Sewed up in that soldier's mantle. I went over there to search for it, and sure there were forty-one roubles and a twenty-kopeck piece," said the peasant, brandishing a chamois leather purse as if it were a war trophy.

"Where is that soldier?"

"There he is, asleep."

"Well, he must be handed over to the police."

"Handed over to the police? Why to the police? Christ be with him! Don't touch him; let him sleep on," he repeated, naively, good-naturedly adding: "Sure, the money is found; it's all there. What more do we want?"

And so the matter ended.

Thus an intimate connection between what are considered to be Russian vices and Russian virtues is duly testified to by a foreign observer, subject to no suspicion of partiality. This close connection leads us to suppose that Russian virtues and Russian vices may be traced to a common origin. But before we proceed to trace this origin any further, we have yet to consider whether the Russian view of national character agrees with that of foreign observers. Of course, we must expect to find Russian writers exalting Russian virtues and omitting to mention or even to take notice of Russian faults. We may take as an extreme example of such Russian authors as are given most to exaggerated ideas concerning national virtues the renowned novelist Dostoyevsky. Russian virtues are, according to Dostoyevsky, simply Christian virtues. The Russian is full of love, humility, meekness toward his neighbors; he is given to renunciation and self-sacrifice. In short, the Russian is "all-human," a phrase by which Dostoyevsky wishes to make us

understand that the Russian mind is universally sympathetic and universally receptive; and that this "universal receptiveness" is the very essence of the Russian national character. To quote his own words:

You will agree with us that in the Russian character there is one trait widely different from anything in the European, namely, that it is in a high degree endowed with a capacity for synthesis—with the talent for a universal reconciliation, with an *all-humanness*.<sup>5</sup> There is nothing in it like the European angularity—no impermeability, no stiffness. It easily accommodates itself to everybody and adapts itself to every kind of life. It sympathizes with everything that is human, without any distinction of nationality, blood, or soil. It finds out and immediately admits to be reasonable whatever may contain but a grain of all-human interest. It is possessed by a sort of instinct of *all-humanness*. This national character by instinct discovers features of humanity even in the most exclusive peculiarities of other nations. It at once conciliates and harmonizes them by dint of its own generalization, finds a place for them in its own scheme of reasoning, and thus often discovers a point of convergence and of reconciliation between the entirely opposed and conflicting ideas of any two different European nations, while these nations of themselves would find no methods of reconciling their ideas and thus, may be, would never be able to harmonize them. At the same time you may observe in a Russian an unlimited capability for the soundest self-criticism, soberest judgment of himself, a complete absence of self-assertion, which is sometimes prejudicial to the liberty of action.

These last words of Dostoyevsky are particularly interesting to us. For he admits that the absence of any positive motive for action—an absence originating in the lack of any definite individuality—may go so far in the Russian character as to preclude the possibility of any action altogether. The observation is very

<sup>5</sup>Dostoyevsky's term is here translated literally, for even in the Russian it is an artificial one.

sound, indeed, and its accuracy is above all suspicion. The type is well known in Russian fiction. But with this observation by Dostoyevsky we unexpectedly come back to the same conclusion that was postulated by us beforehand. We have now to accept as the chief feature of the Russian character a complete absence of anything limiting, anything "stiff" and "angular" in the Russian mind. But is not the "all-humanness" of Dostoyevsky—while it is endowed with such traits—just the same thing as the "amorphousness" and "plasticity" of our own definition given by us at the very beginning of this reasoning? It is so, indeed. The plasticity and indefiniteness of the Russian type, and, as a necessary consequence, its wonderful adaptability to new conditions and surroundings; such are the qualities that make the Russian mind so "universally receptive," and accordingly "all-human." It does not impress itself on things, but is impressed by their "angularity" and "stiffness;" and thus it is rather passive than active, rather receptive than creative.

Thus the bad and the good traits of the Russian type really take their rise in this one fundamental quality—its flexibility, its accessibility to every new impression. A backbone is missing both in Russian virtues and Russian vices. We have already quoted Mr. Lanin's observation that in the Russian character the "cement of hypocrisy" is lacking; by which we meant that in Russia hypocrisy has no medium of social conventionalities to nestle in. Now we may proceed to a further generalization. It is not only the social conventionalities that are undeveloped, but the "social mind" in general. The psychological web

of social forms, symbols, principles, and habits—in short, of everything shaped by social intercourse—is very thin and flimsy. A body of social tradition generally determines social conduct and works out formulas which act as stimulus or coercion. Russia has not enough of this tradition. Hence we must infer that our history has not given us sufficient social education. Indeed, we may find proofs of this on any page of Russian history.

An example will show what I mean. Foreign travelers in ancient Russia were much struck by the conduct of the Russian people during a conflagration. No mutual aid was given, and no common plan of action was organized. Instead of fighting the fire, the people sat before their houses, holding the images of saints, and patiently waiting till the turn would come for their dwelling to burn. The only active conduct displayed was that of some neighbors lurking about, waiting for the opportunity to rob any inadvertent persons who might attempt to put out the fire instead of looking after their private property. This is only a telling instance of the general state of social isolation we have pointed out.

To take some of the permanent results of this social isolation, let us mention that in Russia the very first means of any social intercourse, the language, has been constantly changing and wavering. It remained unsettled until as late as the beginning of the nineteenth century. We mean here not so much the spoken language of the common people as the language of intellectual intercourse, the written language of literature. Intellectual intercourse was so extremely scanty that

no continuous reaction of the literature on life was possible, and no reciprocal influence among authors and their readers could possibly exist. Each author stood comparatively alone, working for himself, and, left entirely to his individual resources, was not likely to alleviate by his work the labor of the following generations. Therefore no settled language in literature and no civilizing tradition were possible. The Russian writers of the eighteenth century are read and understood in Russia with the same difficulty that an Englishman would experience in reading his Chaucer, or a Frenchman his Montaigne. Thus a continuous thread of civilizing literary tradition in Russia cannot be traced farther back than about one, or one and a half, centuries. This may help you to understand the deficiencies in our social memory, and so to explain the lack of proper tradition in the Russian social mind.

And so, whatever branch of social life we touch, we shall find everywhere the same fundamental feature in the Russian historical process: the lack of continuity and the insufficient development of any binding social tradition. More than once in our subsequent exposition we shall have occasion to point out that in the economic intercourse the idea of property, in the legal the idea of law, in the moral the idea of an ethical sanction, have been but lately developed in the common consciousness, and until the present have remained incomplete.

To avoid a possible misunderstanding, a reservation must here be made. When I characterized the Russian national type, I necessarily had recourse to terms ("amorphousness," "plasticity," etc.) whose



meaning is not narrow enough to be applicable to this type alone. "Good-natured and morally lenient"—so I might have summed up a part of my observations on the Russian psychological type; but you will remember that these were the very words used by Mr. Bryce to define the American type. You may have observed now and then, while I have been speaking, that this or that feature referred to, in order to specify the difference between Europe and Russia, might also have been used to point out a similar difference between England and America. Of course, this does not make the comparison untrue; but it makes you remember that such comparisons are necessarily relative.

Anybody coming to Russia from western Europe could not fail to notice such deficiencies in the Russian character as I have referred to. But when I happened, some years ago, to come back to Russia after two years' stay in Bulgaria, my country appeared to me to be a land of higher culture, and all Mr. Lanin says about us I was tempted to apply to the newly born society of the Balkan peninsula—I mean all his negative characteristics. I should think a citizen of some middle state of America would waver like that in his appreciation of his own surroundings, according to whether he came home from New England or from California.

From what has been said hitherto one might possibly infer that the development of Russia from its primitive state has been very slow. The contrary assertion would be nearer the truth. Far from being stagnant, Russian development has proceeded very rapidly, and thus Russia, having started far behind the other countries, is now overtaking the lands of more

ancient culture. First, the material growth of Russia has been enormous; in fact, this growth is second only to that of the United States. While at the time of Peter the Great (1724) the whole population of Russia was only thirteen millions, there are now five times as many in the same area (sixty-five millions); and the inhabitants are ten times as numerous (one hundred and thirty millions), if we consider the whole country, together with the territories colonized and conquered since then. Two centuries ago the Russian people formed about one-ninth of the whole population of Europe; today they make up one-third of the Europeans, that is, they are proportionally three times as numerous as formerly. The average density of the population (in European Russia) has grown during the same period from the very insignificant cipher of 9.6 per square mile to 50.5. The state budget has risen from some twelve millions of dollars to more than one thousand millions; *i. e.*, nearly a hundred times as much. The population of the cities since 1724 has increased from 328,000 to 16,289,000; *i. e.*, to nearly fifty times as many. This may give you an idea of the growth of the economic life in Russia during these last two centuries.

The social, the intellectual, and the moral growth of Russia is far from being so obvious; nevertheless it has been actually going on very rapidly. There are at hand no statistics with which to make a comparison; and it would not be right to judge the rate of the progress by the modest results attained. To do Russia justice, and simply be able to understand her history, we must not forget what was the starting-point of her

development. Russia had no chance of building the edifice of her culture on such an elevation as was given to the United States by its English tradition. She had to begin to build on the low level of barbarism, and thus was obliged first to work through centuries of an almost unconscious process of growth, before the mere possibility of a civilized existence had dawned for her. Hence it was impossible for Russia to preserve the unity of her political and social tradition through the course of her historical growth. The starting-point was too different from the aims she is striving after now. To give you a definite view of this development, rapid and still incomplete as it is, I shall draw for you three pictures, representing the state of civilizing ideas at the end of each of the last three centuries. By comparing these we shall be more easily able to appreciate the measure of the change in Russia.

Let us look first at Moscow, as early as the year 1689, *i. e.*, just before the reign of Peter the Great. At that time Moscow was the ancient and only capital; nay, in the boundless woods, marshes, and prairies of Russia, it was the only Russian city at all worthy of the name. And yet it was nothing more than an enormous court-yard around the manor-house of the Tsar. The city was inhabited by the officials of the Tsar's palace and by the officers of the Tsar's army. There was no room for any abstract ideas or feelings, in the midst of this world of illiterate churls, where only every tenth man could say his Lord's Prayer, not to mention the Apostles' Creed and the Ten Commandments. An A-B-C book or a primer for reading was

to be found there at the rate of one copy per 2,400 inhabitants; the gospel was never read and, when recited at the mass, was heard without being understood; there was no elementary and no regular secondary school, even for the clergymen, and of course no higher school at all. Ideas, if any were to be found there, were of a foreign importation—a very rare and most severely prohibited merchandise, kept for the private use of a few persons of higher station, striving after self-culture; for the most part these ideas were preserved in foreign books and carefully put up in the book-cases of a dozen foreign merchants and higher officers. Some sparks there were of a deeper and truer piety, kindled in the depths of the Volga forests; they glimmered dimly through the thick covering of childish faith and half-pagan ceremonial. Many and many a year was still needed before these sparks could be fanned into a continuous and steady flame.

Meantime another fire was kindled. In one of the market-places of the capital of the Tsars, on the fourth of February, 1689, a German mystic, Quirinus Kuhlmann (a friend of Jane Leade, the founder of the Philadelphian Society), was burned at the stake. His crime was that he had come to Moscow in order to deliver a most important prophecy. The end of the world was coming, he said; the Roman faith was to be extinguished, the old apostolic creed was to triumph in the whole world, and Christ alone was to rule, instead of the motley crowd of princes and kings. All men would be equal thenceforward; private property would be turned to common use, and nothing any longer would be called one's own. Righteousness was

to be enthroned, sin and lawlessness were to vanish. The poor dreamer had hoped to make the Russian Tsar his pupil and a forerunner of the coming kingdom of God upon earth. But, of course, he found no ear among the Russian authorities and no people to listen to his turbid gospel of religious and social freedom; he was instead carried to torture, finishing his life at the stake. This happened, it is true, just at the time of the Salem witchcraft (1692); but it was also the epoch when the foundations of religious freedom and tolerance were laid in Great Britain and New England.

A century has passed. We are again in the Russian capital, in the year 1789—the era of the French Revolution. This time, however, the capital is a new one. It bears a foreign name: it is a Peter's burgh. It was built all at once at the imperious beck of a revolutionary ruler; and it has still remained foreign to the country, in spite of a noisy existence of half a century. As late as the epoch of Catherine II. it still remained, as Diderot found it, "a city of palaces," for it contained very few burgher dwelling-houses. Nevertheless not only in Petersburg, but throughout Russia, we are now far removed from that auto-da-fé which took place in Moscow only a century before (1689). It was in the name of religion that the "magic incantations" of the unhappy prophet of the millennium were condemned in Moscow. Now, a century later, nobody in Petersburg cared about the official religion. Magicians were no longer burned for the sake of religion. In the time of Catherine they were rather received with open arms by the

higher society, if only, instead of preaching communism, they were willing to teach the people how to change baser metals into gold. But while Petersburg society had entirely lost its religion and had not fixed upon a new ideal to strive for, the unofficial—the spiritual—religion was making rapid progress among the lower classes. In the civilized upper crust the “pre-revolutionary” ideas of religious and political freedom were spreading at great speed. But this upper crust was, as yet, very thin indeed, and its members were quite powerless to apply new ideals to real life. That is why the empress, jealous as she was of her power, condescended to connive at the spread of these new ideas: they did no harm, and they were so attractive, so human! Thus, Catherine II. professed that she was not afraid of her people’s getting enlightenment; nay, she even contrived to spread a net of secondary schools all over the country.

But, just as the French Revolution broke out, everything was suddenly changed. Catherine searched for victims of her anger and suspicion among the adherents of the new ideas; she tried to break up the thin crust of the newly formed public opinion. One of the best representatives of this public opinion was Radeeshchev. He had been sent by the empress herself to Germany, where he had learned the lesson of European civilization more deeply than any Russian before him. Then he came back to tell Russia, just on the eve of the Revolution, what he had learned. He was cut short at his first utterance of the great word of freedom. His book, *A Journey from Petersburg to Moscow*, which has since become renowned,

was condemned by the empress herself to be burned as revolutionary and dangerous. The author was first sentenced to death, and the sentence was changed to exile in Siberia. This was the first triumph of Russian public opinion, for this treatment recognized it as a force capable of influencing actual life. Still, its further fate was quite uncertain. Would it recover from the heavy blow it had received? Would it get new adherents and wider influence? Or might it not die in the moment of its birth? These questions remained unanswered.

Meanwhile the dawn of political freedom was shining brightly all over Europe, and your own venerable monument of political art was just raised in Philadelphia. Russia had been following the march of the world's civilization with rapid strides, but the road stretched far ahead.

Let us return, however, to Petersburg as it was a century later. Words had meanwhile become deeds. The best dreams of poor Radeeshchev had been carried into execution. Russia had got rid of her slavery at the very time (1861) when the great war against slavery began in the United States. The hearts of the best men throbbed with joy at what had been achieved, and with hope for what remained to be done. People expected that the building of social equality would soon be crowned by political freedom and individual liberty, freedom of belief, liberty of the press and of opinion, the rights of man and of citizen, a reign of law and justice, independent courts, real self-government. Public opinion seemed to glory in its final victory, to have taken its proper place in

political life. Vain hope. A few years passed, and the golden dream was once more completely dispelled. A struggle began, the most merciless and violent that Russia has ever seen, between authority and opinion. And how did the struggle end? In suspicious and narrow treatment of every living force of the nation on the side of the government; in bitter disappointment and rigid opposition on the side of public opinion. Presently every scheme of further reform was gradually eliminated from the field of action, and their promoters were exterminated. This extermination of the intermediate shades of public opinion resulted in a terrible shock between the old and the new, between a dying tradition and a buoyant ideal of the future. They met face to face, the old and the new, and the shock was indeed terrible, because there was nothing left between to soften the blow; no engine at hand peacefully to convert the latent heat into useful action, the potential energy into actual work.

Thus, as we have seen, a mad millennial dream of foreign invention, the enthusiastic anticipation of a student of European civilization, and a real political struggle for a definite and practical platform—such are the three steps which Russia has achieved during the last three centuries of her history, on her way from barbarism to civilization. We must concede that a nation that was achieving this had not been standing still. On the contrary, the movement went on so rapidly that Russia of necessity soon got out of touch with her old tradition, and a question has arisen as to the desirability of this departure. While drifting from her ancient moorings, the defenders of the old order asked: Was



not Russia running the risk of losing her very nationality in her mad race for improvement? Would it not have been more prudent to remain "at home" than to start on this long and dangerous journey of imitation through Europe? The objection was, surely, senseless; the Russian nation is itself "European," and the process of its remolding originated, as much as elsewhere in Europe, in internal evolutionary causes and not in the fanciful pleasure of "borrowing" new fashions, or in a mere craving for change for change's sake. Change was necessary, and there is nothing to our discredit in having it. "To live is to change," as Cardinal Newman says, "and to be perfect is to have changed often."

Still, objections are not to be silenced by this kind of reasoning. Russia was certainly to be civilized, the defenders of the old tradition argued; but she did not need to be civilized after the European pattern, as there were enough civilizing elements in her own tradition. True or false, this argument has become the crutch of every reactionary measure in Russia. Thus, our next task will be to examine more closely what elements of a peculiar civilization are inherent in the nationalistic feelings and theories and in the Russian historical tradition.

## CHAPTER II

### THE NATIONALISTIC IDEA

It is with intention that I entitle this chapter, not the "national," but the "nationalistic" idea. By this term I mean to designate a particular kind of national theory—that which declares certain national peculiarities to be unalterable and exalts them as a foundation of national life for all future time. Civilization makes nations, as it makes individuals, look alike; while, on the other hand, the more backward a nation is in culture, the more likely it is to be peculiar, and the more scope is left to such politicians as assert the preservation of those peculiar features to be its only means of political salvation. This is especially the case in a country like Russia, where a new culture has overlapped the old, the two continuing to exist in a perpetual contradiction of each other. Owing to this situation in Russia, nationalistic aspirations and theories have been built up in great number in order to defend the old from the new, and they have played such a large part in political life that the "nationalistic idea" deserves a separate chapter.

Of course, the nationalistic idea in itself lacks any scientific foundation. The peculiarities of a national life cannot be considered "unalterable," for the reason that in the eye of modern science nothing is unalterable. What made the old theories hold the nation to be unalterable was the fact that they confused the idea

of the nation with that of the race, which seemed to be unalterable indeed. Race and nation, in fact, still form, in the nationalistic view, one notion. But, in the first place, in the view of modern anthropology, not even the race is regarded as unchangeable; and, in the second place, the race, the anthropological type, has nothing in common with the nation. A nation may include many racial types, and one racial type may be scattered through many national groups. Of course, a national type implies a certain physical uniformity; and this uniformity may be brought about by mere natural forces, such as, *e. g.*, a common descent or the long action of uniform natural surroundings. But natural forces of this kind are not essential in producing a uniform national type; the best proof of it is that the same forces may act as well in a quite opposite direction, by differentiating the national type, instead of making it uniform and homogeneous. In its very substance, national uniformity is sometimes produced, not because, but in spite of, natural causes; it is thus not a product either of unity of race, or of unity of geographical surroundings; but it is of a psychological and sociological origin. National uniformity is the result of a long course of unconscious and half-conscious imitation among the members of a given social aggregate. This kind of social imitation is propagated in space by conquest or by peaceful intercourse; it is perpetuated in time by birth and tradition, *i. e.*, by the natural growth and the conscious education of new generations. Accordingly, a national type, as a sociological product, is not a group of characteristics that would stick inalienably

to a man or a social group. The traits may be artificially dissociated. They may be taught and untaught by custom and tradition, as in the United States with the immigrant population.<sup>1</sup> The national type may even be learned or unlearned by purpose and politics, as is often the case with mixed populations and with small ethnic groups, living on the boundaries of many large European states.

As a rule, however, the uniformity of a national type is not the result of a systematic policy or of a conscious volition. It is rather constituted and acquired in dim periods of national life, when social consciousness is just beginning to dawn. This is generally the period when national territory is framed into a political unit, under the leadership of a central military power. In Russia this process of national unification was going on at the end of the fifteenth century. The leading part fell to the share of the Duke of Moscow. John III. was the powerful ruler who laid heavy hands on his prey and brought to an end the existence of many smaller dukedoms or more weakly organized territories, surrounding his central seat of power.<sup>2</sup>














But this period, when the national type is beginning to form itself within a military state, is far from being the time of the full blossoming of national feeling

<sup>1</sup> A study of the process of assimilation of foreign elements by the old American stock will give one day a clearer insight into the laws of the formation of nationalities. European science has a right to expect this contribution to sociology from American students of this branch of knowledge already so much enriched by American scholars.

<sup>2</sup> See map of the "Making of the Russian State."

**THE MAKING  
of the  
RUSSIAN STATE**



- |   |  |   |  |   |   |
|---|--|---|--|---|---|
|  | The Muscovite Dukedom before John III (1462).              |  | The acquisitions of Peter the Great (1689-1725). |  | The acquisitions of Paul (1796-1801).         |
|  | The acquisitions of John III and Basilius III (1462-1533). |  | The acquisitions of Anna Ivanovna (1730-1740).   |  | The acquisitions of Alexander I (1801-1825).  |
|  | The acquisitions of John IV and Theodore (1533-1598).      |  | The acquisitions of Elizabeth (1741-1761).       |  | The acquisitions of Nicholas I (1825-1855).   |
|  | The acquisitions of Michael (1613-1645).                   |  | The acquisitions of Catherine II (1762-1796).    |  | The acquisitions of Alexander II (1855-1881). |
|  | The acquisitions of Alexis (1645-1676).                    |   |  |   |   |



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and nationalistic theories in the unified nation. The national feeling as yet lacks full consciousness. The nationalistic theory is late in catching up with the historical events of national unification. Both feeling and theory come later, as a consequence and a vindication of the accomplished facts.

National consciousness generally begins at the time when the politically unified nation as a whole is brought into closer relations with some neighboring national units. Then a comparison between the two nations is frequently drawn. The results of such a comparison are twofold. First a sort of self-sufficiency and self-conceit is felt. National arrogance thus appears to be the first utterance of the nationalistic idea. This feeling is particularly emphasized if a struggle for national existence is carried on, no matter whether the issue of this struggle is disastrous or successful. But then—perhaps simultaneously—the second result of the comparison appears: self-criticism and self-negation. The inferior nation looks up to the superior, supposing that there is between the two a difference in culture.

Between Russia and other European countries the contrast was not so great at the moment of their first meeting, some centuries ago, as it is perhaps now between Japan and the Europe of today. Therefore the contrast between nationalism and foreign culture could not be fought out in Russia in such a rapid and resolute way, and the victory over old traditions could not be so soon and completely won, as would be the case today. Instead of that there followed a long process of compromise and assimilation, which in Rus-

sia is even yet not completed. The consecutive stages of compromise may be traced by study of the subsequent history of the nationalistic idea. The changes Russian nationalism has undergone closely correspond to the positions it alternately assumed and surrendered in its struggle with higher civilization.

In the very soul of the nation there thus appears a clash between the awakened consciousness of national selfhood and the dawning consciousness of belonging to humanity in general. National self-consciousness clings to particular features of national existence, such as dress, dwelling, social habits, political institutions, and old forms of the popular creed. But in the long run these features cannot be preserved. By and by they disappear from actual life and take the shape of a dim remembrance of a past never to be recalled. And while historical peculiarities are vanishing, a notion grows up that nationalism does not consist in keeping to dead tradition, but in realizing the living "spirit" of the nation. Then a right to free action, to free play for inherent forces of the national spirit, is claimed in the name of the nation. But as soon as this view is assumed by nationalism its end is near. For living "spirit" is not to be bound by a dead tradition. It remains only to understand that the national "spirit" is not a metaphysical "substantia," or a simple element of chemistry, but an evolving and complex product of historical development. With this explanation nationalism is ferreted out of its last lurking-place, and it not only dies out, it turns to its opposite. It thus kills itself by the very process of its development.

Indeed, *pari passu* with the growing appreciation



of cosmopolitan elements of culture grows the perception that some of them necessarily exist already in the national spirit itself. The nationalistic idea thus becomes messianic; that is, it begins to claim for itself a place in the universal development of mankind. In this stage of development the nationalistic idea has already become cosmopolitan. Or else, in order to avoid this logical result, nationalism must recoil from its own conclusions and stick more steadfastly than ever to some institutions and habits peculiar to the past history of the nation; must become, in short, reactionary. But in that case its influence on actual life is paralyzed. Turn which way it will, it arrives at the same end—self-annihilation. Thus, we may distinguish three stages in the development of the nationalistic idea. Nationalism is first instinctive; then it turns out to be self-assertive and arrogant; and finally it becomes subject to criticism and a comparison with some higher culture. At that third stage the nationalistic idea is differentiated into two opposite types: the one, cosmopolitan and messianic; the other, particular and reactionary. Both bring the nationalistic idea to the same upshot—inner dissolution.

I have now only to substitute more Russian names and data in order to fill up this general outline—which may refer as well to any backward country—with its proper contents.

I shall not here dwell long on the first two stages of nationalism in Russian history. The nationalistic idea as an instinctive feeling was characteristic of Russian ancient history; and in the same state of instinctive feeling it remains until now in all but the

upper layers of Russian society. Thus, large stores of crude national feeling are kept untouched against the future. And this is the reason why Europe has always been afraid of a possible ascendancy of the "spirit of conquest" in Russia. But this instinctive feeling is perhaps much more dangerous to Russia itself, because it is always liable to deprive her of her self-control, as was the case in our last war with Turkey (1877-78). Or else it may be exploited for such shameful deeds as we recently witnessed in Kishineff.

There follows then the second stage, in the development of nationalism; I mean such first attempts at consciousness in national feelings and theory as were made during the age of national unification. But these attempts are very closely connected with what is considered to be Russian political and religious tradition; and therefore it will be better to make you acquainted with them in the two chapters next following, where Russian tradition is to be discussed. You will see there that it was the stage of a serene self-complacency and unperturbed self-reliance.

For our present purpose it will be more interesting to dwell on the following—the third stage, when this serenity of national feeling began to give place to a vivid apprehension of confusion and trouble. This came to pass when the contact with foreign culture became so continuous as to be considered dangerous. This condition was first realized in Moscow about the middle of the seventeenth century.

Of course, foreign people lived in Moscow long before that time; they came there as soon as the political unification began, at the end of the fifteenth

century. But these foreigners were few and remained as yet unnoticed by the great bulk of the native population. Hence they were permitted to live where and how they pleased. From the beginning of the seventeenth century, however, the strangers came in crowds to Moscow. They entered Russia as commissioned officers, wholesale merchants or trade agents, petty craftsmen, or skilled artisans in the Tsar's personal service. Their number doubled in Moscow within the first half of the seventeenth century, increasing from about five hundred to one thousand—a great many for the Moscow of that time; they bought houses in the city and estates in the province; they conversed freely with Russian people, wore Russian clothes, engaged Russian servants, and spoke the Russian language. Then the Muscovite clergy became alarmed. The patriarch requested the Tsar to enjoin the strangers from endangering further the Russian national habits and creed. This request was granted: the foreigners were ordered (1652-53) to sell their houses and estates, and thenceforward to inhabit a single quarter in the Moscow suburbs, since called the "German" quarter. But this was, as they soon found, "drowning fish in water." While residing among the Russians the foreigners always ran the risk of being insulted by urchins or plundered by ruffians; or else, in the long run, of wholly losing their nationality by becoming Russianized. Now, in the "German quarter" they lived at their ease and thus were able to preserve their national habits. The new quarter, entirely inhabited by foreigners, stood there close to the walls of the ancient city of the Tsar, a visible model for

imitation. Russian people were thus prevented from gradually intermingling with strangers, with the only result that at a later period they were subjected to the undisputed influence of European civilization. The Tsar Alexis in 1652 drove the strangers to a suburb outside his capital; Alexis's son, Peter the Great, came, forty years later, to the suburb made "German;" he lived there the European life to the full, and never came back to his father's home.

Thus, before the seventeenth century came to a close, the danger for the old nationalism was rapidly increasing. Russia had to choose between the old and the new, between the "Greeks," who gave Russia their church, and the "Germans," who were going to give Russia their culture. It was a compatriot, a Slav though not a Russian, the learned and far-seeing Croatian, Georges Kreeshanich, who first (about 1670) pondered the issues of the choice. No Russian of that time had been able to formulate so clearly and so precisely what were the chief points of the conflict of the two civilizations that met at Moscow; and he paid for his superior knowledge and his clairvoyance by exile to Siberia. It was from Siberia that he sent to the Tsar his book on *Politics*, in which he formulates for the first time a systematic view of what may be called a nationalistic policy. Says Kreeshanich:

The Germans wish to poison us with their novelties; but then, the Greeks inconsiderately condemn whatever is new; and they force upon us under the false name of antiquity their foolish inventions. The Germans sow heresies; but the Greeks also confound the true faith with schism [Kreeshanich was a Roman Catholic]. The Germans propose to teach us true science, but they mix it with the arts of the devil; on the other hand,

the Greeks count as heresy every bit of knowledge, and advise us to remain in complete ignorance. The Germans vainly hope to be saved by preaching the gospel; the Greeks leave off preaching and like better to forbear all discussion. The former permit every laxity in life, and thus lead us by the broad way of perdition; the latter point to a way still narrower than that of salvation, by summoning us to pharisaic superstition and bigotry. The Germans denounce as barbarous, tyrannical, and inhuman whatever is Turkish in political matters; the Greeks declare the same things to be admirable and praiseworthy. The Germans do not acknowledge the due rank of the Russian state; the Greeks exalt it in a way that is senseless, vain, fictitious, and impossible.<sup>3</sup>

This renowned patriot advised the Russians to choose the middle course between these two extremes, according to the "dictates of reason." Thus he hoped to escape the danger of the Russian nationality's destruction, whether by the Greeks or by the Germans, a destruction which, as he well knew, had come to some smaller southern and western Slavonic groups. But then there were three things that Kreeshanich was not aware of. First, there was at the time he wrote no national consciousness and, accordingly, no possibility of any reasonable choice. In the second place, there was no danger of the Russian nationality being destroyed, even if the borrowing of foreign culture should go on as inadvertently and blindly as possible. And last, though not least, he did not see that there was really no choice, that there was only one way to civilization, if civilization it was to be: that of the West, not of the East; that of the "Germans," not of the "Greeks." Thus only a quarter of a century after Kreeshanich wrote, Russia was to be

<sup>3</sup> See chap. iv, pp. 160-64.

made outwardly and manifestly European. Peter the Great had come.

Let us see now what became of the nationalistic feeling and theory after Russia had been Europeanized by Peter. Such nationalistic tradition as had formed in the two preceding centuries, the sixteenth and seventeenth, by its very essence could not surrender. Indeed, as we shall see later (chap. iii), it turned into a stubborn opposition to the new culture, and, when easily subdued in the higher classes, dragged out a stealthy existence in the lower strata, where it persists even to the present time.

But among the higher classes—the only ones that were as yet Europeanized—nationalism took an entirely new shape. It did not remain in the state of instinctive feeling, uncompromising and inflexible, such as made the masses and the genuine Muscovite opponents of the new culture prefer death to surrender. On the other hand, the higher society that acquiesced in Peter's reform was not as yet guided in its conduct by a conscious theory. It got rid of the instinctive feeling, but had not yet arrived at a theoretical foundation for any new view of things. That is why it accepted the new order of things without resistance, but also without sincere conviction in its favor. It simply adopted the new social customs and the new style of living because such was the order of the Tsar; but it did not really embrace the ideas of western civilization. With it the imitation of foreign culture was limited at first to its outward aspects.

Even at this stage, however—the stage of a more or less unconscious adaptation of the new culture—

the relation to it was different in individual members of the higher society. Now that the way of imitation had been decidedly taken, everybody followed it; but some people went on grumbling and stubbornly insisting that there was nothing at all to imitate. While enjoying the pleasures and advantages of the new culture, they contemplated a reaction, and looked backward to their fictitious national paradise of ancient Russia. Others, however, rejected with the same fervor whatever was Russian, and prided themselves on being the first to imitate. Thus two new social types appeared, not unknown at this stage of national development in every country; let us call them "xenomaniacs" and "xenophobists"—the friends and the enemies of the imported culture. Both were far from leaning upon any conscious theory, as we have already said; both were the immediate products of life, not of theoretical training. A wounded national vanity was their chief motive in both extremes of imitation and rejection of the foreign culture. Both types were also soon caricatured in literature and ridiculed by witticisms of Russian satirical writers, the literary imitators of Steele and Addison. And, indeed, those types were grotesque enough. Let us take, by way of illustration, a description of them drawn from life by a foreign traveler, soon after their first appearance and long before they had had time to be represented by Russian literature. I translate the following from a book by Peter Haven, a Hollander, who traveled in Russia during the years 1736-39.

This is a portrait of a Russian lady, profiting freely by the new fashions and manners of life. In the

second half of the century she will appear in Russian satire as a "coquette," an *élégante*, with her male counterparts, the "dandy," the *petit-maitre*. It is not a literary sketch, but an illustration from life of the young Princess Koorakin:

She has a whole court round her. She drives six-in-hand, with two post-boys and four footmen. She has two dozen chamber-maids and as many men-servants. She eats luxuriously and at no fixed time, sleeps until noon, and dresses like an opera-singer. Though she speaks nothing but Russian, she mixes up so many French and Italian words with Russian endings that it is far easier for a foreigner to understand her than for a native. In her talking she generally extols French fashions and liberty of social manners. She laughs at pious women, who lament the world's vanity, simply because they themselves have no chance of marrying. Her own love stories are apt to prove that in Moscow you may play no worse amorous dramas than in London or Paris.

Let us look next at a worthy old-fashioned couple, Prince and Princess Cherkasski:

The prince asked me whether I understood Russian. "Yes, a little," I said. The prince then retorted that he could not allow anybody to speak with him otherwise than in Russian while in his country, because when traveling he had always been obliged to speak the language of the country he was in. "I should like to know," he went on, "why the Russian language should not be put on the same level with French or German?" I answered that perhaps the reason was that the sciences were not yet flourishing in Russia; therefore the language was not much in use and little studied. Again, another reason might be that the Russian state only recently had begun to be held in esteem by foreigners; with the power of the state would also grow the appreciation of the language. The prince was appeased by this; but then the princess asked me whether I was a German. I said I was not. Then she took off her hat, made in the English fashion and wanted me to say whether I really thought that



things like that ought to be ordered from abroad. I said this fault was fully redeemed by the good quality of the hat and the impossibility of getting it otherwise. "Well, now," the princess rejoined, "my slave has made it for me here in Moscow; thus, you see, we don't want German goods, any more than we want the Germans themselves, to come here into Russia.

Such were the first types of newly cultured people that made their appearance in the higher society of Russia in consequence of Peter the Great's reforms. You have observed, perhaps, that of the two types thus sketched by Haven the more grotesque is that of the dashing lady, Princess Koorakin. In fact, the new imitators of European culture offered much more material for satire than its old-fashioned detractors. The reason was that the influence of European culture remained quite superficial. The real need for this culture was felt by the state only, which borrowed from abroad plans of military, naval, and administrative institutions. Beyond these mere technicalities, the only use made of foreign culture at first was for the amenities of life.

But very soon the new standard of life brought in from abroad began to serve another more practical end. As the higher classes alone imitated Europe, the new culture became a mark of social distinction. French dress, French wines, French meals, and, last but not least, the French language served to distinguish the Russian nobility from the bulk of the people. All that was not noble was "vile;" thus ancient Russian clothes and habits and creed became so many attributes of the "vile people," of peasants, merchants, and clergy. Thus the higher classes—the nobility and the gentry—for the first time in Russian

history were entirely and outwardly dissociated from the lower strata. Later on (see p. 339) we shall see that just then slavery had attained its full development in Russia. Thus European culture had become a property of the privileged landed aristocracy. Thenceforward there were to exist in Russia two cultures, two systems of tradition, almost two different languages. The "vile" multitude provided supplies for the "noble" few who lived in opulence and luxury. The common people had to live the life of toil and suffering in order that their "landlords" might live in a world of fiction. Thus the civilized type of the higher society became such as was known abroad until the epoch of the emancipation of the serfs. Broad ways of living, liberal hospitality, literary refinement, together with entire incapacity for actual work and the lack of any real interest in life—these were supposed sometimes to be the features of the Russian national type. But they were only features of the Russian "noble" during the period of slavery. This was the type of the Russian *bahrin* (landlord).

This necessary digression may help you to understand the further history of nationalism in Russia. Both types of xenomaniacs and xenophobists were thriving amidst the privileged nobles; but there was something unreal, something fictitious and conventional, about them. Whether they extolled either merry old Russia or the advantages of civilization—all that was mere idle talk. The real partisans of the old traditions, the "Old-believers," as well as the real admirers of Europe, were hardly to be sought in their midst. The former were to be found only in the lower

classes; the latter, nowhere but among the very few really educated people.

The real discussion of principles concerning nationalism or European culture went on only among these last, the cultivated few—in Petersburg, in the immediate neighborhood of the throne, and in close connection with the higher schools opened by the successors of Peter the Great.<sup>4</sup> A few Petersburg journalists began by ridiculing both the xenomaniacs and xenophobists. Sincere adherents of European culture though they were, they exposed to derision particularly the civilized type, the xenomaniacs, just for the reasons that we have seen, *i. e.*, that these were representatives of the privileged class, using new culture only as a mark of social distinction. Thus the democratic journalists of St. Petersburg went even so far as to sigh for the homely and patriarchal virtues of the good old time, that were vanishing forever with the new culture of the privileged few.

But the most prominent of these journalists, the renowned Novekov, very soon remarked that the empress Catherine II. was trying to turn these mournings to her own advantage, and then he desisted at once from lamenting the imaginary virtues of the Russian past. We know (see p. 26) that Catherine found new ideas dangerous to the existing order of things, and thus gradually ranged herself with the defenders of the ancient tradition. Looking about for some theoretical support of her reactionary aspirations, she thought of utilizing Russian satire for the derision of new ideas. She expressly wanted Novekov to exalt

<sup>4</sup> See chap. v, p. 274.

old national virtues and to ridicule their detractors. But far from having obtained what she wanted, she only made a few liberal publicists of Petersburg aware that they were running the risk of being used as a cat's-paw for her own political views. Then for the first time the boundary line was drawn between the defenders of the backward and of the forward movement in Russia. The government was with the former; the liberals were gathering around the banner of opposition. From that moment the nationalistic theory received a governmental and reactionary meaning, which it has preserved up to the present time.

Curiously enough, now that the practical necessity of a nationalistic theory was felt by the government, the elements required for it were found to be entirely lacking. The old traditions of Russia before Peter the Great had been entirely forgotten, and the historic study of them had not yet begun. On the other hand, the higher class had definitely adopted European culture and clung to it, because of its convenience. The predominant theory of European literature at that time was not in the least propitious to the building of a nationalistic theory. In the enlightened age of rationalism the idea of "nation" was drowned in the larger idea of "mankind." Men were thought to be equal by "natural right" all over the world. The subjugated nations were to be free, not for the sake of their separate and particular existence, but in order to fraternize with the whole of mankind in one cosmopolitan type of universal democracy. There was no room for exalting national peculiarities, especially in a land like Russia, which so entirely lacked tradition.

Thus, when Catherine II. was forming her nationalistic theory, she was obliged to start from an axiom as contradictory as possible to the very essence of nationalism. She had to accept as proved the proposition that "men are the same always and everywhere." The idea was not bad when Russia was to be defended against her foreign detractors. But the use Catherine made of it was quite wrong. She affirmed, in her criticism of a French writer on Russia, the abbé Chappe d'Auteroche, that Russia stood on the same level with Europe; that Russia was as good in everything—or as bad, as the case may be—as western Europe. In literary skirmishes with her own subjects she went a step farther in building a nationalistic theory: whatever was bad in Russia she declared to come of foreign origin, from Scythians and Sarmatians of old, and from the French at present. Whatever was good was to be considered as old Russian.

All this did not go beyond mere playing with abstract and historical ideas. At last a writer came who helped Catherine to a better insight into the real Russian peculiarities. This was Bolteen, the historian. He started from an assumption quite contrary to that which Catherine had made. Russians were to be thought, not as like and equal to Europeans, but as different and peculiar. The reason of this difference was to be sought in the outward conditions of historical growth, especially in the climate, where Montesquieu and Bodin had already found it. Undeveloped as this theory was, it was the first really important step toward the construction of a nationalistic theory for Russia. But there was still wanting an important ele-

ment to make this theory really nationalistic. Such peculiarities as Bolteen found in Russian history were only relative, not absolute. There was nothing in either to prove the *superiority* of the Russian nation over the other nations. On the contrary, the Russian nation would have to be put on the same level with others, if history was to be explained by the general laws of nature.

Thus, the eighteenth century in Russia saw a great development of national feeling, and of curious national types; but it did not witness the building of a nationalistic theory; the times were not ripe for that.

Nationalistic theory was essentially the work of the nineteenth century. With it appeared the romantic idea of nationality.

The French Revolution had just proved a failure. The Napoleonic wars and conquests had spread over all Europe a rapidly growing discontent with French fashions and with French ways of living and thinking. This discontent prepared public opinion in France and other countries of Europe for a sudden return from French rationalism to the old national tradition. A new intellectual movement set in, known as romanticism. It entirely changed the views of theorists and politicians concerning the question of nationality. According to the previous, the rationalistic, idea a nation was looked at as a sum of individual units, entirely equal one to another and bound together by a formal or tacit act of "social compact." This idea was now condemned and rejected as too abstract, too formal, and too mechanical. The concrete and living nationality was reinstalled in its rights by romanticism; and it was

looked at as an organic whole, as a unit acting on a kind of collective impulse. Rationalism had once opposed reason to Providence; the will of individual man to the will of God in the making of history. It had hoped to reconstruct the whole fabric of society with the help of law made by reason. On the other hand, the first principle of romanticism in politics was that human law is powerless against the law of nature, and thus no intentional reconstruction of the social order is ever possible. The law of social phenomena cannot be changed by individual will or reason. Thus far romanticism agreed that there was a law in history; and it was obliged to admit that this law was independent even of God's momentary will. This idea born of romantic thought made a very important contribution to sociology. According to this fundamental conception, history was not to be understood in a rationalistic way as a series of accidents, resulting from the personal will and exertion of man; but neither was it to be explained in a supernatural way as a series of miracles, produced by God's intermittent attempts to force his own will upon the natural drift of events. Between a world of chance and a world of miracles, romanticism interposed an intermediate notion, that of a world of natural law, preformed by God and realized by man's unconscious volition. The romanticists were the first to make this sort of unconscious volition a subject of study and trace it to its sociological origin. The rôle of individual actor was thus to be explained by an inherent law of society.

A nation is, according to the romantic idea, society acting unconsciously as a living aggregate of like-

mind and like-intentioned beings. Such a nation, being subject to God's will and superior to individual volition, is a tool in God's hands to lead humanity toward its final destination. The universal history of mankind is made up of a succession of many predestined nations, each playing its part on the way of mankind to that supreme end known to none but God. Every nation has its own particular "idea" which it is predestined to realize on this royal road of history; and this peculiar "idea" forms the very essence of the nation—its inmost "spirit" and its inborn soul, preformed since the beginning of time in the Eternal Council. This "spirit" is the very core of the nation, the source of its living force, of its will, of its "freedom." Of course, it is to be thought unchanging and unchangeable; on its durability the very existence of a nation depends.

Such was the theory created by a group of thinkers, politicians, and philosophers in France and Germany on the verge of two centuries. The political meaning of the theory was, however, different in the two countries. In France the theory took on a reactionary meaning, owing to the violent opposition to the French Revolution. There were two nobles, both men of political action, who formulated in that country the romantic theory in question, De Maistre and De Bonald. In Germany the popular opposition was directed rather against French rule and French fashions than against the revolutionary ideas of France. The revival of national feeling here went hand in hand with the movement for political freedom. Thus it was understood in Germany that God's plan in



history was that of the "education of the nation for freedom," and while French politicians were tending to restore the ancient national institutions by means of their romantic theory, the Germans preferred to sound the depths of the living "soul" and "spirit" of the nation. This national theory was promulgated mainly by Fichte, in his renowned *Speeches to the German People* in 1808. Then appeared Hegel's *Philosophy of History*, in which a particular place was assigned to every "historical" nation, worthy of representing some "idea" in the solemn march of universal history; and, as was natural, the German people took the lead.

This was the theory that was adopted by the Russian nationalists of the nineteenth century. Thus, by a curious irony of history, the first and only nationalistic theory ever developed in Russia lay on the foundations of western European philosophic thought; and we must add that this theory was very old in western Europe when it was first heralded by Russian nationalists. Russia, indeed, was slow in adopting the romantic theory. Very little of it was known until the reign of Nicholas I., *i. e.*, the second quarter of the nineteenth century. In the first quarter of the nineteenth century Russia's national feeling; it is true, burst into flame, in consequence first, of the Napoleonic wars, and, then, of the national revolutions of the second decennium in Europe. But very soon a reaction against French fashion turned in Russia into a rough chauvinism, deprived of any theory. The old Russian virtues were exalted, just as the Teutonic virtues were in Germany; only there came no Fichte,

and there was no talking about the free utterance of the national spirit. There was, to be sure, a political movement, which had set in some years later in Russia—at the period of Congresses, 1818-22—but it was liberal, not romantic; and so its theory is to be traced to Benjamin Constant, the French statesman, rather than to the German philosophers, Fichte and Hegel. This movement, resulting in the December insurrection of 1825, has no place in this chapter; we shall, however, return to it when we come to trace the history of Russian liberalism (see p. 254-59).

✓ A genuine romantic movement was, however, started in Russia immediately after this insurrection of the so-called "Decembrists" only in a quite different environment: not in Petersburg, but in Moscow; and not among the officers of the guards and the army, but among the students of the university. This movement soon became known as Slavophilism. After two decades of preliminary development, it culminated in an organized theory of Russian nationalism.

The university movement in Moscow had nothing in common with revolution and politics. It was closely connected with German metaphysics and particularly with Hegel's philosophy of history. Slavophilism began to build up its theory just at the point where Hegel stopped. The Slavophiles took for granted everything Hegel had said about the universal development of nations; but they completed his philosophy of history with a chapter of their own. If Hegel were right, Germans were to be at the head of humanity, and there was no place left for Slavs. Now, Slavs were not to be thought outside the world

of law; they too must have a universal "idea" to be realized in history. Of course, no "universal" idea had as yet appeared in their past; but this only proved to the Slavophiles that the ascendancy of the Slavs was to be in the future. They thought they would bide their time, and then, forming a fresh nation, unworn by life's humiliating experience, they would forge ahead of the Germans and of all the rest of the "rotten West," as they called it.

What, then, was the "universal idea" that Russia, and Slavs in general, were to exhibit for the benefit of mankind? The answer to this question is the very essence of Slavophilism.

The civilization of the West, they found, was rich and luxuriant; but at the same time it was one-sided and incomplete. Rationalism was its original sin; rationalism divorced reason and feeling, and therefore the western civilization failed. Whatever branch of the life in western Europe we look at, everywhere we are likely to find the same phenomenon of discord and inner contradiction unappeased by feeling. In the state, it is the struggle between subjects and authority; in religion, that between Scripture and tradition; in philosophy, between reason and experience; in social life, between the upper and the lower classes; in social conduct, between law and morals. Russia, on the other hand, was always striving to unite and reconcile the conflicting elements of life. And that is why the Slavophiles reasoned that her civilization is bound to become wholesome and complete.

It is generally known what part feeling played in the romantic theory. Feeling was opposed to reason;

it was thought to be the only way to that superior truth which science can never discover for us. The weapon of science is logic; and logic is not able to grasp the essence of phenomena, to introduce us to the inner meaning of things. Logic is only formal; life and every living trait slips through its loosely woven net. These traits of concrete things are retained in our minds only by feeling; feeling supplies us with sounds and color—with all the motley of actual life. Art, therefore, which speaks to us in pictures and appeals to our feeling, is a higher type of knowledge than science. And for the same reason religion is the highest of all possible types of knowledge: it gives us communication with the very origin of the living actuality of things.

Now, the Slavophiles go on arguing, it is only in the East that religion has gone the way of feeling. Western religion has chosen the way of reason and logic, and so has run astray, becoming the victim of its own infatuation and lack of humility. The eastern church alone knows what is the right way for human progress, and toward eternal salvation.

Religion makes up the essence of civilization. Hence the western civilization has erred in the erring of its religion. Roman Catholicism was western civilization's first step in the error of forsaking the collective feeling of the church for individual judgment in religious matters. The second step in rationalism was the Reformation; and it was the necessary consequence of the first: just a step farther toward individualism. The third and last step in the succession of this logical necessity was revolution and atheism. None of these

was possible in the eastern world, it being the world of traditional religion—the religion of love and humility.

Thus the essence of the eastern civilization is Christian self-absorption in love. Now, is this feature to be found in Russian history? The Slavophiles, to be sure, found plenty of it. The community of Christian love—was it not identical with the Russian village commune that was supposed to form a peculiar feature of the Russian social life? Was there to be found in the inner life and order of the Slavic commune anything like western formal law? Was there a difference between rich and poor, an idea of private landed property? Was not the origin of that village community hidden in the remote past, so that it fitly represented the unalterableness of the “spirit of the nation”? Thus the key to the explanation of Russian culture was found. Christian love and landed peasant community—these were the particular “ideas” to be introduced by Russia into the universal history of mankind.<sup>5</sup> Everything that did not agree with these “ideas” in Russian history itself was to be explained as foreign, and eliminated. Foreign, in the first place, was the state, with all its worldly sins which did not befit the community of Christian love. The “commonalty” of people, the “land”—this was the genuine national element in Russia. The government originated in a military association of the prince’s followers, (the *gcsith*); thus it had come from abroad and had remained foreign to the “commonalty of the land.”

<sup>5</sup> See further applications of this theory for radical purposes, on p. 366.

This was the reason why the upper classes were so easily conquered by foreign civilization after the reform of Peter the Great began. They were foreign by origin; their high treason before the nation was, as it were, hereditary. And yet the Russian state was not so bad as the western European, because there was a great difference between Russia and western Europe as to the way in which the state was built. Russian princes and barons ("thegns") had not conquered the Russian natives, as was the case with the building up of the mediæval states in western Europe. Slavophiles laid much stress upon the old Scandinavian legend with which Russian history opens. According to this legend, the first rulers were voluntarily called by Russian and Finnish tribes from the Northmen in order to preserve "peace" in the "land." Thus the state authorities came from outside and remained foreign to the genuine life of the nation. They liberated the "land" from the material duty of keeping "external right" and order; the nation was free to go its own way of "internal righteousness." No conflict whatever was thenceforward possible between the state and the nation; the nation—the "land"—retained its "right of opinion," but never aspired to share in the "power" of the state. The "right of opinion" was embodied, according to the Slavophiles, in the Old Russian States General; the "power" of the state was embodied in autocracy, which, however, never interfered with people's "opinion," up to the unhappy moment when this original compact was broken by Peter the Great.

Thus, both the Russian state and religion were

utterly idealized in the theory of the Slavophiles. In this idealized shape they resembled the actual ones as little as the would-be "Russian" attire, worn by some Slavophiles and mistaken by their own peasants for Tartar or Persian, resembled the ancient Russian dress.

In such spiritualized form Russian traditional "ideas" were destined to play their part in the last and most perfect stage of universal history. Russia was to say the "last word" in the development of mankind. Thus, Russian nationalism became messianic, just as its Polish counterpart was at this very time, about half a century ago.

I am not here to confront the Slavophil theory with the real facts of Russian history and the actualities of Russian politics. We have only to follow the further, purely theoretical, development of Slavophilism in order to see how soon the different elements out of which the theory was formed became antiquated.

First, the metaphysical, the Hegelian, elements of the scheme were forsaken. The "fundamental idea" of the whole plan was the notion of a single thread of universal history, consisting in a series of select and privileged nations that came each in its turn to the fore. This idea completely lost its value in the next generation. Under the growing influence of natural sciences, an opposite idea was generally accepted. Every phenomenon had now to be explained by its own motive forces, not by final causes lying outside of it. Hence every nation was expected to live its own national life, not that of mankind. Thus the very idea of a universal history of nations was thrown aside. When later it was resumed by sociology, it was entirely

purified of its teleological meaning. Then a practical consideration presented itself. A theory that approved of certain national qualities only so far as they suited the general development of mankind was surely not nationalistic enough. Such qualities were found to be rather too cosmopolitan. And if the most important of these qualities for a Russian was to be an orthodox member of the eastern church, the further question arose: Was the Greek church exclusively Russian? And, moreover, did Russian people possess this quality at least in such a measure as would be sufficient to enable them to play the missionary part which was theirs in the drama of universal history? Thus in the second half of the nineteenth century a new current of nationalistic thought appeared. It was now the impending task to find out something more peculiar, more fitting to characterize the Russian nation in particular, even though it should be not at all universal and messianic. This particularizing tendency fully prevailed, when national feeling was roused by important events of history: by European coalition against Russia during the Crimean War (1853-56), and by the Polish rebellion (1863), enjoying the moral support of western public opinion.

The new nationalistic current found its outlet in Danilevsky's book on *Russia and Europe*, which started from the idea of their irreconcilable opposition. Facing the supposed fact of this opposition, the book included an entirely new reconstruction of the Slavophil theory; and it has remained until now the generally acknowledged gospel of the nationalistic creed in Russia. Let us see what changes the old theory has under-



gone. According to Danilevsky's theory, Europe cannot help hating Russia. The reason is that their "national types" are as different and as incapable of being reduced to one as zoölogical species. You see by this that Danilevsky takes his arguments from natural history; it was not in vain that he was living and writing (1860-70) when natural sciences were in their ascendancy in Russia. But Danilevsky has not yielded to the general drift of science. He is anti-Darwinian, and he does not acknowledge the common descent of species; he prefers to think that the zoölogical species were all preformed by God's will and thus unchangeable. The same he affirms to be the case with national types. Thus the national types are exclusive and absolutely particular; no transmission of culture is possible from one to another. Fish cannot be made to breathe with lungs; and just so Russia cannot have European institutions. Accordingly, Russia has to live only on what the Slavic "type of culture" has had in itself, since the beginning of its existence. Hence the only historical mission Russia has to accomplish is to make free the Slavs of Turkey and to unify all Slavs under its sway, choosing Constantinople for the center of this federation of Slavs.

Now, "who says A, must say B," as the German saying goes. Danilevsky stopped too soon in drawing consequences from his premises. His followers went farther. Danilevsky had opposed the Slavic type to the European. With the same right the Russian type could be opposed to the Slavic. Experience proved just then that Slavs did not wish to be related to the same "type of culture" as the Russian people. The

liberated Slavic nations of the Balkans were irrevocably driven away by the European whirlwind of culture. The Poles wanted to be liberated from, not by, Russia. Under these circumstances the puerility of Danilevsky's scheme of a Slavic federation under Russian leadership became completely manifest.

There came then Mr. Leontiev, a Russian consul in the near East, who declared that Slavs were entirely lost to Russian culture in consequence of European contagion. But then, were Russian people themselves quite free from the same contagion of "liberty and equality"? Those who opposed the Russian people to the emancipated Slavs were bound to oppose, among the Russian people themselves, those social layers that were still preserving the old national type of culture to such as had been torn off from the old stock by European civilization. There existed a literary group in Moscow — Apollon Grigoryev, Tertius Filippov, and others—who professed that the genuine type of Russian culture was to be found only among Great Russians (to the exclusion of the Little Russians and White Russians—two other branches of the Russian speech); and in the midst of the Great Russians they found their favorite type only among the inhabitants of Moscow; and even in Moscow the type was thriving nowhere but in the old merchants' quarter on the other side of the Moskva River, where the best Russian songs and the oddest Russian customs were still preserved free from European "progress." The friends had regular gatherings in a Moscow tavern, "Britannia," in order to sing the songs and to discuss the admirable old habits. Now, this looked very much like Mr. Pickwick's researches.

And yet this was not all. The Moscovite Pickwickians found very little of their genuine Russian type, but it was much more than Leontiev could find. Indeed, he found no elements of culture in the "Russian type." The church and the state he declared to be Byzantine, not Russian. Genuine culture in the common folk he found to be *nil*. And last, the very idea of nationality he discovered to be of revolutionary and European origin! He concluded from all this that "Russian originality did not consist in a creation of the new, but in the preservation of the old." Accordingly, he gave the good advice to concentrate all the state wisdom on one thing: namely, to "freeze out" every new force, every element of progress, which should bud under the surface of Russian Byzantinism. Only this heroic cure could prevent decay. The best model of such a treatment Mr. Leontiev found to be the Turkish rule of the Christian *rayah*. This same policy was to be used by the Russian autocracy, in order that the barbarism of the Russian people might be preserved in its entire "originality" from every contact with any civilizing influence except that of "Byzantine principles" in church and state.

Such was the last word of the nationalistic theory, and such it ought to be, if the theory was to be consistent and sincere in drawing conclusions<sup>8</sup> from its original assertions. We must add that such also was the real sense of the actual policy of the Russian government during the last thirty years. Take, as an illustration, the writings of Mr. Pobedonostsev, the man of reaction in Russia of the present day. You will find there nothing but Mr. Leontiev's program of policy.

Nothing is to be created anew; nothing that is original and positive is even to be expected to come from the "soul" of the nation. The only aim is to preserve as long as possible the Byzantine state and the Byzantine church, the autocracy and the orthodoxy. Political freedom in the whole civilized world Mr. Pobedonostsev proclaims a failure. Freedom of thought and opinion he thinks a humbug, a sham employed by the rich and cunning. Freedom of belief he declares sheer nonsense. And all these he finds to be in flagrant opposition to national ideals, which, however, nobody knows how to read aright.

This series of exclusively negative assertions were perhaps better as a reactionary program than as a national theory. For a living nation, believing in its future, it was simply an insult. It was to be expected that even among the nationalistic party somebody would arise who would try to find a way of escape from the deadlock of reactionary nationalism. There came now Mr. Solovyov, the theologian and philosopher of a mystic stamp. He reminded his party that nationalism is not necessarily reactionary. He tried to recall to their memory the fact that cosmopolitan elements alone were to help the Russian people to their historical predestination, according to the prevailing idea in the original Slavophil doctrine. Cosmopolitan elements in a national type—this was to be its religion. Now, Russian religion ought not to be thought of as fatally lacking cosmopolitan elements. True Christianity, Mr. Solovyov asserted, was identical with human progress, not opposed to it. There exist no contradictions between modern ideas and Christianity. Thus Russia

was to share in the general progress of mankind without disclaiming its religion, but only by embracing in it a deeper and larger sense. The Russian religion was narrow-minded, because the rights of the church were appropriated by the state; such was the Byzantine form of religion, borrowed by Russia. But Russia had only to disown this, and to unite with the only really universal form of Christian faith, the Roman Catholic church. This universal creed was to be carried through with the aid of the most powerful ruler on the earth. Thus the mediæval idea of an only church, attended by an only empire, was to be resuscitated and realized. Pope and Tsar allied, with the prophet of their union between them; such was Solovyov's apocalyptic vision. You see that even here the share of the Tsar and of the Russian people was material power alone; the moral strength of the alliance was to be the pope's. Thus even in Solovyov's cosmopolitan theory of nationalism the only part of Russia was that of self-resignation.

With this, every possibility of a nationalistic issue had been tried and found wanting. Solovyov's bold entanglement of ideas served only to complete and to close the series of possible nationalistic schemes.

While studying thus the development of the nationalistic idea, we have gained some insight into what has been supposed to be Russian historical tradition. It consisted, we found, in a peculiar "spirit of the nation," embodied in certain religious and political institutions. Now, as far as regards the national "spirit," we have nothing to add to what has been said about the Russian psychological type in our first

lecture. But a larger treatment is needed in so far as the peculiar forms of the Russian church and state are brought into consideration. What was really the religious and political tradition bequeathed by ancient Russia to modern Russia? What were the civilizing elements of that tradition? Were there any such elements at all? Was this tradition continuous and inherited by many, or was it rather artificially revived and shared only by few? These questions, by the help of historical evidence, we shall now try to answer.

## CHAPTER III

### THE RELIGIOUS TRADITION

THOSE of you who have read the *Lectures on the History of the Eastern Church*, by Dean Stanley of Westminster, may remember his splendid pages on the general characteristics of the eastern church. The author was influenced in some measure by the Russian Slavophiles, particularly by Homyakov. And the Slavophiles, in their turn, were influenced by the German historians of religion. Thus the view Dean Stanley takes of the subject is by no means personal; it is rather characteristic of many generations of scholars and general readers. As he rightly observes:

The distinction which has been most frequently remarked [between the eastern and the western churches] is the speculative tendency of the oriental and the practical tendency of the western. "The East," says Dean Milman, "enacted creeds, the West discipline." The first decree of the Eastern Council determined the relations of the Godhead. The first decree of the Pope of Rome interdicted the marriage of the clergy. All the first founders of theology were easterns. Latin Christianity contemplated with almost equal indifference Nestorianism and all its prolific race, Eutychianism, Monophysitism, Monothelitism. Probably no Latin Christian ever felt himself agitated even in the least degree by any one of the seventy opinions on the union of the two natures which are said to perplex the church of Abyssinia. This fundamental contrast naturally widens into other cognate differences. The western theology is essentially logical in form and is based on law. The eastern is rhetorical in form and based on philosophy. The Latin divine succeeded the Roman advocate. The oriental divine succeeded the Grecian

sophist. The subtleties of Roman law as applied to the relations of God and man are almost unknown to the East. "Forensic justification," "merit," "demerit," "satisfaction," "imputed righteousness," "decrees," represent ideas which in the Eastern theology have no predominant influence—hardly any words to render them.

And, on the other hand,

The Latin language was inadequate to express minute shades of meaning for which the Greek is admirably fitted. The Athanasian creed by the evident strain of its sentences reveals the ineffectual labor of the Latin phrases, "persona" and "substantia," to represent the correlative but hardly corresponding words by which the Greeks, with a natural facility, expressed "the hypostatic union."

All these fine observations we may agree with. But we must be aware that the subtleties of philosophy and the subtleties of law which mark the difference between the eastern and the western theology have no connection whatever with the Russian church. In Russia the Orthodox church was incapable of any subtleties and possessed no theology of her own. Thus, such characteristics of the eastern church as we have just quoted from Dean Stanley's book ought not to be mistaken for the characteristics of the church of Russia. The age of refined theological heresies, engrafted on ancient philosophical systems, had long passed by before the oriental doctrine was spread among the northern barbarians. To take a share in working out the teachings of religion was for them chronologically impossible. The doctrine of faith was handed over to Russia in the form definitely given by the Seven Ecumenical Councils. No further development was to be tolerated. Thus, when Russians first embraced Chris-



tianity, the doctrine had already become stationary. And for this reason the oriental doctrine preserved many an archaic feature of primitive Christianity; such, for instance, as the undeveloped and unspiritualized form of the sacraments, the close relation between clergy and laity, the principle of electing the former by the latter, the divine service in the vernacular, the unsystematized theology and uncentralized hierarchy. To perpetuate all these traits of stagnation north of the Euxine proved easier than it would have been to transplant to Russia the taste for refined dogmatical controversies. The Russian church is not speculative like the oriental churches of the first centuries after Christ. But it is oriental in its other aspects, being old-fashioned in ritual and stationary in dogma.

This, however, is not sufficient to give an adequate idea of the Russian form of eastern orthodoxy. Russia was not only unable to develop any further the religious idea which she had received, but she was not even able to preserve it in its oriental shape unchanged. She necessarily adapted very easily and involuntarily the oriental dogma to her former pagan creed. She attained this result by dint of simplifying the eastern Christianity and reducing it to a state of complete materialization. Simplified and materialized, the oriental creed has become a particular and national type of Russian orthodoxy.

Of course, this would not be done all at once. Centuries passed before even this most imperfect kind of religion was worked out. The bulk of the common people remained entirely pagan and wholly unacquainted with even the rites of the Christian faith, not

to speak of the sense—nay, even of the letter—of their new creed. When a foreign traveler asked a Russian peasant, as late as the seventeenth century, why people should not know either the Lord's Prayer or the *Ave Maria*, he was answered that this was a superior knowledge, which did not at all suit the simple peasants, but only Tsars and the patriarch, and in general the lords and the clergy who had no work to do. Thus people did not know the Christian doctrine at all, and they acknowledged the Christian clergy only as a substitute for the pagan one. The parson had to perform the same duty as the pagan priest; like a *shaman*, or popular wizard, he was asked to expel the evil spirits from houses and from fields, by magic rites and solemn incantations. And the clergy acquiesced in this; the village priests of today still do so in times of droughts and disease, just as the bishop of the first popular monastery in Keeyev, Theodosius of Pechersk, had done in the eleventh century.

The old pagan gods had now turned to demons; the Christian gods, the saints, were there to take their place. A popular writer of the beginning of the eighteenth century, Pososhkov, complained that common people bowed before the image of God only from the waist; while before St. Nicholas, the beloved saint, they bowed down to the floor. Before the image of St. Nicholas there were always plenty of tapers lit in his honor or proffered as an offering; while before the Lord our Savior there were none. Every saint was supposed to cure a particular disease and to be able to insure a special sort of benefit. But this was not yet sufficient. Everybody had his own particu-

lar family saint. Instead of listening to the divine service when in church, everybody preferred to worship his own particular god. People brought their family images with them to church, set them upright in any place they chose, and bowed and prayed to them, not attending to the general prayers. If they chanced to be deprived temporarily of the Holy Communion, their particular image ("icon") was sent away with them from the church. Generally they did not realize that a Deity existed somewhere beyond and independent of their fetich. But even if they were directed by their spiritual leaders to heaven as the seat of a higher Deity, they did not need much mental exertion to grasp this new idea; the popular theologians themselves thought God and the saints abode materially in heaven, just as they saw them represented on their icons. The angels had wings, and their hair was bound by narrow bands that floated in the wind; and they were supposed to hold the little mirrors that they held in their hands on the images. The Holy Trinity, according to popular theology, "sat in a row in heaven, upon separate thrones, just like a father with his sons: God, the Father, in the middle, the Son on his right, the Holy Spirit on the left; and Christ sat there also, as a fourth person, on a special throne before God, the Father." Then the question would arise in more speculative minds: How could these Gods leave their place to visit this world and still remain in heaven? Popular theologians foresaw and wisely resolved this embarrassing problem. The Holy Spirit went down only to pour out his gifts upon the apostles; having done this, he returned—or perhaps he did not move

at all, and only sent the grace down. Well now, but how could Christ be born on the earth from a virgin? Why, Christ certainly came into his mother through the ear!

Such was the sort of theology that Russian people had got after many centuries of Christian existence. These were, however, the opinions of the enlightened; the bulk of the nation was not even as far advanced as this. In Mr. Wallace's *Russia* you may find an anecdote about a peasant who was asked by a priest to name the three persons of the Trinity, and who immediately answered: "Why, of course, they are the Savior, the mother of God, and Saint Nicholas, the miracle-worker."

Religion being considered, not as an inner state of the soul, but as a formal contract for salvation between man and God, the whole scheme of salvation was worked out accordingly. "*Do ut des*"—"I give to you—in order that you should give to me"—such was the meaning of the contract, which left no place to the action of "grace" and reduced the "works" to their outward expression alone. Prayer was not an inner concentration of thought and feeling on religion; it consisted in crossing and bowing, in kneeling and in lighting tapers before the holy image, in order that the saint might grant whatever was asked of him, no matter whether it was good crops or success in a scheme of robbery. Popular theologians tried to introduce some amendments here also, but they could not soar too high above the average thought and feeling. They ventured to give advice as to the best magic formula for prayer; they recommended as best the

short, "Jesus Christ, have mercy on us"—the mediæval *Kyrie eleison*. They knew no other means for concentration of religious thoughts on prayer than the continual repetition of this formula. Not relying on any inner religious motive, they enforced their precepts by frightening the people with familiar notions of heathen times. The demons and the evil spirits were lurking about—the air was full of them; if prayer were interrupted by secular thoughts, this opened a "chink" into the very soul, and demons entered it immediately. Was the prayer inattentively said, the demon intercepted it and dispersed it in the air, so that God, or his saint, could not listen to it. It was only when properly delivered that the prayer dashed through the air up to the very throne.

In this kind of religion personal salvation was everything; social action, nothing. Of course, works of charity were to be practiced; but there remained in fact little real charity in these works. "The old Russian benefactor," a Moscow professor says, "did not so much intend to raise by his good work the standard of the general social welfare as to attain in a higher degree to his own moral perfection. Hence pauperism was not dealt with in ancient Russia as an economical evil, as a plague of the social order, but rather as a practical institution for moral education." In short, charity did not exist because there were poor and downtrodden people; but the poor and downtrodden people existed in order that charity might be practiced. It was a part of the divine order of things; therefore pauperism was not to be destroyed or even alleviated, but simply to be used for the soul's salvation.

It was a kind of Eternal Life Insurance Company. What sort of benevolent feelings this "institution" contrived to produce may be seen from the Christian advice of the popular theologian, Pososhkov, quoted before:

When drinking exquisite liquors, recall to your mind such paupers as do not possess even pure water, but are obliged to drink muddy water and to draw it from a swamp, mixed with flies and worms. When partaking of greasy and sweet meals [this was the kind of gastronomy Russian people relished] recollect the poor, who do not get even pure bread, but rotten bread baked with chaff. And then consider how God has replenished you and supplied you with such abundance, while other people, who are quite like you, suffer. And having brought to remembrance these sufferings, render thanks to God because of such an abundance as yours.

To sum up the spirit of practical work in this religion, we have only to refer again to the words of the same Pososhkov:

Take care that you surpass the scribes and Pharisees by your virtues, in order that you may enter into the realm of heaven. Therefore you must, after having given to God the tenth of your substance, add to it something—about 5 per cent. of it. The Pharisee fasted twice a week; but besides this you must fast the whole four fasts of the year, established by the holy fathers. Thus you will be superior to the Pharisees.

But enough of these quotations. Russian religion, as we see now, had ceased to be entirely heathen, without becoming entirely Christian. By degrees it became the national religion of Saint Russia, as foreign travelers learned to know it as early as the seventeenth century. It was the religion of a continuous ringing of bells, innumerable bowings and crossings before icons, long fasts, and interminable divine services,

which brought consternation even to the Christians of the eastern ritual who happened to come to Moscow in order to get the ordinary tsarish alms for oriental monasteries and bishops.

But in their turn Russian people, as they became aware of the difference between their own national religion and that of the eastern divines, began to wonder which was the genuine and original one. And they came to the expected conclusion: they exalted their national religion, and repudiated the oriental. The consequences of this distinction and comparative evaluation of the oriental and the national Russian churches were so important that we must dwell on them longer.

Russia received her Christianity, as is well known, from the Greeks of Constantinople. But there existed an antagonism between the Russians and the Greeks; and it was perhaps as old as the time of the conversion of Russia. All bishops in Russia were Greeks or orientals until the epoch of the Tartar conquest in the thirteenth century. Many of the simple priests were also at first easterners. Through them the Russian church kept in close relation with her Byzantine metropolis. She was under the direct rule of the Constantinopolitan patriarch and under the control of the Byzantine emperor. The oriental divines were as a rule not much interested in taking spiritual care of their flock. In ancient Russia they were what they are even now in remote corners of Turkey, where they still go on collecting their tithes from the Slavic population, who hate them for their avidity and arrogance. The difference in culture, then, was equally

great between the sheep and the shepherds. A Greek bishop, and even an ordinary priest, considered himself the bearer of a higher and more refined culture among the barbarians, the "sheep-skins"—a culture which they were not able to understand, still less to adopt. As a rule, these eastern divines did not know, and rarely tried to learn, the language of the natives. In their turn the people did not trust them, and longed to get divines of their own kith and kin. As long as the patriarch of Constantinople could hinder this, he did so. But then hard times came for Constantinople, too. The same Asiatic wave which brought Tartars to southern Russia brought their kinsmen, the Turks, to Asia Minor; Constantinople was frightened at the approaching danger at the same time as the Russian Keeyev. The fourth crusade was organized for Constantinople's defense; and with the arrival of the crusaders (1204-61) began the troubled period, which ended only with the final conquest of Constantinople by the Turks, two centuries later (1453). The Greeks had to look for allies to the west, not to the east; and these were to be bought by promises of a religious union. During this time the Russian church was left to herself; she was just then working out her national type of religion. Profiting by the distress of Constantinople, Russia presently appropriated the long-contested right of the ordination of bishops, and tried to get rid of the right which still remained to the patriarch—of confirming the elections made by the council of the Russian bishops. At this moment Constantinople fell under Mahomet II.'s arms.

The news of the fall produced a very deep impres-



sion in Russia. Surely it was God's punishment: Constantinople had just accepted the union with the Roman Catholic church (1439, in Florence). "Thenceforward," as the Great Prince of Muscovy wrote to the Byzantine emperor, "we began to be on our guard concerning our Orthodoxy, and our immortal souls, and to remember the hour of death and our responsibility before the Judge of secret thoughts, at the last judgment." The responsibility was great, indeed, in the eyes of the Muscovite people: they had to assume the legacy of the fallen empire, and see to the continuity of the church and apostolical succession to the end of time, since there was no other independent Orthodox church in the whole world. The theory that Moscow was the third Rome originated in these days, in order to formulate the new idea of the universal mission of the Russian national church. A learned monk, Philotheus, wrote to John III., the Muscovite prince:

The church of ancient Rome was destroyed in consequence of the heresy of Apollinarius, and the Constantinopolitan church of the second Rome was cut to pieces by the axes of Hagar's posterity. But this Holy Apostolic church of the third Rome—to wit, of thy autocratic power—shines more brightly than the sun in the whole universe. Look here now and listen, Oh thou pious Tsar: Christian realms have all converged into thine, the only one; two Romes have fallen; the third stands upright, and there is no fourth to come; thou art the only Tsar of the Christians in the entire world; thy Christian sway shall never yield to anybody.

Now, were Russian spiritual resources equal to this new task? Was the Russian church worthy of her universal mission? The very character of the mission

gave the answer. There was nothing to create; just because they strove for new things, two Romes had perished. Russia had only to preserve her spiritual wealth untouched unto the day of judgment. But, in order to preserve it, she ought to know what that wealth was. The first and the only task now to be fulfilled was the collection and the examination of all the elements of the national sanctity.

Let us recall here what has been said above about the national type of the Russian creed. This creed had become closely connected with outward rituals considerably different from Greek religious practice. And, from the new point of view, this was just what was wanted. Russian faith was unlike, because the Greeks had betrayed their tradition and their antiquity. This faith had to be kept as the only genuine relic of Christianity in the world. To preserve it from all change was the universal mission of Russia. Having this in mind, Russian theologians began systematically to search for differences between the Greek and the Russian ritual. And such differences as they found they at once explained by this or that failure of the Greeks in doctrine. The Greek church, for instance, did not hold two fingers erect in making the sign of the cross: this meant that the doctrine of the Trinity was wrong with the Greeks. The Greeks in their processions did not follow the rising and setting of the sun: it was because they did not wish to follow Christ and to tread down hell, the realm of darkness.

But if the Russian was to be considered as the only true and righteous church, where were then the outward signs of this righteousness—the Russian saints

and miracle-workers? We know how large was the part assigned to saints in the Russian church. If saints could be found to exist in Russia in sufficient numbers, this would serve of itself as a proof that religious formulas were effective, and religious work was operating in the Russian church. Two consecutive councils assembled in 1547 and 1549 in order to bring to notice information about all Russian saints who were locally venerated, and duly to canonize them. Twenty-two were found at the first and seventeen at the second council. In these three years more was done than in all the five centuries of the previous existence of the Russian church. The national church was rich now, and so had no reason to envy the "two first Romes." Of course, there were no great luminaries among these "new miracle-workers," as they were called; no lights of faith or of religious science. But then, in Russia the idea of a saint was as different from that of both the oriental and the occidental church as were the doctrine and religious life. A Russian saint—*i. e.*, a really popular saint, not an official one—was not expected to possess exquisite qualities of mind, a power of deep thought, an intense religious feeling, or a strong will. He was not appreciated according to his theological knowledge, mystic penetration, or administrative talents. The obstacles he had to overcome, the pains he had to suffer, must be made visible and easy to be understood by everybody. They were to be physical pain and endurance. Thus he had to stroll about in the streets naked during the most severe winter frosts, and to mortify his flesh, not only by fasting, but with real wounds and real bloodshed.

Therefore he wore a heavy iron collar around his neck or a chain about his waist riveted too closely to be unfastened. And the iron would eat into his very body, staining his clothes with blood. His appearance was squalid and disgusting: long hair, never cut or combed, hung about his shoulders; his eyes looked wild, or dull and dim. His dress, if he wore any, was in rags. He was always insane, or he affected insanity: the broken sentences he spoke were as void of meaning as an oracle's—and as apt to be turned into a prophecy or an admonition. But by reason of this very vagueness he enjoyed a quite exceptional freedom of speech, even in the times of the Terrible Johns of Russian history. He was venerated just as a lunatic through whose mouth God himself was understood to pronounce judgments; his was the only mode of life fit to escape the sinful ways of the world of those days. Thus the world appreciated him as its living contradiction and suffered him to be its uncompromising accuser. Do not think this a fanciful sketch, for in Russia you may meet with this "beatified" person in history as well as in actual life; in Fletcher's account of his travels in the sixteenth century, as well as in Gleb Ouspensky's modern novel.

Russia now, as we have seen, had got her national type of religion. It was definitely framed and officially sanctioned as early as the middle of the sixteenth century. People were proud to possess at their home in Moscow the best and the purest Christianity in the world. They were extremely flattered to be intrusted with its preservation unto the end of time. The foundations of religious tradition seemed to be laid down

firmly for all time to come. We must add that at the end of the sixteenth century the Russian church at least became autocephalic: she had her own patriarch at Moscow. But scarcely had a century passed before this national tradition was completely destroyed by the state. It was in opposition to the Greeks that this national tradition had been formulated. Now, the authority of the Greeks in matters of religion was fully re-established. Everything that did not conform to the Greek church in ritual and in teaching was declared schismatic. Russian books of divine service were found to be spoiled by alterations and interpolations. New translations from Greek texts were ordered and printed; and these "new books" were to be introduced everywhere for general use, while the "old books" were to be burned. Such were the exact commands of the imperious patriarch Neekon, the "friend of the Greeks."

Of course, "old books" and old national tradition that had to be thus canceled could not fail to find fervent defenders in the world of the Muscovite Orthodoxy. We know what the spirit of the national church was. People had been taught to believe firmly in the infallibility of their rites. Russian rites were thought to be the only true ones in the world. If they were now condemned by the official authorities of the Russian church, it could only mean—in the eyes of the people—that the official Russian church itself was falling away from the true faith. This event had even been foretold in "old books." The very time of the Russian apostasy had been foreseen: it was to come at the beginning of the second half of the seventeenth

century. And at that precise moment it came. The Russian church—Neekon's church—had itself become delinquent from the point of view of men who were stigmatized by the church authorities as "Schismatics."

It would seem that in this conflict the official church, while taking the side of the Greeks as against her own immediate past, represented the higher civilization. Low as might be the religious level of the Greek eastern church, it was doubtless higher than that of the Russian national religion. And such was, of course, the general meaning of Neekon's reform. But we must add that, in fact, Neekon, while undertaking his reform, did not represent at all the view of the eastern church in his conflict with the popular religion. For this latter view was formulated in a letter that the patriarch of Constantinople had written to the Russian Tsar, in order to tell him that a mere difference in rite was a matter of small importance. There were differences enough among oriental churches themselves, the patriarch asserted; but that was not a sufficient reason for proclaiming any one of these churches schismatic. The patriarch might also have added—if he had known this fact, revealed by modern research—that some of the old Russian differences in rite also occurred in the Syrian church, whence the Russian people might have borrowed them through the intervention of their first metropolitan at Keeyev, a man of Syrian origin. The point of view of Neekon was quite different from the patriarch's; it was essentially the same as that of the "Old-believers," his enemies, who indeed, before he had become the "friend of the Greeks," had been his "friends." The ritual

seemed to both parties to be as necessary for salvation as dogma. Hence both Neekon and his antagonists were quite sure that there could exist only one formula for every rite; if the formula was not right, God was "blasphemed," instead of being praised, in the performance of the rite. The question was now: which formula was right—Greek or Russian? That they might be equally admissible was beyond the understanding of a Russian of that epoch.

Thus Neekon's reaction against the national religion was in its spirit and substance entirely national. It could not be taken by its contemporaries as a step forward in the understanding of religion. But, on the other hand, it annihilated the former step, the only one that Russian people had really taken. This former step consisted in teaching Christian rites to a people entirely pagan. The second step would consist in teaching the spirit of ritual to the ritualistic believers in its letter. Neekon, however, wished his flock, not to learn the second step, but to unlearn the first. And so the rupture was accomplished; an anathema was proclaimed upon the "Schismatics" by a council of bishops in the year 1667.

The consequences of this formal breach of tradition for the Russian church were innumerable. The fruit of many centuries of development had to be cut off. A new start was to be made, which was discredited in advance by the faithful adherents of the national tradition. The result was that the people would not follow their official leaders, and thus the creed became twofold: the popular religion separated itself from the official. The "true fold" became thus almost

entirely empty and void of religious devotion. Those who could make use of the religious reform of Neekon for their further religious development were few. The average believers were the "Old Ritualists," the uncompromising supporters of the "old books." They turned their back on the official church. Outside these two categories, the adherents of Neekon and the adherents of the old belief, there remained the great bulk of plain, wholly illiterate folk, who were either completely indifferent to religion, or inclined to take the side of the "Old-believers." But the "Old-believers" were condemned by the church as Schismatics. Thus there remained no moral link between the common people and the few learned divines of the established church. The true religious life was, in the eyes of the people, that of the opponents of the official church. The learned religion of the instructed few was, henceforth, concentrated in schools, and these presently adopted Latin, the learned language of the European theology. They did not, however, invent any original theological system; instead they were continually wavering between Protestant and Catholic authorities on theology. They were busy confuting the first by the arguments of the second, and the second by the arguments of the first. And this was the method by which the Russian theology was formed. The common people no longer listened to these theologians, and so they were at liberty to preach freedom of will or predestination, good works or grace; in short, whatever they liked. But whatever their opinion was, the church was not in the least bound by their theological lucubrations. Obligated to keep a constant equilibrium between the



Bible and the Seven Councils, the councils and the elaborate science of theology of Christian churches more advanced in learning, Russian theologians necessarily became eclectics.

As far as the laity is concerned, the only instructed men among them belonged, at this time, to the class of the tsarish officials. Of course, they had to be on the side of the official church, whatever might be their own views on religion. The consequence was that an atmosphere of religious indifference was formed in this only educated class, and this indifference in its turn became a tradition. Thus, at the very moment when a powerful wave of foreign culture poured upon Russia from abroad, the spiritual life of this class was barren. Nothing stood in the way of their now becoming in soul and body the "apes of Europe." Religion could form no obstacle to this desire to imitate foreign culture, and no other hindrance existed.

Thus the breaking of the old religious tradition was the prelude to Peter the Great's reform: it helped the higher class to achieve a complete departure from the old culture of the lower strata of Russian society.<sup>1</sup> The same break prevented also the further spontaneous development of the common people's religion within the "true fold" of the official church. Outside, there was going on a very peculiar and multifarious religious development among Russian dissenters and sectarians; but the established church did not profit by that kind of religious development. Accordingly, the official church was morally very much weakened. And this weakness brought forth a further consequence for the

<sup>1</sup> See above, pp. 43, 44.

official church, which must now be mentioned: the secularization of the Russian church.

Of course, the beginnings of this process of secularization are to be discovered many centuries before the religious break of the established church with the "Old-believers." The preponderance of the state authority in matters of religion is known to be one of the most characteristic features of the eastern churches in general. The Byzantine emperor shared with the patriarch the power which the Roman popes alone possessed. The emperor appointed and dismissed the bishops; he presided over the councils and influenced their decisions. The Byzantine emperor had his share of power also over the Russian branch of the Constantinopolitan patriarchate. In proportion as the Russian church became independent, Russian princes inherited the religious rights of the emperor. Moreover, Muscovite grand dukes made a large use of the ascendancy which their position as the "only remaining Christian Tsars in the whole world" had given them. Their clergy were the first to call them "Tsars and autocrats." But they were not satisfied with this. For after having strengthened, by the help of the church, their own position, they began to feel uncomfortable when face to face with the church's increasing wealth, and the growing popularity of the new patriarch of Muscovy. They more than once tried to diminish the rights of the church regarding landed property and clerical jurisdiction. But more than once they were obliged to repeal their measures or not to bring them into execution. Nay, in the first half of the seventeenth century they were forced to yield new

power to the church: they were brought to an actual division of power, to a duarchy of Tsar and patriarch; after which Neekon formally renewed the mediæval theories of Hildebrand. All this was possible as long as the nationalistic theory of religion stood firm and the patriarchs knew that the whole population was backing them. Now, as soon as the nationalistic theory of religion was doomed as spurious, the great bulk of its former supporters were proclaimed enemies of the church, and the official head of the church was no longer dangerous. And, too, there soon remained no danger for the state in the body of the higher clergy. Learned monks from the west of Russia gradually took the place of the fanatical divines of the old Muscovite stock. And the new clergy, not feeling obliged to support the universal claims of the national church, proved to be much more obsequious to the secular authorities. They were quite ready to surrender the position of independence which the Russian church still possessed; and nobody was there to defend it. Thus the circumstances were most propitious when Peter the Great came. With the help of one of those western prelates, Theophanes Procopowitz, known to sympathize with Protestant views, Peter substituted for the patriarch a collegiate body, the "most holy governing synod." Those who are surprised at the ease with which this important reform was achieved may consider that the national church was much too weak just then to resist this measure, and that the very essence of eastern Christianity made it possible for the organization of the church to be changed by a mere decree of the secular power. The eastern church

has not to decide the fundamental questions of doctrine, for they are supposed to be definitely settled by the Seven Councils. She has only to preserve the received tradition from any further change. Her daily action thus is of a purely administrative character. Therefore, as long as no extraordinary question arises, the half-secular organization of the Russian church seems to be entirely sufficient. Just such a question arose, of course, even at the time of Peter the Great, when the theologians of the Sorbonne proposed to Russian divines a discussion regarding the unification of the churches. At that time the "keeper of the patriarch's seat," an enemy of Peter's reform (Stephen Yavorsky), replied that Russian bishops were as unable to decide anything in such a momentous question as the limbs of the body would be unable to move without the head. From this time the anti-canonic position of the Holy Synod became still more obvious. The synod had got its head; but this head was a minister of the state, not the head of the church. Peter the Great had already appointed a Superior Procurator, who was to be chosen among the commissioned officers ("one who would be daring enough," as the imperial order ran), and whose rôle was to control the activity of the Holy Synod. In the course of the nineteenth century the Superior Procurator became the actual chief of the ecclesiastical office, and the Holy Synod became a ministry of cult. That is why it has lost every moral influence over the religious life of the nation. As a rule, its actions pass without attracting much attention; but it sounded utterly incongruous when the actual procurator, Mr. Pobedonostsev, tried to recall old times by launching

an excommunication against the new heresiarch, Count Leo Tolstoy. Some petty shopkeepers and grocers alone applauded the decision of the Holy Spirit residing in Petersburg; but there was no end of laughing among the educated classes over this decision dictated to a dozen crazy sexagenarians by a prelate in lay dress. After having allowed Russia for two centuries to believe in whatever it wished—which for the upper layer was equal to a permission not to believe in anything at all—it was rather late, and certainly ridiculous, to attempt the punishment of the only man who was trying to inculcate into Russian society a doctrine which at least was a sort of religion. It was as if a hero of a former generation, after a centennial sleep, should try to unbend his stiffened joints, in order to achieve one of his old-time strokes; but the limbs dangle palsied and powerless; a too long inactivity has benumbed them. And people who had believed in the giant's legendary strength were now reassured; there was no danger to be feared from this venerable relic. Mr. Pobedonostsev meant to bring about a revival; but instead, what he did became matter for derision.

We cannot expect, of course, to find more life in the members than we have found in the head of the official church. The parish priests remained what they always were—the official performers of rites, instead of becoming the pastors of souls. The only thing that the village people wanted from their parsons was “that there might be singing in the churches [by which they meant that the divine offices might be performed], and that deceased Christians should not remain without burial.”

Higher duties than these the aspirants to curacies could hardly perform. Indeed, these aspirants were often chosen from among the peasants; and even when they were sons of clergymen it was not expected that they should know how to read and write, to say nothing of their having any knowledge of general theology. Down to the second half of the eighteenth century, candidates had to undergo, before their ordination, an examination at the bishop's court. But this they passed quite easily: the illiterate would give money to their examiners, and were then required to learn by heart some two or three passages from the Psalter; and they were then certain to be asked to read one of these passages at the examination. By and by the clergy became so numerous that there was no room for more. So they formed a levitic caste, whose social position was a flagrant contradiction to their spiritual vocation. The peasants hated them for their greediness and rapacity—vices that were provoked by the material difficulties of a Russian clergyman's life. For they, receiving no fixed appointments from the government, were obliged to live on voluntary contributions. Generally these were very modest. Thus the village priests were obliged to wear peasant's clothes and to work in the fields; and accordingly they were quite unable to inspire their spiritual flock with respect or deference. The squires looked down on them and did not spare them any humiliation. On a holiday a parson was obliged to call on his squire, bringing the cross, to sing some prayers in his drawing-room. Then he was invited to drink, and after both the host and the guest had become tipsy, the parson

ran the risk of a beating or of a ducking in the manorial pond; of being bitten by the squire's dogs, or flogged until he swooned; sometimes he had to flee for his life. Indeed, as late as the middle of the nineteenth century, all the innumerable whims of a drunken squire could with entire impunity be inflicted upon his parson. But it was only in his bishop's court that a curate could undergo formal torture. Being low in morals and character, a parson often incurred the punishment legally; but still more often he was flogged, deprived of food, and imprisoned for not having been able to satisfy the avidity of the bishop and his men. The position, as we see, was not to be envied; and nobody from the higher classes ever wished to occupy it.

The consequence of all this was that the caste of the clergy prevented, rather than increased, the spread of a deeper religious instruction and feeling among the Russian people. The following witness, for instance, refers to the facts of the middle of the nineteenth century:

Could the people respect the clergy when they heard how one priest had stolen money from beneath the pillow of a dying man at the moment of confession, how another had been publicly dragged out of a house of ill-fame, how a third had christened a dog, how a fourth while officiating at the Easter service was dragged by the hair from the altar by the deacon? Was it possible for the people to respect priests who spent their time in the gin-shop, wrote fraudulent petitions, fought with the cross in their hands, and abused each other in vile language at the altar? One might fill several pages with examples of this kind—in each instance naming the time and place—without going beyond the boundaries of the province of Nizhni-Novgorod.

I chose this quotation from an official report; you may read more of it in the excellent book of Mr.

Mackenzie Wallace about Russia (see the chapter "The Village Priest").

Not only was the quality of spiritual food, thus supplied by the official church, very low. Its quantity also was quite insufficient; and it went on diminishing with the growth of the general indifference and distrust of the ways of salvation within the "true fold." One of the attractions which the "Old-believers" had for Russian peasantry was that they very often provided them with priests and with divine office in such places of Russia where there were no priests of the established church. To be sure, the absolute number of Orthodox priests and churches increased with time; but this increase was far from proportionate to the growth of the Orthodox population. The following figures may help you to realize to how large an extent this disproportion increased during the last century and a half:

FOR EVERY 100,000 INHABITANTS DURING THE YEAR

	1738	1840	1890
Churches .....	106	71	56
Secular clergy (including sextons).....	781	265	137
Monasteries .....	6	1.2	1
Regular clergy (includ. novices) { monks	49	19	18
{ nuns..	40	15	38

All this makes clear, I hope, how many and how important the consequences were which followed the break of religious tradition in the middle of the seventeenth century. The continuity of religious life in the official church was stopped. The ritualistic tendencies, far from being weakened thereby, increased propor-




tionately as the indifference in matters of religion prevailed. The bishops and priests became state officials. All independence of spirit vanished, together with the inner religious life of the church. Religion became the instrument by which the instructed class governed the illiterate crowd; *i. e.*, the irreligious few, the equally irreligious multitude. The many who were religious were obliged to search for a substitute, and to live their religious life (whatever that life might be) outside the "true fold" of the official church.

Two different ways might have been chosen. The one was that of the strict national tradition, so lately betrayed by the official church. The other was that of an entirely new movement deepening and enlarging the religious feeling and understanding. The former was in complete accordance with the past of the Russian church; the latter, in complete contradiction with it. The first was chosen by the so-called "Old-believers," or "Old-ritualists." The second was approved by the "sectarians." We have now to follow the evolution of the two.<sup>2</sup>

The "Old-believers," to begin with them, were also divided into two opposite bodies, those "Acknowledging Priests," and the "Priestless," and their significance in the development of the Russian popular faith was far from equal. Both factions accused the official church of having betrayed the Orthodox religion. But the "Acknowledging Priests" thought that the true church still continued to exist in their own midst. The

<sup>2</sup>To make general lines of development and mutual relations between different factions of the Russian "Old-belief" and sectarianism more easy to follow, a "synoptic table" is appended, showing also the time of first appearance of these sects and factions

A SYNOPTIC TABLE OF THE RUSSIAN SECTS, IN THEIR CONSECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT



“Priestless” held to the extreme opinion that no church whatever existed, and that the second advent was on its way. This decisive view, however, was not adhered to at once even by this uncompromising party of the “Old-believers.” Some time after their excommunication at the council of 1667, the Schismatics were uncertain and wavered between the two views just mentioned. According to the chances either of reconquering the former dominant position of the old creed, or of being obliged to surrender in the struggle with the established church, they alternately clung to the idea of the existence of a church or to that of the reign of Antichrist. But in measure, as the years went on and the hope for a re-establishment diminished, they were brought to choose between these opposite views. Moreover, the choice became quite unavoidable, because they actually remained without priests and legal hierarchy. At the moment when the “Old-believers” were proclaimed Schismatics by the established church, they had no bishops in their midst. Thus their priests could not be duly ordained, and accordingly they could not administer sacraments. Now, it was understood that a church without sacraments was no church at all; its further independent existence, therefore, became impossible. And, indeed, their theologians did not fail to find, contrary to the current doctrine, that Holy Writ itself foretold the extinction of the Christian church on the eve of the coming of Antichrist. In its turn, the extinction of the church served in their view to prove that the end of time was approaching. Therefore the extreme faction gave themselves up to wait for Antichrist, which

made all further questioning about the future superfluous.

But the moderate faction, even though they believed in the coming of Antichrist, did not dare accept the bold theory of the complete extinction of the church. Had it not been promised by Christ himself, they objected, that the church should exist until the end of time? Of course, there were no bishops in their midst; but this only meant that Orthodox bishops must be supposed to exist somewhere else, say in the far East. The only task was then to find out where they were hidden. Meanwhile they acquiesced in acknowledging even such priests as came to the schism from the official church.

Thus the moderate set of the "Old-believers" was brought to "acknowledge priests." This implied, however, an inconsistent supposition that some scraps at least of Orthodoxy were still lingering in the official church. But why then leave it at all? In fact, attempts at full reconciliation were more than once really made. Were it not for the uncompromising spirit of the established church, the reconciliation would have been attained long ago. Failing that, the "Old-believers" who "acknowledged priests" went on searching for bishops of their own. After a century of search, they succeeded in founding an independent hierarchy, whose first chief was an Orthodox bishop from the Balkans. He consented to be "corrected" regarding some details in the rite of his consecration according to the demands of the "Old-believers," and took his metropolitan seat at Bailaya Kreenitza, in Austria, close to the Russian frontier, in 1846. Then he ordained many Russian

bishops, and now the "Austrian hierarchy" flourishes in Russia. Many "Old-believers," however, do not acknowledge the Austrian bishops, owing to some doubts about the "corrections" of the first metropolitan, and also because this great change too was an "innovation," not likely to please the illiterate conservative crowd who had grown accustomed to their "fugitive priests."

We see that this set of the "Old-believers" did not go much astray from the highroad of Russian Orthodoxy. Centuries of persecution and the constant necessity of searching for new issues and of adjusting them to the strict letter of the canons helped, of course, this faction to keep alive their religious interest. But there was no inner incitement for them to come to a deeper religious understanding. Their religious ideal was behind them; their theological tendency was chiefly conservative; thus they ended by coming back to their starting-point, and they brought with them only what they had lost at the very beginning of their religious pilgrimage, the fulness of hierarchy; and even this they got by dint of a very doubtful compromise.

Richer by far was the religious life of the extreme set of the "Old-believers" — that of the "Priestless" people. Their beginnings were quite revolutionary. They prepared for the coming of Antichrist; hence they did not wish to acquiesce in any compromise. Antichrist was in their view Peter the Great. His personality, his reforms, his aversion to everything that was old, his persecution of schism, his way of treating religion, all served to prove that the Father

of Lies was himself reigning in person. In consequence, there was no salvation for the people who should remain in the "world." Their device was, then, to flee from the world and, if possible, from life altogether. "Save yourself by flight into the wilderness, and if you are sought for by the authorities, burn yourself or drown yourself or perish by starvation, whichever you like, and you will deserve a crown of martyrdom." Such became now their rule of life. Just at the moment when Peter personally took the reins (in 1691), the second advent was expected, and there was a very epidemic of burnings: not less than twenty thousand perished by fire. The woods and wastes north of the Volga were the center of this "Priestless" movement: in the tundras of the White Sea region they founded their larger communities.

But as soon as these communities (particularly the chief one among them, on the river Wig) were built, the relation of the "Priestless" to the "world" began to change. People who admitted no sacraments were obliged to permit married pairs to live in their midst. Men who looked at the state authorities as servants of the devil were obliged to pay taxes, to serve in the army, and even to receive passports, the very "seal of Antichrist." Fanatics who shunned every contact with the "outsiders" could not avoid meeting them in the market-place, or even the buying of victuals from them. These concessions to the "world" called forth a protest from some members of the community. A certain Philip in 1744 persuaded many of them to be burned alive rather than take the seal of Antichrist and pray for the Tsar, as they were ordered by the

authorities. A like opposition was kindled by the head of another "Priestless" community, a certain Theodosius. Thus the "Priestless" people were divided into three branches: the moderate—who kept their geographical name of the "Littorals," the "Shore-dwellers" along the White Sea ("Pomortsee")—and two extreme sects—the Philippians and the Theodosians. But naturally enough the extreme factions, in their turn, could not keep clear of every compromise with the world. The Theodosians were the first to share the fate of the "Shore-dwellers." They also founded a wealthy and powerful community in Moscow, during the reign of Catherine II., and were obliged in their turn to defer to authorities and to converse with the "secular" people. But, while indulging in these necessities of actual life, they did not wish to acknowledge the necessity of any compromise in doctrine, and so clung to their original idea of Antichrist's reign in the world. Their chief aim was thus to bring back the whole movement to the crazy enthusiasm and fanaticism of its old days. Accordingly, the extreme faction became more conservative in theory, than the moderate faction was. The moderate party, indeed, were ready for a theoretical as well as a practical compromise. They did not feel bound by the psychopathic strain of their origins; they considered the needs of the new times. "We must not recoil in doubt before the argument that our fathers did not know this or that," their theologians declared. "Their life cannot serve as an example for us. They were living far from the world, in the wilderness and in isolation. But we live in the midst of the world, and we dwell surrounded

by all kinds of temptations." Thus, the moderate party of the "Priestless" proved to be more inclined to innovations in doctrine; they were theoretically more radical. We may take as an illustration their debates on the question of marriage. The difficulty was that marriage was looked upon as a sacrament; but, with priests lacking, no sacraments could be performed. Therefore the Theodosians did not admit of marriage and preferred concubinage. "It is better to sin than to twist the teachings of the holy church," they argued. Now, the moderate party, the "Shore-dwellers," preferred to "twist" the old doctrine of faith, in order to have legal marriages kept. The outlet they found was quite unusual for Orthodox and "Old-believers." The "Shore-dwellers" found themselves asserting marriage to be not a sacrament at all. Or rather, they found the sacrament to be, not what it was supposed to mean in the Orthodox church—not a rite, but an inner fact of religious life, a state of soul. Marriage was consummated, they asserted, by the very fact of union of man and woman, not by the consecration of this fact by the church authorities, by means of a certain rite. The way they came to this conclusion was not less uncommon than the conclusion itself: they studied the question historically and dogmatically. The rationalistic element was thus entering into the theology of the "Old-ritualists." Accordingly, the very idea of the church was to be entirely changed. The new idea found its expression in a saying which thenceforth passed from "Old-ritualists" to our sectarians: "The church is not in the wooden walls, but in the ribs." This meant: the church is not an outward form, but part of conscience.



But before we enter into a closer study of this new and liberal view of religion, which originated in the midst of the moderate party of the "Priestless" people, we must dwell on some novelties which the extreme and uncompromising set of the same party contrived to bring into the Russian religious life. Antiquated though this latter faction was on points of rite and dogma, they always tried to be as radical as possible on questions of their relation to the "world," to the "outsiders." This was the point where, in the second half of the eighteenth century, a vagabond dreamer, Euphemius, made the last and most consistent attempt at a revival and a reconstruction of the old "Priestless" doctrine. He required that the true "Priestless" should break the temporary truce which even the Theodosians had concluded with the world of Antichrist, and that they might again "flee away from town to town," as they were doing at the end of the seventeenth century, in general expectation of the second judgment. But in order to prove most obviously that Antichrist was really reigning over the world, Euphemius modernized the antiquated religious theory of the "Priestless" by means of recasting it into a radical social doctrine. Landed property was, according to his teaching, the chief tie which bound people to a settled station. But landed property, he affirmed, was invented by Peter the Great and Neekon. Before their time the land was, as it ought to be, God's; therefore it must remain for collective use and possession. Men would again become equal as they had been before, should they return to the pure doctrine of shunning the world and Antichrist. Thus the religious protest deepened into a

complete rupture with the civil authorities, with the state and its law, with society and its traditional morals. A hundred years before Leo Tolstoy, his theory of Christian anarchism was anticipated by the fugitive soldier, Euphemius. The followers of Euphemius are known under the name of "Runners" or "Wanderers;" they exist up to the present day.

We may thus conclude that in both the moderate and extreme ramifications of the "Priestless" the doctrine decidedly transgressed the orthodox limits of the ritualistic "Old-belief." But long before this inner evolution was accomplished among the Orthodox, Russia received the leaven of a purer faith in a more direct way. In a parallel line with the "Old-belief," modern sectarianism has developed in Russia.

The fact of its spread is as extremely important for Russian culture as it was entirely unforeseen and unheeded by the theorists of the Russian nationalistic tradition. Up to the present time Russian nationalists persevere in their serene conviction that Orthodox religion is an indestructible quality in the national soul. No thorough change of religion have they ever thought possible for the Russian people. The only change that actually occurred, *i. e.*, the "Old-belief," they triumphantly pointed out to be only a more scrupulous and anxious clinging to the old tradition of faith. No other way of betraying the established church seemed to them likely ever to be found.

Such was also the old Russian view of religion. When, at the end of the sixteenth century, a Russian lad, Boris Godoonov, sent abroad for study by the Tsar, became an Anglican clergyman, the Russian govern-

ment repeatedly insisted upon his extradition for this specious reason that a man "cannot get rid of his very nature," and thus the person in question could not possibly change his religion. Of course, there were some instances in Russian history of men adopting heresy. But this was explained as something quite occasional and due to foreign influence.

Foreign influence there really was, as we shall soon see; but it worked along the line of an inner process of religious development. It was only when this process of inner evolution had prepared Russian people to embrace new views on religion that foreign influence became operative and effective. And we saw how this preparation began while people still remained within the limits of the "Old-belief."

In fact, this was the same line of religious development that we may trace, *mutatis mutandis*, in western Europe and, in general, everywhere where there was any possibility of such a development. It consisted in making the ideas of religion clearer and more abstract as well as in deepening religious feeling. What the psychological substratum of this development is, we do not undertake to show here; it is quite sufficient for our present purpose to find out what was the historical line of the process. And in this we find indubitable uniformity. You will remember what was the starting-point of the process in western Europe. It took there the shape of a protest against mediæval views on religion. Deeper views were found to be contained in earlier sources of Christianity, and a return to the Scripture was felt necessary. There the idea of an apostolic church was found to be opposed

to the church of the Middle Ages. But this idea served as a germ for further development. Man must be in immediate communion with God; no outward and magic help of rite and sacrament for salvation was to be administered by the priests. Religion was to be understood as a reign of grace, not a reign of strict law. This again led farther: By rigid logic, the idea of grace led to the notion of the church as consisting exclusively of such members as had the grace necessary for salvation; a church of the predestined, as Calvin taught; or a church of "saints" and saved, as the Independents preached; or a church of free believers individually adopting grace, as was the teaching of the Arminians. Thus the Christianity of Paul and Luther was shaded off into the Christianity of such sectarians as believed in the presence of the Holy Spirit in the soul of man and asserted that Christianity should be mystic, prophetic; in short, entirely spiritual. Spirit was opposed to Scripture, as Scripture had been opposed to tradition. Evangelicism was evolved into prophetism.

Of course, in Russia, as we shall see, no such logical succession of stages in religious development is to be traced. The evangelical forms of belief did not precede prophetism; they appeared at the same time as the spiritual form, and even somewhat later perhaps. Accordingly, the spiritual belief, when it first appeared, did not look like a purified and logically developed evangelicism; on the contrary, it looked inferior, because it was oddly enough intermingled with elements of popular belief, and even of sheer paganism, with which it still remained in immediate

touch. Then, the whole subsequent history of Russian evangelicism and spiritual sects consists not so much in an evolution of doctrine as in a gradual elimination of such elements as are due to the ancient religious notions of the people. In this way a higher degree of understanding is reached, and reception of more advanced forms of Protestant thought is made possible.

The influence of Protestant ideas on Russian belief appears very early; it is contemporary with the first attempts at a religious reformation in Europe itself. The religious movement in the Balkans which spread over mediæval Europe, and found its final expression in the building of such sects as the Albigenses in France and the Lollards in England in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, had a remote reverberation also in Russia. This influence of "Paulikianism," further developed by other mystical teachings and rationalistic heresies, came to Russia in the fifteenth century through the orthodox channel of the Greek monasteries at Mount Athos, and through the immediate intervention of the Karaite Jews, they being also a kind of Jewish Paulinists. But until the period of the unification of Russia, at the end of the fifteenth century, the influence of those heretical doctrines was limited to the most civilized parts of the Russia of those times, to the rich merchant republics of Pskov and Novgorod. From this last city the heretical teachings found their way to Moscow, just at the time of the political unification, at the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century. But here just then a nationalistic type of religion was being formed, entirely opposed

to the new currents. The nationalistic religion was growing ritualistic, formal, and subject to state influence. The tendencies of the rationalistic and mystic currents were spiritualistic, critical, and bent on independence, moral and political. Thus no other relation was possible between the old and the new types of religious thought than struggle. The struggle set in indeed, and after half a century, as was to be expected, it resulted in the triumph of the nationalistic type, which is already known by us. The new "heresies" were completely vanquished and driven out of Russia; they found their refuge in the neighboring countries of Lithuania and Poland. Every spark of the pre-Reformation ideas in Russia seemed herewith entirely extinguished.

But now the immediate action of the Reformation began to be felt. In Moscow this new current of religious ideas succeeded the former one almost without interruption as early as the middle of the sixteenth century. The old "heresy," imported from the Orthodox East, from Constantinople and Athos, here came into contact with the new heresy, coming from the German West. The German religion was then supposed in Moscow to be still Roman Catholic, because nothing was known here as yet about the Reformation. In fact, a Russian officer, Matthias Bashkin, was condemned by a council of bishops in Moscow in 1554 as an adherent of the "Latin heresy," though his doctrine was entirely evangelical and had been learned from a Protestant physician coming from Lithuania. This early evangelist of Moscow professed that there is no transsubstantiation; that the church

does not consist of the building, but of the gathering together of the faithful; that images of saints are wretched idols; that there are no confession and no remission of sins unless you actually desist from sinning; that prayer must be addressed to one God, the Father; that the traditions of the holy Fathers were mere fables; that the resolutions of the ecumenical councils were arbitrary; that one must believe in the gospel alone. None of these doctrines found any further echo in Moscow. We may understand why if we consider that even in the second half of the same century the Tsar John IV. himself—who was much interested in religious questions, and who wished really to know what the Protestant religion was—did not find a better way to satisfy his desire than asking a Protestant pastor “how they performed the rite of divine service, how the priests entered into the church and put on vestments, what they sang during the mass and how they brought it to a close, whether they rang the bells in the same way every day, or whether perhaps they rang differently on great feast days of our Lord.” The Tsar had evidently not the least notion that to answer these questions was not to inform him what the essence of Protestantism was. He simply did not know how to ask and what to ask about. Thus the very essence of the new conception of religion remained wholly incomprehensible to the Russians of the sixteenth century. Therefore the European Reformation could not strike root in Moscow at this time. That is also why foreigners were then permitted to live in the midst of the Orthodox population without any apprehension of danger.

We already know<sup>3</sup> that the situation changed greatly in the middle of the seventeenth century, when the foreign inhabitants were relegated to the confines of the city. This marks also the time when foreign religious belief began to influence the Russian population. The soil was now more ready for the seed, and thus, in the second half, or rather at the end, of the seventeenth century, the first original movements of an evangelical and spiritual character appeared in Russia.

We must recollect that this was just at the moment when the separation of the radicals—the “Priestless”—from the bulk of the “Old-believers” began.<sup>4</sup> We have seen that it was the time of general agitation and trouble: the second advent was said to be approaching, and Antichrist was expected to come. The end of the world was foretold for the year 1691. The doctrine of voluntary death and martyrdom was ardently propagated among those most inclined to religious emotion. Such were the conditions under which the ordinary concomitant of religious emotionalism, *prophetism*, appeared. Men were seen to fall into trances and to deliver revelations. “The Holy Spirit talks through us,” they asserted.

Such, then, was the origin of the first Russian sect of spiritual Christians. They called themselves “Men of God,” or plainly “Christs;” later on this name was altered to “Hleests,” with a meaning something like “Flagellants.” The reason for their appearance they explained in a legend about the founder of the sect. There was once an old and wise man, the legend runs,

<sup>3</sup> See p. 37.

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 95, 96.



named Daneelo Fillippitch, who was studying the question which were the true books—the “old” or the “new.”<sup>5</sup> This question Daneelo Fillippitch resolved in a radical way. There was no need either of new or of old books. The only book wanted for salvation was a “living” one—the Holy Spirit himself. So he gathered all his books and threw them into a river. God’s men afterwards assembled and resolved to send wise men to ask that God himself might come to the earth. And a chariot of fire rolled down from the clouds, and God was in it, and he took up his abode in the sanctified body of Daneelo Fillippitch. You may conclude from this legend that the divine idea was not quite comfortably lodged in the rather heavy mind of Daneelo Fillippitch and his followers. They did not grasp satisfactorily the notion of living inspiration. Hence the whole of their teaching makes up a curious mixture of the old and the new. To become inspired, for instance, a peculiar method is used—a method entirely outward and physiological. The Hleests gather in circles, in a private room, and perform a kind of dance to the tune of peculiar songs of their own. The time of the song grows gradually quicker and quicker, and also the movements of the choir. Some people, more fit for inspiration, turn like dervishes in the midst of the circle, in a whirling dance, until they fall on the floor wholly exhausted and begin to vociferate some incoherent words which are taken for a prophecy. Such people as can “turn in the circle” are sure to possess the Spirit; they form a higher rank of the community—the “prophets” and

<sup>5</sup> See p. 79, Neekon’s reform.

“prophetesses.” The other members remain in a stage of preparation. There is a “Christ” at the head of every community—or “ship” as it is called—and a “Mother of God,” too, at his side. Many features in rite and teaching are taken directly from the “Old-believers,” from whose number the Hleests issued. The assemblies regularly end in orgies which remind us of pagan rites; the notion of Christian love being interpreted in a rather wide sense.

We shall not dwell on a reaction against the last-mentioned feature, which gave origin, in the middle of the eighteenth century, to an ascetic sect of “Castratoes” (*Skoptsee*). This, indeed, was no step further in the development of the spiritualistic belief. And before we take up the consideration of such sects as really achieved progress, let us look back to the end of the seventeenth century, when the Hleests first appeared. We have to trace there also another origin—that of the Russian evangelical creed.

We have just seen that the origin of the Hleests was popular, and that by this origin they are immediately connected with the extremest party of the “Old-believers.” The origin and the affiliation of Russian evangelicism are quite otherwise. The surroundings in which evangelistic doctrine first struck root were entirely different from the popular gatherings of “Old-believers” waiting for the day of judgment; it was in the much more refined atmosphere of the first Russian academy for theological studies, which had just been founded in Moscow in the year 1687. Of course, no foreign theology was to be taught there. Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinistic books on religion

were rigorously forbidden, and lectures were to be delivered in strict accordance with the Greek doctrine of faith. Nevertheless, discussions about the different denominations constantly took place in the school; and thus the differences in religious rite and belief became current topics of scholarly controversy. Presently, however, these discussions passed beyond the walls of the academy. In connection with them an amateur debating club gathered around a Muscovite free-thinker, Demetrius Tveretinov, and along with the discussions the head of the circle undertook a work of formal propaganda. Tveretinov was assisted in this propaganda by a change in the official position of religion which occurred at the time of Peter the Great. "Thanks to God," Tveretinov would say, "now everybody is free in Moscow to believe whatever faith he chooses." In fact, contemporaries witness that Tveretinov and his circle "professed their opinions as boldly as if they were foreigners." This was so, however, only for some dozen years; for in 1714 the religious opinions of the circle were condemned by a council, and the "heretics" were obliged to renounce their opinions. The only one among them who did not acquiesce in this renunciation was burned alive. But Tveretinov's teachings were not extinguished with his renunciation. From this time on, evangelistic opinions have always existed in Russia.

To what extent, however, the term "evangelical" may be used concerning Tveretinov's body of doctrine may be doubted. The term was, of course, his own; but his opponents were not incorrect when they observed that "here a new heresy was beginning, worse

than Lutheranism or Calvinism." The fact is that Russian evangelicism, from its first appearance in the sixteenth century, seems to have cherished some opinions that remind one rather of Unitarian doctrines. The influence of the Polish Socinians may account perhaps for this peculiarity. You will remember that the Russian "heretics" of the sixteenth century, when condemned by the Moscow councils in 1552-54, had fled over the western frontier.<sup>6</sup> One of these refugees, Theodosius the Squint-Eyed, was known to be at one with the Polish Anti-trinitarians. He had followers in Russia, and his teachings were refuted in Russian theological tracts. As regards the followers, their further fate is quite obscure; but the teachings were preserved for the future by the theological refutations just mentioned. Thus the very name for Russian evangelical believers, until the second half of the eighteenth century, seems to have been borrowed from controversial tracts against Russian "heretics" of the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries. These heretics were called "Judaizers." It is not known positively whether the name alone was preserved, or whether there existed, from the end of the fifteenth century onward, a continuous tradition of the "heresy" itself. In the last case Tveretinov's doctrine must have served to revive this tradition of heresy, or else it may even have laid anew the foundations of evangelicism, if before the end of the seventeenth century evangelicism may be found to have been extinguished. Anyhow, the early Russian evangelists, such as the "Judaizers," the "Seventh-day Observers," were now all adherents

<sup>6</sup> See above, p. 104.

of Tveretinov. Tveretinov's "Extracts from the Holy Writ" served them as a catechism and a gospel. These extracts were systematically arranged by Tveretinov under different headings, in accordance with the chief points of evangelical criticism. Their aim, though, was not an exposition of any positive doctrine, but the making of converts by the refutation of errors in the orthodox faith.

Thus both the spiritual and the evangelical currents of Christian thought took their rise in Russia at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries. Their teaching, however, did not remain unchanged. Subsequently both currents, about a century later, profiting by the comparative freedom of the reign of Catherine II., who was indifferent to sectarianism, and by that of Alexander I., who rather favored it, took on quite a new form. The new sect of spiritual Christians that now was developed from the Hleests was that of the "Wrestlers with the Spirit" (*Dookhobortsee*). The other new sect, the evangelical one, that was also developed from the former—the "Judaizers"—under the influence of the spiritual sect just mentioned, took the name of the "Milk-Drinkers" (*Molokanee*).

The Dookhobortsee (or "Dookhobory") are particularly interesting, because they achieved a considerable progress in the spiritual Christianity of Russia. Such pagan ways and rites as the Hleests performed are entirely eradicated from the religious practices of the "Wrestlers with the Spirit." No whirlwind dances, no ecstatic prophecy, no sensual orgies, can be found there. At the same time the religious doctrine is con-

siderably spiritualized. There is no hierarchical distinction like that which existed between the "prophets" of the Hleests and the rest of the congregation longing for inspiration. Everybody is inspired; everyone is a "son of God," and as such possesses Christ in his inmost soul. Such were all souls at the moment they were created by God. But a part of them had sinned even before God created the world. Therefore they were cast off by God and plunged deep into the flesh, the matter, which is the very element of sin. To free themselves from every seduction of the flesh—this was, they held, the only way to revive Christ in the soul. The first men on earth still were so perfect that they had no need of outward rules or rites for this purpose. But in measure as the flesh prevailed, prescriptions of state and church were felt to be necessary. Then also the divisions of churches began. As yet, however, all these authorities, laws, and doctrines were no more than palliatives, powerless to restrain the "wickedness of the wicked." For the righteous, on the other hand, even such restrictions were not at all necessary. "In whose hearts the Sun of eternal truth has risen in midday brightness, there moon and stars have no more light. For the children of God, tsars and authorities and every human law are truly superfluous. Through Jesus Christ their will is made free from any law: no law is given for the righteous." No Holy Writ or sacraments or rite whatever can bind the sons of God; for them such things are mere "signs" and "images," having only a figurative, an emblematic sense. Churches of every denomination are equally open to them. Superior to any particular

church, they feel also superior to the state. Like Quakers they profess the unlawfulness of war and of oaths for Christians. You know, I suppose, what extreme consequences of Christian anarchism were drawn from these general ideas of the "Wrestlers with the Spirit" when their doctrine was recently renovated by the teachings of Leo Tolstoy. In Canada they have just tried to realize their social Utopia, which was perhaps more easy to understand in the days of George Fox and Roger Williams than it is in our own time.<sup>7</sup>

In the year 1818 two Quakers, William Allen and Stephen Grellet, saw the colonies of the "Wrestlers with the Spirit" and had no difficulty in recognizing how near the doctrine of the Dookhobortsee was to their own. They visited also the neighboring colonies of the Molokanee (the "Drinkers of Milk") who, as we have seen, were a new evangelical sect, formed, under the influence of the Dookhobortsee, out of evangelical elements formerly existing in Russia.<sup>8</sup>

The chief merit of this new sect was, indeed, the unification of many sects, vaguely evangelical, and also the formulating of a more definite, positive doctrine, which completed and took the place of the rather negative criticisms of Tveretinov's "Extracts from the Bible." The contents of their new creed, quite different from that of the Dookhobortsee and wholly founded on Scripture, are very well epitomized by the two Quakers just mentioned. We borrow the following passage from a report sent by William Allen to the emperor (1819):

They believe in the divine authority of the Holy Scriptures, in the deity of our Lord and Savior, and in the influence of the

<sup>7</sup> See p. 119.

<sup>8</sup> See p. 111.

Holy Spirit, as fully as any Christians whom we ever met with. They believe it their duty to abstain from all ceremonies, and think that the only acceptable worship is that performed "in spirit and in truth." They collect their families two or three times a day to hear the Scriptures read, and abstain from secular employment on the first day of the week, called Sunday, considering it their duty to appropriate this day to religious exercises. Their *marriages* are performed with solemnity in their public meetings, and the parties promise to be faithful to each other during life. They believe that the only true *baptism* is that of Christ with the Spirit, and that the water baptism of John is not now necessary; and they consider that the true *communion* is altogether of a spiritual nature, and make use of no outward ceremony. In their meetings for worship they sing psalms, and several of those who are esteemed by the rest as more pious read to the others, in turn. They have no appointed preachers, but anyone who feels himself properly qualified, through the power of the Divine Influence upon the mind, may expound and speak to edification; they, however, consider that it should never be done for hire, or from any worldly motive.

They believe that a true Christian can never harbor revenge, and they think it their duty rather to suffer wrong than to seek to avenge it; if any differences arise, they are settled among themselves, and not brought to the tribunals.

Some among them are considered as elders, and though it does not appear that they are regularly appointed, yet those who are most eminent for their piety are regarded as such, and it is their duty, when any of the fraternity are ill, to visit them, and if able to do so, to offer them advice, or afford them comfort. No particular ceremony is observed at their burial, but they sing a psalm.

If the moral conduct of anyone does not correspond with his profession, he is tenderly exhorted, and much labor is bestowed upon him; but if they judge that he cannot be reclaimed, he is dismissed from the society. With respect to the poor among them, they deem it Christian duty to take care of, and support each other. It appears that they have no instance among them



of children acting irreverently towards their parents, and they are very careful to have them instructed in reading and writing.

Another quotation, from the *Memoirs* of Stephen Grellet, who journeyed together with William Allen, points out some new features, particularly of social teachings, of the Molokanee, and also their similarity to the Quakers:

Previous to our going to the meeting with the Spiritual Christians, we prepared a list of the principal subjects respecting which we wished to inquire of them. They were very free to give us every information we asked for, and they did it in few words, accompanied, generally, with some Scripture quotations as their reasons for believing or acting as they did; these were so much to the purpose that one acquainted with Friends' writings might conclude that they had selected from them the most clear and appropriate passages to support their several testimonies, etc.<sup>9</sup> On all the cardinal points of the Christian religion, the fall of man, salvation by Christ through faith, the meritorious death of Christ, his resurrection, ascension, etc., their views are very clear; also respecting the influence of the Holy Spirit, worship, ministry, baptism, the supper, oaths, etc., etc., we might suppose they were thoroughly acquainted with our religious society, but they had never heard of us, nor of any people that profess as they do. Respecting war, however, their views are not entirely clear, and yet many among us may learn from them; they said, "War is a subject that we have not yet been able fully to understand, so as to reconcile Scripture with Scripture; we are commanded to obey our rulers, magistrates, etc., for conscience' sake; and again, we are enjoined to love our enemies, not to avenge ourselves, to render good for evil; therefore, we

<sup>9</sup> The Molokanee in their answers to Grellet, used doubtless a selection from the Holy Scripture which took the place of Tveretinov's "Extracts" and which until now formed their chief source of religious knowledge. This selection is called "Ritual," because the selections are classified here under the headings of different Christian rites.

cannot see fully how we can refuse obedience to the laws that require our young people to join the army; but in all matters respecting ourselves, we endeavor to act faithfully as the gospel requires; we have never any lawsuits; for if anybody smites us on the one cheek, we turn to him the other; if he takes away any part of our property, we bear it patiently, we give to him that asketh, and lend to him that borrows, not asking it back again, and in all these things the Lord blesses us; the Lord is very good also to our young men; for though several of them have been taken to the army, not one of them has actually borne arms; for, our principles being known, they have very soon been placed in offices of trust, such as attending to the provisions of the army, or something of that sort." Their ministers are acknowledged in much the same way as ours, and, like us, they consider that their only and their best reward is the dear Savior's approbation; therefore, they receive no kind of salary. They use the Slavonian Bible; few of them, however, can read; but those who can, read to the others, and these from memory teach the children, so that their young people are very ready in quoting the Scriptures correctly. They pointed out to us the great distinction there is between them and the Dookhobortsee. The latter deny the authority of the Scriptures; they deny the divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ; the offering up of himself a sacrifice for sin on Calvary and salvation by faith in him.

These rather long quotations show at first hand how purified the life and the teachings of the Russian evangelicals were a hundred years ago, and a hundred years after Russian evangelicism took its rise.

We come now to the nineteenth century. Never was religious life in Russia more animated, and never was the official church more lifeless and powerless in its spiritual struggle against "heresies." With the ancient schism of the "Old-believers" the church had long since come to terms; the parish priests generally derived profits from its existence, by delivering to

“Old-believers” certificates for the performance of Orthodox rites and sacraments. Thus they were interested in concealing schismatics from the persecution of the government. With the new sects the case was quite different. With the single exception of the Hleests, the sectarians were eager to testify to their faith and gave no bribes to the parish clergy. Endowed with a fresh spirit of proselytism, they made many converts, and so diminished the number of the Orthodox parishioners. Their very teaching seemed infinitely more revolutionary for the church than were the doctrines of the “Old-believers.” Therefore, the clergy had now to set at work proving that for the state, too, sectarian doctrines were particularly dangerous. And they did not appeal in vain to the secular arm. A persecution began, systematic and relentless as it never had been before. But, in spite of persecution, the religious movement was always growing, particularly in the second half of the century. The growth manifested itself, first, in a considerable increase of adherents of the old sects; secondly, in a continual development of their doctrines; and, thirdly, in the appearance of new sects. The results of this evolution are at the present time so varied and so continuously changing that I cannot give you here even an approximate sketch of them. I can only point out the chief changes which the sects already known to you have undergone, and mention some of the most important which have recently appeared.

The Hleests did not remain unchanged after the development from them of a more perfect type of spiritual Christianity—the “Wrestlers with the Spirit.”

There was no lack of attempt on their part to purify their rite, to heighten the quality of inspiration, and to deepen its mystical sense; while at the same time they endeavored to preserve to the sect such practical ways of receiving the spirit as the too prosaic doctrine of the "Wrestlers with the Spirit" had completely got rid of. As concerns their former rite, many Hleests desisted from the practice of ending their whirling dances with fleshly orgies, and they regulated, in a certain measure, their habits of "spiritual love." Some of them even ceased to use any artificial ways whatever for eliciting the voice of the spirit in the soul. The spirit was to be got, as was claimed by a new theory, by a long series of spiritual exertions, implying complete "self-negation," a "surrender of self to the will of God," a "self-burial" in Christ. Only after such complete mortification of flesh and will an internal voice began to be felt, commanding man's actions independently of his own will. This is the "mysterious resurrection" which follows the "mysterious death." The inward dictation of the spirit makes the will free from any command of the law: such is the necessary conclusion of Antinomianism of every time and nation.

Unlike the Hleests, the life and doctrine of the "Wrestlers with the Spirit" started from so high a point that it has lowered in the course of the nineteenth century. Their abstract teaching could not be grasped by undeveloped minds, and so the sect was obliged to recur to the help of outward symbols and figurative expressions; such, for instance, was the kind of short catechism compiled for their general instruction in

faith. As concerns their life, they were ruled rather arbitrarily by a dynasty of "Christs," whose dignity and vocation were supposed to pass regularly from father to son. The last of this dynasty, the "Mother of God," Lukairya, died in the year 1886, and her heirs have appropriated as their own the collective property of the "Wrestlers with the Spirit." This served as a signal for a religious awakening. The sectarians considered their loss as a punishment for their sins, and so resolved to live thenceforward "according to freedom and conscience." Just then they were strongly influenced by the Tolstoyan doctrine of "non-interference with evil." The most fervent immediately began to practice their new teaching. They changed their name for a new one—that of "All-brethren"—refused military service, ceased to pay duties which might serve to "hire other people to kill men." They were then exiled—for the third time during a century—to the confines of the empire, and were transported from there, with the help of Tolstoy and his followers, to Canada. In Canada they tried to ward off every interference of the state in their affairs. To this end they refused to acknowledge the possession of landed property, to register births and marriages, and generally to recognize any state law. Because they wished to "be directed exclusively by the dictates of their own conscience," they considered every outward rule "murderous to life." Being checked, by a positive refusal on the part of the Canadian authorities to consider their point of view, they addressed themselves "to all men, brethren of all countries," asking to be told whether there is to be

found anywhere a country or a society where they would be tolerated. After some fruitless waiting for an answer, the majority yielded to the requests of the authorities; but the minority, supported in their resolution to resist by Tolstoy himself, worked up their spirits to a state of mystic exaltation, and so exhibited to the puzzled Americans the mediæval show of a crowd proceeding, with a "John the Baptist" at its head, in search of Christ's kingdom. But to do the sect full justice, one must remember that they are such only in moments of high religious emotion. From time to time such emotions have swept like epidemics through Russia itself. In quieter times, however, the impression that our sectarians leave on the observer is entirely different. It is like what we saw in the descriptions of Allen and Grellet. By the high moral tone which the sectarians exhibit in their family life and social intercourse, by the strict observance of their pledged word, by the rigid keeping of their obligations toward their fellow-men, by their readiness to help and sympathize both with outsiders and with their brethren in the faith, they present exactly the opposite to what I described in my first chapter as the average Russian type. Theirs is a higher social type—the type of the Russian of the future.

Of the sects of the eighteenth century there remain to be spoken of the Molokanee, the "Drinkers of Milk." As they were the most moderate, and as their doctrine was the most definitely formulated in harmony with the Bible view of the early apostolic church, they have changed less during the nineteenth century than other

sectarians. But still the general drift of religious currents did not leave them untouched. In the same wise as they themselves had been recast into a new sect, from many congenial elements which had previously existed, they in their turn served as a ready material for the building of more advanced sects of a kindred spirit. Two new sects appeared about the middle of the nineteenth century, closely related to each other in the original character of their inspiration, but gravitating to quite different central ideas, either spiritual or evangelical. One was called the "Shalopoots," the "Good-for-Nothing Men." The Shalopoots shared the purified and spiritualized doctrine of the Hleests; at the same time they adopted (or preserved) the "Ritual" or catechism of the "Drinkers of Milk." Their social doctrine was that of collectivism; their rural economy was practically communistic. In general, they preserved the character of spiritual Christianity.

The other sect was called by a German name, "Stundists," which points out its foreign origin. It originated, indeed, amidst German colonists of the Mennonite denomination. In the middle of the nineteenth century a religious fermentation began among the Mennonites, and it was felt immediately among their Russian neighbors. In its origin the movement was also spiritual, and even mystical. At the time, however, strong influence of Baptist preachers began, which gave to the movement rather an evangelical character. Baptist missionaries and learned Baptist presbyters tried to unify and organize the Russian Stundists, and for the most part succeeded in their attempt, the

more easily as the profession of the Baptist faith was a means of escaping persecution by the state.<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless, plenty of differences still exist in the little groups of the Stundists, as regards questions of rite and hierarchy, views about the sacraments, about Scripture, and so on. The Baptist point of view appears to be intermediate between the extremes of the various existing opinions of these sectarians. Whether it will prevail depends, in large measure, on the further exertions of the Baptist missionaries from abroad. At all events, it is clear that the sect will remain essentially evangelical. Upon this condition the prospects of its further expansion are dependent, as there exists already another evangelical sect, of recent origin, which is ready to unite with the Stundists. This last sect was founded some twenty-five years ago in the northern part of Russia, while Stundism was spreading in the south. They were called "Pashkovists," from the name of the founder of the sect, Colonel Pashkov, who belonged to the higher society of Petersburg and had undergone the influence of Lord Redstock's preaching in the year 1874. The central, and nearly the only, doctrine of the Pashkovists is justification by faith, with its antinomian consequences. Thus even here, as we see—in a doctrine purely evangelical—there is a tendency to spiritualistic conclusions. And this tendency appears more clearly as the teaching spreads among the people from its original center of educated society.

Thus, wherever we look we always find that the process of Russian reformation is far from having

<sup>10</sup> See below, p. 126.



reached definitive results. The last half-century added more perhaps to the spread of the movement than centuries of former history. It seethes and boils under the seemingly placid surface of the Russian official religion; there are many springs which spout hot currents from the bottom. As yet, however, they are isolated, and so act separately. Their action is dissipated and seems to be almost entirely lost in the standing water that surrounds them. Still, by degrees, the temperature of the water is rising. Is the time soon to come when the ebullition will become general?

That is what our "home mission" foretold long since and is still afraid of. Accordingly, it cries and vociferates for prompt measures to be taken by the state, in order that the established church may be saved from the new religious spirit. Morally powerless, it appeals to material force. And material force has been used for its protection; it is still used to a degree quite incompatible with any claim to civilization. Were it not for that reason, Russian reformation would have been an accomplished fact. This is not at all my personal supposition; the apprehension of this result, as a necessary consequence of any religious tolerance, is loudly outspoken by the representatives and apologists of the established church. In fact, this apprehension it is that makes persecution so relentless and brings the state authorities to the head of the persecution.

I know, of course, that, in consequence of a recently published manifesto, London newspapers informed their readers that "the Tsar grants religious freedom to his subjects." This view seems to have

found its way to America also, if I may judge by an article in the *Chautauquan*. It is affirmed there that the recent decrees of the Tsar on the subject of religion undertake to establish absolute freedom of worship throughout the empire. They thus not only give the nonconformists the rights for which they have long been contending, but mark out a broad and liberal policy of the state in religious matters which certainly augurs well for the country.

I entirely agree with the author as to the appreciation of the policy in question; and I am quite sure that this policy will sooner or later be adopted. But unhappily this is not yet the case; and the manifesto in question actually says quite the opposite to what it was supposed to say. It affirms that existing fundamental laws are quite sufficient to preserve religious tolerance; and that to this effect "authorities will be obliged to observe the fundamental law." This is something, because until now religious persecution did not even take care of the existing law; a ministerial circular, or even an edict of a local governor, was quite sufficient to inaugurate in any given locality—or in the whole empire—the reign of terror for nonconformists. A body of such circulars is still in action, though even the Petersburg senate some twenty years ago protested against their having any legal power. But the chief obstacle to the introduction of a new era of tolerance is quite other; namely, that even the fundamental laws of Russia do not at all assure the subjects any religious freedom. To be more accurate, the sort of religious freedom they give is quite different from what is understood under this term by every civilized nation. It is not at all synonymous in Russia with

the individual freedom of everybody to believe whatever he chooses. The idea of religion is so bound up there with the idea of state and nation that the law makes no attempt to draw a distinction between them. Orthodoxy is a "Russian" religion just as Protestantism is considered in Russia to be the "German" religion. Every nation is free to believe its own religion: that is what is meant by the fundamental law. "Let the Poles worship God according to their Latin rite; but Russian people always were and will remain Orthodox; together with their Tsar and Tsarina they above all venerate and love the native Orthodox church." This is a resolution which the Tsar wrote some years ago concerning such Russian people as were converted from Catholicism to Orthodoxy in western provinces of Russia.

Accordingly there is no freedom as regards your personal belief; you are free only to adhere to the faith in which you are born. An exception is made from this fundamental principle for the benefit of the established church, which is free to receive converts of any other religion. Otherwise the principle is applied rigorously. A man born in the Russian religion cannot possibly change it. He may be heretic or a freethinker; he may not believe in anything; he still is supposed by law to remain Orthodox; and he may be formally compelled to appear before a confessional and to partake of a holy communion once a year at least. If he insists (the fact is hypothetical) on his individual belief, he still does not cease to be Orthodox: he is merely an "erring Orthodox," and he is supposed to repent and then to be given over to

his confessor, in order to learn better. The law does not foresee the possibility that anybody would further insist on his individual belief. But this is not all. As the change of the Orthodox religion is not admitted to be possible, no legal punishment for the change exists, unless there be some criminal transgression connected with the new form of faith adopted; *e. g.*, mutilation of members. The law is strictly consistent, considering every change as *nulle et non avenue*. But there is another side of the question. The convert is not held responsible; but then the responsibility is with the converter. Here is the point where persecution sets in. Not being able to deal with the converts, and even being obliged to comply with the conversion in the next generation, the law concentrates all its severity on the would-be converters. A criminal must be found when there is a crime. And so the punishments are very severe—exile to Siberia or even hard labor—if the conversion chances to be to a sect that is proclaimed by the authorities “particularly dangerous.”

Such is the case with all new sects that make proselytes. You will be interested in one of them that is most like the Baptists, the Stundists. The law proclaims Russian Stundism “particularly dangerous” and severely treats the “converters.” The same law admits the existence of the Baptists as a foreign denomination. Now, a formal struggle is going on between the sectarians who, in the case of a judicial trial, attempt to prove that they are Baptists, and the home missionaries, who declare the Baptist faith to be a “German faith,” not permitted to Russian sectarians. The administrative authorities are always with the mission-

aries; but the judges are sometimes on the side of sectarians. The result of a trial is thus always uncertain.

The principle that a Russian is always supposed to be Orthodox admits also of other applications which practically lead to the same result of crying intolerance. The spirit of proselytism has always been absent from the Orthodox church; it would seem strange to a Russian to convert the Chinese and the Japanese to Orthodoxy. But upon a Russian subject Orthodoxy must be inflicted, for the sake of national uniformity, not for religious reasons. And so it happened to Russian missionaries, who very rarely, if ever, try to convert men of foreign creed, to convert at a bound one and a half millions of adherents of the United church (Græco-Catholic) in 1836-39, and later about half a million of Protestants, Catholics, and United Greeks in Poland and the western and the Baltic governments of Russia. The result of this forced conversion, which was meant to be the best means for Russianization, may be seen in the official reports of Mr. Pobedonostsev. The report for 1895 showed that 73,000 forced converts to Orthodoxy "stubbornly clung to the errors of Catholic faith;" in 1896 their number increased to 77,000; in 1898, to 83,000. According to the same official reports, these people were "without any assistance of the church, either not performing sacraments and spiritual duties, or doing so clandestinely, in local and foreign Catholic churches." In 1898 there were 26,777 children whom their parents preferred to be unbaptized, and 8,699 marriages contracted without religious (*i. e.*, official) sanction.

I do not need to add anything about dismissed Catholic priests and Protestant pastors who were performing their duties; about formal fights for churches, and monasteries sentenced to be closed by Russian authorities. The facts are too well known by Europe, which, some years ago, protested in vain against such treatment of coreligionists.

Of course, the educated classes of Russia have not remained indifferent to such a state of religious intolerance. The cry for freedom of belief and tolerance in matters of religion has always been a war cry of the Russian liberals; nay, even of certain Russian conservatives also. I shall quote to you some recent pleas for religious freedom, belonging to this latter class. At one of the last congresses of Russian missionaries resolutions were passed with a view to enforcing prosecution against sectarians; among other things it was proposed as a general measure—it had already been used in individual cases—to take children from the sectarian parents and to let them be educated by Orthodox persons. Then an isolated voice was raised against such barbarous measures, a voice that reminded the fathers at the meeting of Christian charity and tolerance. That was, however, the voice of a layman, a marshal of nobility, Mr. Stahovich. Mr. Stahovich proposed that the missionaries demand from the government the real, the individual, freedom of conscience. It gave the signal for a tempest of indignation against existing intolerance in the liberal press, and provoked many denunciations of Mr. Stahovich on the part of the clergy. Since then the question of tolerance has not been silenced. It was again raised and dis-

cussed by a Petersburg private society for religious and philosophic culture which had been founded for purposes of defending conservative nationalism, and as such had enjoyed a certain protection in influential spheres of Petersburg. Then the debates and the address delivered on this occasion by Prince Volkonsky—known to America as a lecturer—were published in a monthly having nothing in common with Russian liberals but this: It happened to be published after the manifesto of the Tsar, and as the opinions of the society and of the monthly both stood in decided contradiction with what was considered to be freedom of conscience in that official document, both the society and the journal made only a hairbreadth escape from suppression; both were saved by their conservative reputations only. This will help you to realize to what an extent the idea of an actual religious freedom is popular and how widely spread it is through all educated strata of Russian society.

Some attempts were even made to connect this idea of religious freedom with the conservative tradition of Russia. Slavophiles were the first to attempt a reconciliation between the spirit of tradition and the spirit of religious freedom. We know already that according to the teaching of Slavophiles,<sup>11</sup> liberty of opinion was admitted to be the inalienable though only right of the people, and as such it was opposed to liberal aspirations after larger political rights. "Power to the government; free opinion to the people;" such was the political scheme of the Slavophiles. This implied freedom of conscience as well as freedom of

<sup>11</sup> See p. 56.

speech. But the Slavophiles failed to perceive that freedom of conscience was also a political right, like others which they denied, and not likely to be realized alone. And thus their political ideal was doomed to remain a sentimental utopia. Whatever our opinion may be on this subject, one thing may be safely inferred from everything that has been said in this chapter. This inference is, that religious freedom and tolerance mean nothing less than a break with Russian nationalistic tradition. And if they are one day to come, they will come as the negation of the ancient religious tradition of Russia.



## CHAPTER IV

### THE POLITICAL TRADITION

LET me remind you of the general trend of our discussion which now is to be pursued further. We started from the nationalistic supposition that Russian Orthodoxy was one of the most distinctive features of the Russian national type. Such was at least the common belief of Russian nationalistic politicians. This belief necessarily implied that Orthodoxy had remained unchanged, as befitted a distinctive feature of an immutable national type. It seemed particularly fitting to choose for such a distinctive feature the Orthodox creed, just because immutability was thought to be an inherent quality of Christianity in general and the eastern form of the Christian creed especially. Now we have seen that as a matter of fact Russia is no exception to the general rule of religious change and evolution. There, as everywhere, Christianity suffered change: it took as many different shapes as there were consecutive stages of culture. And these stages were the same in Russia as everywhere else. First, as we saw, there was a long stage of transition from paganism to ritualism. Then followed the stage of transition from ritualism to evangelical and spiritual Christianity. Peculiar to Russia was the particular circumstance that the established church refused to take any active part in aid of this religious evolution, but was very active in its repression. Owing to the non-interference of the

established church, the whole process in Russia took a somewhat incidental character. The religious movement was deprived of its natural leaders, and thus a regular evolution of doctrine was made impossible. Moreover, the natural growth of religious thought was branded schism and heresy, and thus exposed to the prosecution of the authorities and doomed to popular disgrace. This, of course, could not prevent the final triumph of new religious ideas, but it helped greatly to retard the movement. Yet, in spite of all these obstacles, the movement went its natural way and has long broken all ties of tradition. Religious feeling was not unchangeable in Russia, as we see, and if Orthodoxy was, so much the worse for it. The pale of the established church was therefore forsaken by everybody who wanted any kind of living religion. If everything remained unchanged inside the "true fold," it was because there was no life. Accordingly we come to the conclusion that religious immutability is not a national distinction of Russia, because there was no religious immutability, perhaps not even within the precincts of the established church.

Now that we pass to the study of the political tradition, we shall have to face a similar error of judgment; and it is to be corrected in a similar way; *i. e.*, by confronting it with the real process of political evolution. The error consists this time in the idea that the actual political form, autocracy, never has changed and is unchangeable. This is considered by Russian nationalists to be the second essential feature of the national type. We shall soon see that this theory itself is of very recent origin; and that even at the

time of its appearance it did not correspond to the scientific evidence then available. Indeed, the theory of the persistence of Russian political tradition clashes with the facts of history still more obviously than the idea of the persistence of the religious tradition. Some seventy-five years ago, when historical knowledge was yet in its infancy, it was possible to hold the view that the Russian state at its very coming into existence was monarchical. But then the necessary stages of political development previous to the building of a state had not yet been studied by European scholars, and no social embryology existed. The theory of the evolution of political forms was not yet much in advance of Aristotle's teachings, though even those should have prevented the error in question. Now that we have this further knowledge, only such people as are interested in supporting old prejudices still cling to the antiquated theory. Nevertheless the theory is made obligatory by Russian fundamental law; not to share it is considered a political crime, which may be punished by forced labor in Siberia.

But let us look at the facts in the light of the contemporary science of sociology. Three consecutive stages of political organization are generally distinguished by writers on sociology: that of tribal society, that of the feudal state, and that of the national-military state, from which the contemporary constitutional state is evolved. Was there anything corresponding to these three stages in Russian political development?

Before we answer this question we must first consider that even in western Europe the political develop-

ment was not entirely uniform in different countries. As we advance eastward from the Atlantic shore to the Urals, we are sure to find the whole process more and more backward, and less intense. The same process of the growth of the state out of the tribal organization which we observe going on upon the Seine and the Loire as early as the fifth and sixth centuries appears in the seventh and eighth centuries east of the Rhine, from the ninth to the eleventh on the German eastern marches (*i. e.*, in Prussia and Austria), from the tenth to the twelfth in Bohemia and on the Dnepper, and in the twelfth and thirteenth in Lithuania. The chief reason for a comparatively later start is, of course, the lack of inner springs of development. As such inner springs we may consider the social differentiation within the tribal society and the resulting changes in its composition. As a rule, the tribal stage of social existence comes to an end when the leading families of the tribe contrive to promote themselves to a position of local power, *i. e.*, when the local aristocracy appears. The only privilege of such leading families at the beginning of the process was generally that their members should be by preference chosen as headmen of clans or tribes. Later on they usurped a kind of overlordship over the territory of the tribe, claimed the right to dispose not only of the unsettled march land and wastes, but also of the common grounds of their fictitious kinsmen, and finally managed to get possession of the whole estate, as its legal proprietors, while the other landholders were dispossessed and reduced to the state of dependent farmers, or even to that of half-free "villains." Thus the

democratic composition of tribal society evolved itself into the aristocratic composition of a feudal society. The social groups built up on the ground of blood-relationship (real or fictitious) gave way before social constructions founded on territorial power and dependence. The collective ownership of land was supplanted by the régime of private property. Thus the village community became a "manor."

The building of the great landlords' estates thus may be called the inner spring of development from a tribal to a feudal organization of society. Wherever this inner spring is missing, no development from tribe to state is possible, unless some outward political elements should supply the lack. Sooner or later these outward causes begin to act in the same way as the inner causes would. As a rule, they are two—war and commerce—and their action is to emphasize differences in wealth and power among the members of the tribe. But when wealth and power come directly from without instead of being accumulated by a prolonged process of organic development, their influence on the primitive tribal organization must necessarily be different. In such a case the elements of political power brought from abroad enter into immediate connection with the local elements of tribal democracy, without the intermediate link of indigenous aristocracy between the former and the latter. Thence the retarded development of the feudal state comes to be quite different from that in typical lands of mediæval feudalism. The representatives of political power take the place that the local landlords had failed to take possession of; and they do so by owning the common

grounds and wastes, by holding the state offices in their own hands—in short, by taking possession, as far as they can, of the superior ownership of the entire domain and the overlord rights. Under these conditions the social process of development of the landed aristocracy is postponed. It becomes a secondary result of a previous political development; *i. e.*, the building of an aristocracy is in a large degree dependent on the policy of the rulers, instead of being able to influence and to modify this very policy.

Now, as we have said, the farther east we go in Europe, the slower is the process by which society becomes aristocratic and feudal. We know, then, what we have to expect from the study of early social development and political institutions in Russia. A long-protracted tribal existence, an undeveloped territorial aristocracy, a political power coming from without and easily appropriating the overlord rights over land, a class of officials that gathers around and derives its further claims from its position as king's servants—such are the particular features of the Russian feudal state. With all these peculiarities, the state that is being so formed already bears within itself the germ of the future autocracy; but this germ is first developed when the central power assumes military functions, in the process of political unification.

Unhappily, we do not possess sufficient information about the tribal organization of early Russia. Some scholars have even gone so far as to deny its very existence. But this is quite wrong. The fact is, indeed, that in the central parts of the territory of early Russia the political power, judging even from

our earliest sources of information, had so much encroached upon the tribal organization that only scanty traces are left for our curiosity. But even these are enough for historical reconstruction. Thus, we may yet trace in earlier sources (eleventh century) the existence of the joint responsibility of kinsmen in cases of avenging murder or of receiving the fees exacted from the murderer's relatives. Of course, the degree of kinship in which the members of a family were bound to revenge was very narrow; and the group that was obliged to pay the fee seems to be half voluntarily formed; the whole frame of tribal organization seems thus very loose and decadent. Still, enough is preserved to bear witness to centuries of fuller existence. The chief of the Russian house communion (corresponding to the Welsh *gwely*) has in the earliest sources the same name as that by which he is known in early Bohemia. He is called *ognishchanin*, *i. e.*, the chief of the principal homestead, where the ancestral hearth, *ogneschay*, is located—the *tyddyn* of the Welsh. The fee for his murder was higher than for that of a common man; it was equal to that of a king's servant. In the city these "town ancients" were even admitted to the king's council. In the country they very probably managed sometimes to push themselves into the position of proprietors of the whole village. At least we may draw such a conclusion from a recently discovered source, the circular letter of the metropolitan Clement, written in the middle of the twelfth century. He speaks there about some people who seek "vain glory": "They acquire house after house, village after village; they take possession

of liberated slaves (*isgoecs*) as much as of joint owners (*saybrees*), of new clearings (*lahda*) as much as of ancestral holdings (*stareeny*)." The quoted passage points out, as we see, two types of appropriated property, and to each type corresponds a particular category of settlers. Evidently such proprietors as are censured here enlarged their estates first by appropriating tribal lands which were already cultivated (ancestral holdings), and second by colonizing new ground. They used as colonists the "liberated slaves" and other persons who had forsaken their situations and were tramping, looking around for some new station. These are the Russian *isgoecs*, as they are known from other sources; they seem to me to be identical with the *hospites* of Polish and Bohemian mediæval law. Now, the other category mentioned, that of the "joint owners," the *saybree*, who were dwelling on their "ancestral holdings," is particularly interesting to us. This category is spoken of here for the first and the only time in early Russian records. In Poland and Bohemia they are more often mentioned under the name of the *heredes*<sup>1</sup> or the *originarii*.<sup>2</sup> In both Poland and Bohemia the position of these *heredes* and *originarii*—the "joint-owners"—is quite clear: they were no longer free tenants, but were already appropriated by former headmen of their tribal groups, by the *ogneschahne*, who thus became big landed proprietors. Thanks to the circular letter of Clement, we now may conclude—if our commentary

<sup>1</sup> The legal heirs, the possessors of the "grandfathers' holdings," the *daydechee*.

<sup>2</sup> Corresponding to the Russian term *staroshiltsee*.



is found right—that in Russia the same process of social differentiation was going on and came to its natural end. This end was the dislocation of tribal groups and the building of large private estates, or a new aristocracy.

But why, then, are not the “joint-owners” and their landlords more often mentioned in early Russian documents? The most probable answer is that neither class was numerous enough to be taken as characteristic of social life in early Russia. Of course, there were landlords and landed aristocracy, independent of the rulers of the land and even opposed to their rule; but they were not many, and they soon disappeared, giving way to the aristocracy of new origin—that of the grantees of the prince, holding land and money from him, forming his court and his military suite, following him wherever he went, from town to town, from land to land, until he and they—or rather the descendants of both—became definitely settled. Thus, lacking a strong landed aristocracy of tribal origin in Russia, the old cultivators had more chance of preserving the ownership of their ancestral holdings until the prince himself came and took possession of the overlord rights, which were still unappropriated by the families of the headmen of the tribe. Such was actually the position of the overwhelming majority of Russian peasants in early Russia—the *smerds*, as they were called. If a *smerd* died without leaving heirs, his holding was inherited by the prince of the land; the prince was considered to be the superior owner of the whole territory and immediate owner of the unoccupied lands. But the consequences of this

general supposition had not yet been realized by law. The prince did not seem to possess the right to eject the *smersds* from their holdings, or even to exact from them anything besides the old custom of the land. Such seems to have been the legal position of the *heredes*—the *daydechec*—of western Slavic law.

But all this was to be changed later on. And perhaps the very conditions under which the changes were made were to a great extent the same in Russia as in the western Slavic states. What was impossible and inconsistent with old custom in the lands of old culture became quite natural when princes began to colonize uninhabited lands. Such lands must have been numerous on the marches; therefore Russian princes, like Bohemian and Polish ones, very early showed their preference for transferring their activity to the boundaries of their dukedoms, there to build and to colonize, using the wandering strollers and indigenous cultivators as a ready material for colonization. To attract the colonists to their lands, the princes gave them franchises (the *lhotas* of Bohemian and Russian law); once settled, such colonists were not often removed from their holdings, and thus the settlers in their turn became the "old inhabitants," the *staro-sheeltsee*. The idea, however, remained, that the land was not theirs, but belonged to the prince; and thus was introduced the custom of disposing of these lands, of buying and selling them, giving them as land grants and conveyances, with the peasants on them as their natural appurtenance. Of course, no remains of tribal property, no joint-ownership, could be preserved there; in fact, they had already been destroyed by the very

process of the migration of isolated settlers to the marches, where their clearings and villages from the very beginning took the form of purely individual settlements.

Such were the elements of early social life in Russia, and such was the difference in composition between the old political center and the land of new culture. We shall presently see which prevailed. But before we go any farther we must make this difference between the types of Russian culture clearer, inasmuch as they are determined by differences of geographical position and historical influence.

The Russian territory was so large and the stages of culture in the neighboring countries were so varied that we really cannot expect to find throughout the country one single line of development. There is, indeed, no such uniform process going on. Before any such general process could begin, it had to be preceded by a number of local processes in various parts of the vast country, which were partly interrupted by conquest or political unification, partly preserved and developed into a higher stage of existence. For a very long time these local processes had no relation whatever to one another. When, in the second half of the ninth century A. D., a Norwegian traveler, Ohter, visited "Gandvik;" *i. e.*, the White Sea, he found there the wild Beormas, while on the southern extremity of contemporary Russia, on the Black Sea, the refined culture of the Greek colonies still survived. They were two different worlds, as dissimilar as Athens and Greenland—these two opposite shores of eastern Europe, just at the time when the germ of the Russian

state was formed at a central point between them on the Dnepper. When, seven centuries later, an English seaman, Richard Chancellor, landed on the shores of the White Sea, the situation was entirely changed. The chief current of national life in Russia was so much enlarged that the inhabitant of the northern shores was bound to know of the existence of countrymen on the southern shores; at least he was just then obliged by the growing state to pay a certain tax every year for the release of Russian prisoners, who were regularly abducted by the robber states of the Black Sea shores, and whom the Muscovite state was as yet unable to protect with its military force. Thus, in the middle of the sixteenth century, the White and the Black Seas were first brought into some connection by the central organization. During all this long period, from the ninth to the sixteenth century, there was no general political organization in Russia. Local processes followed each its own line of development. Before the Muscovite type of culture prevailed many other types, differing geographically and chronologically, thrived and flourished. It is easy to guess that the earlier types were located in the best situations. We may distinguish the following:

1. The primary south Russian type, which we have already spoken about. It was in this southwestern corner of Russia that the Russian state originated.<sup>3</sup> The surroundings were there the best to be found in Russia; and yet even here the state could not be evolved by a mere process of inner organic evolution. Commerce and war, these outward springs of political

<sup>3</sup> See adjoining map.

**THE LOCAL TYPES  
of  
RUSSIAN CULTURE**





development,<sup>4</sup> helped the Russian state into existence. A brisk commerce on the Dnepper was the combined effect of two purely external causes: the advantageous geographical position on the "Great Waterway" from Scandinavia to Greece—the "Eastern Way" (*Austrvegr*) of the Scandinavian sagas—and the good luck of there being at the extreme ends of this eastern way three nations: the Northmen, who were very enterprising, and the Greeks and Arabs, who were very rich and who wanted to buy the products of the north—furs, wax, honey, serfs, etc. The necessity of war was also determined by a merely external cause: the political cataclysms of inner Asia, which drove from it hordes of Turkish tribes into southern Russia. The commerce with the Greeks and Arabs attracted Scandinavian adventurers, scattered them through all the "Eastern Way," made them build towns and establish the beginnings of political organization. The necessity for the defense of the commercial highways from southern nomads made the Northmen organize their military force on a larger scale. And so it came about that the military defense of the roads and waterways of commerce was concentrated in Keeyev, the residence of the early Russian princes of Swedish extraction.

Aside from the "Great Way," where no regular commercial intercourse existed and no military defense was needed everything went on as before. The tribal organization remained untouched and entire, including all the three degrees of kinship: the house communion, the minor clans ("brotherhood," or "the larger kin-

<sup>4</sup> See p. 135.

dred") with their heads, and the tribe with its greater chief.<sup>5</sup>

This looser tribal government made the conquest of such tribes very difficult and by its means they were able to protract their separate existences. But the period of prosperity of the few commercial centers on the main river was also very short. After the Arabian kingdoms fell under the arms of the Turks, and their kindred tribes in the Russian steppes became too powerful to be kept off by the southern princes, the Russian dukedoms quickly became impoverished and one by one finally yielded to the Tartar yoke. Such was the end of the splendor of the southern commercial state system which had existed from the middle of the ninth to the middle of the thirteenth century.

2. After this, the center of political life shifted west and north. Even such a fictitious unity as persevered in the first period did not now exist, and three quite different political groups had evolved from the union of the southern system. Near to the original scene of historical action, a secondary southern type was developed under the strong influence of Polish feudalism. But it was just this influence which, some centuries later, proved the chief cause of its decay. The feudal organization, being too loose, was obliged to give way to the stronger. Presently, we shall again refer to this type.

3. The northern type of the Russian merchant republic was Novgorod and, though on a much smaller

<sup>5</sup> At least so we may conclude from the fact of the existence of whole tribes called by patronymic names and at the same time lacking every central power; *e. g.*, the descendants of Radeem, or Vatkan.



scale, Pskov. Though dependent on western neighbors to buy its merchandise, Novgorod gathered its riches from the enormous territories of colonized land which stretched as far eastward as the Urals. It was able, therefore, to preserve its power during many centuries, until it, too, met with the stronger organization of central Russia. And at that time the democratic rule of Novgorod had already changed into the oligarchy of rich merchants, who dominated the republic through the general assembly of citizens.

4. The next was the Muscovite type, that of the colonized "marches." We shall have to speak of this at greater length. Owing to their extended estates and to their position as superior owners of the whole land, the Muscovite princes had at their disposal greater pecuniary resources, and so it proved possible for them to organize a large military class of landed proprietors. That is why they prevailed in the general struggle for unification.

5. Yet powerful as the Muscovite princes were in directing the process of unification, and reckless as were the means they employed, they could not extinguish the chief differences between their stock lands in central Russia and the lands annexed from the territories of the other types just mentioned. Thus some secondary types came into existence. Two of them in particular must be named. First the northern peasant type, which was formed from the territories of Novgorod. There was no landed military class there; rather, the country served the state by its contributions of money. On our map we call these regions the "Peasant Districts;" the Muscovite government called them "Black" or "Tributary Districts."

6. The second new type formed after the process of unification was at its end. This is that of the new southern colonization. We dwelt long enough on this type in our first chapter. The older part of this region of new colonization was not very different from the Muscovite center, but in measure as we descend southward, the population takes on a more modern aspect. This is the land of new religious currents, while the Old-belief found its adherents among the peasants of the old Novgorodian north. Here also wheat is cultivated and coal and iron mines are concentrated; while in the center, for a long time, it has not been considered worth while to pay much attention to agriculture, and in the north the products, as well as the population, remain extremely scanty. In short, the Russian south is "the promised land" of the Russian future. The ties and traditions of the past do not press on it and easily give way to everything connected with the new phase of Russian existence. Thus this territory may be compared with the American West. For nearly all the features mentioned may find their counterparts in American researches concerning the settlement of the West. I have only to refer to the valuable articles of Mr. Turner, of the University of Wisconsin.<sup>6</sup>

We must now return to the history of the two chief regions which played the most prominent part in the general history of Russia. These are the primary southern type and the Muscovite. The difference between them is quite obvious; it may be explained as the difference between the land of old tribal settlement

<sup>6</sup> The geographical disposition of all these regions of Russian culture may be seen on the map.

and the land of later colonization on the "marches." The rulers of the marches, as we have seen, were much freer in carrying on the process of settlement. They easily appropriated over the whole of their territory the rights of an overlord, as they had not to deal with any former claims of local organizations or of the indigenous aristocracy. And thus it is that the social and political organization, on the marches, proved comparatively more powerful, just as it had shown itself on both of the German marches, Austria, and Brandenburg, in northern France, and partly in Poland and Bohemia. Nevertheless, this fundamental difference between the two types of settlement has, for various reasons, often been denied. The Muscovite princes themselves pointed to the continuous succession of both types whereon to lay the foundations of their right to possess the "whole of Russia." Some modern scholars of the nationalistic set used the same argument to prove the right of the central government to "Russianize" the "whole of Russia." Then an opposite set of scholars, the radicals, set to work to prove that the northern Russia of later times had been connected with early southern Russia by the democratic tradition of folk-motes, afterward so treacherously betrayed by the Muscovite princes. Then came an independent scholar of law, Mr. Sergueyevich, who wished to prove that there was no fundamental difference between the southern and the northern Russian type, as both societies were founded on the same principle of contract. Contract was meant to be opposed as much to the ties of blood, *i. e.*, to the tribal organization of society, as to the ties of state subjection, *i. e.*, to the

modern organization of society. And so far it is true that both southern and northern Russian types are intermediate between the tribal and the military-national stages of Russian history; but it is none the less true, too, that the southern type originated in tribal society, and that the northern type finished in the military-national organization of John III. and John IV. And so we are bound to suppose that in the southern type there persisted a something which kept it ever connected with its tribal origin, and in the northern something was inherent that compelled it to culminate in an autocracy. Both types had, of course, enough elements in common, yet it was not these, but the divergent elements, which determined their final issue. These latter elements we have in the beginning of our discussion already pointed out. We saw that while aristocratic elements were generally lacking in Russian social life, they were, comparatively speaking, more lacking in the northern type than in the southern. Also, we saw that political power, which was generally stronger in eastern than in western Europe, was comparatively stronger in the north than in the south of Russia, and that here it assumed the form of a general proprietorship over the whole territory. And because of these characteristics of northern Russia—a weaker development of the aristocracy and a stronger development of the central power—the question arose whether this intermediate stage between tribe and state still has anything in common with the feudalism of western Europe.

The answer is closely connected with what we have already said. If the territorial aristocracy of great

landed proprietors was not much developed in Russia, and if the territorial power of princes was much more developed than in western Europe, we should have no reason to expect that western feudalism would appear in Russia, especially in the north. But feudalism had another chance to develop on Russian territory—in the secondary southern type.

After the primary southern type had been extinguished at the time of the Tartar invasion, and the southern population had been driven backward—westward to the Polish frontier and northward to Lithuania—a new period of life began in these regions; and the more developed Polish organization proved very influential to it. Then, indeed, many features of western feudalism appeared in western Russia and in Lithuania. There was formed, for instance, a compact class of landed aristocracy, which, by the privilege granted in the year 1447, finally emancipated itself from royal taxation and justice, and so made it necessary for the state power in each separate case to ask the lords, by dint of summoning them to a national council, to share in the military contributions and to serve in the military service. This national council was soon transformed into a regular parliament, consisting of separately summoned magnates, as well as of formally elected knights, who represented their class organization in the shire. (There was no representation of boroughs.) The competency of this great general diet was extended to the sphere of legislation, and even of foreign politics. Thus the Lithuanian and western Russian baronage encroached on the rights of their kings, just as the Polish baronage had done aforetime.

The consequence was that the central power became too weak to organize an effective defense of the country at the very time when such a defense was particularly necessary. For it was the epoch of constant struggles on all the frontiers, except that of the allied and united kingdom of Poland. The Turks and Tartars were attacking the southern frontier; the Teutonic knights had to be driven from the north; and, from the east, Muscovite princes were threatening to bring back the territory of the old Russian dukedoms. This made the Lithuanian princes ready to grant concessions in order to get money, military levies, and mercenaries, all of which the barons of the land were slow to grant. Having got whatever social and political privileges they wished, the barons did not for that become any the more attentive to the state necessities. The feudal type of state in western Russia and Lithuania was, therefore, obliged to yield to the Muscovite type, which was at that time reconstructed after a more oriental fashion. The necessities of the times then felt in Moscow were quite the same as those in Vilna or Warsaw: they needed money and soldiers, but they were supplied in an entirely different and far more successful manner. The Muscovite prince had no feudal elements to contend with; therefore he took his lessons in politics from the Byzantine empire, from the southern Slavic states on the Balkans, perhaps even from Turkey, rather than from Poland or western Europe. There, on the confines of Europe and Asia on the Bosphorus, the capital problem of a standing army was resolved almost as in mediæval Europe: lacking money to give, the state distributed its land among the warriors.

Similar, too, was the final result of the whole operation: the grantees finally became landed proprietors. But in general this final forming of the landed aristocracy took place in the Orient at a much later date, at a time when the original aim of the military organization had been achieved; either the conquest had been made, as in Turkey from the fifteenth through the seventeenth century, or the national state was already founded, as in Russia during the same period, or the military landholders were transformed by foreign conquerors of later times into landed proprietors, as by the English in India and the French in Algiers. In all these cases the appropriation of state lands by private owners did not lead to the feudal organization of society, because the central power was already too strong to be dispossessed of its superior rights in the land. It was quite opposite with the feudal aristocracy of western Europe, which preceded the development of a central administration, and thus succeeded in overpowering the state.

The origin of the oriental system of land grants for warriors may be traced to the moment when both great eastern monarchies, Byzantium and Persia, met together in a decisive clash. Kosru Nushirwan was the Persian ruler of the Sassanian dynasty who first used the system against the emperor Justinian, in the sixth century A. D. A century later Arabian khalifs stepped into the place of the Persian kings, dividing the demesne among their own new warriors; this was the origin of the Moslem military organization, which lasted for centuries. The attacks of the Arabs on Constantinople made the Byzantine

emperors adopt the same system of "military tenure." At last the Turks superseded the Arabs, in the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, and soon proved to be much more dangerous to Constantinople. They improved and completed the military system of the Persians and the Arabians; and the Byzantine emperors had only to follow their example. Thus the Ottoman military holdings, the *temars* and *zeeams*, appeared, and they were closely followed by the Byzantine *proneas*, which had just the same meaning. The system of "*proneya* holdings" was then adopted by the southern Slavs.

This system can be studied particularly well in Servia in the fourteenth century. The institution is everywhere the same: the military holders—*proneyars* as well as the *teemarlees*, or *spahees* of the Ottoman empire—were not the owners of their holdings, but merely temporary possessors; and they held their allotments only so long as they were able to perform military service. While possessing their allotments they could, under the threat of being punished and even deprived of their holdings in case of oppression of the peasants and deterioration of the estate, claim from their peasants only such taxes and services as were strictly determined by the law. As the holdings were not hereditary, the heirs of the possessors had to ask for the renewal of the grant, and were by no means sure to get it back undiminished. Such were at least the arrangements of the law, which of course were often disregarded in reality. Now, this eastern system of military holdings was borrowed by the Muscovite princes just at the time when their western neighbors and competitors in Lithuania were vainly



exerting themselves to get money and soldiers from their "great general diets," in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Thus the same state necessity which led to a complete development of the feudal elements in Lithuania and helped aristocracy to its fullest development, kept back their development in Moscow.

To forestall possible objections to this opposing of the Russian system of military holdings as *oriental* to the feudal system of the west of Europe, some further details are here necessary. To be sure, north-eastern Russia had also possessed a kind of feudal land-tenure, even before the oriental system had been introduced. But this ancient system had nothing in common with the *military* allotments of land. Whatever such allotments—and they were not over-numerous—existed during that earlier period, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, were granted by the princes in return, not for military, but for court service. And whatever landed estates were held at that time by men of military service were not granted; they were held as absolute properties; not as conditional holdings from the state authorities, but by right of inheritance. The very name of these lands proves their status: they were called "father's holdings." Such private holdings stood in no connection whatever with military service, for a possessor of a "father's land" was entirely free to serve whom he liked, or even not to serve at all. Thus, for instance, in the middle of the sixteenth century there were 574 private possessors in the four little counties of the dukedom of Tver (already incorporated by Moscow). But only 230 of these were in the Muscovite service; sixty proprietors served the

bishop of Tver, forty-six served the three representatives of a lateral branch of the former princes of Tver, about twenty served different persons, while 150 served nobody.

It will be seen, therefore, that there existed in northern Russia no principle which corresponded to the fundamental notion of feudalism, and which French legists formulated in their thesis: no land without sovereign (*nulle terre sans seigneur*). And there was no idea that a landed proprietor should necessarily serve his own sovereign; *i. e.*, the lord of the territory on which his estate was situated. In Lithuanian Russia the conditions were more like those of western feudalism; but even here the right of a landed proprietor to serve whom he liked was acknowledged, though only on the express statement of the condition, in a contract; if it were not so stated, the proprietor legally lost his estate when he went to another sovereign. In northern Russia, as we have said, this fundamental principle of western feudalism did not exist. "Free service" was here the rule and so dependent "military tenure" of the subsequent period had no possibility of evolving out of this "free service."

The origin of the military holdings in the Muscovite state grew out of something different from western feudalism; namely, from a principle identical at bottom with that of the oriental states. Dependent military tenure of the oriental states was always founded on the idea of the superior property rights of the prince in the whole land; without this idea of overlordship no grants from the state lands were possible. In Byzantium this idea of the superior right of the emperor

was derived from a Roman and a Christian source. In Mussulman states it originated in the general teaching of the Koran concerning property. In the Muscovite dukedom the idea existed also; but here, as we have seen, it had a different origin—the extended power of the prince on the marches. This fact was then further developed and formed into a principle of law under Byzantine and Tartar influences. Indeed, the princes of Moscow began very early to dispose of free cultivators and their lands. As early as the fourteenth century we see them granting and exchanging, “permitting” persons of different stations to buy the free peasants of central Russia as appurtenances of the land whereon they lived, and themselves buying them from other proprietors. Thus, so early, land grants were made without the least consideration for the “old inhabitants” of the granted lands. Thus the condition necessary to the introduction of the military tenure system—the right to dispose of settled land and of its peasant inhabitants—was already existing at the moment when the process of political unification began, and the necessity of military reform was felt.

One thing was yet lacking, however. The quantity of settled lands in central Russia was not sufficient to build up at once an extended class of holders of military allotments. Such lands as the prince possessed here in the center had to serve another purpose: they were distributed among the servants of his court, in order to organize and make safe the regular supply of grain, hay, meat, and other necessities and pleasures of his private household. It was only when the political unification of Russia under the Muscovite rule began that

the formation of an extended military class became particularly urgent. But just then the same process of unification made this formation of a new Muscovite army possible, by increasing immensely the quantity of lands to be freely disposed of by the Muscovite princes.<sup>7</sup> Little is known as to how this process of military reform went on; but what we do know of it is quite sufficient to prove that the reform was carried out systematically, and that the measures taken were so bold and decisive that they must have brought about a rather serious revolution in the Russian landed property of that time.

The military reform was begun by John III., the contemporary of Mohammed II., and was achieved by John IV., the contemporary of Suleiman the Splendid. And the years in which the chief reform measures were taken correspond almost identically with those years which saw the chief Turkish measures for the introduction of the system of military tenure. In 1484 John III., who had just incorporated the Novgorodian possessions, dispossessed in that country more than eight thousand big and little hereditary proprietors, and transferred there, to be settled on these estates of former proprietors, as many military holders of the new type as he wanted. To find so large a number of tenants, he moved the military servants from the courts of his big vassals and placed them in direct allegiance to himself. This lower class of subvassals or "courtiers" (*dvoryane*) formed thus the chief element out of which the holders of new military tenures were taken. The ancient class of hereditary owners

<sup>7</sup> *Vide* map, "Making of the Russian State."

of their "fathers' lands"—the "boyars" and the "sons of boyars"—were presently lowered to the same condition as the courtiers, and obliged by the government to serve as if they too were holders of military tenures, and not of lands owned as private property. In fact, these "sons of boyars" were even placed beneath the "courtiers" in rank as early as the middle of the sixteenth century. The name of "courtiers" became thenceforth the preferred one for designating Russian "noblemen," while the "sons of boyars" formed the lowest layer of the military class: they were supposed to serve in provincial detachments of the army, while the "courtiers" were often enabled to enter the city regiments, and even to be promoted to the dignities of the court.

This sudden reversal of the comparative social position of the old hereditary owners and of the new dependent landholders was made possible by a series of state measures. First, the military duties of both classes were equalized, by exacting from the old landowners the same military service that the new holders of military allotments were obliged to perform. Then, from both these classes, so mixed up, a choice was made by the government of John IV. in 1550, of those best fitted for the court—the Tsar's guard. The chosen "thousand" had to serve the Tsar in Moscow; therefore new allotments were apportioned to them within a radius of a hundred miles from Moscow. Some fifteen years afterward a new revolution in landed property—the last one of this series—appears to have been accomplished. The old hereditary proprietors in the recently annexed territories, particularly the larger

and more influential ones, were once more in a large measure dispossessed. New holders from Moscow took their place, and they were put in a particularly close connection with the "court," which was made a separate political institution opposed to the "land," a kind of state within the state. These measures appear to have done away with the large estates and independent landed property, in so far as at that time they still existed in northeastern Russia. All higher social elements were now mercilessly overthrown; the Muscovite society was systematically and intentionally leveled, to form the foundation of an autocratic power. Thus, by nothing less than a series of social revolutions, completed nearly within a century (1484 to 1584), was begun the political tradition of autocracy.

The official doctrine of autocracy was always that Russian monarchy was eminently democratic. We can see, however, that this was true only in the sense of its being the enemy of the landed aristocracy. For the Muscovite princes really had got rid of the aristocracy. Only in so doing they were supported not so much by the population in general as by a lower class of "serving men," the "courtiers." So far from being relieved by the outcome of this struggle, the peasant population paid its expenses, sacrificed as they were to the holders of military allotments. Indeed, though the statutes of John IV. determined in detail how these military tenants ought to serve the government, nothing at all was determined as to their rights and duties toward their peasants. Thus was laid the foundation for a future slavery. We saw that even in Byzantine law and in the Ottoman and southern Slavic law

the position of the peasants on military tenures was strictly determined, and the rights of tenants legally circumscribed. Of course, the possessors could, as they sometimes did by the inadvertence of the authorities, appropriate their tenants' holdings; but they were not likely to appropriate the peasants themselves and make them into bondmen, as was the case in Russia. Accordingly, the Russian autocracy may be called anti-aristocratic, military, oriental, if you like; at least it never really was democratic.

But we shall have other occasions to come back to the history of the social elements of Russia. Now that we are studying the political tradition, we are much more concerned in other deductions from the facts just set forth. We have seen how the autocracy came into existence and power at the end of the fifteenth century, but we do not yet know of any tradition of the autocracy. It was entirely new when it first appeared; in the past it had no antecedents, if we do not consider as such the actual power that the princes on the marches possessed in higher measure than other princes of mediæval Russia. The new régime had yet to work out its own predominance by a formal struggle against the heterogeneous elements in politics and in social structure. In short, autocracy at the moment of its origin in the process of the building of a military-national state was new and unprecedented. Has it since that time remained unchanged, so as to form a standing tradition? Or has it undergone a further process of evolution? This is what we have now to consider.

Autocracy, so far as we can know at present, was

nothing more than a material fact, an event of history. A fact, in order to grow into a tradition, must become an idea. What idea, then, had autocracy to represent from the time of its first appearance onward? Undoubtedly there was such an idea: the political and national unity of the Russian state just then in process of formation. But the idea of unity was, of course, not inseparably connected with that of a definite political form. There must have been some other ideas at hand to make such a connection strike root in the popular mind. Let us then consider closely from what elements the primary idea of autocracy was formed in the minds of its founders, which of these elements were lasting, and which proved temporary and transient; lastly, what changes the original idea underwent in its further development.

It is generally known that the Russian theory of autocracy was a reflection of the Byzantine idea of a theocratic imperium, or "cæsaro-papism," as it was sometimes called. But what is less known is that this Byzantine idea was not entirely understood, and was perhaps never completely realized. There were two different elements in it, one juridical and the other theocratic, the first coming from the Roman law, and the second from a Christian source. We shall presently see that the second alone was embodied in the Muscovite political theory. The necessity for a legal theory of power was not much felt in Moscow; the very fact of there being such a power as the Muscovite princes possessed seemed to be quite sufficient in itself. When the growing Muscovite dukedom began to be known by western Europe, the emissaries of both pope and



emperor came to Moscow, in order to propose, each for his side, the consecration of the prince to the dignity of a king, if he would agree to take active part in the struggle of Europe against the Turks. But—happily for Russia—it was altogether above John's power of comprehension to understand what a big thing the Holy Roman Empire was, and what kind of legitimacy it could impart to him by means of the new title. All he understood was that, if he accepted the offer, instead of being independent, he would have to acknowledge some foreign sovereign. From this disadvantage he deliberately shrank. He answered, therefore, that he was quite satisfied with the sanction bestowed on him by the very fact that his power was hereditary, that it descended to him "from the very beginning, from his first forefathers" (1488). But then John soon felt that his answer was not quite right in the eyes of foreign diplomatists. Would not his more civilized western neighbor, the king of Poland and prince of Lithuania, be afraid, and would not he be envied, were he called by the pope or the emperor "King of the Whole of Russia?" The half of Russia was then under Lithuanian power.

The Muscovite government now, however, began to think whether there was any other means of getting a superior title and of preserving the claims over the "whole of Russia," without asking help from the German "Cæsar" or the Roman Pontifex. After some months (1489) the Muscovite ambassador in Vienna returned the emperor an unexpected answer—an answer proving that Russian diplomatists had found a way. For they had determined that John should assume

the high position quite independent of the sanction of pope or emperor. "Our forefathers," the Russian diplomatist now adds to his former explanation, "were from olden times friends of the ancient Roman tsars, who gave Rome to the popes and who ruled in Byzantium." Thus, even then, Russians did not dare yet affirm anything more than the mere fact of friendship. But at once the Russian clergy set to work to change this presumed friendship into a relationship, and to build on this last supposition the theory of a formal transmission of imperial power.

To be more accurate, it was not, however, the *Russian* clergy that started this learned proof of the theory. There lived in Moscow many divines from southern Slav countries, which just then had been conquered by the Turks. They transmitted to Moscow their patriotic hopes for the liberation of their countries. Thus they felt it necessary to adorn the Muscovite rulers with all the insignia of power and dignity, which they had formerly bestowed on their own Slavic rulers. An Alexander of Bulgaria or a Stephen of Servia had already worn the titles and the insignia of the Romaic emperors in the fourteenth century, before these symbols of power were offered to John of Moscow in the end of the fifteenth century. The "most glorious" Bulgarian city of Tyrnov had already played the part of the "second Constantinople" and the "third Rome," which it was now proposed that Moscow should play.<sup>8</sup> A pedigree was concocted which made "Cæsar Augustus" the ancestor of the Russian house of princes. An invented legend was

<sup>8</sup> See p. 75.

spread about, containing a detailed narrative as to how and when a formal transmission of the Byzantine insignia and power from an emperor of Constantinople to the Russian prince of Keeyev had taken place. The Russian divines of that time were not very strong in chronology, and so they unfortunately chose for the hero of their legend an emperor (Constantine the Monomach) who had actually died when his would-be Russian correspondent (Vladeemir the Monarch) was but two years old; and they put the scene of the transmission of the insignia, which they supposed to have taken place in the eleventh century, into surroundings which could have existed only five centuries earlier. Nevertheless the legend found credit with the public, and half a century later was officially adopted by the government, which now wanted the patriarch of Constantinople to confirm it by a general decree of the council. The patriarch seems to have had some difficulties in gathering an actual council for this purpose; and so, having the charter drawn up in his chancellery, he forged the fictitious signatures of members of the imaginary council. This was all very well, but the contents of the charter were not what Muscovite diplomatists expected them to be. The patriarch appears to have had scruples as to the historical reality of the facts, alleged in the nationalistic legend invented in Moscow, and he, therefore, acknowledged the only one that could truthfully be assumed: the baptism of the first Christian ruler, Vladeemir the Saint, and his marriage with the Byzantine princess. Now, Muscovite princes did not care much about historical facts, any more than they cared about the legal validity of their

claims for the Byzantine inheritance of power. Thus they even did not wish to put forward the best claim they actually had in their hands, namely, the recent marriage of John III. with the heiress of the last Paleologue. The only legal heir, at the time, of the last Byzantine emperor was ready to sell his rights to the highest bidder, but he vainly urged the transaction in Moscow, and finished by selling his inheritance to Charles VIII. of France. The Muscovite prince wanted his claims traced to a deeper antiquity, one that squared better with his fundamental argument—that his power was inherited from his own “forefathers”—and one that at the same time cost him no money. Anyhow, the Muscovite government clung to the popular legend, and then it resolved to introduce into the forged charter of the patriarch a clause which should make it prove, not the historical fact, but the spurious legend. The theory of the transmission of the imperial power was now openly proclaimed, the new title of “Tsar” (*i. e.*, Cæsar) was solemnly adopted by John IV., while the pseudo-Byzantine insignia were used at his coronation (1547), and the newly adopted legend was engraved on the Tsar’s throne, which in the Ouspensky cathedral of Moscow may even now be seen—a lasting memorial of the great Muscovite fraud.

Such was the legal origin of the Russian autocracy. The legal claim, as we have seen, was not a very strong one; and thus it was never referred to in the days of greater enlightenment. Autocracy remained what it actually was: a fact, not a legal institution. There being no legal foundation for its support, the

theoretical vindication of autocracy has always been uncertain and wavering. No wonder, then, if in the course of our subsequent narrative we shall find different attempts to prove anew the necessity of autocracy, and, at the same time, we shall find that those attempts to lay new theoretical foundations for autocracy are not in the least consistent with one another. Not being bound to any obligatory tradition, they necessarily reflect very different points of view, current at the time the attempts were made. What they really have in common is the tacit avowal that there never existed a theory of autocracy that could be considered binding and legally valid.

Just such, of course—*i. e.*, binding and legally valid—the initial theory of autocracy, that of the Byzantine origin, pretended to be. But, as we said before, it was not borrowed in its full extent by the Russian authorities. The legal—the Roman—elements of the imperial theory did not find an adequate appreciation by Russian lawyers. There were no lawyers, and there was no formulated state law in Russia at that time, and thus no attention was paid to such qualities of the Roman state theory as gave it full weight and brought it into greatest consideration in mediæval Italy, or France, or Spain. There existed no “legists,” or *letrados*, in Russia to recall the imperial law of a *princeps legibus solutus*. And, on the other side, feudal elements were not so mighty in Russia as to make this legal formula an important and necessary weapon against them. The Russian autocracy did not evolve without a struggle, as we have seen; but this was not a struggle of legal principles.

On the contrary, the theocratic elements of the Byzantine theory were considered much more important.

As we have seen in a former chapter, the first part that the Muscovite Tsar had to play as successor of the Byzantine emperor was a religious part—that of a defender of the faith, a champion of Orthodoxy. The national state was founded in close connection with the national church. The clergy were the first, and for some time the only, advocates of the new political theory; they took the place of legists in Russia. Hence, the religious proofs of the rights of autocracy overcame the legal; in fact, the former were the only ones that found currency. Everybody knew that the Tsar was the representative of God on earth, that just for this reason he was to be obeyed, and that even his trespasses were to be considered as God's punishment for sins; nobody cared to know more. As to the prince himself, he liked better to infer that his actual power proceeded from his forefathers, instead of tracing it to a more ideal origin, *i. e.*, to God or to the Byzantine emperor. But even in this direction the legal theory of autocracy remained rudimentary; as late as the beginning of the nineteenth century there existed no legally established order of succession. In the undeveloped understanding of Muscovite rulers, Evidently the actual facts appeared much more solid than any legal claims; and this was the reason why they neglected every opportunity of getting any legal foundation for their power.

Now, however, the theocratic foundation of the Russian autocracy soon became very much enfeebled by the apostasy of the Tsars from what was con-

sidered by the overwhelming majority of the nation to be pure national Orthodoxy. We know the facts: the national authorities themselves found national Orthodoxy to be spurious; it had to be amended after the Greek model. Since that time the old national creed has been separated from the national state. Moreover, the representatives of the state were thenceforth considered by the "Old-believers" to be delegates, not of God, but of Satan. And even those people who persisted in their former belief in the divine right of the Tsars were indifferent as to the particular rights of any given representative of power. Did not "every power" proceed from God? And so what did it matter where that power actually lay? The "Period of Troubles" (1598-1613) and the change of dynasty may have strengthened this way of thinking, which is designated by a contemporary writer under the picturesque term of "low-spiritedness."

The objection may be raised, however, that during the "Troubles" the peasants kept defending the right of a legal offspring to their democratic hero, John IV.,<sup>9</sup> and that thus they were on the side of the right. The fact is true, but the explanation may be otherwise. The peasants just defended the legal heir as their Tsar, one likely to take their side; and at the same time they did not care much whether he was an authentic person or an impostor. The "low-spiritedness" of those people made them sustain the right of the first pretender, if only he was supposed to represent the popular program. The popular pretenders to the throne of the Tsar did not even need to conceal that

<sup>9</sup> See chap. vi, pp. 353, 354.

they were impostors. Later on, Poogachov, for instance, not satisfied with having taken the false name of Peter III., husband to Catherine II., gave to his auxiliaries the names of the first dignitaries of the empire. Though everybody knew who they actually were, nobody refused to acknowledge them in their new quality. The power of the Tsar was, of course, sacrosanct; but it was an institution, not a particular person, that was venerated under the title. Thus even such partisans of autocracy as admired the pretended love of the Russian people for their rulers the most enthusiastically, never tried even to prove that these people were legitimists. "God is far above, and the Tsar is far off"—this saying, so characteristic of the passive obedience and indifferent skepticism of Russian peasants toward any actual power, always remained.

We see now why the theocratic foundation of autocracy could not supply the lack of a legal formula. In any case such a legal formula had yet to be invented. This was done, for the first time in Russian history, in the day of Peter the Great, at the time of his entire reconstruction of the state institutions upon European models. Thus, by a curious coincidence, the autocracy got its legal formula at the very moment when it had decidedly broken with its oriental past. Naturally enough, the new legal formula then invented was in no way dependent on the old theocratic foundation of autocracy. Here again the tradition was cut off. The new formula was borrowed from the current and very modern doctrine of "natural law." According to the "law of nature" the human rulers were not to be considered as vice-gerents of God, appointed by



direct mandate of the Creator, but rather as delegates of the people, deriving their power from a common consent, "a social contract" of the nation. This theory of "the social contract" was formally acknowledged during Peter's reign in the official writing compiled by the enlightened and learned archbishop, Theophanes Prokopovich. The direct aim of his political pamphlet was, as its title indicated, to prove the "Right of the Monarch's Will;" namely, to justify Peter the Great's disposition as to the free right of a monarch to nominate the heir-apparent. But in order to prove that, Prokopovich made of the theory of social contract an acknowledged state theory. "Every form of government," Prokopovich asserts, "has its origin in an initial mutual agreement among the people." The object of this agreement being the general welfare, the ruler is obliged to care for the common good of the people; though in case of inadvertence or misuse of his power, even in Prokopovich's theory, he is answerable only to God.

The moral feeling of Peter himself was quite in harmony with this new doctrine of autocracy. Peter was one of the first and most typical representatives of the "enlightened absolutism" of the eighteenth century. Long before Frederic the Great, he proclaimed, and actually practiced, the theory that the prince is the first servant of the people. Of course, he served his people as he himself chose, and, on account of his crudity and violence of temper, his was a most despotic rule. It was not in vain that in his political tract Prokopovich formally deduced from popular election the right of Peter to change "every rite, civil and religious, every

custom, whether in the wearing of dresses, or in the building of houses, in every kind of ceremony and prescribed form at festivities, nuptials, burials, and so forth." This is an accurate abstract of what Peter really did. The practice as well as the theory of the absolute monarchy were, now that autocracy was recast into the quite new and more modern form of bureaucratic absolutism, quite revolutionary. The power of the monarch, as well as the habits of his subjects, were Europeanized — in an Asiatic manner.

The next step in the legal development of the autocratic doctrine was taken some sixty years later, when, during the reign of Catherine II., a truer and finer sort of enlightened absolutism prevailed in Russia. This new step led still farther away from the accepted Muscovite doctrine and, accordingly, from the old tradition. Catherine II. knew and shared in the theory of "the law of nature," as everybody did at her time. But she did not seem to know that a deduction might be drawn from this theory, such as Hobbes had drawn and Peter had practiced; namely, that the power of the people's elected is absolute and unlimited. By her principles she was not absolutist; nay, she affirmed that in her inner conscience she was republican. But, on the other hand, Catherine felt a positive aversion to the other extreme deduction from the theory of "natural law;" namely, Rousseau's democratic theory of "the social contract." She held rather a moderate variation of the same theory—that of Montesquieu, her principal teacher in politics. She was very glad to know from Montesquieu that Russian autocracy admitted of what was then called a "philosophical" justi-

fication. The Russian territory was so much extended, Montesquieu taught, that no other form of government than the existing was there possible. And this rationalistic explanation was followed by a rehabilitation of autocracy, which was as agreeable to the Russian empress as it had been to the king of France. The courteous writer kindly explained to both that a European monarchy need not be humiliated by a comparison with Asiatic despotism. European monarchy had originated in feudalism, and so it must be limited by the rights and privileges of different social orders, among which the nobility was chief.

There was, however, as we have seen, no feudalism and not much of a nobility in Russia. But those social orders might be formed anew on the European pattern; and Catherine proceeded to form such privileged orders as Montesquieu wished. This seemed very easy to do with the Russian nobility, which was then in its ascendancy, and which actually was the only influential social power likely to form a check upon despotism. But the same reform did not succeed at all with the "bourgeoisie," which Catherine II. was powerless to create. Lastly, it also proved impossible with the peasants, who had to be left as serfs of the nobility, if the nobility were to be favored. In fact, the position of the peasants was aggravated, because the privileged nobility were now no longer mere "men of service" dependent on the government; they now turned their former land grants and military tenures into an entirely private property.<sup>10</sup> A self-government of the nobility was begun in the country, recalling the provincial estates of France, or

<sup>10</sup> See p. 237.

the land diets of Germany. Now that the *pouvoirs intermédiaires* of Montesquieu—the “intermediate powers” between the people and the throne—were created in the provincial government and in the social composition, a “true monarchy” could be realized in Russia, as a political form quite opposed to an oriental “despotism.” But in order to achieve this liberal transformation, should not a “true monarchy” be organized as a “limited” one?

From the very beginning this logical issue did not seem to be grasped by Catherine. She began her reign by convoking a representative assembly elected by a large vote, but she never thought of admitting these deputies to share her power. The assembly remained a deliberative one, and just as soon as it showed a tendency toward independence, Catherine used the first pretext—the Turkish war—to send away the deputies. Nevertheless, for long, she cherished the idea of perpetuating her deputies in a regular central office, as Diderot urged her to do. Finally, however, she recoiled from this plan. The only remaining method of transforming her arbitrary power into a regular monarchy, according to the idea of Montesquieu, consisted in drawing a sharp line between the legislative and the administrative power. But even this task became much more difficult—in fact, quite impossible—since Catherine had renounced her former resolution of founding a representative assembly. For so long as there is no representation there can be no regular legislation. This is the unvarnished truth, which the subsequent practice of Russian political institutions did not fail to confirm, and which a

whole century of persecution has not been able to eradicate from public opinion in Russia.

But let us see now what was done for the further "self-improvement" of autocracy during this last century of the Russian history. The nineteenth century began by the attempt to take the third and most decisive step from theocratic absolutism to legal monarchy. Alexander I. mounted the throne with an ardent desire to proclaim the rights of man and to give Russia a constitution. But he was not able even to abolish the most crying abuses in the sale of serfs; and he thrice failed in his endeavor to grant his subjects a constitutional charter. On the first occasion, in 1801-2, the affair did not go beyond a vague and general discussion in the intimate circle of some few friends. But the second time, in 1809, Alexander I. went farther.<sup>11</sup> This time there existed a definite plan of reform, drawn up by Speransky. The Tsar had begun to put this plan into execution, and had already taken the first steps when he suddenly changed his mind, and, yielding to the pressure of Speransky's enemies, sent him into exile. The program was then abandoned: and so the only institution brought into existence was the Council of State. It had now to take the place of the legislative assembly of representatives planned by Speransky. Until the present time this council has remained the chief—though far from the only<sup>12</sup>—

<sup>11</sup> It was then that he addressed himself to George Washington, who sent him a copy of the American constitution.

<sup>12</sup> An imperial order is law in Russia as well as the opinion of the State Council confirmed by his majesty. All the chief measures of the two last reigns were taken without asking for the "opinions" of the State Council. And even if the "opinion" is asked for and

legislative body in the Russian empire. In 1819, for the third time, the draft of the constitution was worked over by the Tsar's former friend, Novoseeltsov, who was assisted by a French lawyer, Dechamps. But though this was done by the Tsar's explicit order, Alexander again withheld his consent at the last moment. He had just then come under the influence of Metternich, who is known to have been anything but favorable to free institutions.

Now what, we may ask, was the reason for this undecided and wavering conduct of the Russian autocrat? Is the explanation to be sought, where Speransky was said to have found it, in the personal temper of the Tsar, who was "*trop faible pour régir et trop fort pour être régi*"? Or did Alexander's other counselors consider that Russia was not ripe enough for a constitution? Or, was it on principle that they opposed any change in the form of government? Any one of these three reasons—the personal character of the Tsar, the real unpreparedness of Russia, the nationalistic opposition of the partisans of autocracy—would actually account for the failure. But what, on the other hand, was the theory of the defenders of the constitution? Their theory has been voiced by Speransky. In the introduction to his draft of the "constitution," he says:<sup>13</sup>

At every epoch the form of government must correspond to the degree of civil enlightenment to which the state has attained. given the emperor is not bound by the decision of its majority. Emperor Alexander I., for instance, adopted the opinion of the minority eighty-three times out of two hundred and forty-two times in which the "opinions" were not unanimous.

<sup>13</sup> The following quotation is a little shortened from the original text of Speransky.

Whenever the form of government is too slow or too fast to keep pace with this degree of enlightenment, it is overthrown with more or less commotion. Thus *time* is the origin of every renovation in politics. No government which does not harmonize with the spirit of the times can ever stand against its powerful action. How many calamities, how much blood, could be spared, if the rulers of nations would observe with accuracy the movement of public opinion, if they would conform to it the principles of their systems of policy and adapt the government to the state of the people, instead of adapting the people to the government! And see, what a contradiction! You wish that sciences, commerce, and industry should be developed, and you do not admit their most natural consequences; you desire that Reason may be free, but that Will should be fettered; that passions may move and change, but that the object of these passions—which is freedom—should remain unapproachable; that people should grow rich, but that they may not use the best fruit of their increase of wealth—liberty. There is no example in the world of an enlightened and industrious people's remaining any length of time in serfdom. The Russian state is now passing through the second stage of the feudal system; namely, the epoch of autocracy. Undoubtedly it is tending directly to freedom. In part this tendency is even more straightforward in Russia than it was in other countries. The unfailing signs of it are: (1) That people lose all esteem for the former objects of their veneration, *e. g.*, for rank and honor. (2) The action of power is so weakened . . . that no measure of government can be put into operation which appeals only to moral, and not to physical constraint. The true reason of this is that at present public opinion is in entire contradiction with the form of government. (3) No partial reform is possible, because no law can exist, if it may any day be overthrown by a gust of arbitrary power. (4) There is a general discontent to be observed, such as can only be explained by a complete change of ideas, and by a repressed but strong desire for a new order of things. For all these reasons we may surely conclude that the actual form of government does not correspond to the state of popular feeling, and that the time has come to change this form and to found a new order of things.

But did not Speransky rather exaggerate the measure in which the popular opinion of the Russia of 1809 was ready for constitutional reform? It is likely that he did. But then, did he not wish to start the reform in time to prevent bloodshed and popular irritation? He knew how to read the "signs of the times;" and, indeed, time proved his forebodings correct. Hardly had a few years passed after he had uttered this prophecy before blood really was shed on the streets of St. Petersburg, and the first martyrs to political freedom appeared in Russia—the Decembrists of 1825. Since then the number of those martyrs has enormously increased; from units it has mounted to hundreds, thousands, tens of thousands!

Let us pass over this century of political struggle to see how, since the time of Speransky, public opinion has actually become more embittered and violent on the subject of Russian autocracy. Let me now quote the speech of a Russian lawyer, recently delivered in 1903 at the trial of students and workingmen who were accused of having taken part in a political demonstration in the city of Saratov. Revolutionary songs were there sung and banners hoisted, bearing such inscriptions as "Down with autocracy!" This was a spectacle very different from that which Petersburg displayed in the year 1825; and this comparison alone may help you to realize how much the state of popular feeling has changed during the course of one century. At that time—three-quarters of a century ago—some few officers of aristocratic birth had become imbued with the tenets of liberalism in western Europe (during the military expeditions of 1813-15), and made their sub-



ordinate soldiers demonstrate, without having previously trained them for sympathy with their political ideas; they chose an interregnum, as a seasonable moment, and an oath of fealty to the very power they wished to dispossess as a convenient pretext, for their pronunciamiento. But for all that they did not know what to do with the forces they had gathered around them, and they remained irresolutely in one place the whole day, until they were dispersed by a few salvos of artillery. Now, in the Saratov demonstration of 1903 we see only the small part of a great movement, which from the capital has spread over all Russia, gaining adherents even among the lowest levels of society, and which consciously and deliberately pursues its scheme of social revolution. Political reform is for this movement only the first and easiest means of gaining better conditions for a further, more successful struggle. Let us listen for a moment to the argument of the Russian lawyer, Mr. Wolkenstein, whose plea was in defense of some persons accused of having "criticised autocracy." In the fragment I quote the advocate endeavors to show what the criticising of autocracy really means at the present time in Russia. Mr. Wolkenstein says:

In every conscientious text-book of state law you may find what the "criticising of autocracy" means. Who "criticises" autocracy "criticises" its evils: bureaucracy, centralization, administrative discretion, denial of the rights of individuality. But all this is in our time everyday talk, words that have become truisms. Open any newspaper you like, even a most reactionary one. Should it be a question concerning school reform, you may find such remarks as follows: Our school has become dead under the pressure of bureaucracy. And what about the budget? The

press, coerced by censors, still criticises openly the system of taxation, whose whole weight rests upon the hungry mass of paupers. Is it not a criticism of the régime? Are not finance and taxation the chief center of the nervous system of the state? Is it not by this very protest against the despotic and arbitrary collection of taxes and the manner of spending the money collected that nations always begin their struggle for political liberty? Do you not hear the voices resounding from everywhere: from shires and counties, from province and capital, from cities and villages—from every corner of the nation? These speeches about the equalization of the rights of every station, about the abolition of arbitrary administration, about the emancipation from administrative tutelage, about the nationalizing of land—is not all this a condemnation of the existing régime? Now, these speeches form the reply of the educated class to the question which recently posed the government—as to where poverty and famine come from. Do not these speeches violate Article 252 of the Statute of Penalties? [This was the foundation of the accusation made by the state's attorney.] But the government keeps silence and listens to such speeches.

It keeps silence, too, toward the loud voice of the Russian nation! This voice claims a share in legislation. Is this also no condemnation of the established order of the state?

And such voices resound often and oftener. Bend your ear and you shall hear how they murmur! And how persistent, and how bold! Twenty years ago they were answered by a repression of what was called the "anarchy in provincial councils." Seven years ago there rang concerning these "dreams" a threatening veto of one [the Tsar] whose word is law for the empire.<sup>14</sup> And now the only reply to these voices is—silence! Meanwhile the press, muzzled though it is by the censorship, asks for a general representative assembly of the land—the *Zemsky Sobor*; it proclaims the "people's council" in 1903.

<sup>14</sup> The advocate refers here to a phrase pronounced by the Tsar in the beginning of his reign. "Senseless dreams" was the qualification of liberal aspirations by the young sovereign, in a speech which is generally supposed to have been prepared for the Tsar by Mr. Pobedonostsev, and which was pronounced before an audience of land-marshals, come to congratulate the Tsar on his coronation.

Life changes. Authority also changes its view. At last there comes a time when authority gives ear to such things as were forbidden even to be spoken in a whisper.

Gentlemen of the jury, you have just been told that your sentence will put an end to the demonstrations; that demonstrations disturb general tranquillity and unsettle people's well-being. Well, I assert the contrary! Apart from the demonstrations you will find no tranquillity in Russian society. The fermentation is spread everywhere. The people here accused are guilty only of having spoken aloud what is said in a thousand ways everywhere. Through the impermeable muteness of our life, through all its pores, oozes criticism of the régime. A criticism of the existing order bursts forth roaring and whistling through every crack and gap. That is what these men have seen and heard. And therefore they hoisted their red banner. You may convict them. But then you must realize that together with them tens, nay hundreds, of thousands of Russian citizens are being judged.

This lawyer's speech, delivered in one of the late political trials, shows clearly what is the general feeling toward autocracy in Russia, and in the face of such growing irritation autocracy has completely changed its tactics. In the period from Peter the Great until Alexander I. we saw it passing through a process of self-improvement. Henceforth, we observe it in the stages of another process: that of self-preservation. When the Tsar Alexander I. visited England in 1814, he spoke enthusiastically to the Whigs of the necessity of forming an opposition in Russia, in order that a parliamentary government might be started. Two years later his younger brother, Nicholas, when on the point of visiting England, received instructions in which he was told not to imagine that it would be possible to copy an organic development like the English constitution, in quite another climate and different

surroundings. This fragment of a nationalistic view became the political theory which was used by the government in self-defense just at the moment when an actual "opposition" appeared in Russia.

The full blossoming of nationalistic theory, as we already know, coincided with the reign of Nicholas I. (1825-55). Then the nationalistic doctrine of Slavophilism was built.<sup>15</sup> Now, the government of Nicholas, in its system of self-preservation, surpassed by far the nationalistic theory of the Slavophiles. Conservative though this theory was, it started from the notion of the national "spirit" of the people as a living force, as an active and creative power not to be stopped or ruled by state policy or by the measures of the police. The authority of the state, to be sure, was fully recognized by the Slavophiles, but their idea of what a state had to be was not a flattering one. The state was something like the "flesh" in Greek philosophy and in Christian morals; it was a principle of sin and evil; and it had to be kept far from the free life of spirit; its only right and duty was to secure to the spirit the full enjoyment of its inner freedom. No wonder that this kind of nationalistic theory could not be adopted by the government; on the contrary, it had become suspected of democratism, and its supporters had themselves to experience what the actual policy of a nationalistic reaction was. Their periodicals were forbidden, all their writings submitted to a special censorship, their persons were put under the strictest surveillance of the police.<sup>16</sup> What the government really wanted

<sup>15</sup> See pp. 52-57.

<sup>16</sup> See pp. 365, 366, where radical and democratic deductions from Slavophilism are shown.

in the way of a nationalistic theory it formulated for itself. This was the doctrine of "official nationalism," poor and scanty as a political theory, but quite operative as a means for carrying out a policy of thoughtless immobility and reaction.

Such a theory did not need to be developed in political pamphlets or in learned treatises. It found expression in manifestos and official reports. The most discursive exposition of it belongs to the minister of public instruction, Count Ouvarov, who is generally accepted as the founder of the theory of "official nationalism." To make you realize its tenets as well as its political meaning, I cannot do better than to quote from a report to the Tsar by Ouvarov, which was written at the beginning of his ministerial activity, the new nationalistic era, 1833. In his pompous and flourishing style, he writes :

While contemplating the problem which was to be immediately solved—a problem closely connected with the future of our fatherland—the mind involuntarily gave way almost to despair and it wavered in its conclusions, while considering the social tempest, which was making Europe tremble and whose reverberations, more or less strong, reached us and threatened us, as an impending danger. In the midst of religious and civil institutions rapidly on the decline in Europe, keeping in view the universal spread of subversive ideas and attending to distressing events that were happening at every step, it was necessary to establish the fatherland on those stable foundations on which the welfare, the strength, and the life of the nation are generally built; it was necessary to discover such principles as belonged exclusively to Russia—those principles which formed its peculiar characteristics; to gather in one the sacred remainders of its nationality, and there to anchor our hopes of salvation. Happily Russia has preserved a warm faith in the salutary

principles without which it cannot prosper, grow stronger, nay even live. While deeply and sincerely attached to the church of his fathers, a Russian always thought of his church as a covenant of social and family welfare. Without love for the belief of his forefathers, the nation as well as the individual must perish. A Russian who is devoted to his native country would not acquiesce in the loss of any of the dogmas of our Orthodoxy, or agree to be robbed of one of the pearls in the diadem of Monomach.<sup>17</sup> Autocracy is the chief condition of the political existence of Russia. The Russian giant rests on it, as on the corner-stone of his greatness. And besides these two national principles there is a third not less important: that of nationality. The question of nationality is more complex than the previous one; but both originate in the same source and are united on every page of Russian history. The difficulty consists here in reconciling the old and the new ideas about nationality. But the principle of nationality does not necessarily imply standing still or going back; it does not demand immutability of ideas. The state composition, like the human body, changes its outward aspect with age: features are changed, but the general physiognomy ought not to be changed. It would be improper to resist the periodic march of things; it is enough if we may preserve untouched the sanctuary of Russian popular notions, in order to take them for a fundamental idea of government.

Thus appeared, immediately after the European revolutions of 1830-31, the famous trinity of the Russian official nationalism: autocracy, Orthodoxy, and—in as bad logical as material co-ordination—nationality. Since that time the Russian government has never renounced this doctrine, and Russian public opinion has never in the struggle against it given in, excepting, perhaps, a few years at the beginning of the reign of Alexander II., when the preparations for the emancipation of the peasants were going on. With this one

<sup>17</sup> One of the insignia, mentioned on p. 164.

exception, the whole period of the last three-quarters of a century may be called one epoch of lasting conflict between government and public opinion. Many things that would be found abnormal in every civilized country have become quite normal and customary during this long progress of political struggle in Russia. What the ideas and the active forces of public opinion are we shall see presently. But for the present we have to consider what were the means resorted to by the Russian government, in order to keep back the increasing current of opposition. Seeing how severe these means were, we shall be able to judge of the strength of the movement that the government was trying to fetter. You know, perhaps, that at the end of March, 1903, two imperial edicts gave a kind of dictatorial power to the governor-general of Finland. By this new instruction he not only was entitled to control and to direct every office and public institution in the country, including the elective ones, to permit and to stop public meetings and the collection of money for whatever object, to control public and private instruction, and so forth, but he also received, by a temporary statute, such full powers as befit a formal state of war: he is now free to arrest and to exile persons whom he finds dangerous to the general tranquillity, to seize property, to close any establishment of trade and commerce, to deprive any official, even an elected one, of his office.

For a country like Finland—a country that has been accustomed to be ruled by law—such measures as these are nothing short of revolutionary. The legal régime is at once overthrown by regulations

which, in the eyes of the people, not having received sanction from the popular representatives, cannot represent law either by their form or by their origin. Now in Russia a like state of things, revolutionary though it may be in its essence, has existed for years; and, as people have never known what a legal régime in politics really is, the same discretionary power does not bring about nearly so much irritation as one might think. Nay, there are people, there are even some writers on politics, who find that even such arbitrary rule, when it is thus founded on edicts and "temporary" regulations, is better than a paternal régime of unbounded autocracy, just because it is a step forward toward a state of legality; at least, arbitrary power is thus publicly proclaimed abnormal, and confined within certain more or less definite limits.

In fact, the discretionary power of the Russian government, having been formally extended by statutes, has become more clearly defined, and thus in a way more limited. But this certainly was not the aim of the authorities who wished their powers rather to be enlarged. The direct purpose was always to give the government some additional weapon in its interminable struggle against public opinion. A short survey of historical facts will suffice to prove this assertion.

The first time that the ordinary—the "executive"—police were found insufficient for the preservation of the general tranquillity was at the time of the military rebellion of St. Petersburg in 1825—the "December" mutiny. A contemporary, Count Laferonnais, the French ambassador, testified as follows concerning the general tendency of public opinion:



The chief evil is that even the most prudent of men, such as looked with horror and disgust upon the events, think and say aloud that reforms are necessary, that a code is wanted, that forms and principles of justice must be entirely altered, that peasants are to be protected from the insupportable arbitrary power of their lords, that it is dangerous to remain stationary, that it is quite necessary to follow—if only at some distance—the progress of time, and to prepare, though slowly, for more decisive changes.

Such was also, as we know, the opinion of Speransky. But such was not, of course, the opinion of the emperor, Nicholas I. “Miserably educated,” according to his own statement, and fond of military discipline and obedience, he did not realize the necessity, so clear to Speransky, of following the progress of the time. Yet even Nicholas understood that absolute monarchy was powerless to control the abuses of bureaucracy, and that some extraordinary measures must be taken, if robbery, embezzlement, and the other vices of a bureaucratic régime were to be done away with. It was to improve these bureaucratic abuses that the secret society of the “Decembrists” had been started some years before.<sup>18</sup> Now that its members were hanged or exiled, Nicholas resolved to recur to another kind of secret redress for public wrongs—the kind that had been used by oriental monarchs more than once. He founded—or rather he reformed—the system of close surveillance both of society and of state officials by means of a special body of the state police, who should be the “ears” and the “eyes” of the Tsar. The chief of this “separate corps of gendarmes” was at the same time the chief of the

<sup>18</sup> See pp. 254-59.

“Third Section of His Majesty’s Private Chancery,” and as such stood in close and immediate relation to the monarch. The subordinate officers were scattered all over the country, and had to correspond with their chief on the subject of private morals and public grievances.

The system was founded on the supposition that the superior policemen were to be superior men—a supposition which proved to be very hazardous. In fact, the new set of officials were on quite the same level as the old ones. Thus the system of bribery and embezzlement was not broken, but only strengthened by a fresh link in the chain, and a more important one, because the members of the superior police in the provinces were surrounded by a halo of the mysterious and irresponsible power from which they drew their origin. Thus, though the original aim was not attained, the “blue coats” of the gendarmerie were soon found to form a most essential spring of absolute power. Every illegal action against person and property has since been carried out with their help. Had an influential person to extricate himself from some complicated pecuniary or family affairs that were not to be divulged or were not expected to be untangled to his satisfaction in the ordinary courts, by the current law, the officers of the “Third Section” were there to relieve—not orphans and widows, as they were supposed to—but the oppressor at the cost of his victim. It was like the *lettres de cachet* of the *ancien régime* in France. Again, had a too popular writer, or a too successful sectarian chief, an applauded actor or actress, or even

an influential official, to be removed from his scene of action and made harmless, a secret order was immediately given, and the person in question suddenly disappeared in the darkness of night, to reappear some days afterward in some remote corner of Russia. All these were manifestations of the paternal tutelage which Nicholas I. claimed over his subjects as a constituent part of the absolute power inherited from his predecessors.

It is easy to understand why the "Third Section" was hated by everybody and soon became proverbial as the incarnation of the Russian autocratic régime. It was supposed to fall into disuse, as a victim of this general hatred, when the liberal reforms of Alexander II. began; but, in fact, it was abolished only in the last year of his reign (1880), after having served the new wants of the government, and it only gave place to new institutions of a similar kind which were found to be more appropriate to the new requirements for the self-defense of autocracy.


The new measures just hinted at were called into existence by a new period of struggle between the government and the revolutionists in the decade 1870-80. The general situation which made the government feel very strongly the necessity for new "bills of coercion" is clearly represented by the minister of the interior, Valooyev, in his report to the Committee of the Ministers of 1879. We may compare his avowal with the testimony of Laferronnais, quoted above:





We must not exaggerate the importance of the difficulties and dangers to be combatted; still the situation is rather embarrassing. A very bad sign is, first of all, such indifference as

is shown by nearly all more or less educated people regarding the struggle of the government against a comparatively small number of malefactors [*i. e., revolutionists*]. The majority of the population is agitated, but it seems to wait for the issue of the struggle, while not sharing in it and not taking the side of the government. Moreover, the general public are nearly always badly disposed toward the orders of the authorities, while they find the measures that are taken sometimes too weak, sometimes too oppressive. As regards the masses, who either do not reason at all or who reason insufficiently, among them two different inclinations may be observed. They are ready to help when first called; but their assistance is disorderly and violent, bordering on arbitrariness, and so is too dangerous to be relied upon. At the same time these masses are accessible to every promise that is held out to them of material profits or of new franchises; and when influenced by such promises they are always ready to refuse obedience to their immediate authorities.

Under these circumstances no moral help from the side of the populace could be hoped for, and a set of new measures were taken in order to enlarge the power of the local authorities. No less than twenty edicts concerning those measures were then codified into a kind of system in 1881 and, without being transformed into standing law, were published as a decree of the Committee of Ministers approved by the emperor to be applied as "temporary" regulations. But since then these "Regulations Concerning Enforced and Extraordinary Protection" have remained a Russian habeas corpus. They correspond pretty nearly to what is understood in Prussia by the phrase "small state of siege" and "great state of siege." And even during these last few years, when the situation has again been very much aggravated, even when compared with the decennium 1873-84, the statute seems to be on the

THE REGION  
of the  
"SMALL STATE OF SIEGE"  
(Enforced Protection)  
in 1902



-  Districts and Provinces. } Under the "Enforced Protection."
-  Separate Cities and Towns. }
-  Districts and Provinces. } Where meetings are particularly forbidden. (Art. 421.)
-  Separate Cities and Towns. }



point of being enriched by new methods of administrative oppression and by the use of military force.<sup>19</sup>

Let us now see what the combined result of all these "temporary" measures of the state policy is—measures which have formed a real tradition during the last three quarters of the century. First, these measures have multiplied exceedingly the number of institutions and persons whose particular duty it is to observe, to discover, and to punish political offenses. If you live in either of the two capital cities of Russia, and if you have the bad luck of manifesting political activity, you may be traced by one of these institutions, questioned by the second, and punished by the third; although none of them have anything to do with the general courts of justice. The honorable office which watches your doings and sayings is the *Ohrannoye Otdelaincye* of the prefect of the city or the "Department for Protection." Its agents are very numerous; they are scattered everywhere—in schools and universities among the students, in editors' offices among the journalists, in social gatherings, in railway stations, in the most frequented streets, in factories among the workingmen, even in revolutionary circles and social-democratic organizations, in private circles for self-culture, and among the young people of the middle schools. What Tacitus says about the *delatores* of the time of Tiberius and Nero is trifling in comparison with the large system of denunciation actually at work in Russia.

Authorities who use this system are themselves

<sup>19</sup> On the map one may see how large is that part of the empire in which the state of siege is continuous.

sometimes bewildered by its extent, and by the quality of the implements; I myself have heard the gendarmes, the representatives of the former "Third Section," boast their pride in that they no longer form a part of the system, since the *Ohrana* has been formed. Unhappily, they are not entirely right in their boast, since their fellow-workers do the same thing in the Russian provinces, where no agents of the *Ohrana* exist. And in the cities they perform the function of formal inquiry, the second step after a person has been tracked by the spies of the *Ohrana*. Thus, even where the gendarmes are not spies and detectives, they are inquirers and—very often—inquisitors. While making inquiry, these agents do not produce the evidence of your accusation; they try to conceal as much of what they know about you as possible. They ask you simply to avow what they do not yet know, and in order to induce you to the avowal they use tricks such as would never be permitted in a regular court of justice. The inexperienced and the least guilty always run the risk of aggravating their position, and even of being convicted of quite imaginary faults, by breaking down before this Jesuitic system of inquiry. The more experienced abstain now more and more from giving any answers. A representative of regular justice, who is obliged by law to assist at this trial, is in fact rarely present.

In theory, the case, when stated by organs of previous inquiry, must then be sent over to an ordinary court, in order to be pleaded before the jury. But, as a matter of fact, this hardly ever happens. The regular Russian courts, founded in 1864, have been proved



too independent and liberal. In 1878 they declared Vera Zasoolich not guilty—a girl who had fired at the prefect of Petersburg, General Trepov, after having read in the newspapers that he had had one of the political prisoners flogged. Since then, by a set of imperial orders, special courts have been introduced, and governors-general have been given the right of transferring political crimes to the courts martial. But even these special tribunals presently fell into disuse. This is due partly to the desire of the government to avoid every public discussion of politics, because special courts, though made inaccessible to the general public, yet gave to the accused and to their advocates the chance of an open defense, which could then be made public through the channel of the clandestine press.

But this disuse of judicial procedure appears also to have been partly the necessary consequence of an enormous disproportion between the insignificance of political offenses and the barbarity of the punishments which were to be inflicted for them, if the legal procedure had to be resorted to. Political criminals have now grown too many, and political crimes have grown too ordinary, to be punished by forced labor or prolonged imprisonment, as the antiquated Russian code demanded. Thus a new tribunal was formed by the "Statute of Protection" of 1881, composed of two representatives of the ministry of the interior and as many from the ministry of justice. They have to sit on every case not judged important enough to call for one of the grave punishments of the law, or in which the proofs of guilt are not so evident as to be accepted as such by

the regular court. These judges do not see the accused, do not hear the witnesses, and do not listen to any defense. Their only material for judgment is that collected by the gendarmerie inquest. This secret tribunal, called "The Particular Consultation," is authorized to sentence to an administrative exile of not more than five years. But in reality it does not observe this limit very strictly; it inflicts sometimes an exile of from eight to ten years, and even imprisonment, though, of course, this needs an imperial confirmation.

Just now<sup>20</sup> a new criminal code is to be published, in which punishments for political crimes are not much alleviated, but the crimes themselves are dealt with in a more detailed and modern manner. Some new attempts were also made to judge political crimes by tribunals—special ones, of course. But it does not seem that this experiment of comparative "legality" can be put into practice. Until the possibility of a more consistent legal state of things is acknowledged, the "Particular Consultation" is destined to be perpetuated. Until then also the police department of the ministry of the interior will continue virtually to judge political crimes. Some people find a kind of progress of legality even in this order of things, when compared with the old régime of the "Third Section of His Majesty's Chancery." And, indeed, there is a kind of formal procedure in what has just been described. We see, then, that here too the personal régime has given place to a system of legalized arbitrariness. But it may be doubted whether the arbitrary power of the superior police becomes more legal after it has been outwardly

<sup>20</sup> July, 1903.

separated from its real origin—the arbitrary power of the sovereign. The emperor Nicholas I., of course, would have been jealous of this particular kind of division of powers, he who knew well where the line of demarkation lies between the autocracy of the monarch and the autocracy of bureaucracy. But, as things now are, the actual division of power between autocracy and the state police is quite necessary, and even such a Don Quixote of autocracy as was Nicholas I. could not have found any other way of escape from this division than to try a more dignified and honest one; namely, by sharing his power with his people instead of with the police.<sup>21</sup>

We know now what is the part of the *Ohrana*, of the gendarmerie, and of the police department in their business of observation of Russian citizens. But this is far from all that can be said about the matter. We have not said anything about the army of spies who are directed by the provincial gendarmerie officers; another army of the agents of the police department who are entitled to control the former; and a third, much more numerous, army of “janitors” who are also made obligatory agents of the political police; and a fourth, still more numerous, army of thirty-five thousand guardians now on the point of being stationed in the villages, because during the last few years the peasants have not, to use the conventional

<sup>21</sup> I need hardly say how many are the facilities for blackmailing and other abuse of power which their exceptional position and their utter lack of responsibility give to these secret state police. It is difficult to realize how often, particularly in the provinces, the state police have used their power to the satisfaction of personal revenge.

term of the Russian police, proved quite "well-intentioned." The part played by the janitors is particularly interesting. The by-laws of governors and prefects impart to janitors many rights and duties which make them regular assistants of the police. They are obliged to observe and to report everything passing before them which may seem to them extraordinary; they must be particularly vigilant about every person unknown to them who comes in or goes out of the respective houses; they must inform the police about every private gathering which seems to them suspicious; in urgent cases they must detain suspected persons even before the policeman appears. The practice goes still farther: sometimes janitors are formally invited to share in the free fights organized by the police against political demonstration.

But from these means of political observation let us pass over to the ways in which they are used. Here also the janitors play a not unimportant part. You know, perhaps, that every Russian citizen must possess a testimonial certifying his identity, and delivered to him by such social groups as he belongs to. The mere fact of not possessing such a testimonial or "passport" is a crime that is punished by deportation "on foot" to the supposed birthplace of the unfortunate person in question. This order of things originated in the necessity of following up and detecting inaccurate payers of the poll-tax, which Peter the Great introduced for the "taxable orders" of peasants and unprivileged town inhabitants. The poll-tax was recently abolished, but the passport system thrives and flourishes, because it has proved an invaluable expedi-

ent for the police. Nobody is permitted to change his dwelling-place without a passport; and before leaving it, even with a passport, he must tell the janitor the place of his destination; and the janitor tells it immediately to the police. Wherever you arrive, you must immediately show your passport to the janitor, who again informs the police. You are not permitted to pass the night, were it with your friends or relatives, without showing your passport to the janitor, or your host and landlord may be punished by a fine of as much as \$250.

Now, if you happen to be under "surveillance" by the state police, the police officer of your dwelling-place communicates immediately with the local police officer of the place of your arrival, and you are sure to be observed there in just the same way. It is worse when you are not permitted to go to a certain place; then your name is found there when your passport is registered, and you are sent away at once. Or, should you be under orders not to leave your dwelling-place at all, your name is separately registered, and it is a crime to have left your abode. The former state is that of "secret surveillance;" the latter, that of an "open" or patent surveillance, which is generally connected with "administrative exile." It legally deprives you of the right of moving without special permission; it bars you at the same time from every public activity; it enables the police to come into your lodging and to make domiciliary search whenever they like. Of course, this last arrogance cannot be particularly resented, because actually, though not legally, such is the general condition of the Russian

citizen. Writs of domiciliary search and of arrest very often follow the fact, instead of preceding it, in Russia. As regards arrest and imprisonment, legally the reasons should be explained within a certain time. But actually they may be kept secret as long as it pleases the authorities, the only condition being that they suppose you to be so dangerous for the general tranquillity as to deserve an administrative exile. Thus the only legal result of your having been imprisoned for a prolonged time, without apparent reason and without any explanation, is the legal necessity of sending you away—though you may not have been found guilty at all—just as a justification for your imprisonment.

But, you may say, all this is only the fate of restless people who disturb the general tranquillity. Severe as these punishments and preventive measures are, they may be very limited in their action; they have nothing to do with the overwhelming majority of law-abiding citizens, absorbed in their private vocations. I may reply to this that the category of those who are not considered "well-intentioned" citizens is far from limited, and that this category is rapidly increasing. In 1880 the number of exiled persons, under patent police surveillance, was 2,873. In the spring of 1901 about sixteen thousand persons were exiled from Petersburg alone, and the number of persons exiled during two years of M. Seepyaghin's ministry is said to be sixty thousand, though I cannot certify this figure to be correct. But let us admit that the group of "ill-intentioned" persons is comparatively narrow. Let us put aside this group of politically active men

and pass over to the larger circle of the general public, and to the conditions of any public activity.

I do not mean, of course, public assemblies and meetings. The Russian people do not possess the right of gathering for any public discussion. There being no legal provisions for public gatherings, every crowd of people on the street or assembly of the people in a private or public lodging is necessarily considered illegal and must take the consequences. The by-laws published by the governors under the "Statute of Protection" are particularly expressive on this point. The following by-law, published in 1902 by the governor of Bessarabia (where Kishineff is located) is typical:

Forbidden are all<sup>22</sup> gatherings, meetings, and assemblies on streets, market-places, and other public places, whatever aim they may have. Forbidden also for passers-by is any crowding which impedes free circulation, and such gatherings are obliged to disperse at the first request of the police. All meetings in private houses for the aim of discussing the statutes of associations for which the permission of the government is necessary are permitted only with the knowledge and approval of the police, who have to give permission for each gathering separately, on an appointed day and in an appointed place.

All gatherings are to be dispersed by armed force, if they refuse to obey the "first request," and particular (secret) instructions to army officers make them answerable for any delay of action, "even should it be caused by feelings of humanity." This may explain why mere crowding in the streets is considered both by the government and the revolutionists as a means

<sup>22</sup> Exception was time and again actually made by the police of anti-Semitic gatherings, intended to teach Jewish socialists, by way of massacres, to be more "well-intentioned" toward the existing order of things.

of revolutionary action. An entirely peaceful discussion of workmen about their strike recently served as the signal for a formal attack of the Cossacks near Rostov on the Don.

But even under normal conditions simple gatherings in private lodgings are closely observed and at any time may be proclaimed illegal. If you gather together a dozen or two of your friends, you must make it known to the police. If they are students, you had better not do it at all, even if you are a professor and the students are your pupils in the university. The professors of the Petersburg university, who are not at all radical, recently claimed as a special right "that it might be made safe for every professor, on his own responsibility, to gather students together, either in the university buildings, with the permission of the rector, or in their own homes, without asking a special permission of the police and without incurring prosecution for the simple fact of having convoked or admitted such gatherings, in order to explain to the students questions touching their own specialty."

Of course, the government cannot forbid every public conference. But it takes care that no free word shall be heard from a public chair. No public lecture can be delivered unless it is specially permitted. To get a permission is not easy. Even such lecturers as occupy official chairs, or are highly placed in government service, are not sure to be allowed to lecture, especially in the provinces. Such a permission depending on the high representatives of the Ministries of Public Instruction and of the Interior, namely the



local "curator" and "governor," the same lecture may be allowed in one province and forbidden in another. For the most part, not only the subject of a lecture must be made known previously to the authorities, but also a syllabus, and often even the very text of it, must be drawn up, the red tape is affixed to the manuscript, and the lecturer is not afterward permitted to add one word to the permitted text. Sometimes a representative of the local authorities is present at the lecture with a copy of the allowed text, in order to be sure that no free word is pronounced. Yet all this does not free the lecturer from responsibility, if his delivery should chance to produce such a deep impression on his audience as is likely to displease the authorities and be classified under the head of "disturbing public tranquillity." Quite recently an old and very respectable journalist, immediately after a lecture which he had delivered in Siberia, was carried off to a political prison in Petersburg, merely because his audience behaved too tumultuously under the impression of his delivery.

Now, all these difficulties and measures of precaution become infinitely greater if the lecture is to be delivered to plain peasant folk or workingmen. Such lectures were not delivered in Russia before 1872-74, and then they were allowed only in Petersburg and Moscow, where two "standing committees" were authorized to organize them. Yet these lectures were not to be delivered extemporaneously: they were to be read out of printed leaflets, compiled by the most conservative contributors of the Petersburg committee. Until 1891 this committee had published only 140

leaflets; but a third of them were absolutely unfit to be read before the people, and the remainder consisted mostly of the lives of saints, histories of churches and monasteries, and so forth. No Russian classics were comprised among them. This was the material which was to be proffered to the popular audiences of the provincial cities of Russia, according to the regulations of 1876. Still, thousands of hearers crowded before the doors of narrow and scantily furnished rooms, longing for admittance; they gladly paid some kopecks' entrance fee, patiently listened to the dry exposition, and did not tire of returning until they knew so well the few pamphlets which they liked as to be able to repeat them aloud in advance of the lecturer. Nearly every attempt to increase the number of the officially permitted pamphlets was an absolute failure. Thus, for instance, in the year 1892, when the cholera was approaching, a person intrusted with an office by the governor of Riga asked in vain for permission to read before a popular audience an article on "contagion." I must mention that this article had already been published in a newspaper edited by the government itself for the people, a newspaper to which every village board of administration is obliged to subscribe.

As regards district towns and villages, no public lectures were permitted to be delivered there until 1894. How dangerous this departure seemed to the government may be judged by the obstacles which were put in its way. In order that a village philanthropist might read to the people some poor pages of printed matter about the Holy Land or Columbus's discovery, three ministers had first to consult—the

Ministers of Instruction, of the Interior, and of the Holy Synod. It was only in 1901 that the village and district lectures were put on the same basis as provincial ones; *i. e.*, they were left to depend on the local representatives of the Ministries of the Interior and of Instruction. In the same year the latter ministry yielded in a certain degree to the numberless demands of provincial councils and local societies for the enlightenment of the people; permission was given to read before the people, besides the scanty number of pamphlets specially permitted for such popular readings, also such as were allowed by the ministry to be introduced into the libraries of the pupils of primary schools. Then it was permitted not only to read the books, but to "transmit their contents orally, while not transgressing its limits." You must know that all the lecturers in their turn have to be formally allowed by the governor to read the printed matter; they are invariably refused permission if they are not supposed to be quite "well-intentioned." I know cases where only three out of eight persons proposed were found reliable enough to read or to expound the printed text.

Of course, the general reading of the people also is under close observation. There are not many free public libraries in Russia. There were only forty-nine in 1856, *i. e.*, before the great revival of Russian public opinion during the reforms of Alexander II. At the beginning of the actual reign of Nicholas II. (1894) they numbered 862, but only ninety-six of this number were outside the cities. The real growth of village libraries has begun since that time, owing to the philanthropic exertions of provincial councils and

local societies for culture. This movement was closely followed by restrictive measures of the government. Here also the free libraries for the use of the upper class are treated differently from those for the lower classes. For the former the government is satisfied to prescribe what ought not to be read. For the latter it goes farther in its tutelage and decides what ought to be read. Thus we have two official catalogues for reading: that of books prohibited for general libraries, and that of books permitted for the people's libraries.

Which, then, are the books forbidden in the public libraries of the educated? They are about two hundred, and these books are published in Russia, with the permission of the censor, and are sold freely in the bookshops. Books which are altogether forbidden even for private use are not included in this number. Among the books prohibited in the public libraries you may find Russian translations of Bagehot's *Physics and Politics*, Huxley's *Evidence as to Man's Place in Nature*, Lyell's *Geological Evidence of the Antiquity of Man*, Mill's *Political Economy*, all Spencer's works, Green's *History of the English People*, Bryce's *American Commonwealth*, Fyffe's *History of Europe*. From these you may judge of the rest.

The other catalogue, that of books permitted in the people's libraries, would not strike a foreign observer in the same way; but to a Russian it is simply crushing. The "Learned Committee of the Ministry of Public Instruction" undertook to make a choice for this purpose among all Russian books actually on sale. They are about ninety thousand, and the ministerial cata-

logue allows the Russian people to read from two thousand five hundred to three thousand of them; *i. e.*, about 3.3 per cent. of the whole number. And, indeed, the committee is unable to avoid this: how can it itself have read all Russian books? Since the catalogue was published in 1896 seventy-five thousand more Russian books have been printed; but only 8 per cent. of these are admitted to the people's and the young people's libraries. Which, now, are these selected specimens of Russian literature? The provincial council of Koorsk designated not less than sixty of the most prominent Russian authors whose works were entirely left out of the catalogue. Among the writers of fiction, such as Saltykov, Korolenko, Garshin, Gleb Oospensky, Chelov; among our poets, such as Nekrasov, Nadson; among the critics, Belinsky, Dobrolubov, Shelgoonov, Michailovsky; among the historians, Kostomarov—are not mentioned in the catalogue. Our best periodicals, beginning with the *Contemporary* of 1856-66, and including *Fatherland Memorials*, *Russian Thought*, are also forbidden. On the other hand, the catalogue is filled up by such special works as can interest only a scholar, not an ordinary reader. Among the periodicals and newspapers which are admitted special ones largely prevail. You may find there plenty of material about the raising of bees and birds, cattle and horses: but for general information you have only the nationalistic newspapers, *New Times* (*Novoya Vremya*), *Light* (*Svyet*), and the *Moscow News*. Anything that may draw attention to the liberal current of public opinion is forbidden entrance into the precincts of popular libraries.

Yet, you may say, all this is permitted to pass freely through the printing press and to be bought in the shops! And this brings us to the Russian censorship. Here also we may distinguish the period of paternal tutelage and the period of arbitrary rule legalized by statutes. During the first period, the censor was obliged to look after the transgressions of law and of morals, as well as of good patriarchal habits and even of Russian grammar on the part of the press. This was the time when a censor could be arrested for not having prohibited a too ardent poem, "To a Beauty," and Emperor Nicholas I., as a particular kindness, himself revised our greatest poet Pooshkin, through the intermediacy of the "Third Section." This period ended with the reign of Nicholas I. in 1855.

The new era began with the statute of 1865, which was nothing less than an adaptation of Napoleon III.'s law concerning the press, compiled by Persigny in 1852. But for the Russian government it seemed the very incarnation of liberalism: the government soon repented of having given the press so much liberty, and fundamentally changed the statute of 1865 by the subsequent measures of 1872 and 1882. The statute of 1865 had liberated periodicals and books of more than ten sheets from the censure of a book before printing, the former "previous censure." By this statute, the authors had had to answer for their trespasses only before the regular court.

But as judges and attorneys persisted in their wish to be independent and refused to find any crime in books that censors handed over to them, it was found

more convenient to seize printed books before their issue. The publishers are now obliged to keep printed books a week, and the monthlies four days, before publication, in order to give time to the censor to make himself acquainted with the book and to stop publication if he wants to. If the offense is of little importance, the publisher can transact his case privately with the censor, by sacrificing some lines of pages that were incriminated. But if the trespass seems to the authorities grave, the book is given over to a committee of ministers, instead of to a court of justice, as the statute of 1865 provided; the periodical is to be judged by a special committee of four ministers, instead of by a committee of the senate—*i. e.*, the Russian Supreme Court—as was the regulation of the statute of 1865. When this extreme measure is resorted to, it generally ends in the destruction of a book and the stopping of a periodical. The legislation concerning the periodical press is particularly rich in every kind of preventive, coercive, and repressive measure. First, the government has its hand in starting periodicals, as no paper can be edited unless the editor is officially approved by the censor as a “well-intentioned” person. Sometimes long years pass before any independent organ is permitted to be published. But if, owing to some lack of information or by other slip, an independent journalist is permitted to enter the field, there are plenty of means in reserve to keep him quiet. The whole finely graduated scale of coercive measures can be consecutively applied against his paper: three consecutive warnings are followed by the stopping of a periodical, after which it is given up to

“previous censure;” besides this, the right of printing advertisements may be reserved, or the retail sale of copies forbidden. How often these measures were taken may be seen from their number, which amounts to 581 during a period of forty years; *i. e.*, more than one per month. But this can give you little idea of how constant was the struggle, and how many of the best and most influential periodicals succumbed in it.

Yet this is not enough. There exists another set of measures used by the government, which serves it better than all these punishments of the press crimes. The best means was thought to be not to let the press sin at all, by withholding from public discussion most important questions just at the time when their discussion was most needed. Such a right was formally given to the Minister of the Interior as early as 1873. This is why it is quite impossible for the Russian press to fulfil its aim, by discussing subjects which most attract the public attention. The use made of these prohibitive measures was as large as may be imagined. If cholera approaches the Russian borders, the press is ordered not to say a word about it. If a financial reform is prepared, or a commercial treaty concluded, or gold coinage introduced, however important it may be for everybody, the Russian press is forbidden to discuss the matter, in order that public credit may not be shaken. Even if a bank is on the point of becoming insolvent, the press has no right to disturb readers by any rumors to that effect. The “public tranquillity” seems to the government to be such a valuable thing that it is not allowed to be troubled even by signs of people’s sympathy with the Tsar. When



Alexander III. was on his death-bed, newspapers were not permitted to speak of his illness. But, of course, the chief use that is made of this right of the Ministry of the Interior is that of preventing political gossip. No communication concerning political processes or criminals is permitted. No information about the state of peasants and about their relation to landed proprietors is to be published. When a movement among workingmen began, during the present reign, this subject also was withheld from public discussion. Again, the disturbances among the students must be passed over in silence by the press. Religious disturbances and religious persecutions very often also must pass unnoticed by Russian readers. In short, there is no burning question of the times that is accessible to the Russian press. The chronicle of the national life in the Russian monthlies often consists only in reprints of official edicts or communications, while forbearing every criticism thereupon. Nothing is permitted to be known about all these things, but what is told to Russian readers in official communications by the government, reprinted by the press from the *Government's Advertiser*. But sometimes even such reprinting is found dangerous, and newspapers are ordered not to publish the official communications of the *Government's Advertiser*. Moreover, not satisfied to withhold from public knowledge and discussion matters of general interest, the censorship uses its power to protect private persons from public criticism, if only they are mighty enough to claim its protection. For instance, the editors were asked not to speak about the family affairs of a certain Mr.

Markus, a privy counselor; to keep silence about the attempt at suicide of a young aristocrat, Nicholas Mooravyov; to forbear mentioning the duel between two officers of high society, a quarrel between two high officials, even not to print the articles of one high official against another, etc. Very often scandals in high society are known to the editorial staff only by way of such orders of the censor. How customary this rôle of censors as protectors of private interests has finally become, you may judge by the fact that sometimes the censor does not even give himself the trouble of concealing private motives for his orders. Lately, an order was issued not to publish anything about some scandalous facts concerning "doping" horses by influential sportsmen, on the ground that "this would not please Grand Duke Demetrius Konstantinovich."

But the censorship tries to go still farther. It is not sufficient for it to influence the press in a negative way, that of imposing silence. It is also interested in influencing it in a positive sense, that of making the press tell what the authorities want told. In the earlier, the patriarchial, period of its existence the press was supposed to serve "the views of the government" by its own initiative. When this supposition was found not to square with actuality, the censor began trying to induce the press to "serve the views of the government" by way of persuasion and personal influence.

The minister of public instruction, Goloveen, in 1862 made an avowal before the Committee of Ministers, that all measures of rigor which had been taken heretofore against the press availed nothing; that they

only "embittered the writers, helped them to form a conventional language tacitly agreed upon and well understood by the readers, and finally produced a general contempt for a government which was unable to attain its aim." Mr. Goloveen recognized that the government ought not to have tried to transform literature into an official institution; literature, he said, was the expression of the thoughts and wishes of educated society; the government must know these wishes, but the censorship only helps to conceal them from the government, without being able to change them. Yet, Mr. Goloveen thought, the government could indirectly influence journalists by letting them know the views of the government and subsidizing them. In the year 1858 it was even proposed to the Committee of Ministers to form a particular committee for influencing public opinion. Now it was quite clear that the best and most influential journalists were not to be corrupted in this way. Hence the government was obliged to start an organ of its own, in order publicly to defend the measures of the government and so to influence public opinion. Such an organ was the *Northern Post*, established in 1862 by the minister Valooyev. The same question arose in a committee in 1879; the minister Valooyev proposed again to found a particular newspaper which should be under the direction of the government. And indeed in the following year (1880), such an official organ, called *The Shore*, was started. It was edited by Professor Tsetovich, who made himself a name by venomous invectives against Russian radicalism. *The Shore* succumbed before the end of the same year, a

victim of public indifference, though materially it was well supported by the government, receiving about \$65,000. This was also the fate of other enterprises of the same kind, except such as received the right of publishing official advertisements, for which big sums of money were paid — the *Moscow News*, for instance.

Finally, one of the chief directors of the press department, Mr. Solovyov (1896-1900) resorted to a simpler means of influencing newspapers. He proposed to some of them, that were running the risk of being stopped, the alternative of appointing official editors, who were to be liberally paid and were to warrant the good behavior of their papers. This resource was also a failure. Some periodicals refused to comply with the suggestion, and were stopped; others that accepted tried to satisfy their official heads with money and to withhold from them the actual business. We cannot leave this subject without mentioning a most ingenious trick of the Minister of the Interior. In the years 1897 and 1899 two socialistic monthlies were published at a time when no liberal organs were allowed to be started. The riddle was explained soon: there was a spy in the editorial staff of both periodicals, and he had helped to start them, in order to observe the socialistic circles. Of course, neither existed more than a year.

All these measures against the press having been constantly in use since the time when the press had become a social necessity in Russia, you may easily guess how distorted must have been the reflection of contemporary public opinion which the Russian press was giving. Of course, public opinion sought a remedy, and found it in the clandestine press written or

published abroad and smuggled into Russia in increasing numbers of copies. Through not suffering any legal opposition, the government thus helped to eliminate moderate elements from public life. Maimed public opinion took its revenge by growing more and more radical. But later we shall return to this question of what influence the policy of self-preservation of autocracy had on the development of public opinion in Russia. Here it was only necessary to mention that the stifling of open criticism and opposition was by no means the only consequence of the governmental policy.

Now we come over to another branch of public life, where the political influence of the government could make itself still more easily felt. This is the department of the public schools. I do not mention the private schools, because they are quite insignificant in Russia. They played a much larger part in the popular instruction of a century or half a century ago; but since then they have been entirely pushed into the background by the government schools. These schools now almost exclusively possess the right of giving such diplomas to their pupils as entitle them to enter the official service, and to enter higher institutions of learning. By this alone the official schools contrived to monopolize public instruction.

A less official character is preserved as yet by the elementary schools for the village population. This is explained by the origin of these schools. The government was not very favorable to such schemes for the enlightening of the common people as have been formed since the end of the eighteenth century by the philanthropists of the educated class. Thus it did

almost nothing for the instruction of the people until the epoch of the emancipation of the peasants in 1861. Then the activity of the newly founded provincial councils, the *Zemstvos*, began, and the peasant schools were first started by the Russian local self-government. In correspondence with this origin, the teaching staff of the village schools were accustomed to consider their work as a kind of social duty which was to be performed, not as a means of livelihood or as a technical profession, but as a high vocation, chosen by their own initiative, for the good of the country. But this patriotic enthusiasm drew the distrust of the government upon the village teachers and upon the whole enterprise of the provincial councils. During the first few years, the development of this type of village school remained unheeded by the government; but when it assumed considerable dimensions, the government became jealous of it and took measures to fetter the initiative of the local self-government. The control of directors and government inspectors of local school boards was increased; the rights of the delegates of self-government were diminished. The aim of the government was to let the county councils pay the money, and to take all the rest of the business into its own hands. Thus far it has not succeeded, but the school programs, the appointment of teachers, the choice of text-books, the examinations—all that is already under the control of ministerial officials.

Not satisfied with this, and powerless to open its own type of village schools, the government began to encourage a competing initiative of the Holy

Synod. There was no regular parish school in ancient Russia, and our clergy, as we know already, was too little educated itself to take care of the education of the people. They were not in the least interested in any action taken for popular enlightenment. Such clerical tendencies as distinguish the church schools in western Europe never existed in Russia. Now, the government itself, which in Europe tries to withdraw the school from church influence, has in Russia recently tried to awaken the zeal of the clergy, in order to oppose it to the "politically dangerous" initiative of the provincial councils. A type of parish school was started opposed to that of the self-government school. Instead of the real knowledge which the teachers were trying to impart in the latter, the parish school was concerned chiefly with singing religious hymns and reading mediæval Slavic—a dead and artificial language, in which the Russian service books are written. But as long as only the parish priests and the sextons were supposed to teach in the parish schools, these schools existed only on paper and in the official reports of the Holy Synod. Exertions were then made to compel the provincial councils to turn their pecuniary help into the clerical channel. A formal struggle for existence began between the two types of village schools. Lastly, Mr. Pobedonostsev managed to find money for the support of the parish schools in the state exchequer. But moral victory was on the side of the provincial councils' schools, as is to be seen from the circumstance that the clerical school is now about to adopt their program and to prepare special teachers, in order to be able to compete with its secular rival.

Unhappily both systems, even taken together, are not equal to the rapidly increasing demand for elementary education. Of course, the number of young men that have passed through the school increases at a very rapid rate. Out of every hundred of the conscripts, for instance, there were ninety-five illiterate men in 1868; seventy-nine in 1875; and not more than fifty-five in 1898. But all exertions of philanthropy and of clerical policy are not enough to keep pace with the natural increase of population. For this increasing number alone it would be necessary to open 2,606 new schools every year; and there are not more than one thousand and seven hundred opened annually. There are about thirty thousand provincial council schools, and about eighteen thousand parish schools, while not less than three times as many (one hundred and fifty thousand) new schools must be opened in order that all young people of an age requiring education may receive elementary instruction. We must add that such instruction as is generally given by elementary schools does not go far beyond simple reading, writing, and counting. Every attempt to increase the number of years of study (from three to four or five), and still more any attempt to enlarge the program and to impart some knowledge of geography and history, invariably meets with obstacles from the side of the authorities.

But to consider the next step in the system of public education—the secondary and high schools. In Russia these institutions antedate the village schools. Schools were necessary, if only that the government might have educated officials; they were necessary



also as a preparation for the higher institutes of learning. And so they were started by the government as early as the reign of Peter the Great; and since Catherine II. the system of government secondary education may be considered as being firmly established in Russia. The government continued to favor secondary education until the first half-century of their continuous existence (1786-1828). During this period the secondary schools, while serving the aims of the government, were not much frequented for the ideal purposes of education.

But then the position entirely changed. Private education, as prosecuted by the government, was less and less resorted to. As a consequence of the general spread of culture in Russia, the public schools were filled with young people who studied for reasons other than a diploma and the chance of official service. At once the government became suspicious and began to find that young people were over-educated. It wished the children of the higher classes to be prepared for service, civil and military; and, as regards the children of the lower classes, it wished them to have a professional education in schools of a lower type. Both wishes, in spite of a whole series of prohibitive measures, it was unable to realize. Particularly since the middle of the nineteenth century young men longing for general education have become more and more averse to state service and to technical craft. Presently they became absorbed by the growing political movement. Then the secondary schools were transformed into an institution of the police as the best means of preventing

the spread of political ideas in the younger generations. A particular system of teaching was started which exalted the formal side of education above the real, and which tried to occupy the student's mind with objects removed as far as was possible from the living present. This was the "classical system" of the minister Demetrius Tolstoy.

By and by the system of political observation increased enormously under the school régime of Tolstoy. Pupils were allowed to read only such books as had passed the censorship of school authorities. I know of cases where lads were excluded from the school for having dared to look into the works of our best literary critic, Belinsky, or for having come to a public library to take a book for their relatives. For the student to be present at a meeting of a learned society, or to visit the theater, a permission of the headmaster was required. Neither was this system of close observation restricted to the college walls; it followed the pupil into the street, and even to his own home. Special teachers were entitled to visit the lodgings of the pupil at any time. When a pupil had finished his course of study, a moral and political "description" of him was to be drawn by a teacher, which followed him to a higher institution of learning. Thus no "ill-intentioned" pupil was likely to pass out of the secondary school.

How severe was this process of selection may be seen in the following statistics: In the years 1872-90 only 4-9 per cent. finished this classical school in the proper time (*i. e.*, eight years); of the others, 21-37 per cent. finished it with difficulty; but

not less than 63-79 per cent. were thrown out as unfitted for the higher institutions of learning. And the government was quite satisfied with such results of the secondary-school pedagogy. For, as we have seen, since the second quarter of the nineteenth century, it has always found that the spread of instruction is too great in Russia, and has, therefore, tried to diminish the number of pupils and students as much as possible. The increase of pupils from the lower classes was found particularly alarming when compared with that of pupils from the nobility. In 1833 more than three-quarters (78 per cent.) of the pupils were children of the gentry, and less than a quarter (17 per cent.) of the town inhabitants, peasants (2 per cent.), and clergy (2 per cent.); while half a century later (1884) the children of noble birth formed less than half (49.2 per cent.), and the town inhabitants sent twice as many as before (35.9 per cent.), the peasants nearly four times as many (7.9 per cent.). Then in 1887 the minister Delyanov published his famous decree restricting the number of Jewish children in the schools to a certain maximum, and withholding from the school the children of the lower classes—"sons of coachmen, domestic servants, cooks, laundresses, green-grocers, and such people." And, indeed, in the next years the percentage of pupils of noble birth mounted to 56.2 per cent. But did the secondary school, as Mr. Delyanov expected, avoid breeding those feelings of "discontent with the conditions of life" or of "bitter resentment against the inequality of social station which was unavoidable by the very nature of things"? The state of mind of the students in the institutions for higher study must answer this question.

Nearly all of the Russian young people who have passed through the schools of Demetrius Tolstoy are socialistic. All the exertions of the school authorities, with all their system of minute police supervision and their teaching of politically indifferent subjects, has availed nothing; or, rather, this very system has contributed to produce results quite opposite to those desired. Russian students in the institutions of higher learning play now the part which German students played in the first half of the nineteenth century, when no regular political life existed in Germany. With an enthusiasm and self-sacrifice far surpassing that of the German secret societies, the *Tugendbund* and of the *Burschenschaften*, Russian students promote the cause of the political and social reform of Russia. Particularly during the last few years (since 1899), the revolution is, as it were, insistent within the walls of our universities and academies. Thus the task of the government superintendence has grown much more complicated. Difficulties have become quite insuperable in this department of higher public instruction. Everything apparently is tried by the authorities to repress the movement. Liberal professors have been banished, the autonomic statutes of the universities repealed, and an entirely bureaucratic organization substituted in their place, the number of students diminished, the fees increased, the system of collegiate dwellings founded, a close inspection introduced independent of university authorities and connected with the superior police, spies provided in abundance, student gatherings severely forbidden, a representative organization of moderate elements brought into existence under the

close supervision and personal responsibility of the professors, chosen by the faculties ("curators"); scholarships and other foundations have been used for political aims. And all of this has been of no avail, and is not likely to change the situation in the future.

What is now the reason of such a complete and continuous failure of all measures of oppression? Here, in the higher schools, we may on a small scale observe their inefficiency as we should be able on a larger scale to infer from the general state of things in the whole country. Oppression never can take the place of measures of creative policy. Real wants and difficulties are not overcome when, by means of the enormous strengthening of oppressive measures, they are brought to comparative silence. And besides, this silence will never prove to be absolute.

What is, then, our general conclusion on behalf of the system we were trying here to describe? We may sum it up in two questions and two answers.

Can the government, while it remains what it now is, namely, a mere system of police, hypocritically supporting itself on fictitious nationalistic tradition, leaving to legislation a merely fictitious independence, to administrative power a likewise fictitious responsibility, to the judiciary not even a shadow of its original freedom and competency—can a government such as this lighten the system of oppression it is obliged to use against any free utterance of an enlightened public opinion? Can it, for instance, abolish the *Ohrana*, the gendarmes, the system of political spies, re-establish regular justice, respect the rights of the individual, forbear arbitrary arrest and exile, allow the population

liberty to meet, to read whatever they wish, to speak publicly about politics? Can it free the press from censorship, the schools from police duties? Of course it cannot, without denying itself in essence.

Now comes the second question: Are all these measures of oppression of any use, of any final consequence to the government? Can they actually prevent growing irritation, the spread of political knowledge, the increasing unity of oppositive action, the consolidation of political parties? They certainly cannot.

To a certain extent, they can, perhaps, delay the movement, and they must greatly increase the number of political victims. But the living forces of the nation cannot be fettered in such a way. A living force is only accumulated by the resistance it meets with. And if it does not find an outlet, after all pores and safety-valves have been stopped, it suddenly breaks through, like

A gentle flood, which, being stopped,  
The bounding banks o'erflows.

We have studied enough now of the "bounding banks." Let us study the "flood" which, from being "gentle," presently becomes violent.

## CHAPTER V

### THE LIBERAL IDEA

ONE of the conventional lies of Russian nationalism is that in Russia there are and there can be no political parties. Of course, such a political condition as was described in the previous chapter is far from being favorable to the formation of political parties. No regular political life can thrive and prosper under the system of police oppression that we have spoken of. Nevertheless, beneath the surface of the official uniformity, differences of political opinion have long existed which correspond in every way to the differences of political parties in western Europe; and those who adhere to the same opinion in politics to a certain extent acknowledge such party ethics and party discipline as are necessary for combined political action. The scope of this political action is wide enough, though it often lies in such fields of public life as might be expected, under more normal conditions of political life, to be free from party spirit. Lacking such a main road of politics as a regular representation of the people would offer, political agitation has deviated from the direct route and fills up the by-ways or breaks new ground. Science and fiction, school and theater, learned societies and establishments for charity, universities and technical institutions, associations for self-help and self-culture, provincial councils and courts of justice—none are free from party politics in a country where political parties are supposed not to exist at all

and political life to be confined to some high offices of bureaucracy. Of course, no regular party organization exists as yet; but even this is only a question of time, perhaps of some few years. An organization of the more advanced groups for political action actually exists in the only form that is now possible—in the form of secret societies, as we shall see later on. The more moderate elements avoid secret organization, but even they cannot entirely abstain from such political intercourse as involves in itself a sort of elementary organization. And the time is near when the government will understand that it gains nothing by keeping the moderate elements scattered, while the extreme ones are strong and skilled enough to combine in united political action.

So far, at least, there may be distinguished two different currents of Russian political opinion, opposed to the government: the moderate and the radical. The former has always been called in Russia by the party title "liberals" of western Europe. The latter is essentially socialistic. These political groups may be traced to different origins; their followers are recruited from different social layers. Liberalism is chiefly spread among the representatives of Russian self-government, among men of liberal professions, even among state officials; all of them for the most part belonging to the old Russian gentry. Radicalism is the prevailing color of the advanced organs of the press and of men of liberal professions; among our youth it shades off into socialism. We shall see later on how quickly socialism is becoming the doctrine of the workingmen, and even of the peasants.



Liberalism is of old date in western Europe. When it first appeared as a systematic policy, its political meaning closely corresponded to the etymology of the term. This was a consistent doctrine of individual liberty. But this meaning has changed much with the subsequent development of political life and theory. Liberalism was a progressive and advanced doctrine when it first exposed its teachings of individual freedom to the mediæval privileges of social orders and to the arbitrary rule of patriarchal government. But the same theory of individual freedom received a different interpretation when it had to deal with the democratic encroachments of the modern state. If liberalism was to preserve its place as an advanced doctrine, then it must extend its meaning so as to cover the new and enlarged scope of state activity. If, on the contrary, it wished to remain faithful to its old *laissez-faire* doctrine, then it would necessarily become essentially conservative. Both issues were resorted to in different countries. Where political life dated from early times, where it was continuous and, so to speak, organic—as was the case in England—the meaning of the old party title was extended in order to preserve the unity and the continuity of the party action as long as was possible. Thus liberalism, by a curious inversion of meaning, began to signify the idea of state intervention by way of social legislation. Of course, this new liberalism—the liberalism of Gladstone and of Mr. Chamberlain of twenty years ago—was not quite like the liberalism of Cobden and Bright. Now, in countries of a more recent and less pacific political development the other issue is generally taken: the old party title is

worn out before its former adherents have time to change or to extend their opinions; then it is thrown aside by the more advanced groups, while remaining the name of some conservative political group. This is the case in Germany, and still more so in the new Slavic states, where "liberals" merely means "conservatives."

Now, in Russia the meaning of the term "liberalism" is at once extended and worn out. It is extended to the more radical groups, particularly in the press, for the simple reason that every more advanced term would be provoking to the censor and thus would incur prompt suppression. The original meaning of liberalism was the more easily altered, because in Russia it was not bound by any historical recollections. It connoted the idea of state intervention, and thus became more democratic, without being inconsistent with a former tradition. General ideas are easily changed, if they remain abstract, not being embodied in any system of actual party policy. At the same time, however, the term "liberalism" is worn out in Russia. This, of course, is not because the liberal program is already realized. Far from being so, this program presents now the first step to be attained; and this is recognized and accepted by all parties in Russia. But, of course, this first step is not acknowledged to be the only one: political freedom and individual liberty no longer seem to be the absolute good that they were considered when the era of liberty dawned in France. In the eyes of subsequent generations, liberalism was rather discredited as a sort of class policy, that of the "third estate," and thus anti-democratic. This was the mean-

ing of the term, which was already largely accepted and current in Russia long before any continuous liberal policy could be outlined. The greater number of such as call themselves liberals in Russia in fact hold to the more advanced opinions. That is why the term, as I said, is worn out, without having actually served. It certainly will not stand the slightest strain. With the first gust of political liberty it will yield to some more advanced term, while it will probably remain in use to designate some conservative group.

We may now see the difference between the liberalism of Russia and that of western Europe. But we shall not be able clearly to understand the reasons for this difference unless we resort to a historical explanation. This is chiefly to be sought in the different structure of the Russian society from that of western Europe.

It is well known that European liberalism originated in the struggle of the bourgeoisie—the wealthy and enlightened middle class of city inhabitants—with an absolute monarchy and the privileged landed proprietors. Russia, however, did not possess such a bourgeoisie as that of western Europe, and such as it did possess was neither wealthy nor enlightened, nor numerous and influential enough to have any political weight in the country. To be sure, in Russia, too, liberalism was directed against the agrarian class of landlords, and particularly against their right to possess serfs. But it was started by members of the same class of agrarian gentry and nobility, and the promoters of the movement, far from supporting the class interests, undermined the social position of the nobility

and destroyed the very source of their political power. In doing so they were, of course, guided, not by class considerations, but by philanthropic feelings and advanced political theories. Thus they represented, not class opinion, but general public opinion. Russian liberalism was not *bourgeois*, but *intellectual*—to use the French terms. Some chief features of Russian social history may help to a better understanding of what has just been advanced.

We must not dwell long, however, on the absence of bourgeoisie and the insufficiency of Russian middle-class development. We know already that for the most part Russian towns originated, not in the necessities of trade and commerce, but in those of military defense and state colonization. We may add now that they kept their original character for a long time. The commercial population of the towns and cities was growing very slowly; the inhabitants for the most part went on tilling the land and living the life of peasants, even though they practiced some petty craft or trade. But even such city inhabitants formed an insignificant proportion of the whole population. In 1630 the entire number of city inhabitants was 292,000—about 2.9 per cent. of the whole population. In 1724 it was still nearly the same, namely 328,000 (3 per cent.). A century later the city population increased to ten times what it was (3,025,000 in 1835), but even then the proportion to the whole population was only one and one-half times higher (5.8 per cent.). In the second half of the nineteenth century, however, the increase of the city population went on more quickly, but even at the present time (1897) the figures are 16,289,000—13 per cent. of the whole population.

Rich merchants who were counted in Muscovite Russia only by tens could be found in Moscow alone, whither they were transplanted from other parts of the country by the government as soon as they became rich in some provincial town. These rich men were very necessary in the city: they were intrusted here with the collection of the indirect taxes, and they were made liable by all they possessed for the accurate gathering of money. Foreign trade was entirely in the hands of foreign companies until the end of the seventeenth century. Peter the Great introduced factories, but, with the exception of some isolated cases of prompt enrichment, these factories gave small profits and had to be encouraged by government subsidies. In the time of Catherine II. (1762-96), when the possession of factories became profitable, noblemen threw themselves into the business, and their competition made profits fall. After a short attempt at free trade, in the reign of Alexander I., began the era of protectionism, which, with few interruptions, has lasted ever since. This system, though it enabled a certain number of Russian factory owners to thrive, did not give them a feeling of independence, nor did it contribute much to the building up of the bourgeoisie, in the western European meaning of the word. Indeed, it was already too late to form such a class, and its political rôle had long been usurped by other social elements.

In western Europe it was the large landed property which gave political power: the landed proprietors, the nobility, contested the power of princes, before the bourgeoisie came, in its turn, to help or to oppose them. In Russia, owing to the primitiveness of economic

development, landed property did not give so much power and wealth. And so the possession of large estates was often a consequence rather than a foundation of the class power of the Russian nobility. Indeed, this nobility never knew how to preserve such landed property as it took possession of. It acquired or lost property according to the gain or loss of its political significance, which increased or decreased for quite other — that is, for political rather than economical — reasons.

When Russian autocracy was newly born (at the end of the fifteenth and the first half of the sixteenth century), it was attended by a brilliant court of princes and boyars. These princes had just been dispossessed of political power over their hereditary properties, in consequence of the unification of the Russian state. Hardly a century had passed, however, before there remained almost no traces of these large hereditary estates of princes. To a certain extent this was their own fault, because Russian aristocracy never could give up the ancient custom of an equal partition of their lands among the heirs. Nothing like the English system of entail ever existed in Russia. Thus the largest estates were scattered and dispersed in the course of a few generations. The representatives of most of the brilliant and aristocratic families were to be found tilling their small shares of land as simple peasants, as early as the seventeenth century. But there was also another reason for this rapid impoverishment of the ancient aristocracy. This was the consistent policy of the Muscovite princes, who were quite conscious of the aim which they were striving to

attain. In a former chapter<sup>1</sup> we have seen how the ancient landed proprietors were despoiled of their properties by the government. This was particularly the case with the large ducal estates of former sovereigns and high vassals. They were given lands in other districts of the country, where they could have no hereditary influence on the inhabitants; or, as a more simple method, they were accused of the lack of fealty, and then underwent capital punishment, sometimes "with all their kin," as one of them, Prince Koorbsky, says. This was the policy of John IV., the Terrible.

One of John's advisers, a political writer of the time, gave him good advice as to where to search for support in this struggle against the aristocracy. In order to be able to "play with magnates as little children," he says, John had only to support and to organize the gentry, the men of military service. We have already seen<sup>2</sup> that this was also the necessity of the time, provoked by state reasons—not only a mere device of internal policy. Thus the gentry took the place left empty by the decline of the nobility of ancient lineage. From the gentry also a new nobility was to be enrolled. This was the nobility of state service. Such persons as were higher officials became members of this new aristocracy. And this new aristocracy, being more dependent on the Tsar than was the ancient order, often contrived to gain large landed estates. The most important of them were such as were personally related to the Tsar. But this kind of

<sup>1</sup> See p. 157.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 150.

importance was not at all stable. According to their rise or fall, their big landed properties came into existence or were again submerged during the seventeenth century. With the new dynasty of the Romanovs, which was of comparatively modest origin, members of the same family take a leading place among Russian landlords; during the next reign, that of Alexis, his new friend and relative Morozov comes into prominence; and only half a century later Romanovs and Morozovs disappear, to give way to the relatives of the new Tsar, the Nareeshkins and the Lopooheens.

Amidst this constant process of gain or loss of influence, no independent source of power and influence could persist. The only power was that given by the place occupied in the Tsar's service: the current formula was that "Everybody in Moscow was great or small according to the Tsar's appointment." Thus the "appointment," the "place" in the Tsar's service, became the chief thing which everybody strove to attain according to his family precedents. The great wish of everyone was not to be "diminished" (or "lowered") in the honor of service from the position which had been occupied by his parents, and everybody was closely observed by everybody else, that he might not achieve such promotion in service as would throw into the background his competitors from equally good families. This is what was called the system of the "struggle for places." You see that this system was not conducive to the development of a feeling of unity among the members of the upper layer. No *esprit de corps* existed among the Russian aristocracy; and nothing like an idea of equality among its members,



the idea of peerage, could possibly be evolved. No other chance of forming a "corporate spirit" existed for the lower stratum of the Russian nobility, the gentry in the seventeenth century. Though favored and protected by the government, they could not become really influential so long as they possessed no class organization, and had no opportunity of continuous touch and intercourse. The military service exacted from them was intermittent and badly organized. Gentlemen joined their regiments of cavalry only when their regiments were quite ready to march; and they always tried so to manage as to go home before the campaign was ended. They had no definite place in the regiment, and they stood where they liked, surrounded each by his servants. Naturally enough, the government was not satisfied with such an army, and wished to have a standing army of mercenary soldiers, skilled in military art and armed with fire-arms. Such a body of arquebusiers existed continuously from the days of John IV.; till the end of the seventeenth century they played the part of janizaries in Moscow. About 1630 regular infantry also began to be organized in the country; and this reform was achieved in 1670, without recurring to the knights of the gentry. The military rôle of the Russian gentry seemed to be played out by this reform of the Russian army. New regiments for regular service consisted of enrolled peasants or of such "lower ranks of serving men" as were not socially far removed from peasants. The officers who commanded them were also not members of the gentry, but, nearly all of them, foreigners. The ancient cavalry of the knights of the gentry thus

became quite antiquated, and their military help could now be entirely foregone.

Thus the old Muscovite system of military tenants of the state was in its decay when Peter the Great began his incessant wars and his civil reforms. Both his wars and reforms made him want men; and thus with Peter began a new era in the history of the Russian gentry and aristocracy. But there were also other reasons which made him restore on a new and larger basis the lower middle class of the "men of service." These reasons were the same as had led John IV. a century and a half before. Peter disliked and distrusted what survived of the higher Russian nobility down to his time, both the nobility of birth and the nobility of the state service. He needed the social support of lower social elements against the higher. At the same time he needed it also against the former standing military corps in Moscow, which was meant to be such a support, but which instead had grown into a continuous danger. I mean the arquebusiers, the Moscow janizaries of that time. They proved particularly turbulent during Peter's minority. Now, to counterbalance both nobility and janizaries, Peter formed some new guard regiments, largely composed of men of the gentry. He needed, however, much more than that; he needed a standing army for his great war with the Swedes, and another army of officials for his bureaucratic institutions. The old class of the "state servants" was not large enough for both purposes. It had to be remodeled and entirely recast on much larger foundations.

This was what Peter did. On a larger scale it was what John III. had accomplished when he first formed

the class of military men of service. New social elements were now again to be resorted to. And the principle on which they were to be united with the former elements into a whole social group was just that of the state service.

Peter wanted his soldiers from the old gentry to serve "from the very foundations," as he expressed it: they were to be obliged to start as simple soldiers, and they were to be regularly promoted to the rank of officers. On the other hand, every simple soldier taken from any other social layer served in the same way and passed the same line of promotion, until he became an officer and, as such, was considered a member of the gentry. Thus, to the extreme dissatisfaction of the ancient families of the gentry, the entrance into their rank was kept wide open for new "men of service." Its social composition was, once more in Russian history, very much democratized, and its social importance very much lowered.

The same system of mixing up the social elements by means of a central notion of the state service was applied by Peter to the civil service. The lower ranks of civil service had formerly been filled by a particular class of "clerks," much despised by the gentry. But now that civil service, with the introduction of the European absolutism and bureaucracy, had gained much in importance, Peter wanted the gentry, so reluctant to follow his orders, to mingle with the "clerks." In civil service as well as in military, an equal system of promotion in rank, without regard to social extraction, was also introduced. Here particularly the ancient principle of state service, of "appoint-

ment" and "place," far from being abolished, was carried by Peter to its extreme consequences. From this time forward there existed no social difference which could not be equalized by means of the state service. The "place" or degree in the service, the *Chin* or rank, was everything; lineage was nothing. (Fourteen ranks, or Chins, were to be passed from the lowest to the highest, in established order, by every "man of service.") The aristocracy of extraction was thus for the second time discarded: the new aristocracy of *Chin* took its place.

To be sure, this new aristocracy was not like that of the seventeenth nor that of the sixteenth century. It was neither an aristocracy of families entitled to high service, nor was it an aristocracy of ancient lineage. But still it was an aristocracy. Its privileges of state service were, of course, extended to every social layer; still they remained privileges. The *Chin* abolished the old marks of extraction; but the *Chin* itself now marked the line between such as possessed it and such as were denied. Thus the democratizing of the state service by Peter the Great served as a new start in the history of the privileged order, and was followed by a new development of the class spirit.

The ranks of the new aristocracy of *Chin* were soon filled up. It included the few that remained of the former two aristocracies, the princes of the sixteenth and the high officials of the seventeenth century. But the greater part of its composition was entirely new, and was particularly dependent on the liberality of the government. The new courts of the empresses Anna (1730-40) and Elizabeth (1741-61), borrowing

French customs, wanted brilliancy, and demanded enormous supplies of money. Few courtiers were able to provide for these expenses out of their hereditary estates. The greater number were to be relieved by the government, and the government came to the aid of the new court aristocracy of the eighteenth century. The government gave them places, money, profitable business: it was blind to certain illegal ways of enrichment which were constantly resorted to; lastly, it gave them most liberal grants of land inhabited by the state peasants; *i. e.*, by free cultivators who thus became serfs. These land grants became most numerous just now, when no need of them for the state service existed. Catherine II. granted 800,000 peasants to her courtiers (on an average 23,000 each year). Paul, her successor, was still more liberal: he gave every year about 120,000 peasants, which made the whole sum 530,000. Many large estates that still exist date from this period; but a still greater number of the estates built up during his time have again disappeared.

Together with these grants to the highest order of the nobility, the gentry as a whole acquired, in the second half of the eighteenth century, a kind of political influence which it never possessed before; and it used this influence to affirm its privileged position. The chief foundation of this new power of the gentry was the military service of the nobles in the Petersburg guard regiments. After having liberated Peter the Great from the fear of the arquebusiers of the seventeenth century, this guard of noblemen became itself a body of janizaries. During the first sixteen years after the death of Peter they four times took part in court

revolutions. And the part they played became more and more important. At first, in 1725, they were used by their superiors only as a means for raising the wife of Peter the Great, a simple Livonian peasant girl, to the throne, at the cost of his legal heir. Five years later, in 1730, the noble guards themselves raised their voice in a debate over the form of government; and practically they carried out the resolution of their majority. They gave back autocratic power to the empress Anna, after their more advanced colleagues had failed to carry into execution a plan for a constitution. And this very failure was also characteristic of the rising importance of the gentry. The plan, indeed, had already been carried out by the high officials of the superior council, who had just made the newly elected empress sign a Russian *magna charta*. But they did not wish the gentry to share in their political victory: they quarreled with the liberal officers, and this was enough to make them quite powerless. Again, ten years later, the guards deposed a regent, and some months afterward they deposed a baby sovereign; after twenty years more (1762) they were to depose an adult one, for the benefit of Catherine II.

The liberal guard officers of 1730 aimed, as we have seen, at attaining a political ideal of their own. While sharing in the theory of "natural law," they wished to realize the theoretical right of the people to choose their sovereign, and to determine their own and the sovereign's powers in legislation and government. The officers of 1762 had no opportunity of formulating their political views: but five years later the gentry had the opportunity of defending their class interests in a gen-

eral assembly of deputies called together by Catherine II.<sup>3</sup> This time the ascendancy of the Russian gentry, as a privileged class, was achieved. The internal policy of Catherine II. was entirely turned to their profit. Some timid steps toward the emancipation of the peasants, or rather toward a mere limitation of the rights of the landlords over their serfs, were made by the empress in the beginning of her reign. But she took them back, and entirely changed her policy as soon as the large majority of the gentry assembled in 1767 raised its voice against this reform. In the following years Catherine, more than any other ruler, contributed to the transformation of the Russian gentry into a privileged class. Noblemen were definitively liberated from their old duty toward the government — compulsory service in the army. At the same time, their serfs and their landed property, which until then they had been supposed to hold from the state on the condition of service, not only remained in their possession, but even became their full and undisputed private property. For the first time in Russia, a serf began to be considered by the law as a thing which might be owned in the same way as any other private property. For the first time, also, local government was given up to the elective representatives and assemblies of the gentry. It seemed that a foundation was thus laid for the predominance of the gentry in the state, and that this predominance was to be solid and lasting.

Three quarters of a century had scarcely passed, however, before this privileged position of the gentry was again definitively destroyed; more easily, perhaps,

<sup>3</sup> See p. 172.

than it had come into existence. Serfs were liberated. The prevailing influence of the gentry in the local government was undermined and practically abolished, owing to the introduction of a new system of self-government, built on more democratic lines.<sup>4</sup> The other privileges of the gentry lost their significance, because they were extended to other classes. How can we explain such a rapid and easy change?

The explanation is the same as before. The privileged gentry of the eighteenth century may have been distinguished by the high-sounding title of the "well-born nobility of Russia;" as a matter of fact, they remained what they always had been: humble "men of service." After all their political successes, they still preferred the "place" in the service, the *Chin*, to any elective office in their class self-government. They went on considering their landed property as a sort of reward for their services to the state, and did not wish to devote to the cultivation of their estates such time as could be better employed to obtain promotion in a *Chin* in military or in civil service. They still clung to their old idea, that they served the state, and that, reciprocally, the state was obliged to provide for their material well-being. In short, the kind of historical tradition they cherished prevented them from facing the new position of independence which the legislation of Catherine II. opened to them. No wonder that the emancipation of their serfs took them quite unawares, and found them quite unprepared for meeting the necessities of their changed position. In the modern struggle of free competition, that they were now

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 241-44.



obliged to engage in on equal conditions with everybody, they were completely beaten.

Not in vain, however, did they invoke their old tradition. At this moment of crisis the government once more came to their aid. We know already that just then the government itself was changing its policy of self-improvement for another policy of self-defense. Everything that was old and was thought to be of some use for the support of the government was put under the protection of the new theory of "official nationalism." Now, the gentry had really served the government in the days of old. Therefore they too were to be fenced about and preserved for some future use, as a particularly nationalistic institution. Thus, curiously enough, Russian noblemen were again taken under the protection of the government, at the moment when their real significance for the state had become *nil*. The new rôle that was by force bestowed on the gentry is founded on a fiction, and on a political ideology. This ideological character of the state protection is best shown by the inefficiency of the measures taken for the protection of the gentry after slavery, their chief support, had been taken from them. Measures were used lavishly, owing to Minister Tolstoy's policy. They formed one of the chief objects of the legislation of Alexander III. (1881-94). But, in spite of all these measures, the decline of the gentry as a class went uninterruptedly on its way. First of all, the only remaining foundation of their existence as a class, their landed property, quickly melted away. Before the liberation of the peasants, 281 million acres of land belonged to the noblemen. They were

obliged, in the process of emancipation, to sell to the peasants 70 millions of acres, so that they kept after this reform 211 millions, and received for the remainder ready money, which might have been used for the improvement of their estates. For the most part, however, they spent that money quite unproductively, and were soon obliged to borrow from institutions of credit. This completely ruined them, because they were nearly always unable to pay the interest on their loans. They lost or sold their estates, so that now they possess not more than 143 million acres. Not less than a third part of the estates went thus to possessors from other social orders; and the number of noble proprietors diminished at the same time from 123,000 to 102,000.

This decrease would have been greater still, had not measures been taken by the state to prevent the sale of noblemen's estates for debt. In 1885 a special bank for the nobility was founded, in compliance with the demands of indebted proprietors of the landed estates of the nobility. This bank provides for cheaper credit, and took so small a percentage for loans that it was not able to cover even its own expenses and payments: the loss was made good by a special state loan. In spite of this, noble debtors proved most unreliable in their payments. About four thousand indebted estates are yearly proposed for public sale by the bank (of which number about one thousand to twelve hundred belong to insolvent debtors), and yet only some thirty-three of these estates are actually sold by auction. All the rest, so far from fulfilling their obligations toward the bank, simply manage to put off their payments, owing to their personal influence, or to pay such a small sum as

will satisfy the bank officials, who very well know that the government does not wish them to be too severe toward the "men of state service." And when such unpaid money grows to a certain amount, it still may be added to the capital debt (or paid by way of an additional loan from the same bank), and the debt thus increased may be permitted to be amortized in a longer term. Thus the official figures quoted above, so far from showing the full amount of economic ruin and distress of the gentry, rather disguise the real condition of things. Only in case the nobility had been treated as ordinary debtors would the actual magnitude of the evil instantly have appeared.

But there is another way in which the government tried to make good the material losses of the nobility after the emancipation of the peasants. While losing economic predominance, the nobility wished to preserve, and even to enlarge, their power in local administration and justice. They strove to attain such a position as English squires and magistrates possessed in parish and county, before the Reform Bill of 1832 had been passed. But the general tendency of that time (1864) was rather adverse to class legislation. Civic equality was the prevailing idea of the reformers. Thence, the first statute for local self-government (1864) based local representation, not on the differences of social orders, but on the quantity of landed property. Noblemen had to elect their delegates together with other landed proprietors, while other orders, the peasants and the city inhabitants, were also admitted to representation; they chose their delegates in separate conventions. Still, even here the predomi-

nance in the local government remained with the gentry, which made up the large majority of private proprietors, and so dominated entirely their convention. But this did not yet seem sufficient, and a further step was taken in order to give the representatives of this first convention a prevailing rôle in the composition of the provincial assemblies. In 300 districts (out of the whole number of 318) they were permitted to elect more than a third, and in 200 of them half the representatives of all three orders; and thus they became quite a leading group in the assemblies. Altogether they possessed 6,204 seats out of 13,024 (*i. e.*, 48 per cent.), while the peasants were entitled to choose only 5,171 delegates (*i. e.*, 40 per cent.), and the town inhabitants 1,649 (*i. e.*, 12 per cent.).

How much out of proportion these figures were with the actual numerical relation of the classes we may gather, if we remember that the 48 per cent. of delegates from private land-owners represented a group of not more than 480,000 private proprietors, and that out of this number every fourth man was a nobleman, and every tenth man was entitled to vote; meanwhile the 40 per cent. of the peasant members represented a solid mass of 22.4 million poll-tax payers, who were the collective proprietors of the Russian village communities; and the 12 per cent. of town delegates represented about three million of the male inhabitants. In approximate figures, this will give one delegate for eight electors, who were generally noblemen taken from eighty private proprietors of all orders; one delegate for 1,800 male inhabitants of a town; and one delegate for 4,300 peasant rate-payers.

The interests of the nobility cannot be said to have been neglected by the reformers. And, indeed, the influence of the nobility over the activity of the provincial assemblies, or *Zemstvos*, was decisive. In such questions, *e. g.*, as local taxation they unfailingly used this influence for the profit of their class. Still the general tendency of the *Zemstvos* was, as we soon shall see, liberal (and even in the matter of taxation they often advocated a progressive income tax). The conservatives were not slow to infer that this liberalism was due to the system of elections. The tendency of uniting different social orders in the same conventions, and of bringing them together in *Zemstvos*, they were sure to trace back to the principles of the great French Revolution. They thought that the remedy was to be found in the re-establishment of pure class representation, with the entire predominance of the ancient ruling class of the gentry. It was taken for granted that the enforced representation of the gentry would change the liberalism of the councils into a kind of nationalistic conservatism. Thus, by the new statute of 1890 the general number of electors and their representatives was diminished (the number of electors had formerly been 226,174, except peasants; now they were only 80,000, 35,000 of them being noblemen). The non-noble electors were, so far as possible, excluded; a number of votes were transferred from the peasants to landed proprietors; and the elective heads of the district nobility were made members of assemblies without further election. The new composition of the district assemblies was now as follows:

Representatives of landed owners - - - - -	5,433
(57.1 per cent., instead of the former 48 per cent., 1 representative from 6.4 electors.)	
City inhabitants - - - - -	1,273
(13.3 per cent., 1 representative from 36 house proprietors.)	
Village communities - - - - -	2,817
	<hr/> 9,523

Of course, the representation had now become still more artificial, and the choice of the delegates from the nobility had deteriorated, because places were now more numerous than candidates, and, not being responsible to any large constituency, the delegates did not sufficiently appreciate the importance of their mandate. At the same time, *Zemstvos* were made much more dependent on administrative authorities; their elected heads and members of the executive boards were joined to the state service, which made them feel responsible to the Ministry of the Interior, instead of to their electors.

With all this, however, was the political aim of the new reform attained? Was there no more liberalism in the provincial and district assemblies? We soon shall see that the liberal flame, far from being extinguished, reappeared at least as large and as intense as before.

We must mention here a further measure taken to increase the local influence of the gentry. The theorists of the ruling class, as I have said, wished to give them the direct right of governing the local population, jurisdiction and the right of punishment;<sup>5</sup> in short, a

<sup>5</sup> There was such an office, the "justices of the peace" elected by the *Zemstvos* according to the statute of 1864; but it did not at

discretionary power that would remind you more of the power of an autocrat than of that of an English landlord of the eighteenth century. The original aspirations of the conservatives were hardly to be carried out, being too barbarous even for such a country as Russia; still the government yielded to their pressure, and in 1889 the "district commanders" (*Zemskie Nachalncee*) were introduced. But even this measure came too late to raise the social importance of the decaying gentry. The government used the new local office of *Zemsky Nachalnik* for its own ends, not for the ends of the nobility. The nomination was made dependent on the will of the local governor, and the appointed "district commanders" are in all they do responsible to the governor. Thus they are, in fact, officials of the ministry; or, again, "men of service," not men of credit and influence among the local nobility. During the first few years of their existence the "district commanders" still showed some examples of the wild independence and energy worthy of the ancient "landlords;" but afterwards they were so often criticised by their superiors, condemned for their overbearing deeds by tribunals, blamed by the senate, subjected to the sarcastic criticisms and derision of the press, that their initial resoluteness was shaken, their arrogant abuse of power became rarer, and finally they acquiesced in playing the rôle of secondary police officials, who unhappily still preserve their judiciary rights and their discretionary power in the village, but who, sooner or later, will be deprived of them.

all satisfy the promoters of the noblemen's interests, because this office, so far from possessing discretionary power, was confined to the branch of mere jurisdiction.

After this short sketch of the social history of the nobility and gentry, we may now judge how much the Russian nobility and gentry always needed the support of the government, how much they owed to the government their past and actual possessions, of how small importance they would have been if left to their own resources of wealth and power, and how hopeless is their economic future. As we now know, the nobility was too dependent on the government, and presented too few elements of political opposition. This is particularly clear in the rôle it played when a question of most momentous significance and of vital importance for it was being resolved by the government—the emancipation of the peasants. A reform that in other European countries might have been achieved only very gradually or, if at once, only by the help of a social revolution, in Russia was decided by the autocratic power, met with no opposition except mere grumbling and some clandestine intrigues, and was carried out in a most decisive manner by an insignificant minority of idealistic men of action. To explain this, we may quote the following words of Count Strogonov, one of the intimate friends of young Alexander I. Count Strogonov, as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century, wished to prove that the danger consisted, not in abolishing serfdom, but in preserving it, because not the discontent of the nobility, but that of the people, was to be feared. “What is nobility?” he asked. And his answer follows:

It is formed of a great quantity of people who became noblemen only by way of service, who have received no education, whose thoughts are so directed as not to conceive anything otherwise than as arising from the authority of the emperor. They



have no idea of right or of law that could generate in them the smallest resistance to the government. Such of them as have been more carefully educated are not numerous, and they are for the most part imbued with a spirit that is in no way contrary to the reforms of the government. Such noblemen as have made their own the true idea of justice will sympathize with the measure in question; the remaining majority will not reason much about it, but only chatter a little. Where are now the elements of dangerous discontent? But, on the other hand, there are nine millions of people scattered through all the empire, everywhere feeling equally the heaviness of their slavery. They possess a common sense that astonished the men who knew them well. From their very childhood they have been filled with hate. . . . At all times it has been the peasants who have shared in disturbances, and never the nobility. . . . What had not been done against the rights, nay, even against the personal safety, of the nobility during the reign of Paul? If ever there had been reason for growing disquiet, it was then. But had they even thought of resistance? Quite the contrary. Every measure that aimed at violating the rights of the nobility had been carried through with astonishing accuracy; and it was a nobleman who had brought measures into action that were directed against his brethren, that were contrary to the interest and honor of his order.

This was said sixty years before the emancipation (1801), but the general situation remained during a century nearly the same. When Catherine II. first opened up the question of emancipation, she told her reluctant helpers that the peasants would soon or late themselves take their liberty from the hands of the landlords, if their burdens were not alleviated. And Alexander II. some four years before the emancipation repeated the same assertion to the nobility of Moscow: "It is better that liberty should come from above than from below."

This brings us back, then, to the question from which we started in our discussion of Russian social

history. We asked: In what classes of Russian society would liberalism be likely to find support? And we have now the answer: The nobility as a class was too weak, even as to questions touching its very existence, to oppose the government. But the nobility, as the most educated body in the empire, supported the government in carrying out measures directed against itself as a class. In fact, the great measure of the emancipation of the peasants was first proposed, always supported, and finally carried into execution by the liberal minority of the gentry. Emancipation was the chief plank in their political platform during the whole first period of their public activity.

This aim was attained in 1861; and the emancipation of the peasants brought with it the economic ruin of the gentry class. Then began a second period in the history of Russian liberalism—a period of struggle for political liberty. This second aim, however, proved much more difficult to attain; for the educated gentry had now to fight against autocracy, whereas during the first period they merely helped autocracy against their own class. In the beginning of this their new struggle no other class sided with them, though millions of serfs had backed the struggle for emancipation. Moreover, in espousing the cause of political liberty, they were suspected by groups more radical than their own of selfishly pursuing their class interests. Constitutionalism, therefore, was doomed as aristocratic; and this for nearly a generation spoiled the liberal plea. Twenty years later, public opinion became more favorable to political reform; but “the educated gentry” as a separate social group was no longer there; other

voices were heard, louder and more determined than theirs. The struggle was resumed by an educated minority of "mixed ranks."

Indeed, the main characteristic of this second period of Russian liberalism is that the educated gentry were no longer the only social *milieu* from which political struggle originated. Owing to "the great reforms" of the sixties, new and more democratic social elements had meanwhile come upon the political stage, and this new condition changed greatly the very program and character of the political struggle. The new generation was very desirous not to be taken for the old-style liberals. The radical elements had so differentiated themselves from the liberal ones that liberalism, from being the general condition of every educated mind, had become the moderate political doctrine of a certain group. In any country enjoying political freedom liberalism under such conditions would have reduced itself to the modest and efficient rôle of a doctrine for the "leisure class." In Russia, however, even after its differentiation from radicalism, liberalism remained what it had been before—a movement patriotic and philanthropic rather than professionally political; and its program, instead of becoming the representative opinion of landed and moneyed interests, followed the general trend of public opinion, until by and by it became more democratic and radical. And this situation can change only when political reform has been achieved in Russia.

Now that these general outlines of the history of Russian liberalism have been made clear, let us proceed to a more detailed exposition of the subject. In its first

stage, the struggle against serfdom, it is chiefly the history of Russian public opinion. In its second stage, the struggle for political freedom, it is, however, the history of a political party.

The beginnings of public opinion in Russia are closely connected with the establishment of the first institutions for higher study. These were the "Corps of Nobility" started by the empress Anna in 1732, and the Moscow University founded by the empress Elizabeth in 1755. Both institutions were intended for the education of noblemen. The first generation of educated noblemen graduated from these schools was not likely to throw itself into any political activity. Their prevailing interest, according to the general taste of that time, was essentially literary and æsthetic. The theater, poetry, and novels attracted them as in the first half of the eighteenth century these same things did the western European public. In the second half of that century literature and fiction gave way to philosophy and politics; and in either line more advanced ideas gradually took the place of the more moderate ones. Rousseau and Diderot, Helvetius and Holbach, eclipsed Montesquieu and Voltaire. And the Russia of 1750-1800 conscientiously followed each stage of this European development. The above-mentioned generation of 1740-50, enjoying the refinements of the newly introduced European culture, was followed by the more politically developed generation of 1760 (the beginning of the reign of Catherine II.). This latter generation still believed in the "enlightened" legislation of absolute monarchs, and was ready to support the wise rulers by widening their knowledge and sing-

ing their praise. After the failure of Catherine's enlightened legislation, the third generation—that of 1770—appeared. The members of this generation no longer credited the rulers with wisdom and had become sure of the deliberate “wickedness” of the rulers. In politics they wished public initiative to take the place of bureaucracy; in education they insisted upon the development of the personal will.

Thus, the men of the two generations—1760 and 1770—represented the first independent political opinion in Russia, and were the first to oppose this opinion to the policy of the government.<sup>6</sup> It was easier for that generation than for their predecessors of 1750 to assume an independent attitude toward the government, since they were no longer in direct touch with the court, as the first “intellectuals” had been. They formed independent private circles in the capital and in the provinces. In politics they professed democratism, and stood up for the “vile” taxable multitude of the village and of the borough, as against the privileged few of their own class. In religion they opposed the stern morality and the mysticism of freemasons to the easy-going materialism and worldly frivolity of St. Petersburg high-life.

This generation tried to influence public opinion first as journalists. In their periodicals, among verse and fiction, under the literary disguise of satire, more serious matters were introduced. They spoke against the social and legal privileges of the rich and the “well-born;” they undertook the defense of the poor

<sup>6</sup> As we have seen (pp. 26, 46, 172), this policy turned to reaction.

and the downtrodden. But this satire proved too morbid, and too much imbued with the spirit of criticism and opposition, to be tolerated by Catherine II. We have seen how vain was her endeavor to allow the liberal journalists to advocate her own cause. Having failed in this, she attempted to fight them with their own weapon, and to this end started her own literary organ, in which she was to take revenge on recalcitrant journalists by exposing them to public derision.

But the satire of the empress was not so efficient a challenge; and then her irritated majesty resorted to sharper methods. One by one the more advanced periodicals were suppressed. But even this measure did not cause the advanced circles to surrender. Thrust out from the field of journalism, they endeavored to act through private schools and by means of editorial activity. They were busy printing books, organizing the sale and spread of them in provinces where no books had until then existed; and finally, by organizing public charity on a larger scale than it had ever before existed, they started in philanthropic activity for the benefit of the lower classes.

The very fact of there being a private organization for public activity was unusual in Russia, and was considered to be a provocation to the government. So the circles of friends were closely watched by the government as suspicious and dangerous. They came to be particularly suspected when the philanthropists founded a kind of secret organization in connection with the masonic lodges abroad. For no political tendencies had existed in the Russian masonry, which rather had been absorbed in mystical "works" and

moral self-improvement. But political tendencies having been discovered in a branch of the European masonry—the “Illuminates”—Catherine II., who knew scarcely anything of the differences between the various masonic systems, would be certain to find these same tendencies existing in the Russian lodges. And she thought her suspicion fully confirmed when the renowned book of Radeeshchev<sup>7</sup> appeared (1790). Catherine was quite certain that the author belonged to the Moscow “ring” of freemasons, whose activity was especially objectionable to her. And just then also she was particularly alarmed at the horrors of the French Revolution. The book of Radeeshchev was the last straw, and so Catherine began a formal persecution of the whole group of liberals, though Radeeshchev stood in no direct connection with the advanced masons in Moscow. Radeeshchev was sent to Siberia; Noveekov, the leader of the Moscow circle—and the most eager initiator and promoter of every kind of activity: literary, educational, editorial, and philanthropic—was imprisoned for several years; and many of his friends likewise suffered.

The book of Radeeshchev thus inaugurated the first political persecution of public opinion in Russia. And with full historical right, for it contains the first political program of Russian liberalism. A cursory glance into the book shows this clearly. After a thorough criticism of the bureaucratic régime in Russia, the author proposed as necessary reforms: the emancipation of the peasants, the abolition of the privileges of the nobility, and the liberty of the press and of religious

<sup>7</sup> See p. 26.

belief. He also contemplated national representation and constitutional government as a corollary to previous reforms. In the book of Radeeshchev Russian liberalism thus became of age, and immediately entered upon its first open conflict with the government.

How this conflict ended we have seen. Yet this end, violent as it was, looks harmless and innocent when compared with the issue of the second conflict between the government and public opinion.

The second conflict was that of the December rebellion of 1825.<sup>8</sup> A certain period passed between the first conflict and the second. And this interval corresponds to a break in the continuity of the development of Russian public opinion. It finds, also, its counterpart in western Europe: the period of reaction against the French Revolution and of the Napoleonic wars. This break of continuity is filled by the attempts at political reform by Emperor Alexander I,<sup>9</sup> but in his liberal attempts the Tsar was not sufficiently supported by public opinion, which, owing to the national irritation against Napoleon, was at that time rather jingoistic;<sup>10</sup> while liberalism was governmental and officially accepted.

The real revival of liberalism among the educated classes of Russian society, however, began first with the end of the Napoleonic wars; and this liberalism was not transmitted by tradition descended from the time of Radeeshchev; rather it was generated at an independent source and, as a matter of fact, it was then first christened by the European name of "liberalism."

The new oppositionary current originated in fresh

<sup>8</sup> See pp. 176, 177.

<sup>9</sup> See p. 173.

<sup>10</sup> See p. 51.



foreign impressions produced on the men of the gentry class by European events. A great many Russian noblemen were as officers obliged to remain some years in western Europe, and particularly in France, with their regiments. After the Congress of Vienna (1815) they came back to Russia greatly influenced by what they had seen abroad. Their habits of life and of thinking became now quite different from those generally prevalent in St. Petersburg; and they laid much stress on publicly professing their new opinions and practicing their new habits. In a society in which drinking and card-playing were the only social entertainments, they drank no spirits; they played no game but chess; they read political newspapers, then existing only in foreign languages, and talked diplomacy, history, and current politics. In their capacity of commissioned officers, they treated their soldiers humanely and began to build primary schools for the instruction of their men. In a word, they were the "austere men," the "puritans," of the northern capital, as our poet Pooshkin called them. Naturally enough, they could not abstain from criticising loudly whatever they deemed the limitations and deficiencies of Russian political and social life as compared with that of western Europe. Not that they were sworn oppositionaries; far from it, they were quite willing to give the government whatever help they could, should the government endeavor to promote culture and the public welfare. For this outspoken aim — of helping the government — the young officers even resolved, encouraged by the example of the German youth, to form a society, whose statutes were copied from those of the *Tugendbund*.

The emperor himself knew these statutes of the "society for public welfare," and could not find in them anything objectionable or dangerous. To attain the aim of the society, which was "to help the government promote Russia to a higher degree of grandeur and welfare," every member chose one of four branches of public activity: philanthropic, instructive, juridical, or economic.

In regard to *philanthropy*, this society intended to organize regular public help for paupers and tramps, and for the old and infirm. In provincial towns it planned labor bureaus. The landed proprietors were to be persuaded by the members to behave properly toward their peasants. The aims of *enlightenment* were to be attained by the personal example of a virtuous life, as well as by dint of publicly preaching moral and social duties. The members were also obliged to spread true ideas about education, to educate their own children accordingly, and to open new schools. In literature, poetry, and art they were to promote social tendencies, and also to spread the knowledge of the social sciences. Members of the *juridical* branch were to obtain magistracies, and to influence provincial society by exposing to the censure of public opinion arrogance and servility, injustice, bribery, and every kind of abuse in the state service. They were also to oppose the retailing of peasants by the landowners. In the *economical* branch the members were obliged to promote useful industries and oppose monopolies. And in the country districts a scheme of insurance for general disasters was planned.

All this was quite harmless; and there was no need

to conceal this kind of activity from the authorities. The break in liberal tradition seemed to have brought its fruits, for the liberal program of the beginning of the nineteenth century looked far less offensive than that of Noveekov and Radeeshchev. The young officers evidently, lacked the practical grip of their predecessors and testified by their action to a rather abstract book-knowledge of political life, while exhibiting a good deal of political sentimentalism in their aims and methods.

But that was a time when political education was abundantly supplied by the facts of current political life; and very soon the Russian liberals had a chance to profit by fresh experience. Just then the political situation in western Europe had entirely changed. The period of revolutions of the second decennium began; and this period was closely followed by reactionary measures of the various governments, led by Metternich. The period of "fraternization" between "nations" and "governments," which began with the wars of 1813-14, was soon left behind. "Governments" were accused by liberals of having "cheated" their "peoples," after they had no more need of their military enthusiasm; all the fine promises had now to be wrung from the governments by armed force.

Of course, the sympathy of the Russian liberals was with the "people" and their new revolutionary leaders. The young Russian officers worshiped the new national heroes, the Riegos and the Pepes, at the very time when Alexander I. allowed his "Holy Alliance" to drift into a merely reactionary channel, and finally renounced his constitutional project of 1819.<sup>11</sup> The internal policy

<sup>11</sup> See p. 174.

of the Russian government henceforth had to be that of Metternich. "Secret societies" and masonic lodges were formally forbidden; the recently opened (1819) societies for the building of primary schools on the "Lancaster method of mutual instruction" were closed; even the Russian branch of the Bible Society, which had enjoyed the particular protection of the emperor, and which in some few years of its existence had become the center of a large educational movement, propagating itself over all Russia, had to cease its activity. In the newly (since 1802) opened Russian universities (particularly in Kazan and Petersburg) a formal persecution of liberal professors was begun, and new programs were planned, according to which philosophy was to be taught on the basis of the epistles of Paul, the science of politics was to be based on Moses and Solomon, in medicine the salutary action of prayer was to be particularly recommended, and in natural science the wisdom of God was to be exalted and man's knowledge to be proved insufficient.

In the face of all these reactionary measures, Russian liberalism soon changed its original character. The moderate and optimistic "Society of Welfare" was closed by its own founders (1821). But this was done only in order that new secret societies might be put in its place, of a more resolute, and even revolutionary, character. They were two: one in St. Petersburg, the so-called "Northern Society," formed chiefly by officers of the guards; and the other, the "Southern," in the general quarters of the southern army. Both contemplated political reform; but the Northern remained more moderate, and was satisfied with claiming a mon-

archical constitution: while the Southern, led by Colonel Pestel, dreamt of a federative republic after the American pattern. So far, the aspirations of both were chiefly of a political, not of a social, nature; and their methods were those of a political revolution, attained by means of a military pronunciamiento. Encouraged by the first successes of the Italian and Spanish revolutions, both societies formed similar schemes; and the moment for starting a military revolution was already decided upon, when the death of Alexander I. compelled the conspirators to act immediately, and so much the more as the conspiracy had already been detected by the government. The meager results of the December rebellion (1825) have been shown.<sup>12</sup> With it the second conflict of Russian liberalism with the government came to an end. A new break in political development ensued, and when, after a shorter interval than before, the movement was again started, it had no longer the character of the western-European liberalism — a character to which the political movement of the reign of Alexander I. adhered more closely perhaps than any similar movement ever did again in Russia.

Indeed, we know that during the following reign of Nicholas I. public opinion in Russia became nationalistic: from liberalism it turned to romanticism, from politics to philosophy.<sup>13</sup> And at the same time there appeared in western Europe new social teachings that found their way into Russia and in a curious way amalgamated with the nationalistic teachings. Thus far the romantic movement became to a certain extent democratic, while remaining consciously anti-liberal.

<sup>12</sup> See p. 176.

<sup>13</sup> See p. 52.

We shall see in the following chapter how this democratic tendency came to be emphasized, and how, without entirely ceasing to be nationalistic, the movement became socialistic.

Thus, with the failure of the December insurrection, *pure* liberalism had lost its only chance of prevailing in Russian public opinion. And the government of Nicholas I., by having repudiated it entirely, also lost the only chance peacefully to carry out a moderate political reform. While stubbornly sticking to what we know as a system of "official nationalism,"<sup>14</sup> Nicholas himself opened the way for the ascendancy of an opposite political extreme in the public opinion of Russia. These extremes, too, seemed to be more naturally connected with each other than with the excluded middle. Nationalism repudiated liberalism as being too cosmopolitan, too much of a *chablone*. Socialism saw in liberalism its chief enemy—"individualism" embodied, as was the fact in western Europe. Moreover, to both nationalism and socialism, liberalism was not democratic enough. If even in Russia it was not the policy of the bourgeoisie which as yet had no existence there—it was still looked at askance as the policy of the educated gentry. In short, both nationalism and socialism were equally averse to liberalism proper. And, besides cardinal points of theoretical divergence, there was an additional practical reason, peculiar to Russia, which might explain why liberalism could not exist in an atmosphere where both nationalism and socialism of the old type thrived and prospered side by side. With all its deficiencies and limitations, so

<sup>14</sup> See p. 181.

far as theory is concerned, liberalism always stood for a certain system of *actual* policy; while both nationalism and socialism, as they appeared in the Russia of that time, were but abstract theories, easily satisfied with some prospect of future glory, toward which from the detestable present actuality no positive way was leading.

This explains why the Russian government, which already had had enough political experience to recognize in liberalism a politically dangerous tendency decidedly contradictory to the very essence of autocracy, had not found much to be feared in the nationalistic dreams and socialistic experiments of the utopian school. Nay, there was even a moment—a very short one, indeed—when the Hegelian nationalists and the admirers of Fourier could flatter themselves with the hope of receiving direct help from the Russian government for the prosecution of their aims, exactly for the reason that they were equally opposed to “politics.” Much additional political experience was needed, however, to convince Russian socialism of the necessity of reconciling itself with the anti-autocratic tendencies of liberalism; and a still longer stage of political education would appear to be needed by the Russian government before it will decide to make one with political reformers. This experience and this education might have been given by nothing short of an actual political struggle. But for any actual struggle the atmosphere of Nicholas’s reign was too close and stifling, while the educated class was as yet too fresh in making politics, and too much given instead to a kind of abstract political philosophy; and, beside the gentry, there were

under the rule of serfdom no other social elements to take part in political action. Thus it was that, every form of political life being absolutely lacking, the few Russian "intellectuals" of the time reveled in absolute doctrines, and came short of any scheme for immediate practical action in "politics."

And so, with very few exceptions, the reign of Nicholas makes a blank sheet and means an interruption in the history of Russian liberalism. Moreover, it fostered a disposition of mind toward liberalism which could only be prejudicial to its future. This fact explains a great deal in the subsequent political history of Russia.

First, there must be taken into consideration, in order to explain what may seem a contradiction of this statement, the ascendancy of liberalism in the brilliant era of "great reforms" of Alexander II.—an era which closely followed the end of the reign of Nicholas I. One may ask: How could liberalism have been weakened during the reign of Nicholas, if immediately at its close it was able to produce such an outburst of public criticism and indignation against this very reign? How could the progressive movement have been lacking in a positive program, when such a program was unanimously proposed to the government by Russian public opinion? It is impossible to answer these questions without discriminating between two different currents of political opinion, in order the more accurately to determine the place of each in inspiring reforms, in carrying out these reforms, and in modifying original schemes of reform in their very realization.

To be sure, the great reforms of the new Tsar,



Alexander II., were not a bit nationalistic, and they did not look very radical; they were essentially liberal. Even the great measure of the emancipation of serfs, so much suspected of nationalism and radicalism by contemporary liberals, was carried out on principles judged by both nationalists and radicals as too individualistic and liberal—too much infected with the *laissez-faire* doctrine. Then there was the momentous introduction of local self-government, where liberalism was to find its chief stronghold, although, owing to its very limited vote and exceedingly moderate tendencies, this institution was severely criticised and caricatured by the radicals. In the third place, there was a new system of tribunals, consisting of justices of the peace for smaller affairs and for voluntary jurisdiction, of regular courts of appeal and revision for civil suits, and of a jury for criminal affairs; all strictly drawn on the line of European (and particularly French) judicial institutions. As the leading principles of this reform there were recognized public and oral procedure, instead of the former secret and registered, and permanent tenure of office and independence for the judges, instead of the former mixture of the magistracy with civil offices of administration. These were all things too badly wanted in Russia's past, and too persistently claimed by every advanced representative of public opinion, not to be enthusiastically hailed both by the democrats and the liberals, and even the nationalists, without distinction of party. Of the same description was the universally needed law of the press, which we have to mention in the fourth place. Far from being radical, even the name of "liberal" can be applied to it only in Russia,

and in a very limited sense, as its contents and origin are both very conservative.<sup>15</sup>

Certainly, the "great reforms" of Alexander II. were liberal; and it is because of their liberalism that they proved to be neither durable nor consistently enough developed. There were some people for whom they were *too* liberal; and these people were naturally opposed to the fixed establishment of such laws. There were some other people for whom the reforms had the disadvantage of being *only* liberal; and these persons withheld that moral support without which there was no chance of a full and consistent development. Though the objections came from different, and even opposite, sides, their practical result was the same; namely, that the liberal reforms fell victim to a united disaffection, no matter whether conservative or radical. This explanation may serve to prove the seeming paradox we have advanced.

Indeed, we shall never be able to understand why the "era of great reforms" so soon came to its close; why the most important of them—the political representation—has remained unrealized, and why the shortcomings of the others were so great, unless we consider how much liberalism was weakened by its variance both with the nationalistic and democratic currents of public opinion.

In order, then, to make our explanation quite clear, let us trace this fundamental disunion among the advanced groups of public opinion to its historical origin; namely, to the conflict in which they became involved while carrying out the greatest of the "great reforms"

<sup>15</sup> See p. 204.

— the “emancipation of the peasants.” We shall soon see that this original clash contained in germ the whole subsequent development of political parties during the reign of Alexander II.

After the long strain of public indignation and discontent, endured under the reactionary rule of Nicholas I., had broken out after Nicholas’s death, which coincided with the humiliating disaster of the Crimean war, the emancipation was the first reform to be carried out. As yet there were no differentiated political parties in Russia, but everybody agreed as to the general assertion that the origin of all disasters and shortcomings in Russian public life was to be traced to the distrust of the government in public opinion, and to the distressing self-assertion of the ruling bureaucracy, which pretended to know better, to be omniscient as well as omnipotent. Autonomy, self-government, publicity, an effective control of society over bureaucracy—such was at that time the general cry of public opinion. At complete variance with this settled public opinion, however, the first reform—a reform of tremendous importance—was being carried out without resort to public opinion, by the actual methods of the discredited bureaucratic régime. These methods were deliberately resorted to by some few democratic nationalists at the head of the chief offices in St. Petersburg, in order to avoid and to crush beforehand the expected opposition from such elements of public opinion as were suspected of “landlordism.” The real, the new democracy, just then in process of formation, looked wistfully to the work of the St. Petersburg bureaucracy, and as far from disapproving their centralistic

methods of reform, rather accused these bureaucrats of not having thrown their uncontrolled power to the full on the side of the liberated peasants.

This was the tangled situation that caused the liberal elements of the provincial gentry to disown their liberal colleagues in the St. Petersburg chanceries, and at the same time accuse them of demagogism; an indictment to which the St. Petersburg democrats—both the pretended and the real—replied by accusing the educated gentry of “landlordism.” This mutual embitterment was all the greater in that the St. Petersburg bureaucracy had tried to avoid the open conflict and *sauver les apparences* in the emancipation reform. The landed proprietors from the country were invited to participate in the preparation of the reform in specially organized local committees of nobility; and the whole reform was supposed to be founded on the “voluntary agreements” of landlords with their former serfs. Not less than forty-six provincial committees, containing 1,366 representatives of noble proprietors, were at work during eighteen long months preparing their own drafts of the emancipation law. Of course, they were sure to have a hand in the final solution of the question. But very soon they became aware that all they had done was a mere blind—mere show and sham; that the real question, in all its essential aspects, had already been solved in St. Petersburg, in a sense not at all acceptable to themselves.

Who, then, were these dictators in St. Petersburg? There was no mistake about them! It was not the Tsar, whose opinion on this matter had been very shifty; it was not some grand duke or grand duchess;

it was not the ministers—they who were never expected to have an unwavering opinion; it was a few young men from their own class—the gentry class—chosen by the government for a sham, but belonging rather to a clique of “journalists” and “demagogues”: a certain Millyoutin, a Solovyov, a couple of Slavophil fanatics like Samarin and Prince Cherkassky; altogether not more than a dozen secondary officials, sure of themselves, and arrogantly prescribing their laws to “all the Russias.”

Of course, those men of St. Petersburg invited deputies from the above-mentioned local committees to come up to the northern capital with their drafts of law; but, first they took particular pains to have come not only the representatives of conservative majorities of the committees, but also representatives of insignificant minorities, as democratic and radical as themselves. And then, too, they had given the invited deputies no chance for an open and collective discussion; they did not produce their own draft of the law; they simply asked questions—individual questions from individual representatives—on the subject of each one’s individual opinions; and such opinions as were formulated by deputies were not even recorded or protocolized. Evidently these opinions were liable to be thrown aside and forgotten as soon as the sitting of the central “committee” was over. This caused even the liberal representatives of the gentry to feel uneasy and nervous. They united, therefore, with the conservatives in a common scheme to ask the Tsar to admit them to a collective discussion of law in the central commission. But they were harshly reprov-

and then the only chance left them was their right of petition to the central power, which the statute of Catherine II. gave to their local assemblies. They left for their homes determined to use that right; so disappointed and hurt were they by their cool reception in the Tsar's palace.

Such was the origin of the first political demonstrations in the local assemblies of the nobility. The period of these demonstrations, beginning with 1858, ends only with the opening of new assemblies of local self-government according to the law of 1864. The character of these demonstrations was very mixed, since liberal and conservative elements shared in them without distinction. "Bureaucracy" was their general target; actual representation, their final aim. But "bureaucracy" was equally objectionable to men of quite opposite political views: to democrats and personal friends of the St. Petersburg "demagogues," as well as to such conservatives to whom these latter were nothing but new Catilines—the destroyers of social order. Again, representation meant to some a real representation of the people, with extensive franchise, while to others it meant only a representation of noblemen, being a logical development of the local representation granted by Catherine II. The intermediate opinion demanded two houses: one for the representatives of the nobility, and the other for the representatives of the people.<sup>16</sup>

Even for members of the same provincial assembly it was not always easy to find their way among such differences in political opinion, just then in process of

<sup>16</sup> See p. 521.

formation. No wonder that to the minds of outsiders — advanced journalism included — the different shades of opinion fully disappeared, and the liberalism of the gentry was convicted of bearing undisguised traits of class feeling. To be sure, the gentry claimed political rights. But they wanted these for themselves, as a compensation for losing their overlord rights over the peasants; and they considered these rights to be a means for preserving in the future their social position as a higher, a privileged class. Another idea also current among the provincial nobles was that of forming small local units of administration, like the English vestry, and of putting at their head the noble proprietors of estates. This idea was also undoubtedly impregnated with aristocratic feelings; and a quite reactionary use was made of it later on, in the days of Alexander III.<sup>17</sup>

Thus it was not altogether without cause that the ideas, both of political representation and of the smaller unit of local self-government, became for a time "suspect" in the eyes of Russian democracy. What the result of it was in carrying out the "great reforms" by democratic "bureaucracy" we shall soon see. It is only fair to add, however, that those mentioned were far from being the only aspirations of the liberal gentry. In general, their demands in the assemblies of nobility of 1858-65 were colored very little by class feeling; on the contrary, they were sometimes quite disinterested and rather ideological; *i. e.*, such as we have seen them to be in the previous history of Russian liberalism. Thus both in the St. Petersburg

<sup>17</sup> See pp. 314 ff.

and in the Moscow assemblies of nobility the small groups of discontented aristocrats were overruled by the adherents of a more advanced liberalism; and resolutions were carried to the effect of convening the central representative assembly of all the classes, in order to examine into the desires and necessities of the country.

In some of the provincial assemblies even more radical decisions were taken. Thus in Smolensk and in Tver the nobles had decided to demand a constitutional form of government; and, besides this, the Smolensk assembly decreed the abolition of all the rights of the nobility; and in Tver, by the overwhelming majority of 113 to 22, the nobles required the immediate and obligatory sale of all the peasant holdings to the village communities, which had been considered—and avoided by the government—as a radical form of emancipation. Some assemblies demanded also a thorough reform of taxation, on the principles of an income tax; *i. e.*, the abolition of the most important privilege which until then had distinguished the upper from the lower classes, which latter for centuries had been the only “taxable” ones. There was also a pronounced tendency to abolish another matter-of-fact privilege of the higher classes—the privilege of being judged according to the rules of a written law; while the peasants were supposed to be in possession of a particular “custom law,” which virtually often issued in there being no law for them at all. That demand, of course, was opposed to the current doctrine of democratic nationalism, which credited this custom law as a hidden well of popular wisdom,



much higher and more perfect than any *ratio scripta* of the Romans, or of their too obsequious pupils in western Europe.

The clash was still more obvious between the views of the democratic nationalists and those of the landed proprietors with reference to the régime of the Russian landed property, the *Mir*. The nationalists saw in this institution the germ of future salvation for the whole of humanity, whereas some of the landed proprietors denounced this very system of the *Mir* as "communistic" and objectionable from the point of view of the sacred rights of property. Reason and class interest were so much intertwined in these arguments of the agrarian gentry that it was very easy for the existing current social doctrine of the Russian "populists" to denounce the whole argument against the further existence either of custom law or of village community as reactionary and undemocratic, and so to discredit it for many years to come.

In this confusing medley of conflicting interests, clashing arguments, and overlapping divisions, which were to have the upper hand? The prevailing opinions were the same as had given the chief impulse to the whole movement—the opinions of the omnipotent "bureaucracy" in St. Petersburg. There has always been an omnipotent bureaucracy in the northern capital; but rarely has it had the privilege of having a settled opinion of its own on political and social questions. Why, then, did it have such an opinion now? And where did it come from? We have seen that this opinion was not that of the official chiefs, but rather of their orderlies in service, the only ones who hap-

pened to have any opinion just at the moment when some opinion was necessary. But why did it happen to be just this particular kind of opinion? We have only to call this opinion by its proper name—as we already have called it—the “democratic nationalism,” in order to fix it definitely. It was, as we have seen, the very opinion the elements of which were in preparation during the reign of Nicholas. Such a statesman as Millyoutin and such a journalist as Kavailin are the best representatives of the whole class. As long as the chief question was a social one, and the best means to resolve it was to impose a ready-made solution upon the proprietors, they were the right men in the right place—virtually the only ones able to use the tremendous power of autocracy for the aim of repeating, in a new and, as they thought, improved edition, one of the best attempts of the French Revolution. But these men had their limitations, and their system partook of the nature of their drawbacks. The same power of autocracy and the selfsame democratic program of peasant emancipation Millyoutin conscientiously applied to crush the oppositionary elements in Poland; and the same feeling against the gentry made Kavailin proclaim as unripe every attempt for a political representation in Russia.

Men like Kavailin could not be mistaken as to the real importance of this new political cry for further development in Russia. Practically, political representation had now to become the chief claim of any political opposition. But for the generation of Kavailin it seemed too much tinged with the class aspirations of the gentry. “A constitution,” says he

in one of his early pamphlets (1861), "that is what makes the subject of secret dreams and fervent hopes of the nobility; constitution is on all lips and in every heart; it is discussed in all circles—in capitals and in provinces; this is the pet idea of the higher class." Now, was it really an idea of the higher class only? And was it only in the interests of the higher class that the educated gentry were claiming it? In order to throw more light on this question, let us enter the precincts of one of those assemblies of nobility which were at that time discussing the question. Let us choose the Moscow assembly of 1865, the only one which published accurate minutes of its proceedings.

To be sure, this assembly declaims, we find, against the "camarila" of St. Petersburg trampling under foot the fundamental laws of the realm, violating private property, and in the name of the Tsar practicing its dictatorial power. The members of this assembly are so much more audacious in their invective that they know—and dare to speak it out loudly—that these men are not the "high dignitaries;" rather they are "democrats, radicals, socialists, and other people of the same kind," who have somehow "slipped themselves into administrative spheres, and sometimes even into important posts." The conservatives of the assembly even do not hesitate to denounce this or that speech of their younger colleagues as "singularly reminding one of the style of a certain Russian monthly" (the renowned *Sovremennik*—"The Contemporary"—is meant, which, abolished two years before for its radicalism, advocated the extreme solution of the emancipation problem). At the same time the assembly sent

congratulations to Katkov, the nationalistic journalist, for having exterminated "the enormous influence of Herzen," the renowned political refugee;<sup>18</sup> and it made one with the government against the Polish rebels of 1863. All these are impressions of the time, which were about to transform many a liberal nobleman of yesterday into a reactionary of tomorrow.<sup>19</sup> Now we must see what these men think about political representation.

A motion to that effect having been introduced by some district nobles, a vivid discussion was begun. An overwhelming majority of the assembly was in favor of a petition to the Tsar for a general representation of *all the social classes* of Russia, to be summoned to a central deliberative assembly. No objection arose as to the *desirability* of such a representation of all classes. And such objections as were formulated by the extreme right and the extreme left wings of the assembly were only: first, whether the given assembly is *authorized* for such a petition, and second, whether the petition is *timely* enough. Of course, these were but formal objections; the real objection was that, to the extreme right wing, general representation seemed to be too democratic and meant a final ruin of the nobility; while to the extreme left even such a representation did not seem to exclude a predominant influence of landed proprietors, and thus to guarantee the ascendancy of a real democracy.

This is why the first, the agrarian nobles, needed an aristocratic representation, and the second, the demo-

<sup>18</sup> See pp. 363 ff.

<sup>19</sup> See next chapter, p. 427.

crats, wished no representation at all. But let us listen to their respective reasons. An extreme conservative and agrarian, Mr. Bezobrazov, said that he "agreed entirely with the great and noble idea of the necessity of a representation, emanating from the whole country;" and that he "would not consider himself to be a human being, a Russian, if such a just idea could not penetrate his whole being." But he was afraid that they, being themselves only an assembly of nobility, had no right to speak in the name of the other classes. What he would propose, therefore, to ask from the emperor was, first, the inviolability of the charter given to the Russian nobility by Catherine II.<sup>20</sup> and confirmed for himself and for all his successors by Alexander I.; and, second, as a new safeguard of this same charter, a logical extension from the local representation granted in it, to a central representation of the nobility. Everybody in the assembly knew, however, that the "charter of nobility" granted by Catherine II. had become waste paper after the emancipation of the peasants, and nobody wished to defend it. Mr. Bezobrazov immediately received a ready rejoinder from another speaker, Mr. Golohvastov, who was not at all a "democrat." Mr. Bezobrazov — *en vrai aristocrate* — had just affirmed that the rights of the nobility were not created, but only confirmed, by the charter of Catherine II.; he certainly was right, for these rights had been created by *the people*, and, as a consequence, the right to revise them belonged to the people, in an assembly formed by way of general representation. Thus, once again the doctrine of "natural law" and

<sup>20</sup> See p. 171.

the "social compact" was substituted for a historical right.<sup>21</sup>

Another argument in favor of the representation by the nobles was offered by the chief representative of the aristocracy in the assembly, Count Orlov-Daveedov, the *Anglophil*. Besides being an agrarian, he was a high dignitary, a master of ceremonies at the imperial court and, accordingly a "bureaucrat." Says Count Orlov-Daveedov :

It is clear to me — and I consider it quite unavoidable — that after the institutions of local self-government, which have just been introduced, shall have been sufficiently developed, the isolated local assemblies will feel the necessity of a common center. There is no doubt that this center, in form of a general assembly, will one day come to exist. But if there be only one, if there is no other assembly to serve as a counterpoise, then this general assembly will distill a spirit so purely democratic that this spirit will burn from the contact with the very air.

The count went on proposing to ask the government, therefore, that, beside a first house representing the people, there should also be founded a second house, to be formed of hereditary members of nobility, nominated by the Tsar.

It is plain, then, that even the most conservative members of the nobility were not averse to the idea of a constitution. For, though yielding to the prevailing opinion of the majority that representation should include all classes, they merely wished precautions taken for a particular representation of their own class. The objection to *any* constitution whatever arose only from the small group at the extreme left wing; the objection being founded on their apprehension that

<sup>21</sup> See p. 168.

competent and conscientious people might not be found in due number adequately to represent democracy. They doubted whether the liberalism of the educated gentry was reliable enough for building a really democratic representation upon it. Such reliable elements as existed, they thought, were too much engaged in carrying out the liberal reforms of emancipation, of justice, and of local self-government. The best device, according to their opinion, was first to concentrate all efforts on a realization of these reforms, and to give up the political reform until *new* assemblies, formed out of delegates of *all* the orders, the Zemstvos, should be inaugurated ; for these new assemblies would have a much better right and title to petition for general representation than the nobility, which just then was a particular object of suspicion to the peasants.

These arguments, however, did not meet the approval of the large majority, who found them dilatory in the action suggested, and even offensive, by implication, in that they cast doubt upon the loyalty and moral strength of the gentry. The bicameral scheme of Count Orlov-Daveedov, however, served as a means for conciliation. And so, after having stripped the scheme of the upper house of its hereditary and unelective character, the assembly unanimously accepted the draft of a petition for a general representation of all classes.

The extreme left wing of the Moscow assembly was not in any way identical with the extreme left of Russian public opinion. This latter—*e. g.*, Russian radicalism of that time—was becoming revolutionary; and the theory which found universal credit

among its adepts was that it mattered little or nothing what the form of government should be, in view of the coming social revolution, to be performed by the workingmen and the agricultural classes without external aid.<sup>22</sup> But the negative argument of both groups of public opinion—radical and national democratic—was the same. Both were sure that any political reform would turn to the profit of the nobles. And it was this idea that made liberalism powerless on the point of political representation.

Yet there was a moment when all shades of public opinion appeared to be unanimous on the subject of political reform. It was in the very beginning of the sixties, when the currents of advanced opinion had not yet begun to differentiate among themselves. In 1862 the cry was for a constitution—a cry not only from the provincial gentry, but also from the Russian political refugees, beginning with the most moderate and including the most radical. Blummer in Berlin and Prince Dolgorooky in Switzerland printed and discussed various drafts of a Russian constitution; and among the friends of Herzen, a socialist of the old school, and even by Bakoonin, who was not yet fully conscious of his anarchistic theories, projects for a petition to the Tsar for a constitution were in preparation. Bakoonin, some years later, excused his proposal to the Tsar on the ground that it was a diplomatic trick played for the purpose of making clear the impossibility of a peaceful reform. Herzen's project, so far from relying on the educated gentry, was based

<sup>22</sup> See p. 398.



upon suppositions such as made a concurrence of the gentry neither possible nor desirable. Thus, he proposed to ask the Tsar to summon a general council of commonalty, elected by the whole adult population and authorized to determine whatever matters it should think necessary, but especially those most important to the new radical theory; namely, the constitution of property, and the organization of local self-government, beginning with the primary commune and ascending to the higher units. From a radical point of view, nothing more was wanted, since the results of this double vote, as contemplated by Herzen and his closest friends, Ogarev and Bakoonin, would establish a new form of social existence in complete harmony with the "spirit" of the Russian people, which means collective property and a free federation of landed communes.<sup>23</sup> Accordingly, it was a demand not for a "constitution," but for a "constitutional assembly" — which here appears for the first time.

Of course, no constitution could possibly be needed by men who had so much confidence in the political ripeness of the people as to think that merely by a universal vote the masses could formulate their wishes and lay the foundation for a new order of things. Here, however, criticism set in. Tourguenev, the renowned novelist, wanted Herzen to understand that a new social order was as yet anticipated by none but men of the educated gentry, and that the "people" were not at all sure to exhibit precisely such features of their own "spirit" as they were credited with by

<sup>23</sup> See p. 311.

their educated admirers. Herzen and his friends (Ogarev and Bakoonin), says Tourguenev,

despise and trample on the educated class in Russia, while supposing that revolutionary or reformatory elements exist in the people. In reality, quite the opposite is true. Revolution—in the true and concrete meaning of the word; I might say, in the largest meaning—exists only in the minority of the educated class; and this is quite sufficient for its triumph, if only we do not extirpate ourselves by our mutual quarrels. . . . The rôle of the educated class in Russia is to transmit civilization to the people, in order that they may themselves hereafter decide what they shall accept or repudiate . . . and this rôle is not yet played out. . . . But you, my friends, are reasoning just as the Slavophiles do: you use the German method of abstraction, and thus you deduce from a dim and unintelligible essence of the people such principles as you suppose they will use to build their whole existence upon, and so you turn around in a fog. . . . In fact, you are brought to repudiate revolution, because the people you worship are conservative *par excellence*; in their sheepskins, their warm and dirty hovels they foster the germs of a *bourgeoisie* which will leave the ill-famed western *bourgeoisie* far behind. . . . The only sure point of reliance for an actual revolutionary propaganda is this very minority of the educated ones whom Bakoonin calls “rotten,” and “torn from the national ground,” and “guilty of treason before the people.”

✓ This literary debate between two eminent representative Russians is pregnant with political significance. It has been shown that a time was now beginning when the former advocacy of the democratic cause by liberal men of the gentry had to give way to a more direct defense of the people in their own name and by their own representatives. We shall later on learn who were the men to claim this direct defense as their right and duty. But even now we can see that, when the claim was first put forward, the chief, the real, claimant was

not yet there to take up his cause. The ideal of an immediate democracy, to be realized by democracy's own hands, was already present; but the actual condition of things was such as to make the realization of this ideal as yet impossible. On the other hand, there was an educated class ready and greedy for political activity for the sake of the people; but this activity was in advance suspected by consistent democrats. Thus, the only political action within the range of practical politics was made impossible by the political idealism of the Russian "intellectuals;" whereas the only contemplated action, a popular plebiscite in favor of a new order of things, was a utopia. Nevertheless, ideas which thus clashed in the minds of inexperienced Russian politicians of that generation—ideas of a constitution or of a rule by the people—were neither futile nor childish. Both of them were fundamental, but in Russia the latter idea followed the former by a too short interval.

Democracy as an ideal of the educated minority, and democracy as a real fact of life, supported by the real class feeling of the corresponding strata of society—these were the two political notions, divided by generations of political experience and belonging to different periods of political life. In more advanced countries the battle of political idealism had been won first of all; its practical results made up the level upon which the latter systems of political realism began to build. Political liberty was settled when the social questions arose. Social radicalism simply accepted the results of a struggle won by political radicalism, its predecessor, without indorsing its theory, but also with-

out repudiating its achievements. In Russia alone it so happened that social teachings prepossessed the more active spirits at a time when the work of political liberalism had yet to be done; and the Russian socialists, not satisfied to consider this liberal work superfluous, went even so far as to deem it dangerous for the people. Indeed, both in politics and in social life Russian radicalism fancied Russia able to jump clean over what was thought to be a transient stage, to the highest requirements of the most advanced theory. Without knowing it, in so doing they had chosen the way of bitter disappointment and of sad practical experience.

Of course, we cannot say that the failure of political reform in the "great era" of Alexander II. was exclusively due to this inner discordance in public opinion. Public opinion had not, even then, its full sway, and the system of the self-preservation of the autocracy had already been started. To credit this system with being able to be brought to reason by any kind of theoretical arguments is not to know what it really is. A strong and united public opinion might, however, have acted on it, not as an "opinion," but as a force. And there are some reasons for thinking that as a force it really acted for some time on the government of Alexander II. Political reform had been contemplated, at least for some future time. Men like Orlov-Daveedov expressed the current opinion of high official spheres of that time, when they said a constitution was unavoidable. And the Tsar, while replying to the above-mentioned petition of 1865, repeated

such arguments against political reform as one might have heard in the assembly itself :

No single class is entitled to speak in the name of other classes; no individual has any right to anticipate the continuous care of the Tsar for Russia; and what has already been done for Russian progress must serve as token of what is to be accomplished.

This looked like a promise rather than a refusal; and like a promise still more positive sounded other words of the Tsar, who just then was developing local institutions in Poland and recalling to life the diet of class representatives in Finland. In the State Council this condition of public opinion was being taken into consideration, and it was acknowledged that it was dangerous to "give too little," and so to fall short of the public expectation concerning self-government. Everybody looked at the self-government of the Zemstvos as a kind of introduction to the coming "era" of free political life.

In some few years all this had changed, precisely in the measure that political opinion had lost its unity, and, from being oppositionary, had turned nationalistic and conservative, on the one hand, and radical and revolutionary, on the other. The year 1863—that of the Polish insurrection and of some attempts at popular rising in Russia<sup>24</sup>—proved decisive. Facing these events, public opinion differentiated at a bound. Instead of a lot of scarcely discernible and very personal shades of political opinion, we thenceforward have to deal with three fundamental groups of politically active men; the political opinions within each

<sup>24</sup> See pp. 389 f.

group having become so cogent as to be almost compulsory, and so had bound up their members in a kind of political party. These opinions, expressed through certain party organs and party representatives, obliged their followers to a definite line of political action. In a word, the year 1863 signalizes a new departure in the political history of Russia; then it was that the continuous history of Russian political parties now in action began.

The three groups mentioned are the following:

1. The *conservative* group, whose most active center was formed out of a few moderate liberals who became frightened by the drift of events. Some of them had formerly been "European liberals;" *e. g.*, the members of the circle of Grand Duke Constantine; and others were "nationalistic democrats" of the type already described. For about a quarter of a century this group was represented by their leaders: Ivan Aksakov, for the nationalistic and democratic, and Katkov for the bureaucratic and centralistic, faction of the party. Though starting from opposite principles, these "nationalist democrats" and "nationalist liberals" ended by uniting for practical politics; and even the third element, the remainder of the party of noble "landlords," which had hated both the nationalistic liberals and the democrats, later on acquiesced in the undignified but profitable occupation of sitting at the feet of these parties and nourishing themselves with scraps from their tables, until better times should come. These times have really come for the ancient nobility and gentry, during the reign of Alexander III; but it was too late for their salvation.

2. On the wing opposite to the group of conservatives the *revolutionary socialistic*<sup>25</sup> party was formed, taking its origin in Herzen's and Bakoonin's theories, though the leaders of the younger generation soon went their own way.

3. The place of *liberalism* lay between the conservative and the revolutionary socialistic party. The newly founded local self-government, the Zemstvos, formed its headquarters; and men of liberal professions throughout Russia, its active army.

We already have seen, in chap. ii, the change of the nationalistic movement to conservative and reactionary. We also have seen, in chap. iv, what bureaucracy contributed to the reactionary program. And we know how the bureaucracy exploited both the nationalistic aspirations of theorists and the class interests of the decaying nobility for the self-defense of autocracy. In the following chapter we shall study Russian socialism and the revolutionary movement. Here it remains for us to consider the subsequent history of the intermediate current — that of liberalism.

Russian liberalism of this second period, beginning with the emancipation of the serfs, was not merely a doctrine, it was also an actual scheme of practical politics. It fought for its program, not only by means of a literary propaganda, but by means of actual work in the newly created institutions of local self-government. As we have said, liberalism recruited its army and organized its headquarters. And that is why liberal-

<sup>25</sup> The term "revolutionary socialistic," which now designates only one aspect of Russian socialism, formerly designated the whole, and its use can be traced back to the theories and the terminology of Bakoonin (see p. 341).

ism no longer meant a more or less indefinite state of public opinion, but rather a political group which soon became a political party.

The composition of the liberal army was a first manifestation of the important change thus characterized. For this army was no longer formed of the educated gentry alone; indeed, the educated gentry had itself very much changed in character. This former element of the liberal party had become more democratic; and new democratic elements joined the party from the lower social classes.

Indeed, the ancient gentry, in consequence of the emancipation of the serfs, had decayed rapidly. The impoverished scions of the class, after the emancipation, had to make their living by personal labor, since rents and other income from land were cut off. They thus descended to the level of the so-called "men of mixed ranks," according to the old Muscovite definition. And for the first time they met these people, not as their subordinates, but as their equals in the free field of competition. There was much friction, of course; many an offspring of ancient lineage, thus falling victim to the new order of things, was elbowed out of work and even from life itself. After a while, however, this new mixture of the social elements cooled down, whereupon things came into a new state of equilibrium. And in the process of all this change Russian liberalism will be seen to have gained exceedingly.

New men of liberal professions had now joined its colors. Nearly all of these professions having been newly created during the epoch of the great reforms,



their followers were entirely independent of state service, which until then had been the only refuge for every educated Russian who, unable to live upon his own income, was obliged to look around for subsidiary earnings.

Literature was perhaps the first of these liberal professions to attract young men, in the epoch of Nicholas I., previous to the "great reforms." As early as 1849-50 the ministry of public instruction observed that the youths from the gentry overlooked positions in military and civil service, which heretofore they had generally filled, and in preference to the official career took to writing articles and editing monthlies and newspapers. How largely this category of educated literary men increased with the new era may be inferred from the fact that after the long period of sterility, during the severe régime of Nicholas I., hundreds of new literary enterprises were permitted to start in the very first years of Alexander II. While in the last ten years of Nicholas I.'s reign (1845-54) only six newspapers and nineteen (for the most part special) monthlies had been permitted, during the first ten years of Alexander II. (1855-64) the corresponding figures were sixty-six newspapers and one hundred and fifty-six monthlies. We must mention here that, though Russia had possessed in former decades some influential monthlies, now for the first time in Russian history independent and influential daily newspapers were established, thus pointing the moment when, at least for a part of Russian political opinion, public expression had become possible. The three most important newspapers were the *Moscow News*, the organ of Kat-

kov and of conservative nationalism; the *St. Petersburg News*, and *Golos* ("The Voice")—both moderately liberal.

Another quite new liberal profession opened by the new reforms of justice was that of lawyer, and particularly of advocate (which in Russia forms a separate department in the judicial career). It need scarcely be pointed out how large always and everywhere has been the part that men of the law have played in politics.

But the chief resort of Russian liberalism was found in the new institutions for local self-government—the *Zemstvos*, or provincial and district assemblies of deputies elected by the various social classes to take care of local interests. Though the rôle of the lower social strata—the peasants and the inhabitants of the towns—has been very insignificant in these assemblies, and the representatives of the nobility and of the gentry have largely prevailed,<sup>26</sup> yet the policy of the *Zemstvos* has remained faithful to the old liberal traditions, and, though slightly tinged with class feeling—particularly in questions of local taxation—the *Zemstvos* have aimed at representing the liberal public opinion in general. But the political importance of the *Zemstvo* has by no means been confined to the activity of the members themselves. The executive work of the *Zemstvos* is done by a number of boards and offices created for the purpose by the *Zemstvo*, and administered by intelligent and educated workers of various kinds. Thus a series of new liberal vocations has been called into life, in which the liberal elements of the population have sought and found occu-

<sup>26</sup> See p. 241.

patron. This work for the Zemstvo has ever since been preferred by every independent man who did not like to submit to the red tape of the government offices; by every philanthropist and enthusiast who wanted to serve Russia according to his own ideas, or—practically the same thing—according to those of an advanced public opinion.

Thus the Zemstvos, having inaugurated a new system of popular education, had at their service a numerous army of school-teachers.<sup>27</sup> To these must be added a second group, not so numerous, but equally enthusiastic in the heavy work it does—the physicians and surgeons in the service of the Zemstvo. Poorly rewarded and badly overworked, the Zemstvo physician is generally a pioneer for the ideas of hygiene and sanitation in the Russian village; and the courage and self-denial with which he performs his duty under most unfavorable circumstances are unparalleled. A third large class of the Zemstvo's army of intelligent workers is the statisticians. No less enthusiastic than the members of the former two classes, the statisticians, from the very nature of their specialty, keep in close touch with the peasants' everyday life and know everything about it. Their rôle in Russian political life may be characterized by the following fact: In the year 1887 the governor of Vyatka reported to the Tsar that local statisticians were oppositionary and not to be relied upon by the officials. The Tsar wrote on the margin of the report: "Very sad, but it is like that nearly everywhere." And since then Mr. Plehve has forbidden the statisticians to approach Russian villages.

<sup>27</sup> See p. 212.

The fourth class of the Zemstvo workers, now in process of formation, are the agronomists; their knowledge of and influence upon the peasant population are the same as those of the statisticians. In Russian political slang, all these executive officers of the Zemstvos are known in an off-hand way as "the third element" (after the government and the elective elements); and thus are characterized a certain solidarity of their political opinion and the particular part they play in the political struggle.

These are the constituents among which Russian opposition found ardent adherents—adherents who were no mere abstract theorists, or political philosophers, but men who dealt with actualities, men connected by their day's work with the lowest classes of the population, knowing its wants, sharing in its sorrows, sympathizing with all its miseries. These men filled with red blood the anemic body of Russian liberalism. And at the same time they gave it a more advanced and democratic character.

Now let us glance at the machine through which all these accumulated stores of the new oppositionary energy were manifested. The Russian Zemstvo, started as a local organization for self-government on a pretty large scale, had, in fact, nothing to envy in corresponding European bodies, so far as the sphere of its competency was concerned. But there was a most deplorable organic fault in its fabric which made it constitutionally weak in the performance of its functions. Unhappily, it was not even so much a "fault," in the proper sense, as a *conscious* omission by the makers of the Zemstvo. This omission may be traced

to the same origin as the failure of political reform — to the distrust of landed proprietors evinced by the “St. Petersburg officials.” So great was the fear of the persistence in the provinces of the local power of recent slaveholders — the landlords — that the Zemstvos were not permitted to have their hands free in their own circuit. The link was purposely left missing by which the Zemstvos could directly communicate with the population whose interests they were supposed to represent. No inferior elective unit was established which would correspond to a vestry, a parish, or a township, with their local primary assemblies.<sup>28</sup> The Zemstvo assembly, with its executive board or council, formed the only representative body for the whole district — which in Russia is generally an exceedingly large unit. *Above* these district institutions similar ones for the whole province were created: a provincial board and provincial assembly of Zemstvo, formed out of members elected by district assemblies, to complete and to regulate their local work. But there existed in the midst of the population no commissioners and no boards *below* those of the district, which could be charged with the execution of the decisions of the Zemstvos. Of course, both provincial and district assemblies were granted the right of making by-laws; they possessed also the right of imposing local taxes. But in levying taxes and in controlling the application of their by-laws they were entirely dependent upon the civil and police officers of the central administration. Thus — to use a current saying — the new building of the Zemstvos was left “without foundation — floating in the air.”

<sup>28</sup> On the demands for such a unit, see pp. 269 and 310.

And it also remained "without the roof," as the saying went. Let us remember that public opinion had very much changed<sup>29</sup> when the draft for self-government was being brought to execution. Thus the original ideas predominant at its foundation had had time to give way before quite opposite ones. No more promises were heard as to the "crowning of the building" with the keystone of central political representation. There also was no more apprehension of "giving public opinion too little,"<sup>30</sup> but some were very much afraid of yielding it "too much" and of "tying up the hands of the government." Instead of thinking of local self-government institutions as of "a preparatory school for representative institutions," others were very careful not to let them "form a state within the state;" and still others did everything to bring these institutions under the close control of local and central government offices—that of the "governor" in the provinces, and of the minister of the interior in St. Petersburg.

Thus the new local representation stood by itself, entirely disconnected from the higher stages of government as well as isolated from the lower units of local administration. All the higher offices and the boards of administration having been built in quite another style—the autocratic and bureaucratic rather than the representative—the organs of local self-government represented a sort of political oasis in the waste. In their isolation they were exposed to all the winds of the desert. They were reprimanded and censured by the organs of the central government; their scope was

<sup>29</sup> See p. 283.

<sup>30</sup> See p. 283.

now and then curtailed; their initiative in this or that branch of local affairs was called in question; their resolutions were put under control and checked; their debates were more than once stopped; their petitions were disregarded. But, in spite of all these repressive measures, one thing always remained certain: that the power they still retained they held from their electors, and no positive orders could be given to them by any central authorities. With this one principle untouched, they still formed a living contradiction to the general political structure of Russia—and this by the mere fact of their existence. This, of course, added a sting to the persecution: and the manner of their treatment at the hands of the distrustful government drove them head and tail into the camp of political opposition.

In the study of this new phase of the history of Russian liberalism we are unexpectedly assisted by no less an authority than the former minister of finance in Russia, Mr. Witte. This well-known statesman some years ago indorsed an elaborate memoir on the political rôle of the *Zemstvos*, written at his order by one of the higher officials. The position Mr. Witte assumed on the question was rather ambiguous. He undertook to prove that *Zemstvos* are inconsistent with autocracy, and that therefore they must be annihilated. But while following up the sad story of that interminable struggle between the *Zemstvos* and the government, Mr. Witte's mouthpiece so warmed himself up on behalf of the *Zemstvos*, and the rôle of the government in the account of this persecution appeared so miserable and so powerless, that quite the opposite seems intended to be proved; namely, the inconsistency of autocracy with

the Zemstvos; and the practical conclusion — the abolition of autocracy — was so obvious that the pamphlet of Mr. Witte has been published by Russian liberals abroad and has served as the best means for propagating nowadays the constitutional idea.

And, indeed, this much can be admitted as proved by the memoir of Mr. Witte: that Zemstvos and constitutionalism in Russia are inseparably connected, both by their fundamental principle of representative self-government and by the actual rôle which the Zemstvos played in repeatedly demanding of the government that local self-government should be completed by political representation.

We have seen that this idea of “crowning the building” of local self-government by granting a constitution was already widely spread at the time of the very foundation of the Zemstvos. The Zemstvos were expected by the more advanced groups to take the initiative in a movement of “all the orders” for political reform, since the particular “order” of the nobility had been refused the right to speak in the name of “all the orders” by the above-quoted admonition of the emperor.<sup>31</sup> But the Zemstvos have betrayed the liberal expectations. In the first place, their legal position was different from that of the assemblies of the nobles as far as the right of petition was concerned. They were not entitled to address themselves to the emperor, and were permitted only to memorialize the minister of the interior — and this only on the subject of their local “material” needs, not on affairs of general political importance. To be sure, in later times

<sup>31</sup> See p. 283.



they did not observe these legal limitations very strictly, but in those first days of their existence they did not inaugurate immediately any strong movement of political demonstration. The explanation of the Zemstvos' failure must be sought, therefore, in the state of public opinion. For since public opinion was uncertain, and men of action were divided between the extremes of conservative nationalism and social revolution, and since the constitutional tendencies of moderate liberalism were repudiated as anti-autocratic by the former, and as anti-democratic by the latter, the Zemstvos were brought to silence by other causes than the direct persecution of the government. In the social class out of which the liberal majority of the Zemstvo representatives was elected the opinion set forth in the Moscow debates of 1865 definitely prevailed. Men like Millyoutin and Kavailin thought, as we have seen, that a more or less prolonged period of modest work of local culture undertaken by the Zemstvos must first elapse before the question of political representation could be raised. In the meantime, they thought, the different classes would contract a habit of working shoulder to shoulder, and the age-long distrust between the lower classes and the gentry would be dispelled by experience of mutual aid and local co-operation.

That is why, after some few attempts to formulate political demands, the Zemstvos having been sharply censured by the government (the Petersburg Zemstvo was even temporarily dissolved), they held their tongue. And so it came about that the expectations of the liberals were frustrated. For some ten years after that the Zemstvos did not renew their political peti-

tions. They had their hands full and made the most of their time in that "peaceful work of improvement" — an entire transforming of the conditions of life in the provinces. They founded schools, built hospitals, helped the peasantry in every kind of agricultural improvement, and developed domestic industries. They were at the very time busy in complying with governmental demands and in finding material means for their own work; *i. e.*, in developing local taxation. But it is impossible to enumerate here how much has been done by the Zemstvos in their chosen work. Virtually they were the first to come to the villages with messages of health, sanitation, enlightenment, and with sound reasons for private economy. Whatever has been done for culture in the Russian villages was done by the Zemstvos — and that in spite of every sort of obstruction (which recently has taken the form of awkward competition, on the part of the central government). The results of all this work were so obvious that the government itself was obliged to recognize them. The following table, borrowed from an official statement, shows how much has been done for local progress in the provinces where the Zemstvos are at work, in comparison with other such provinces where local self-government has not yet been introduced.

Thus, under every heading of the table we see the Zemstvos outbidding by far the other — antiquated — type of local government. But these are mere figures, and they cannot make clear all the deficiencies of the former type of local administration. They do not show, for example, how really poor the medical help is, not only in quantity, but in quality, in the provinces

without the Zemstvos; how inferior the schools; how formal and void of any enthusiasm the charity; how lacking in energy and initiative the insurance agencies — and, indeed, practically all officials of the government service employed in the provinces. It must be borne in mind also that this comparison can be drawn only between those branches of administrative activity

	Without Self- Government	With Self- Government	Proportion in the Latter as Compared with the Former
Average number of inhabitants to each physician (appointed by representative authorities).....	83,000	35,000	3:7
Average amount spent for free distribution of medicine in each province.....	\$2,350	\$23,300	10:1
Average, yearly salary paid to a village physician.....	\$360	\$615	7:5
Average number of hospitals for each province.....	7	26.6	10:5
Average number of lunatic asylums.....	0.56	2	18:5
Average number of paupers and orphans supported by public charity.....	4.033	38.291	19:2
Average number of inhabitants to each (regular) school.....	7.346	1.919	5:19
Average number of inhabitants for each pupil.....	111	54	1:2
Average number of buildings insured ("voluntarily") against fire.....	1.219	23.436	19:1

which are common to both types of local government; thus, a long list of functions successfully performed by the self-governing provinces find no parallels in the institutions of the provinces existing previous to the era of "the great reform," where no local representation had been introduced.<sup>32</sup> Such are, for instance, the

<sup>32</sup> These provinces are located in the borderlands of Russia, partly too thinly populated, partly too much suspected of "separatist" tendencies. The material from which the table in the text was compiled proved only able to persuade the government to introduce into these provinces a sort of self-government unknown to any civilized country — the *self*-government by the governmental nominees, enjoying, nevertheless, the right of local taxation.

fire brigades and other measures for preventing conflagrations, the local post-office, and particularly the organization of economic helps to agriculture, trade, and industry. To this last branch of activity the Zemstvos have lately devoted much attention: agricultural engines are sold on credit; new systems of crop rotation and special cultures are introduced; home industry is provided with raw materials and the sale of its products insured; Zemstvo agronomists and economic boards are apportioned; statistical inquests are organized on a large scale and their results published in a splendid series of reports unique not only in Russia.

The central government could not help finding all such work useful; but it also found it too expensive. And, indeed, the growth of local taxation in the Zemstvo provinces was comparatively great, though quite insignificant when compared with the central taxation. While in the older type of provinces local taxation did not exceed  $\frac{3}{4}$  per cent. of the government taxation, it increased to 5 per cent. in the Zemstvo provinces. And if still other items of local taxation are added, the whole sum will not exceed the moderate figure of 15.5 per cent. for the whole of Russia; while in Great Britain it makes up 38 per cent., and in the United States 41 per cent., of the whole taxation. Russia is—to its great disadvantage, as we shall see later on—still the most centralized state economically as well as politically. To make clear the difference in the use of the governmental and the local revenue for local purposes, we may study the following comparison drawn up by the Yeletz Zemstvo:

Government revenue, per inhabitant... 533 kopeks.<sup>33</sup>  
 Zemstvo revenue, per inhabitant..... 49.8 kopeks.

	Government Expenditures per Inhabitant	Zemstvo Expenditures per Inhabitant
Needs of the central state offices.....	460.3	....
Finance and administrative organs.....	33.0	....
Police and justice.....	21.4	2.3
Prisons.....	9.0	0.5
Roads.....	9.0	2.6
Post.....	9.0	0.7
Sanitation and veterinary.....	1.0	32.3
Public instruction.....	8.1	10.3

Thus in Russia, as elsewhere, the proportion of the local to the state expense only reflects the degree of attention paid to the proper work of social culture in comparison with the elementary necessities of the central government. The Russian government, nevertheless, has thrown every kind of obstacle in the way of this work, its latest achievement having been to limit the yearly increase of the Zemstvo expenditure to a small percentage, strictly determined by law, out of all proportion to the growing needs and extending activity of the Zemstvos.

In fact, all this "peaceful work of civilizing" was "liberal" work in its very essence, and the Zemstvos could not help its being liberal. Nor could the government help finding such work contrary to its essential principle, which was not liberal. And thus began a conflict which has since become continuous, though at times it has been latent, and only now and then, when circumstances were propitious, has burst into open opposition.

In his memoir quoted above, Mr. Witte fairly

<sup>33</sup> A kopeck (*kopayka*) is equal to one-half cent.

acknowledges that it was the government that took the offensive. First, the right of controlling local representatives by the organs of the central authority was extended as far as possible. Already, according to the original statutes of the Zemstvos, their assemblies were to be presided over, not by members elected by these bodies, but by the marshals of the nobility, instituted by Catherine II. Now, in 1867 these chairmen received full powers to stop any discussion, and even to close the meetings, and they were made answerable for not using these powers when necessary. The governors had also been given the right by the original statutes to suspend temporarily every decision of the Zemstvos; in 1866 they were further empowered to refuse their consent to any election or nomination made by the assemblies, if they should find that the candidate was "ill-intentioned;" and in the year 1879 they were given the additional right to dismiss even such "ill-intentioned" persons as had already been admitted to serve the Zemstvos. All specialists (such as teachers, physicians, etc.) in the Zemstvo service were later on subjected to the particular control of corresponding boards and offices of the central administration. Finally, the new statute of 1890 gave the whole executive body of the assemblies, the *Opravas* ("boards of administration"), the "rights" of civil service, thus fettering them also to its "duties" and transforming elected representatives into officials. The government thus has turned to its profit an antiquated theory of Gneist—the assimilation of elected bodies of local self-government to governmental institutions.

The Zemstvos enjoyed the right of petitioning the

central government concerning their local interests. This right, however, became particularly suspected; and Mr. Witte admits that, for fear of the political character of such petitions, the most important of them were often either left without answer or were given a plain refusal. Indeed, out of the whole number of 2,577 petitions sent over to the ministry of the interior by the Zemstvos in the period of 1865-82, not less than 1,354—*i. e.*, 52 per cent—were formally declined; not counting such as were answered in an evasive way or simply left unanswered. It would be quite wrong to suppose that all these demands thus left without satisfaction were inspired by the oppositionary spirit. By far the greater part of them did not exceed the competency of the Zemstvos, for they represented nothing more than a realization of their duty to “have care for the local needs and advantages.” The Zemstvos were generally requesting the government’s help, or non-interference, or special legislation, in regard to their economic, financial, educational, and other functions mentioned above. The government generally refused these demands, not as being “illegal,” but as conflicting with the interests of the exchequer, or of some influential social class, *e. g.*, the large proprietors or capitalists, protected by the central authorities. Or, if no interest was to be protected, the government usually neglected to answer, or alleged some formal reason for not inquiring into the affair at all. Very persistent petitioners might hope, by dint of repeated requests, to get some satisfaction, after from eight to fifteen years of waiting. The more indolent ones might have the moral satisfaction of seeing some of their demands, if

they had stated a very urgent need, embodied in a law a quarter of a century later.

The impression produced on the Zemstvos by these bureaucratic delays and heedless refusals, which thus systematically hold in check the whole activity of the Zemstvos, was not left unnoticed by Mr. Witte in his memoir. Seeing themselves distrusted by the central government, restrained in every way, unable to bring into execution the resolutions of the Zemstvo assemblies, the best men cooled in their enthusiasm for the work of the Zemstvos. As early as 1870 Mr. Katkov summed up the unsatisfactory state of things as follows:

The institutions of the Zemstvo exhibit a sad spectacle. The representatives in many places are rendered apathetic toward their work. They desist from seeing in it any serious significance whatever, and begin to doubt its future. Many meetings of the last session were conducted in a slovenly manner, and were attended by very few representatives. Some of the assemblies could not be held at all, because the number of the members present was insufficient.

When the men most interested in the "peaceful work of culture" went away, however, there were two classes remaining: those who were kept by personal interest in serving the Zemstvos, and those others who were too enthusiastic and too conscious of the political significance of the work done by the Zemstvo to yield in the struggle begun by the government. These latter were not numerous—they never are. But they were the leaders; and they were always sure to be followed by the average, the political *marais*, as soon as circumstances permitted a somewhat freer expression of opinion.



The same cause that brought about the change just mentioned in the life of the Zemstvos also radicalized the most conscious elements in Russian educated society; namely, the reactionary policy of the government in every department of public life. The general dissatisfaction which had followed the too short "honeymoon" of the "great era" formed the social atmosphere in which the revolutionary movement ripened. Its first outburst, the murderous attempt of Vera Zasoolich and her trial, which issued in her acquittal by the regular jury, left a very deep impression on the public mind, and immediately after her acquittal a series of terroristic acts began.<sup>34</sup>

The government, ill-informed as it always was, thought it could find succor against the revolutionaries in the ranks of educated society. On August 4, 1878, an appeal was published in the *Government Messenger* inviting Russian society in general to assist the government in its struggle against the "revolutionary infection." During the summer of that year, quite independently of that official appeal, a few liberals from the southern Zemstvos entered into negotiations with the revolutionaries with a view to stopping their acts of violence. The liberals proposed to the revolutionaries to address a collective petition to the government, asking for (1) the restitution of the original (non-curtailed) statutes for the Zemstvos and for the censorship; (2) the abolition of administrative evils and of special courts for political crimes; and (3) a general representation elected by the Zemstvos.

The southern liberals did not, however, succeed in

<sup>34</sup> See p. 416.

converting the revolutionaries to their moderate scheme of opposition; but they themselves soon got an opportunity of addressing the government openly, through the intermediacy of the Zemstvo assemblies. This occasion presented itself after Alexander II. had renewed his appeal to society in his November (1878) speech, at a general reception in Moscow. The emperor said he "counted on their assistance in keeping the erring youth from that ruinous path into which some irresponsible people try to lure them." Answering this address, five provincial Zemstvos gave voice to their discontent. The assembly of Cherneegov stated in the report of its committee that destructive ideas cannot be overcome by mere repression; that the deeper causes of their general spread lie in the general state of education, in the lack of freedom of speech and of the press, and in the lack of respect for the law. The representatives of the Zemstvo of Tver were still more explicit; after having enumerated the same reasons for discontent—and having pointed out an additional one, the restrictions imposed on the Zemstvos—they wound up their address with a plain demand for a constitution:

Caring for the weal of the Bulgarian people after their liberation from the Turkish yoke, the emperor found it necessary to grant this people true self-government [a circumlocution for "constitution," which word it was still found inopportune to pronounce aloud], the inviolability of the rights of the individual, the independence of the judiciary, and the liberty of the press. The Zemstvo of Tver dares to hope that the Russian people, which bore all the burden of the war with thorough readiness and with a self-denying love for their Tsar, will be allowed to enjoy the same blessings, which alone can conduct them along the path of a gradual, peaceful, and legal development.

The assembly of the Kharkov Zemstvo also asked the Tsar "to give the Russians what he gave the Bulgarians." Upon this condition—"of organizing society by means of a regular representation"—they even declared themselves ready "to eradicate the evil and definitely to crush the propaganda undertaken by the enemies of the government and of society." But even such a readiness did not induce the government to yield. Instead, police measures were taken against any further spread of similar declarations and petitions, and the voice of the Zemstvos again was silenced.

Meanwhile the political situation became more and more acute. The revolutionary movement steadily gained ground. The advanced liberals from the Zemstvos proceeded to organize regularly into a great political party. The "Southern League," whose activity in 1878 has just been mentioned, transferred its activity to the northern provinces and had here even a larger success. It grew into a "Society of the Allied Zemstvos and of Self-Government," or, shortly, the *Zemskie soyouze* ("Alliance"). In 1881 the liberal party founded its literary organ abroad—the *Free Word*—whose editor was Mr. Dragomanov, a former professor at the University of Keeeyev, "a man not only well educated and endowed with large understanding, but thoroughly civilized and scrupulously conscientious." Thus runs the official characteristic of a later ministerial inquiry on secret societies, "not very dangerous." As to the success of the liberal propaganda among the Zemstvos, Mr. Witte in his memoir values it as follows:

The *Zemskie soyouze*, having spread their activity over all the Zemstvos of Russia, and having at their disposal their

periodical which was very successfully smuggled in, soon succeeded in organizing a certain regular connection between the Zemstvos and in starting a concerted movement for the introduction of a constitutional régime. One might think that the activity of the Alliance did not even need any particular exertion, to prove itself successful. The abnormal character of the mutual relations between the government and the Zemstvos was deeply resented by every advanced member of the Zemstvos; by the very force of events, they could not help striving to change these relations, in order to enter into immediate touch with the central government and raise their voice there.

Such was the general state of mind when the government, after having exhausted its own resources in the struggle with the revolutionary movement, again tried the method of concessions. Mr. Loris Melikov was given extraordinary powers to combat the terrorists, and he thought of conciliating liberalism to the government. That gave the Russian liberals a new chance to propose terms. In March, 1880, Melikov received a memorandum signed by twenty-five of the most influential liberals from Moscow — including professors in the university, leading barristers, well-known authors, and representative citizens of the old capital. This was a summary of liberal grievances and desiderata. The memorandum began by showing that the principal reason why the conflict with the government has taken such a morbid form is the absence in Russia of any opportunity for the free development of public opinion and the free exercise of public activity. Dissatisfaction cannot utter itself through the channel of the press, since the press is closely restricted in its comments upon governmental action. Questions of the very first importance are wholly removed by censorial prohibition from the field of newspaper discussion, just when they most occupy public attention.<sup>85</sup> Another reason for the develop-

<sup>85</sup> See pp. 206, 207.

ment of "underground" activity may be found in the enforced silence of public assemblies. The government often treats with contemptuous neglect statements and petitions from sources fully competent to make them, and listens unwillingly to the representatives even of the most legitimate interests. There may be found in the reports of any provincial administration records of innumerable petitions sent by the assemblies to the government, which not only have never been granted, but which have never been even answered.<sup>36</sup> The result is the creation of an impression that the government does not wish to listen to the voice of the people; that it will not tolerate criticism, however just, of its mistakes and failures; that it despises the opinions of competent advisers; and that it has in view peculiar objects not related in any way to the necessities of the people. The impossibility of speaking out frankly compels people to keep their ideas to themselves, to cherish and nurse them in private, and to regard complacently even illegal methods of putting them into practice. Thus is created one of the most important of the conditions upon which the spread of sedition depends; namely, the weakening of the loyalty of those who, under other circumstances, would regard sedition with abhorrence. Educated society as a whole, irrespective of rank, position, or opinion, is intensely dissatisfied, and out of that dissatisfaction arises the existing agitation.

Moreover, society demands the right to act. It is aroused both by the nature of its own reflections and by circumstances of the time, and it seeks to participate in the life of the state. These strivings the administration regards with hostility, and throws obstacles in its way. [But] the Russian people are becoming more and more impressed with the conviction that an empire so extensive, and a social life so complicated, as ours, cannot be managed exclusively by officials. If the ruling mechanism in its present form excludes from direct participation in the government a majority of those who have the first right and the strongest desire to take part in it, then that mechanism stands in need of reformation.

Another demand of society which at the present time is even less satisfied than the desire for political activity is the demand

<sup>36</sup> See p. 301.

for personal security. The indispensable conditions upon which the very existence of modern society depends are free courts, freedom from arrest and from search without proper precautions and safeguards, the responsibility of officials for illegal detention and imprisonment, and the due observance of all the legal formalities of public and controversial trial. [Meantime,] for the past ten years the police, either upon a trivial suspicion, or upon a false accusation, have been allowed to break into houses, force their way into the sphere of private life, read private letters, throw the accused into prison, keep them there for months, and finally to subject them to an inquisitorial examination without even informing them definitely of the nature of the charges made against them. Still more offensive is the system of administrative exile and banishment without examination or trial. Hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of persons annually are subjected to the severest punishment that can be inflicted upon an educated man; namely, banishment from home and friends, upon a mere administrative order, without even his being informed how long his punishment will continue.

The discontent which pervades Russian society, and which is the result of the mistaken policy of the government in dealing with internal affairs, cannot be removed by governmental action alone. [Its cure] requires the friendly co-operation of all the vital forces of society. The only way to extricate the country from its present position is to summon an independent assembly consisting of the representatives of the Zemstvos, to give that assembly a share in the control of the national life, and securely to guarantee personal rights, freedom of thought, and freedom of speech. The Russians are fit for free institutions, and they feel deep humiliation at being kept so long under guardianship. The granting of such institutions, and the calling together of a representative body to preside over them, will give the nation renewed strength and renewed faith in the government and in its own future.

Unhappily, there was among the liberals no concerted opinion as to what the much-desired "free institutions" should be. Indeed, the variance on this sub-

ject was very great. Conservatives, like Mr. Koshelov, still stuck to the antiquated Slavophil scheme of reviving the deliberative assemblies of ancient Russia, summoned at irregular intervals, irregularly composed, granted only a *consultative* voice, and discussing only such subjects as the government was willing to ask them about. In the meaning of Mr. Koshelov, who was recommending the *Zemskce Sobor* in his numerous pamphlets printed abroad, this institution did not progress much beyond the old Slavophil notion. (Mr. Koshelov was himself a Slavophil, though he differed from his friends in such questions of practical policy as the enforced Russianization and the dispossession of the noble landed proprietors in Poland.) The idea of a *Zemskce Sobor* no longer satisfied even the most moderate among the younger generation of liberals. A somewhat more advanced scheme was discussed in their midst — if we may judge by Mr. Leroy-Beaulieu's articles in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of that time. A certain group bespoke the possibility of granting the representatives a share in legislative power, by way of introducing them into the existing legislative body, the State Council, founded by Speransky, the constitutional minister of Alexander I.<sup>37</sup> But even that second scheme could have had only a passing value, as expressing some particular opinion of a private circle. Since the "Alliance of the Zemstvos" — the *Zemskce Soyouse* — was formed, a third scheme seems to have been adopted, reminding one of the original and larger plan of Speransky. The political representation was to form the upper stage of a four-storied representative

<sup>37</sup> See p. 173.

organization. Underneath, as foundation, was to lie the lowest representative unit—the township—representing all the classes of local inhabitants; they were to choose representatives for the district assembly of the Zemstvo, which in its turn—as is also the working custom now—would send its delegates to the provincial assemblies; only, these latter, in this case, would represent larger territorial units than at present; they would correspond rather to the provincial assemblies of ancient France, than to the existing Zemstvo assemblies in the departments (or “governments”). By this representation of larger territories there would be secured the decentralization and the local autonomy of the conquered borderlands of Russia, as well as that of different component parts of Russia proper.

We may trace this idea of—more or less politically independent—provincial assemblies as one of the fundamental features of a future Russian constitution, back to the Decembrists of 1825.<sup>38</sup> The project of Prince Dolgorooke, of 1860, also included this idea of provincial assemblies in the scheme; and they are introduced in the printed project of a Russian constitution, published anonymously by Mr. Stepnyak, as late as 1895. In the particular moment of which we are speaking the politically independent provincial assemblies had also the advantage of satisfying a prevailing tendency of Russian radicals toward “federalism.” Originating in the purely anarchistic tendencies of the then current democratic doctrine,<sup>39</sup> the idea of “federalism”

<sup>38</sup> Namely, their “Southern Society,” under the program of Pestel; see p. 258.

<sup>39</sup> See pp. 279, 385.



was thereupon extended—and this by the very originator of anarchism, Bakoonin<sup>40</sup>—from the voluntary anarchist associations, the “communes,” to the existing larger provincial groups, such as Poland or Little Russia. Mr. Dragomanov, the editor of the *Free Word*, being himself a Little Russian, the federalist formula of the liberal program corresponded also to his personal convictions. And so, after having admitted a federalist organization of the provincial assemblies, the program, consistently enough, was planned to include a topmost form of representation on the American pattern. There had to be formed two chambers, one to represent the people, and the other to represent the federal units.

This, however, was not the last scheme of the Russian liberals, nor the one generally agreed upon. We have seen how the Zemstvo liberals asked the government to grant Russia the same institutions as it had given the Bulgarians. This meant by far the more practical, and at the same time, the more democratic, issue: no “federalism” and no second chamber, but only one chamber and a universal franchise. And, indeed, if we have to believe the ministerial inquiry referred to above, the liberals of the “Alliance” at their congress of 1880 resolved to demand as a condition *sine qua non* a one-chamber system and a general vote. There remains to mention a fifth scheme, the most radical of all, in that it took into consideration the dislike of the revolutionists for a “constitution” and flattered their hope of getting everything directly from a “people’s convention.”<sup>41</sup> The plan of this scheme—

<sup>40</sup> See p. 341.

<sup>41</sup> See pp. 382, 418.

which reminds us of the scheme of Herzen—formulated in an article written for the *Free Word*, was confiscated by Austrian authorities. The author was satisfied with three concessions: freedom of speech and of press, guaranties of personal rights, and convocation of a constitutive convention.

What Mr. Loris Melikov, the “dictator of the heart,” really had at his disposal for the satisfaction of all these expectations and demands could, however, not possibly satisfy even the most moderate of them, if we exclude Mr. Koshelov, since he was the only one who approximately knew from Mr. Loris Melikov himself, what had been his intention. But Mr. Koshelov never thought of limiting autocracy, which, as a true Slavophil, he thought compatible with his scheme of popular representation. It is doubtful whether the more statesmanlike Melikov really adhered to the same romantic illusion of preserving autocracy under a constitution. The emperor, however, was made to believe that this was Melikov’s scheme—as this was the only way to lure the emperor to commit himself to this path of concession. Whether the step that was intended by Mr. Melikov was to be followed by further and more important steps; and, further, whether these were to follow voluntarily or be imposed by public opinion—these questions must remain forever unsolved. The fates, in fact, spared Melikov’s fictitious reform the chance of a trial, for Tsar Alexander II. was killed by the revolutionaries at the very moment when he had ordered the draft of Loris Melikov’s reform to be submitted to a previous discussion by the Committee of Ministers.

This unexpected turn has helped very much to magnify the enterprise of Mr. Melikov. People spoke — as they had spoken after the Decembrist rebellion — about liberal efforts turned to naught by the inadvertency of the revolutionaries; of Russia driven back into reaction for decades; of the whole history upset — in short, what is generally said on the occasion of such extraordinary occurrences. The draft of Mr. Melikov was called — always in parentheses — in a pamphlet which first brought to light some details about it, a “constitution;” but, in spite of its evidently derisive use by the editor, the term found credit with the general public. Mr. Loris Melikov was generally believed to have contemplated a constitution for Russia.

In fact, Loris Melikov intended to summon the representatives from the Zemstvo assemblies and from the chief cities to St. Petersburg; but not at all in order to ask their advice about the needs of the people, nor to speak about any right of legislation to be granted to them. They simply were to discuss, and to criticise, some drafts of laws at that time in course of preparation. Bodies intrusted with this previous stage of preparation were kept distinct from representative assemblies; these were “preparatory commissions” made up of officials and persons individually invited by the government. During the discussion of drafts in the deliberative assembly, gentlemen of the preparatory commissions were to be present and to have a voice in voting resolutions. After discussion, projects had to go through the regular routine: *i. e.*, were to be reconsidered by the respective minister, to be presented in his name and on his sole responsibility to the real legis-

lative assembly—the Council of State—in order here again to be discussed, and only then converted into laws. Thus the rôle of the representatives of the Zemstvos, far from being important, was rather humiliating; it was not even like that of the tribunate of Napoleon, which at least had been given the exclusive privilege of discussion, if not the right to prepare or to publish laws. And then, too, the tribunate was a standing institution, while no promise as to the continuity of the summoned assembly of representatives was to be given, according to the draft of Melikov. It was only a timid experiment which could have been revoked without the slightest difficulty by the government. Reduced to this, it did not even grant the Zemstvos so much in the way of discussing current legislation as had occasionally been given them both before and after that project.

After the death of Tsar Alexander II., the project of Mr. Melikov preserved only a symptomatic significance. The looked-for discussion really took place in the committee of ministers, on March 20, 1881, after the new Tsar, Alexander III., had personally got acquainted with the draft of Loris—which he approvingly attested with his own handwriting on the margin of the paper, “exceedingly well written.” The majority at the meeting—Grand Duke Vlodeimir, Count Valooyev, Nabokov, Solskee, Demetrius Millyoutin (brother to the one formerly mentioned), Saboorov, Abaza—voted for the reform. Count Stroganov, Pobedonostsev, Mahkov, Prince Liewen, and Possyet were against it. The voice of Pobedonostsev, the former teacher of the Tsar, was decisive. After some few days of inde-

cision, the Tsar invited Pobedonostsev, in the greatest privacy, to write the renowned manifesto of April 27 (May 11), 1881, through which he made known his determination to preserve autocracy, "which he found necessary and useful for Russia," as he stated it in his letter to Grand Duke Vlodeemir. That such words should be used to decide in such an innocent case as that of Melikov's scheme—which did not at all raise the question of autocracy—may witness to a lack of political knowledge; but it also may characterize what was then the general feeling; namely, that, whatever the intentions of the Tsar and his ministers might have been, the real question was that of the further existence of the form of government doomed by history. Pobedonostsev's manifesto solved this question for a time: his solution meant a quarter of a century more of reaction, thousands of fresh victims to the political struggle, one or two more generations sacrificed, and, beyond all that, an enormous loss of time for the cause of Russian progress, and enormous complications in the possible realization of the reform. To balance all this, the new reign was most anxious to increase the material welfare of the people, particularly that of the peasants and noblemen. But in reality it achieved only the ruin of the noble class and was preparing distress for the peasants.

Yet the transition would have been too brusque from the "dictature of heart" by Loris Melikov, and from his promises, to the unqualified reaction. The dissatisfaction in society was as strong as it had been before, and the revolutionary movement was by no means stifled. Thus, Russia first passed through a

period of transition, under the rule of Melikov's successor, Ignatyev. Count Ignatyev did not renounce at once the idea of a reconciliation with the Russian liberals. As a platform for this reconciliation, a new variation of the old Slavophil political doctrine had to serve. That doctrine was founded on the contrast of the state and the country as that of "power" and "opinion."<sup>42</sup> The application was obvious, if "state" were to mean government, and "country," province or Zemstvo. According to the old theory, the power must belong to the state, the freedom of "opinion" to the country. The interpretation of the epigoni of Slavophilism, as Ivan Aksakov, was: autocracy to the Tsar, self-government to the provinces. The question presented itself: Is then autocracy consistent with the local autonomy? No, it is not, the practice of the Zemstvos answered. It is not, was repeated also by men of political science — and by those who wished autonomy curtailed or abolished in the interest of autocracy, as well as by such as looked for autocracy to be abolished and autonomy to be extended to central institutions. Mr. Ignatyev, however, dissented: Yes, local autonomy is consistent with autocracy, he said. Moreover, it is the very essence of autocracy to have a large local autonomy of "communes" at its foundation. Accordingly, the circular writings of the new ministers spoke a quite peculiar language. "Bureaucracy," its members' "negligence in performing their duties," their "unconcern for the public weal," and even their "appetites for public property" were severely criticised by the minister of the interior. On the other hand, "the repre-

<sup>42</sup> See p. 56.

sentative men of the provinces" were promised a "vivid participation in the work of realizing the views of His Majesty."<sup>43</sup> Not to fall short of these promises, Ignatyev smoothed Melikov's project into a plan of calling from time to time "experts" from provincial Zemstvos to assist the government in preparing drafts of laws. Of course, these experts—the "knowing men"—were to be nominated by the government itself, and no definite form of their collaboration with the St. Petersburg officials was provided for.

This measure did not produce the expected effect. On the contrary, it only provoked a storm of indignation in the Zemstvos, whose demands for a constitution had become much more definite and peremptory with the beginning of the new reign. No less than twelve Zemstvo assemblies gave utterance to a most positive and unequivocal disapproval of the system of calling forth the "knowing men," picked by the government, instead of summoning the actual representatives of the country. Delegates of the Zemstvos, they argued, must be duly elected by the assemblies, not nominated by the ministry of the interior; else they had no right to be considered as representing public opinion. They form nothing but a "fictitious representation," and even though they were actually members of Zemstvos, they must be formally forbidden to function as representatives of anyone's opinion except their own.

Now the situation became clear. Public opinion

<sup>43</sup> It recently became known that Mr. Ignatyev, in greatest secrecy, considered the project of summoning a Zemskee Sobor—in the Slavophil meaning of the word—and that even a date was fixed for it, namely May 18, 1882; but the Tsar then dropped the scheme, some few days before the term.

was not to be lulled to sleep by small concessions, and the government did not wish to try concessions on a larger scale. Thus no compromise between the political aspirations of the Zemstvos and what the government was willing to accord appeared possible. At the same time, the chief reason that forced the government to deal with public opinion no longer existed. The revolutionary movement was stifled or died out from internal exhaustion.

Then a reaction set in, unswerving and undisguised. The minister Tolstoy—a man who, intensely hated by educated society for his school system,<sup>44</sup> had been obliged to resign the ministry of instruction when Loris Melikov's dictatorship had been started—was now given a free hand as minister of the interior. His was the policy of re-establishing the influence of the nobility in local administration and self-government<sup>45</sup>—at variance with a sort of instinctive democratic nationalism of Tsar Alexander III. As to the Zemstvos, Tolstoy acted toward them much more as a personal enemy—one of the Zemstvos having had the courage to refuse him the honor of membership—than as a statesman. He resolved to annihilate entirely provincial self-government, by means of substituting the governor's boards for elective administrative offices of the Zemstvos. The annual assemblies of representatives in each province had to be preserved, but in Tolstoy's draft they were given only a consultative voice: none of their decrees were to be executed until they had been approved by the minister or by the governor of the province. This measure, however, was con-

<sup>44</sup> See pp. 216, 217.

<sup>45</sup> See p. 239.



sidered as too reactionary even in high official spheres; and so it was only in a much modified form, as a half-measure, that the original draft of Tolstoy after his death was carried into execution.<sup>46</sup>

Russian liberalism as a political force was entirely paralyzed after the revolutionary movement had come to an end, in the middle of the eighties. The only refuge of liberalism was now the press; but only nationalistic organs, such as Ivan Aksakov's *Russ* or Katkov's *Moscow News*, were permitted to speak comparatively freely; all other periodicals were submitted to the régime of censure. Already in 1882 the chronicler of the best liberal periodical, *Vestnik Yevropee* ("The European Messenger"), compared the monopoly of the nationalistic press with the position of that elector in Scotland, before the reform of 1832, who alone came to the poll, proposed himself as a candidate, seconded his proposal, gave his vote for himself, and proclaimed himself to be duly elected. Under such conditions, tamed and muzzled by the government, the oppositionary press was unable to give adequate expression to public opinion and represented no political force. Universities, under the new statute inspired by Tolstoy and carried into execution in 1884, were deprived of their autonomy and, later on, purged of the slightest tinge of the liberal spirit. Learned and philanthropic societies were strictly watched, and at the first signs of political revival in the nineties the most active among them were suspended or closed altogether. Thus the social atmosphere became very close during the whole

<sup>46</sup> See p. 243, the statute of 1890.

decade beginning with 1881 — the year of the murder of Alexander II.

✓ That was also the moment when the surviving revolutionaries began to revise their doctrines and formally to repudiate their former illusions, already much shaken in the process of struggle. The meaning of that change, as we shall see later on, was to draw them nearer to the idea of political reform. They had already come so far as to acknowledge that political reform was a previous step, necessary to any further activity: the famous address of the Executive Committee to Alexander III., some few days after March 1, 1881, proposed the free election of a constitutional convention—in the sense of Herzen—as a basis for reconciliation. Now they began better to understand the part of illusion in this very idea of a constitutional convention, and to see that the people were not ready to vote as they wished. The leaders of two opposite currents (the “Socialistic Democrats” and the “Socialistic Revolutionaries”—see the following chapter) were ready to admit, the one, that the people must first be prepared before the social revolution might be started; the other, that meanwhile the work of the educated class remained necessary and was to be resorted to more systematically. Let us quote a few passages from an article written in 1890 by Stepnyak, the well-known author of many works on Russia published in English, and one of the most prominent terrorists of the seventies. These passages will remind the reader of the observations of Mr. Tourguenev, quoted above.<sup>47</sup> Says Mr. Stepnyak:

<sup>47</sup> See p. 280.

The question of how to unite the scattered members of the Russian opposition remains the question of the day. We may even say that it is more pressing than ever before. There is not at this moment a single section among the Russian revolutionists which seriously looks to the peasantry for support—that is, which really works to obtain partisans among them. Up to now our movement is exclusively an urban one, depending upon certain elements of the town population—partly on the working classes, but chiefly upon the educated classes in general. . . . To see in [the workingmen in the cities] the chief lever by means of which the autocracy is to be overthrown is to lose sight, while looking at theories, of the real state of things in Russia. At present this class can be nothing more than a help to the revolutionary movement. The principal support, without any question, is the educated class. . . . The educated class has given us Shellyabov, Kibalchich and Perovskaya [see, on these names, the next chapter], and many others, and will always give successors to them and continuers of their work, because it is the heart of the nation, which feels more intensely than any other class the nation's wrongs and sufferings, and more passionately believes in its bright and glorious future. Moreover, this same educated class occupies all the high posts, and fulfils all the most important social functions. It manages the press, sits in the Zemstvos and municipal councils, and holds the university professorships. . . . We ought long ago to have given up the habit, borrowed from western Europe, of confusing liberalism with narrow *bourgeois* class interest. Ours is not a class opposition, but an intellectual opposition. . . . The majority of them are advocates of most radical economic reforms, and a large number sympathizes, in essentials, with socialism. . . . We all understand quite well that, in contemporary Russia, political liberty can be obtained only in the form of a constitutional monarchy. And yet we still continue to look upon the word "constitution" as something unclean. We carefully avoid the use of it, employing various roundabout methods of speech, for fear people should "confuse us" with the constitutionalists. We are not contemplating any formal or organic unification [with liberals] . . . [but] we acknowledge without equivocation that, as regards the political

question, which for us is the question of the day, our program is precisely that of the advanced section of Russian liberals. . . . To hope that, in a moment, and by one blow, we can win for ourselves as much liberty as is enjoyed by the English and Americans, would be too naïve. There is far more reason to suppose that our first portion of liberty will be a much smaller one, and that it will become widened later on by the common efforts of all progressive parties. . . . In politics we are revolutionists, recognizing not only popular insurrection, but military plots, nocturnal attacks upon the palace, bombs and dynamite. . . . But as regards the introduction of socialism into life, we are evolutionists. We utterly disbelieve in the possibility of reconstructing the economic order of things by means of a burst of revolutionary inspiration. . . . The violent actions to which we now have recourse are purely temporary measures, which will give place to peaceful, intellectual work as soon as popular representation is substituted for the present despotism. . . . If we look at the West, we see clearly to what brilliant results our comrades have attained by using those weapons of propaganda and agitation which constitutional freedom has placed in their hands. In proportion as the results obtained are more precious, as the moment comes nearer when the party may expect to be called to the practical realization of its ideals, the complications and difficulties of the gigantic task become more evident, and the rhetoric of blood and violence inherited from political revolutions is more decisively abandoned. The German Socialist party, which has astonished the world with its titanic growth, presents the most brilliant example of political discretion and self-control.

We do not say that this is the generally accepted view of the Russian socialists for all times past and future. But we shall scarcely be contradicted if we emphasize that this disposition of mind was typical of the moment and common to all shades of socialistic opinion—Mr. Stepnyak as well as Mr. Plehanov, the “populists” as well as the “Democratic Socialists” (see also p. 428). If Russian statesmen pretended to be

hindered in their work of reform by revolutionary agitation, at that particular period (the second half of the "eighties") this excuse did not exist. Then, if ever, the reform on a larger scale might have been tried. But the official illusions of the government proved to be more tenacious against the "logic of life" than even the utopias of our early socialists. If Mr. Stepnyak has succeeded in casting "the old bones of dogmatism" out of the living body of socialism, the body of official nationalism was not even a living body: its doctrine and policy were, indeed, a "leadен coffin lid" pressing suffocatingly upon the living forces of the nation, but to be removed sooner or later — if not by reason — then by some elemental force.

Thus one more chance to begin a conciliatory policy was lost with the decade 1881-90. The article of Stepnyak, quoted above, shows us the ebbing tide of the Russian revolutionary movement at its lowest level; and the new flood immediately followed. Some few months afterward the author added a postscript to his article, under a particular and very optimistic title: "The Beginning of the End." Here he already strikes a quite different note. What has happened meantime? The author answers: "During this period [of half a year] autocracy has received a blow from which it cannot recover, and which may possibly shake it to its very foundations. We speak of the terrible famine which has fallen upon almost the whole of corn-growing Russia."

One of the saddest results of the abnormal conditions of Russian political life is that public disasters are needed to bring about periods of political revival.

The Crimean defeat we have mentioned as the signal of the era "of the great reforms" of Alexander II. The famine of 1891 started a movement — Stepnyak's foresight was clear and true — which has not yet ceased, though it has not found a satisfactory issue. No wonder, then, that Russian patriots sometimes are brought so far as to look forward to some fresh disaster to rescue Russia from the deadlock in which she now is.<sup>48</sup> One can imagine how great the political tension must be in order that this mode of thinking, which seems so utterly unpatriotic, may serve as a distinctive feature of the highest patriotism in Russia.

The fresh political current did not, however, originate in the middle classes, as did liberalism. It came from below — and so far the discussion of it belongs to the following chapters. But it also influenced Russian liberalism. It was again a revolutionary movement which awakened the political activity of the liberals, and at the same time made the Russian government more or less attentive to their demands.

The beginnings of the new movement were very modest; still they could not remain unnoticed by attentive observers of Russian life, the Russian police included. A quotation or two from a secret message by the minister of the interior, Mr. Doornovo, to Mr. Delyanov, the minister of public instruction (1895), will show the initial character of the movement:

Among the social phenomena which came to the front during the past year, the tendency to raise the level of popular education by means of organizing popular lectures, libraries, reading-rooms

<sup>48</sup> These lines were written before the Russo-Japanese war began; I leave them as they were written.

for, and free distribution of, scientific, moral, and literary publications among the factory and rural population, which was so strikingly manifested, must be specially pointed out. . . . While the libraries and reading-rooms are, though not under sufficient, yet still under some, control, the free distribution of books escapes any governmental oversight. Still more must it be noticed that the distributors of these books are intelligent young people of both sexes, very often still pursuing their studies, who penetrate into the midst of the people in the capacity of teachers, statistical agents, organizers of soup kitchens, and the like. The failure of the crops in 1891, and the cholera in 1892-3, caused an exceptionally large influx of educated young people into the villages, and as a result they have revived the tendency of Russian youth to raise the level of education of the lower classes — a tendency which had been somewhat slackened during the eighties. . . . It appears probable that the above-mentioned movement, which was called into being by the popular calamities of the last two years. . . . will develop systematically in a way which will not be in accordance with the views of the government, and that in the near future it may lead to very undesirable results.

The revival of the liberal movement in the Zemstvos is chiefly due to another event which happened a little later; namely, the death of Alexander III. in 1894. The hope awoke at once that the "leaden coffin lid" might be lifted, and the Zemstvos used the first opportunity for addressing to the new Tsar their former demands. These addresses were very humble in tone and most moderate in their contents — much humbler and much more moderate than those of 1879-81. The boldest wishes the Zemstvos dared to articulate were that the voice of the Zemstvos might be heard by the throne, and that the law, as an expression of the imperial will, might not be violated or made dependent on the good-will of local executives; that the curtailed rights of the local representation should be respected

by the government officers; that more freedom should be given to the Zemstvos in treating questions of popular education. No hints were made as to the limitation of autocracy. How moderate were not only the words of the addresses, but even the intentions of the people who were sending them, may be seen from an "underground" pamphlet written to develop and systematize the ideas of the addresses, and evidently compiled by one of the Zemstvo members. This author, Mr. S. Mirnee—a *nom de plume* which very characteristically means "the peaceful" or even "the tame"—in his proposals does not go beyond the scheme of enlarging the composition of the State Council by introducing representatives from provincial assemblies of the Zemstvos, one from each, with rights of full membership. "The consultative character of the resolutions of the Council may be preserved," the author adds, while ignoring the fact that even now the Council has *legislative* power, though, of course, not "compulsory" for the Tsar.

As to the answer of the ill-advised monarch to these timid demands, you may read it in the following letter to the London *Times*:

Whatever doubts may have been felt or affected as to the policy of Nicholas II. were yesterday [January 17-29, 1895] very decisively settled by a particularly clear and unequivocal announcement from his own lips. St. Petersburg is at present crowded with delegates from every part of the empire charged with the duty of congratulating the Tsar upon his marriage. More than six hundred deputations, each composed of three or four members, representing the nobility, the military classes, and the Zemstvos. . . . One hundred and eighty-two of these deputations were yesterday received by his majesty, whose speech upon



the occasion is a model of vigor and brevity. Advancing a few steps, the Tsar pronounced in a strong, clear voice, and with a remarkably resolute manner, the following words: "I am pleased to see here the representatives of all classes assembled to express their feelings of loyalty. I believe in the sincerity of those sentiments which have always been characteristic of every Russian. But I am aware that in certain meetings of the Zemstvos voices have lately been raised by persons carried away by absurd illusions ('senseless dreams' would better render the original words) as to the participation of the Zemstvo representatives in matters of internal government. Let all know that, in devoting all my strength to the welfare of the people, I intend to protect the principle of autocracy as firmly and unswervingly as did my late and never-to-be-forgotten father."

Thus Mr. Pobedonostsev had again the upper hand, as he had on May 11 (April 27), 1881. But the old gentleman did not take into consideration that, while the manifesto of May 11 only stated the accomplished victory over the revolutionary movement, the speech of January 29 was a prelude and an instigation to a new movement on such an enlarged scale as Russia had never seen before. The day after his speech the Tsar was answered by the liberals in an "open letter," as follows:

You have told your mind, and your words will be known to all Russia, to all the civilized world. Until now nobody knew you; since yesterday you became a "definite quantity," and "senseless dreams" are no longer possible on your account. We do not know whether you clearly understand the situation created by your "firm" utterance. But people who do not stand so high above and so far off from actuality can easily comprehend what is their own and your position concerning what is now the state of things in Russia. First of all, you are imperfectly informed. No zemstvoist has put the question as you put it, and no voice was raised in any Zemstvo assembly against autocracy. . . . The

question was only to remove the wall of bureaucracy and court influences which separate the Tsar from Russia; and these were the tendencies which you in your inexperience and lack of knowledge ventured to stamp as "senseless dreams." . . . Unhappily, your unfortunate expression is not a mere slip of language, not an occasional lapse; it reflects a deliberate system. Russian society realizes very well that not an ideal autocrat has spoken to them January 29, but a bureaucracy jealous of its omnipotence. . . . January 29 has dispelled that halo which surrounded your young, uncertain appearance in the eyes of many Russians. You yourself raised your hands against your own popularity. But not your popularity alone is now at stake. If autocracy in word and deed proclaims itself identical with the omnipotence of bureaucracy, if it can exist only so long as society is voiceless, its cause is lost. It digs its own grave, and soon or late — at any rate, in a future not very remote — it will fall beneath the pressure of living social forces. . . . The alternative you put before the society is such that the mere fact of its being clearly formulated and openly proclaimed implies a terrible threat to autocracy. You challenged the Zemstvos, and with them Russian society, and nothing remains for them now but to choose between progress and faithfulness to autocracy. Your speech has provoked a feeling of offense and depression; but the living social forces will soon recover from that feeling. Some of them will pass to a peaceful but systematic and conscious struggle for such scope of action as is necessary for them. Some others will be made more determined to fight the detestable régime by any means. You first began the struggle; and the struggle will come.

Ten years have passed since these historical words fell from the exalted lips of the Tsar. Russia is as far as possible from that state of submissive resignation which made it ready to "be thankful" for the slightest alteration in its fate, as the conservative Soovorin tried to suggest in his *Novoya Vraimya* in 1894. The reform became much more difficult in measure as it became urgent. The government has now to face positive and

peremptory demands of different political parties, more numerous, much better organized, and making a common front against the government. The choice of a program to save the situation is not easy, and the statesman who endeavors to determine what is the minimum program that would carry with it public approval must possess extraordinary skill and authority.<sup>49</sup>

That this minimum program has changed meanwhile we may judge from the opinions of such representative men as never would be counted as liberals in former days. A good instance is the lately deceased Mr. Cheecherrin, an eminent lawyer and a former professor at the University of Moscow. Mr. Cheecherrin began his political career as a highly conservative man by a rash rejoinder to Herzen. This was in 1859. Then, in the epoch of Loris Melikov (1881), Mr. Cheecherrin advocated a strong repression of the political movement then in process, and gave advice, which nearly coincided with Melikov's project, for a modest participation by the "experts" chosen by Zemstvos in the preparatory work of legislation. This, he then thought, would "for a long time" satisfy Russian society, which is not ripe for a real constitution. Now we have the last *profession de foi* by Mr. Cheecherrin, in his book on *Russia on the Eve of the Twentieth Century*, published abroad anonymously. Cheecherrin here holds to the opinion that

it is impossible to limit bureaucracy without limiting the power

<sup>49</sup> These lines were written before the complications of the winter of 1904-5. No individual statesman can "save the situation" now; the word belongs to the representatives of the people. See also chap. vii.

whose weapon it is, or — as more often happens — which itself serves as a weapon in the hand of bureaucracy. I mean the unlimited power of the monarch. As long as this exists, unlimited arbitrariness at the top will always generate like arbitrariness in the dependent spheres. Legal order can never be affirmed where everything depends on personal will, and where every person invested with power may put himself above the law, while sheltering himself behind an imperial order. If a régime of legality may be said to form the most urgent need of the Russian society, we must conclude that this need can be satisfied only by the change of the unlimited monarchy into a limited. . . . It is necessary that the elective assembly should be invested with definite rights. A consultative assembly, whose decisions may or may not be followed, will always be swayed by the ruling bureaucracy, though it is just bureaucracy that must be limited. Only such an organ as would be entirely independent and possess a deciding voice in state affairs can counterbalance the officials surrounding the throne. Only such an assembly, possessing some rights, can limit the will of the monarch — which is the first condition of the legal order. As long as the monarch will not grow accustomed to the idea that his will is not almighty, that there exists a law independent of his will, and that he must defer to it, every hope to overrule the arbitrariness of the officials, every dream about “guaranties,” are vain and futile.

The words of Checherrin are clear and deliberate, as well as thoroughly reasonable. They characterize the prevailing idea and the minimum program of the contemporary liberalism. In the face of them, all previous schemes of forming a “consultative” house seem to be relegated from genuinely liberal circles to such nationalists or conservatives as have been converted by the general trend of opinion to liberalism, while preserving their inclination to compromise with autocracy. Among such new converts there are some “officious” journalists, like Mr. Soovorin and other

contributors to his *Novoya Vrainya*, or a third-rate publicist like Mr. Sharahpov, who made his reputation by announcing himself as the successor of Ivan Aksakov, the last Slavophil; or Mr. Demchinskee, the famous "weather prophet," who by a strange irony of fate found himself to be private adviser of the Tsar in things political. Curiously enough, to save autocracy, all of them lay particular stress on "federalism," and, in order to avoid the convocation of a single chamber in St. Petersburg, they advise the forming of some eight chambers in the provinces, thus enlarging the scheme of Ignatyev by the above-mentioned feature of the former liberal scheme. Political science is familiar to no one of them, as may be seen from their projects; they have instead the nationalistic conviction that autocracy is "indissolubly a part of the very life of the Russian people." "Russia will not be Russia without autocracy," Prince Meshchersky recently said. Mr. Cheecherrin, too, belonged to that generation of Hegelian adepts who first laid the foundation of this nationalistic belief; but his manner of explaining away the deep-rooted axiom of nationalistic thinking is worthy of one of the best scholars on Russian constitutional history:

No doubt autocracy has had a great historical importance, with us even more so than with the western nations. It has united and organized Russia, has sown the seed of enlightenment, and it ended by liberating the people and uplifting social forces. But when this was done its vocation was fulfilled. For an unlimited monarchy is a form of government that suits peoples in their infancy, not in their adult age. When social forces begin to move by themselves, this form becomes an obstacle. Autocracy can bring the people up to a certain degree of development, but this

degree is not high, and it cannot be increased with the aid of autocracy. And though, under the pressure of the irresistible demands of life, autocracy may adopt liberal principles, by this very adoption it sows the seed of its own destruction.

Thus, any consistent view, whether held by an impartial observer like Cheecherrin, or by a consistent liberal, or even by a consistent conservative, does not admit any compromise on that particular point. Mr. Witte, as we know already, holds the same opinion as Cheecherrin in regard to the incompatibility of liberal principles with the existing régime. Of course, from this identical admission he draws quite opposite conclusions. It is not the political form, but the liberal principles, that must be destroyed. But there is a certain undertone of pessimism running through the memoir of Mr. Witte as to the unexpressed but unavoidable question: Which of the two is easier — eradicating liberal principles, or changing the old political form? As soon as this dilemma is made clear to public opinion, the evolution of liberalism previous to the constitutional stage of political life must be considered as completed. What remains is not the theoretical discussion, but the struggle. And “the struggle has come,” as the author of the open letter to Nicholas II. foretold. In casting aside the liberal elements, the government deprived itself of any chance of a peaceful issue, and fostered instead a widespread revolutionary movement. On this field the decisive battles were now again to be fought and won; and as long as the government hoped to be the winner, it always declined to listen to the softer whisperings of Russian liberalism.

That is why, in order to have a key to the whole position, we must make ourselves acquainted with the revolutionary movement in Russia.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE SOCIALISTIC IDEA

WE have now to consider the movement known outside of Russia under the nickname of "nihilism." This really was never its party title. The name was given to the movement forty years ago—*i. e.*, before it had had time to assume definite shape—by its opponents, in order to characterize its negative side; and it has always sounded offensive to its adherents. But even as a title descriptive of the negative characteristics of the movement, is it a fair name? Even this question can hardly be answered affirmatively. "Nihilism" does designate a certain aspect of the early phase of the movement—a general disposition toward a summary negation of tradition and of all authority. This negation can be brought into connection with the peculiarities of the Russian mind and with Russian history, as they have been described in chap. i. But in this latter meaning "nihilism" is too broad a term, and is liable to include and characterize everything Russian—the government as well as its opponents; while in the former meaning—as a feature of the earlier phase of the movement it is too narrow a term to cover the whole, or even the most characteristic part, of the movement. Moreover, at this time the term was used to characterize another and quite opposite activity of forty years ago—a purely individualistic movement of personal "emancipation," which partly preceded and partly ran parallel with the collectivist movement which we are going to describe.



If, then, we eliminate the local and transient features just mentioned, so-called "nihilism" will appear in its true character as a specifically Russian variety of the socialism of western Europe, without any exact counterpart elsewhere in the world. To be sure, in its beginnings this particular Russian movement had strong peculiarities in theory, and it still remains unique as far as its revolutionary practice is concerned. But such peculiarities, so far from being national and "nihilistic" only, are rather due to the early period which Russian socialism was traversing, and are not at all unfamiliar to the students of the international movement of socialism in its earlier phases. These particular features of Russian socialism disappear as the movement grows. The more it spreads and develops, the more cosmopolitan it becomes.

But there is another feature characteristic of Russian socialism, not so obvious as, but much more important than, its "nihilism" — a feature which is not likely to be eliminated from the next stages of its development. Socialism in Russia, more than anywhere else, represents democracy in general. This is what makes its political rôle much more important than it is in countries with a more and earlier developed democracy.

When socialism made its appearance in these latter countries, it found its field of activity already occupied by a dangerous rival. The middle class, which actually fought the early battles of modern democracy, has imprinted on that democracy its own intellectual stamp. Democratic habits of thought and life were essentially individualistic, and thus were antagonistic to the teachings of socialism. The militant democracy of the early

days had considered its chief enemy to be the centralistic state with its absolutistic rule. This enemy had to be defeated by means of the principle of absolute freedom of individuality. The individual member of society claimed to be in possession of inalienable "natural" rights which no one but himself could give away, and which he, as a matter of fact, had partly and conditionally given away in order to found an association of human individuals. Thus the political democracy of that epoch found its expression in the theory of a voluntary covenant of individuals, a "social compact," as a foundation for the existing state. If consistently developed, this idea led to the individualism of Spencer, or to the anarchism of Proudhon: the state was to be considered a necessary evil, to be reduced to a minimum, or to be wholly exterminated. American political thought was not, of course, so hostile to the very idea of the state as was that either of the French Encyclopedists or of the English Liberals; for here in America it was not a political struggle against despotism that directed political thought, but an almost inborn instinct of self-assertion fortified with a religious feeling of independence. Yet that instinct was thoroughly individualistic, and as such was the prevailing idea of New England Puritanism and of the "fathers" of 1776. In spite of the modern encroachments of collectivism and centralization, the country of Jefferson even after a century of federal government remains more faithful to that old spirit of individualism than the country of Rousseau.

Under these conditions, socialism had to meet a formidable adversary in the politically full-grown

democracy of the English-speaking countries. The distrust of the state existing in these countries had first to be overcome, and the idea of state interference to be made familiar to them, before the collectivist view could be substituted for the individualistic in politics and social life. The advocates of the new movement themselves avow that they are not yet far beyond this very threshold of socialism either in England or in America. One is here particularly slow to recognize at the bottom of the general "social unrest" the struggle of the "masses" against the "classes;" mere "municipalization" schemes and the expansion of state enterprise often are considered—and either extolled or denounced—as socialism, the means thus being taken for the end. The socialistic spirit to a large extent remains "unconscious of itself."

This is totally different in countries of a more recent political life and a less developed democracy. The case of Germany may help us to realize the conditions underlying the development and the possible future of socialism in Russia. In both countries socialism found the ground of its activity unoccupied; its rivals weak or wanting; the machine for centralized political activity quite ready. The only task remaining was to take possession of the steering-wheel. The state of Frederic the Great, as well as that of Peter the Great, already was a huge machine of centralized bureaucracy. Both rulers were somewhat acquainted with the theory of the "social compact;" but both built upon it their own system of "enlightened absolutism." After this superstructure was ready, a new school of lawyers and politicians rejected the theo-

retical foundation as "shallow" and "rationalistic." They declared that the absolutistic state did not need any fictitious "consent" or "compact," since it was firmly founded on a historic basis—on centuries of unconscious submission and rule; and they justified its further existence by the philosophic argument that it was a great instrument for the education of the national spirit.

The state was now considered, not a "necessary evil" to be tolerated, but an unmixed blessing, a providential good predestined to lead humanity to its highest destination and fullest freedom. These ideas of the state, originated by a Fichte and a Hegel, were indorsed by a Lassalle and a Marx. In a sense, socialism was to become the "enlightened absolutism" of democracy—quite the opposite of the anarchistic idea of a free federation of individuals. Since a democracy of voluntary associations for economic purposes—a strictly professional, non-socialistic organization of labor—had never been strongly developed in Germany; no anarchistic scheme like that of Proudhon could there take root. Voluntary co-operation was in Germany dreamt of only by men like Schultze-Delitsch; and this dream was dispelled and made the subject of derision in the very beginning of the serious socialistic agitation. Thus the German labor party came into existence both as a socialistic and as a centralistic party, not as a trade-unionist and an anarchistic one. Far from repudiating the state, the German socialists tried to take hold of it by means of the universal suffrage, in order to use its machinery for the bringing about of a social revolution. German socialism, we need only

remind ourselves, began by entering into negotiations with Bismarck, and it gradually grew into a great parliamentary party ready to work—at least in the persons of its more conservative members—“not for the better future, but for the better present,” thus substituting the idea of social reform for that of social revolution.

Russian socialism, then, differs from German socialism in that it carries to an extreme the features which have made German socialism differ from English and American. If in the English-speaking countries democracy is not socialistic, and not likely to become such in a measurable space of time, in Germany it *is* socialistic, though German socialism is endeavoring more and more to disavow its revolutionary beginnings. In Russia it is both socialistic and revolutionary. Trade-unionism which, within the region of the Anglo-Saxon race, is becoming master of the situation and is gradually imbibing the spirit of socialism, in Germany is conservative and is overruled by socialism proper; while in Russia it is the autocratic government that recently tried to start trade-unionism in opposition to the overpowering propaganda of socialism.<sup>1</sup> At the bottom of these and similar differences, however, lies the fact that both in England and in America democracy has had to become conscious of itself; its decisive victories were won long before socialism appeared; while in Germany democracy awoke to consciousness simultaneously with the growth of socialism, and in Russia democracy was to be awakened by socialism. In each case the ultimate explanation is thus found in

<sup>1</sup> See p. 541.

the degree of development of individualism previous to the appearance of socialism.

Russian socialism met with no opposition from the individualistic spirit, and found no organized democracy. Every page of the social history of Russia explains why it is so. We have seen that the bourgeoisie did not exist in Russia, and that that country never developed such an intense social life as that which in mediæval Europe succeeded in balancing the central power of absolute monarchy, and which in modern Europe is sufficient to hold in check the absolute democracy of the socialism of today. Whatever in these conditions was unfavorable to individualism and liberalism favored, and still favors, collectivism in Russia. This also is the reason why it was not so easy for socialism itself to become a class doctrine in Russia. Socialism as well as liberalism for a long time remained "intellectual;" and if liberalism was so because it was opposed to the interests of its own class, socialism was so because—and as long as—it represented the class which was as yet unable to speak in its own name and to articulate its own demands. The next consequence of this similarity of conditions was that Russian liberalism and Russian socialism were not at all mutually exclusive. Russian liberalism was always tinged with democratism, and Russian democratism has been strongly impregnated with socialistic teachings and tendencies ever since socialism made its appearance. To be sure, the modern—and predominant—socialistic doctrine in Russia today is a strictly class doctrine—that of the German socialistic democratism of Marx; but we shall see that the other

large division of Russian socialism still clings to the former Russian idea: the negation of every class distinction, rather than the self-assertion of only one class, the "proletariat."

The main point in the history of Russian socialism is this change from the latter point of view to the former—a transition which was only gradually taking place. We designated the modern view as that of the "scientific" socialism of Marx. We may designate the earlier view as that of "utopian socialism"—or the anarchism of Bakoonin. Bakoonin and Marx—the beginning and the end of Russian socialism! The fundamental conception of the Marxist view is that the class-consciousness of the "proletarians" is gradually and necessarily rising with the development of capitalism, and that the proletariat must take possession of the political power, in order to consummate the social revolution which had already been prepared by the whole process of economical development. The view of Bakoonin was that the masses are and always have been socialistic, and that the Russian—or rather the Slav—masses are so in particular, because they live under the régime of communal property. They need not to be taught socialism; they need only to be awakened: the whole remaining task of changing the social order will be accomplished by the masses themselves, from beneath by way of the free federation of communes.

Both these views of socialism appeal to the Russian "masses;" but before entering into further details, we must first know what these "masses" are, and what is likely to be their active part in the socialist move-

ment. Let us proceed, therefore, to a sketch — which we shall make as short as possible — of the Russian lower classes, and of their aspirations in the past and in the present.

It is well known that the lower classes in Russia consist largely of agriculturists; more than 80 per cent. of the population are peasants. The number of workmen in the factories does not exceed two millions, and to a large extent even now they form, not a separate social class, but a part of the same peasant class which finds temporary employment in the factories as an addition to their farm work. The political rôle of the workman has just begun, and as was to be expected, it at once gave an important meaning to the socialistic propaganda. But even now no general scheme of the socialistic reconstruction of society can be planned — in Russia less than in any other country — unless the interests of the agricultural population are taken into consideration. This is what makes the position of Russian socialism particularly difficult when compared with that of countries more industrially developed. The labor movement in Russia is developing along lines pretty similar to those of other countries; but the agrarian movement cannot but be very peculiar. That is why we must concentrate our chief attention upon the position of the peasants.

More than forty years have passed since the Russian peasants were emancipated. Social habits in the meantime have changed greatly to their advantage. Still, they remain a separate caste; and the very latest cry of Russian public opinion<sup>2</sup> has been for the

<sup>2</sup> See p. 529.



equalization of the peasant with the other social orders, as far as their personal rights are concerned.

Emancipation, indeed, did not make the Russian peasants equal with other citizens of the empire. This was partly the result of too much care bestowed on them by their nationalistic-democratic liberators, who were afraid lest, should the peasants mix up with the other classes, slavery might return, or lest the nationalistic type of Russian peasantry might perish. Thus they prevented every intermixture of the Russian village communities with outsiders: the Russian Mir had to remain a world by itself, ruled by the elected aldermen; judged by its own judges according to its own customs, supposed to be transmitted orally from father to son; managing its economic affairs by a democratic convent; and allotting and redistributing its communal lands among the heads of families, according to the wants and working capacity of each member. The Mir was even given the right of interfering in family affairs, and of chastising its members by flogging them or sending them into exile.

But the Mir as it actually was did not much resemble the ideals of the Russian democratic nationalists.<sup>3</sup> The organization of the commune always was, and always remained, first and foremost a weapon in the hands of the government for assessing and levying taxes, and for getting every kind of local duties performed. Therefore the elected aldermen of the village became a kind of lower police officials, responsible to every other authority, but not to their own electors. This position was so difficult that it was shunned by

<sup>3</sup> See p. 271.

every worthy man in the village. The village judges were not much better, and their custom-founded law very often proved to be no law at all. The only literate man in the village frequently happened to be the village clerk; and he used his position of influence to lead the community affairs as best suited its wealthy and powerful members. Thus the person and property of everybody within the village commune were entirely dependent on the good-will of a certain few. This evil became so evident that the state tried to mend matters; but it only succeeded, however, in making them still worse by the sort of measure it resorted to. The good-will of the few was supplanted by the good-will of one—the new “rural commander,” an officer introduced in 1890,<sup>4</sup> virtually possessing unlimited power over the village members, communal meetings, and authorities. This, of course, only served to strengthen the régime of arbitrariness and to accentuate the exceptional position of the Russian peasant before the law and among the other social orders. The peasant representation in the Zemstvos, already insignificant, was practically annihilated, because the elections could always be directed by the “rural commander,” and he himself was for the most part elected to sit beside the peasant representatives and tell them how to vote. At home he was master of all the decisions of the Mir, and so every individual was completely in his power. Very often he even outwardly indulged in playing the part of the landlord of olden times. He addressed the peasants with the old-fashioned “thou” instead of “you;” and demanded that they should bow and take off their hats

<sup>4</sup> See p. 300.

whenever they met him. Sometimes he personally condescended to beat them, and scolding was the natural tone of his conversation. Woe to him who, feeling his personal dignity offended, would grow irreverent. There is a terrible provision in the institution for "rural commanders" which enables them, without further formalities, to imprison such peasants as hesitate immediately to execute their "legal" order; the legality of it being left to their own determination.

The economic position of the Russian peasant by and by became still worse, if possible, than his position before the law, because economic evils were much more acutely felt. Already by the conditions of the emancipation his economic position was unsatisfactory. The redemption money—the price he had to pay for the allotment bought from his former landlord—was often too high. Still worse, the size of his lot nearly always was too small; and, in consequence of the increased number in the family,<sup>5</sup> it has grown even smaller since then. Moreover, the lots apportioned to the emancipated peasants were almost invariably chosen from the worst parts of the landlord's domain; and generally they were scattered and divided into narrow strips located among the landlord's possessions, which made cultivation difficult and pasture impossible, for fear of possible transgression, followed by a suit for damages from the influential neighbor. A system of fees was sometimes formally introduced by such neighbors for petty trespasses of the peasants, to be paid in the form of manual work on their estates—a

<sup>5</sup> For further details on this point see chap. vii.

custom which virtually meant the re-establishment of slavery.

Worse than all this, however, was the position of the peasants toward the usurers, or village creditors, who charged enormous interest for loans. Loans were unavoidable, as there was no accessible petty credit for such members of the village as most needed it. At the same time, the peasant has always been a stepchild of the financial administration of Russia. Of course, the time was past when the peasants and the inhabitants of boroughs were the only "taxpayers." Some of the direct taxes which were most burdensome in former times have recently been reduced or repealed. But, at the same time, indirect taxation has enormously increased, and the peasant is virtually robbed of whatever small income he has.<sup>6</sup> After all of the many items have been paid, little, if any, surplus remains. First the peasant has to pay taxes, and, though the mode of levying them has to a certain degree been improved, this makes no difference to him, since his paying capacity remains the same as before. In fact, the paying power of the peasants is so exhausted that often they are in arrears to the government for full three years. For those who know the severity of the Russian methods of levying taxes it is easy to realize the utterly hopeless state of affairs signified by these arrears. Then, besides his taxes, the peasant has to pay rent on such lots as he rents from his neighbors, generally at an exceedingly high rate.<sup>7</sup> And, finally, he has to pay interest on his debts. Not having either cash or cheap

<sup>6</sup> For further details on this point see chap. vii.

<sup>7</sup> See examples, p. 451, note 6.

credit, he invariably is obliged to sell what he needs for himself. He sells his grain in the autumn, when it is cheap, to buy it again for seed in the spring, when it is dear. His working days for the coming summer he sells in advance, at prices that are a mockery; and when the time comes to fulfil his engagements, he tries to shirk them, going off a hundred miles or so in search of new work in a haphazard way; very often he does not find anything, and comes back a tramp and a pauper. Good crops do not always help him out, because then grain is cheap and, not being able to wait for better prices or to find a wholesale purchaser, he sells it for a pitiable sum to the petty agents. Bad crops ruin him entirely and bring him to starvation. And bad crops are probable, because his tilling is quite primitive, there is no such thing as artificial irrigation, and the first drought may destroy everything. Then he may have to sell his cow and his horse, give up his lot to his village, and go to the city in search of work.

But what about the Russian Mir, the village community? Is it not said to bring help and salvation to every one of its members, to give him his full share in the rights of the commune, in its lands, its pastures, its woods? Has it not always been looked upon as *the* institution to prevent Russia from the danger of a proletariat of paupers?

Well, whatever opinion one may choose to hold concerning the Russian Mir (and the opinions are very many and very different), he cannot possibly expect that the Mir will give to its members what it does not itself possess. It is the Mir itself that has grown poor and indigent; the Mir that has no more land to give:

the Mir that accumulates the arrears, in spite of the joint responsibility for the payment of taxes by which its members were bound until very recently. Thus far everybody will agree that it is not the Mir, but the general deterioration of agriculture and the material distress of the Russian village, that is answerable for the present condition of things. But has not the Mir itself contributed to the causes mentioned? Is it not the Mir that prevents the general cure and makes it impossible?

Here opinions largely differ. "The Mir hinders any change in the primitive system of culture," some people claim, "and thus precludes the possibility of any agricultural progress." To this others reply that the Mir is quite as able as an individual, and perhaps even more so, to introduce any amelioration that may be desired. "The Mir fetters the individual, stops every private initiative, and thus makes any further development impossible," say the opponents of the Russian village community. This is met by the assertion that quite the opposite is the case; the Mir preserves for the future stores of resources for a harmonious development of individuality, being indeed the only institution that guarantees the possibility of any such development. "The village community must be annihilated," its adversaries say, "in order that as many as possible may be permitted to save themselves from general shipwreck in an economic *débaclé*, wherein the whole commune will otherwise be submerged. Rather let some of the peasants secure well-being than all become paupers." "No," the adherents of the Mir reply; "the Mir must be preserved in order that all be saved

for a better future; otherwise Russia will take the path of capitalistic development, and there will be a few who are wealthy, while all the rest will turn into proletarians." But that is exactly what is really going on now within the village community itself, in spite of all the regulations and dispositions of law for preserving material equality," the adversaries of the community argue. "The fact is only hypothetical," its adherents retort. The differentiation of the constituent elements of the village is by no means so great as it was presumed to be; at least nobody can prove it, since there exist no exhaustive studies of the actual conditions in the Russian village.

Thus do Russian scholars and publicists disagree on the subject of the Russian Mir, and public opinion on this point is very uncertain. In general, one may say that the individualistic tendency has constantly gained ground in the views of both scholars and practical philanthropists, as far as the village community is concerned. A pet child of Russian public opinion, the Mir has always given it much more disappointment than satisfaction. Concerning its past, views have entirely changed. The village community is no longer considered as an aboriginal and thoroughly democratic institution, such as it was once looked upon, not only when it was first discovered by Russian Slavophiles and by the German scholar, Baron Haxthausen, about 1840, but even twenty or thirty years later, when German mediævalists constructed on the village community the whole fabric of their constitutional history, and Henry Sumner Maine found a place for it in the general scheme of comparative politics. Modern

research, led by such eminent scholars as Fustel de Coulanges or Mr. Seeböhm, came to the conclusion that village communities are by no means so elementary and so antediluvian as they were supposed to be. And now the point of view of Henry S. Maine has been entirely abandoned in his own branch of study, as may be judged from the excellent book of Mr. Baden-Powell, *Village Communities in India*, which forms an excellent introduction to the understanding of the origin of the Russian Mir. This origin was, indeed, multiform; but the unique character of the present Russian commune has evolved from these different forms under the undisputed influence of two powerful agents: state authority as far as the financial and administrative organization of the commune is concerned, and landlord authority as far as economical unity is concerned. Both forces worked in the same direction, and some results of their combined action may be traced to the fourteenth century, and even earlier; others, to the eighteenth century, and even later. The outcome is the existing Russian village community.

Now, of course, this genesis of the Russian Mir, whatever it might have been, cannot have the slightest influence on its present position and its future rôle in the structure of Russian society. All we may say is that the agents which contributed to the making of the Mir are now partly absent, partly decreasing. There are no landlord authorities to direct the commune; and the financial ties of the state have also been much loosened. At the same time, the individualistic, the centrifugal, tendency undoubtedly increases within the



limits of the Mir, along with the material and moral development of its members, slow as this process may be.

The question for a state facing this process of dislocation is: What must be our agrarian policy? And the problem is as important as it is intricate and difficult of immediate solution. The traditional position occupied by the Russian government consisted of a kind of state socialism, which coincided queerly with the point of view of one of the socialistic factions. The peasant lands were considered as belonging to the state; that is, to the nation. Now, from this point of view it was a most difficult thing to decide what was the meaning of the redemption of their ancient allotments by the peasants emancipated from serfdom. Were the lands purchased by the peasants to be considered as their own? Or were they to become, as the lands of the crown peasants were formerly supposed to be, state property? And, if the redeemed lots were to be considered as the property of the peasants, were they the individual property of every purchaser, or the collective property of the whole commune; *i. e.*, something intermediate between private and state property? In spite of the fundamental importance of a clear answer, the problem was left unsolved. It therefore remains to be settled by a compromise between further legislation and the actual conditions of peasant life itself. Legislation on the subject has been uncertain and shifting. At first (after the emancipation) it favored the individualistic view, but recoiled from its practical consequences. Without formally proclaiming the lands of the peasants the collective property of the communities,

it practically took this view, and, as a consequence, forbade any sale of redeemed allotments, subjected divisions of the lots among family members to strict regulations, and made periodical redivisions of allotments obligatory within a certain period of years. It seems, however, that in practice these regulations are often eluded, and that they do not prevent the process of the individualization of landed property, as well as the differentiation of a village population into rich and poor—such as have more than the average and such as practically possess nothing. The views of the peasants themselves are utterly at variance, differing chiefly according to the different conditions of existence in the various sections of Russia. Tilling the soil has never been considered a profitable business in Russia; and the government, with its taxes and other requests, has fully transformed it into a state duty, a particular kind of “state service.” This was what made the existence of a village community, with its joint responsibility, so necessary to the government. But after the emancipation, conditions entirely changed; it now was individual profit and interest, and not state interference, that was to keep people in their former occupations or to drive them away from them. Under these conditions, wherever tilling of the land looks profitable for the future, individualistic tendencies will have their way; and to resist the dissolution of the village community will be a most difficult enterprise. But there exist, particularly in the north and east of Russia, a good many peasants who are satisfied with being able to live upon their lots of land, without drawing any profit; and for this element, generally the most con-

servative, the traditional village community will be preserved for many years to come. Before long this differentiation of forms of property must become quite patent, and particularizing legislation will then be needed.

But we may not pursue this interesting subject farther. It was touched upon here only to prepare for the understanding of such solutions as have been suggested by the different socialistic factions, for all of which the question of the Mir is one of the most, if not the most, important. We now know something of the juridical and economic position of the peasants. Let us see what are the political ideas and aspirations of the Russian peasantry. After that we must proceed to the study of the Russian revolutionary movement.

We cannot expect, of course, to find political consciousness very highly developed among the Russian peasantry. Still, a certain amount of it has always been present. Political ideas among them took the shape most convenient for oral transmission among illiterate people: the form of a legend, of a popular saying; and the slower and simpler the means of transmission were, the stronger was the action of political axioms impregnated on the popular mind. These ideas proved able to live through centuries, and to survive the most convincing disproof furnished by historical events. The chief of these fixed ideas was that of the democratism of autocracy. We know that this idea played an important rôle in Russian nationalistic views; but undoubtedly it also made up an important ingredient of the popular political consciousness. The origin of the idea is very ancient; it appears together with the

actual policy of the Muscovite princes directed against the aristocracy in the sixteenth century. John IV., the chief enemy of the aristocracy, particularly impressed the popular imagination with his bloody and violent methods of political struggle against the people's enemies and his own. Popular songs like to represent him in a picturesque attitude—putting on the Byzantine purple and waving the imperial scepter, while he boasts and threatens loudly: "I will extirpate treason from the Russian land." "Treason" then meant the political influence of the ancient ducal aristocracy. The Tsar had the people's sympathy, because he was combating the lords; and he was entirely conscious of it. He even went so far as to request a kind of formal plenipotence from the lower classes to help him in his struggle with the higher. To this end he formally resigned his power, and then arranged a sort of re-election of himself, while he made representatives of the different classes ask him to resume his dignity on the express condition of dealing freely with his and the state's enemies.

All these things produced such a profound impression on the popular mind that, even when the dynasty had become extinct with the death of John's son, Theodore (1598), the people were ready to support the first impostor who should proclaim himself the Tsar's other son, Demetrius (who had been stabbed in his infancy, to clear the way for Theodore's brother-in-law, Boris Godoonov). It was in vain that the few remaining aristocrats tried to use this interregnum for abolishing autocracy. They were in favor of a constitution, with a higher chamber of "Tsar's councilors"

and a lower chamber representing "all the people." But this political program of the Russian *boyars* was decidedly unpopular with the masses. An attempt to elect a Tsar boyar (Basilus Shoosky), ruling on such constitutional lines, ended in a popular mutiny, and the Tsar boyar was forced to take orders. The autocracy, owing to the popular support, went out from that first trial victorious.

We know, however, that the theory of a democratic autocracy cherished by the people did not at all correspond to any reality. And the people very soon began to find this out. The Muscovite government, to be sure, eradicated the aristocracy, but at the same time it formed a new class of warriors, "the men of service," who were even more dangerous to the peasants.<sup>8</sup> The original idea may have been to transform the peasants who were granted to the warriors together with their land into a sort of Russian "helots;" *i. e.*, state peasants whose work and income were taxed only with a certain legally determined duty for the benefit of the soldiers. There were even some Russian publicists who advised the government of John IV. not to let warriors settle in the villages granted to them, but to oblige them to live in cities, where their peasants had to provide for their support; or to let the peasants pay their duty directly to the exchequer, from which salaries then were to be paid to the warriors. Now, the organization of the state at that time was too elementary to make this arrangement possible. And so the warriors were left to deal as they would with their peasants. No restrictions of law were provided for the

<sup>8</sup> See pp. 232 ff.

protection of these latter, and, as a result, the first germs of slavery soon appeared in the practice of the landlords. Now the political consciousness of the peasants became enriched by a new element: their social protest against their new possessors. The first form, however, which this protest assumed was merely passive. It was flight from the landlords. Just then the government was rendering the southern frontier comparatively safe from Tartar raids, and there began that settlement of the south which we described in chap. i.<sup>9</sup> The discontented peasants fled away from their landlords to the steppes. The most daring and reckless elements joined the Cossack communities near the mouths of the Don and Dnepper, whence they began a long struggle against their former oppressors.

The end of the dynasty (1598) served these new settlers as a signal for a formal social war. The pretext of the peasants for their offensive action was, first, to defend the claims of a "true Tsar;" *i. e.*, the pseudo-son of John IV.; second, to punish the boyars for having killed the imposter. But soon their own real purpose and their chief impulse became evident: to sweep away the wealthy and the powerful, the boyars and the merchants; to make free their personal serfs, and to start a new régime of Cossack equality. At least, such were the promises they were making in their proclamations to the serfs of those boyars whom they wished to rouse for a general rebellion.

Facing this position, the Muscovite government had to decide between the policy of defending both peasants and serfs against their lords, and of defending

<sup>9</sup> See p. 7.

the lords against their dependents. Of course, it chose the second alternative. It published edicts and ordered measures to be taken against the general flight of peasants from their lords; and it ended (1648) by inscribing peasants, in a kind of census, as the inseparable appurtenance of granted lands. It drowned the southern insurrection in floods of blood, and it gave the villages of the rebels to the free pillage of Tartars.

This, however, did not help the peasants to a better insight into the actual social program of autocracy. In their eyes autocracy was still democratic; and they clung to the opinion that their only enemies were the landlords, who were also the enemies of autocracy. They now acquiesced in their new position as *glebae ascripti*—bondmen of the land. But they found an optimistic explanation which helped them to represent their humiliating position as being only temporary. The Tsar had no money, they argued, to reward the "men of service" by fixed appointments; therefore, instead of pecuniary appointments, he gave them lands with peasants. Their idea was that, though they belonged now to the landlords, their land still belonged to them, and that both they with their land and the gentry with their military service belonged to the state. The time would come, they were sure, when the government would find other means of rewarding its warriors; and then their ancient "freedom" and their ancient "lands" would be restored to them.

One can easily imagine how great their expectations became when, after more than a century of patient waiting, the time for the promises to be fulfilled had arrived. The gentry were liberated by Catherine II.

from compulsory service. The peasants were sure that now they would immediately be given their own "freedom" and their "lands." In this firm belief they did not seem to notice that already half a century before that time Peter the Great had thoroughly changed the juridical terms of their slavery—terms to which they were so conscientiously sticking. Since Peter the Great land grants were to be possessed quite independently of any military service, which everybody was obliged to perform, whatever his social station. So that, when Catherine II. relieved the gentry of their obligation to military service, their position for the first time presented itself to the peasants in all its horrifying clearness: they were now unmistakably *serfs* of the landlords—their private property, and not their temporary servants and the property of the state, as they had been before.<sup>10</sup>

This seemed to them quite impossible, incredible, absurd. Surely some "freedom" had been prepared also for them by the empress; only, the imperial order had somehow been concealed by the "men of service," the common enemies of the Tsar and of themselves.

In a few years this new explanation became general. The claims of the peasants were embodied in a new social movement, and the chief of this movement, Poogachov, took the name of the assassinated husband of Catherine, Peter III. He had been deprived of the throne by the nobles—Poogachov explained to the peasants—just because he wished to pay the gentry in specie, and to give the land to the peasants. The military service had to be made voluntary, as it was with

<sup>10</sup> See above, p. 237.



the Cossacks; then there would be no need of remunerating noble "men of service" by peasant work and taxes. These explanations and schemes squared entirely with the people's political ideas. And though the rebellion of Poogachov was spreading only in the customary regions of peasant rebellions—in the borderlands then in process of settlement—yet there was in the whole of Russia no single peasant who would not have liked to join Poogachov and help him realize his claims.

Again the rebellion was stifled in blood; but the peasants persisted in their view, which seemed to be a logical deduction from their whole history. Both the social orders—the lords and the peasants—had served the state; both must be simultaneously freed from their service. And there was now no end of small insurrections of peasants over the whole country. Year after year these insurrections and agrarian troubles repeated themselves with a regularity which needed no Quetelet or Buckle to explain their causes constantly at work. There was no mistake about it: slavery was the reason, and slavery had to be abolished. It was, as we have seen, the threatening attitude of the peasants that gave no rest to the government, and finally forced it to proceed to the emancipation.<sup>11</sup>

But serfdom was not abolished as the peasants would have had it. They wanted their land simply to be restored to them without payment and without any diminution of lots; while, as a matter of fact, they were given only a part of the lands they had been accustomed to think their own, and were obliged to

<sup>11</sup> See p. 247.

pay, for such lots as they received, heavy "redemption charges," which sometimes ate up all their income.

Again, of course, it was *not* the "true" freedom. The "true" freedom was concealed by the nobility! Disturbances began again in the villages. But this time a new set of men appeared among the peasants — men who, taking the peasants' ideas about the community of land and about the "true" freedom, wound these ideas up into a theory that seemed as queer and suspicious as the manners and deeds of these men themselves were. They were strangers in the village, and, though some of them tried to speak its dialect, they betrayed by their habits that they did not belong to the people. They spoke too well about the "land;" but then they wanted the peasants to work in common and to divide their collective produce. That was not right. After some hesitation, the newcomers were regularly delivered to the state authorities, who knew well enough what they were. They were "socialists." Some more years passed, and these very "socialists," as the villagers called them, killed the Tsar, the same Tsar who had liberated the peasants. Now it was quite clear to the peasants, too, who they were, and there was no need to call them by a foreign name. They simply were the *boyars*, the landlords, who were avenging on the Tsar their class offense; the same landlords who were concealing from the people the "true" freedom.

After some twenty more years had passed, this situation completely changed. The strange men came again to the village, but they were no longer received as strangers. They were now "Students" — a mis-

nomer in which "Stundists" and "students" are made one. "Stundents" are honorable personages; they undoubtedly wish the people well. And what about the Tsar? The Tsar is good, too, but he ought to be elected for some three years, as their village aldermen are.

These are, of course, only some individual features of the new situation; but the talk referred to is of the peasants' own invention, and it shows how much the popular thinking on politics has changed. The time is now past which Tourguenev had described in *Newly Broken Land*. The hero of this novel was represented to have been handed over to the authorities by the very peasants whom he tried to convert to socialism. But at present the peasants do their best to conceal the propagandists from the police, and, when directly requested to hand over seditious leaflets distributed by socialists, they often answer with plain refusal. To watch them more closely, thirty-five thousand special village policemen had to be introduced by Mr. Plehve.

How has this change come about? We shall learn it from the history of the Russian socialistic movement.

The origin of Russian socialism is, of all political events of the nineteenth century, most closely connected with the French revolution of 1848; and its early theory is, of all socialistic doctrines, most closely connected with the anarchism of Proudhon. This was also an era in the history of European socialism. The revolution of 1848 marks the very moment when European radicalism definitely wound up into socialism proper; or, to state it more clearly, when the popular leaders first understood that the interests of the

working "proletariat" were irreconcilable with the interests of the middle class. The French revolution was the last attempt to intrust the cause of the working men to the care of the middle-class politicians. And the complete failure of that attempt seemed to prove once and forever that political radicalism was not to be trusted by the "masses." Proudhon's anarchy seemed to be nothing but a further consistent inference drawn from the same object-lesson. The French revolution failed of success, he argued, not because it was instigated by the middle-class politicians, but because it was a political revolution. Every political revolution is liable to be a failure, because it does nothing except change the power, and every power—even the most democratic and republican—is always conservative. The existing economic order can be changed only when all power is abolished and the adjustment of the economic interests are left to private exertion; *i. e.*, to the direct mutual consent of the individual members of every commune. No "revolution" is necessary for that change to be accomplished; or, rather, the only revolution that is necessary is the one which is to be brought about in human minds. After that, the existing economic order will be naturally and spontaneously abolished. "The means that were taken from society by an economic arrangement will be given back to society by dint of another economic arrangement."

This is, briefly stated, the doctrine which helped to differentiate the economic interests of the workingmen from the political radicalism of the middle-class politicians, and to draw a definite line between political revolution and social overthrow.

How did it react on the minds of the Russian originators of socialism? The two leaders of it — Herzen, the powerful writer and deep thinker, and his friend Bakounin, the more impulsive of the two, and for that reason much better known in western Europe — were just then wandering about the continent and with deep concern observing the movements of European democracy. The two friends approached it with a ready determination to admire its boldest acts, and they predicted for it most amazing successes. Instead of this, however, they had to witness its shortcomings and its utter defeat. In close touch with Proudhon, they drew from the events the same conclusion that he did, but they went farther than he in the same direction. This is what Herzen himself gave as the explanation of that bolder start. In one of his pamphlets he says :

A thinking Russian is the most independent being in the world. What, indeed, could stop him? Consideration for the past? But what is the starting-point of modern Russian history other than an entire negation of nationalism and tradition? . . . . On the other hand, the past of the western nations may well serve us as a lesson — but that is all; we do not think ourselves to be the executors of their historic will. We share in your doubts, but your beliefs leave us cold. We share in your hatred, but we do not understand your attachments for the legacies of your ancestors. You are constrained by scruples, held back by lateral considerations. We have none. . . . We are independent, because we start a new life. . . . We are independent because we do not possess anything — nothing to be loved. All our recollections are full of rancor and bitterness. . . . We wear too many fetters already to be willing to put on new chains. . . . What matter for us, disinherited juniors that we are, your inherited duties? Can we, in conscience, be satisfied with your worn-out morality, which is non-Christian and non-human, which is invoked only in rhetorical exercises and in judicial sentences? What respect can

we cherish for your Roman-Gothic law: that huge building, lacking light and fresh air, a building repaired in the Middle Ages and painted over by a manumitted bourgeoisie? . . . Do not accuse us of immorality, on the ground that we do not respect what is respected by you. May be we ask too much—and we shall not get anything. . . . May be so, but still we do not despair of attaining what we are striving for.

Here, in this pathetic confidential statement by Herzen, we are at the very root of “nihilism.” Lack of conventionality and tradition—which constituted a feature of the Russian national development<sup>12</sup>—was transformed into a theory of national superiority by the generation to which Herzen belonged. It is, however, very important to emphasize that “nihilism,” though peculiar to Russia as a psychological disposition of mind, as a theory is undoubtedly of foreign extraction. In Russia it was only a belated reverberation of a movement which had had its day in both France and Germany. “Nihilism” borrowed its theoretic expression from St. Simon and from Ludwig Feuerbach. Individualism and collectivism, materialism and metaphysics, were confounded in the doctrine of these precursors of the modern view of things. “Rehabilitation of the flesh”—this designation characterized, to be sure, but a part of the new teaching; but it pointed out just what part was considered at that time practically the most important. This was a complete negation of mediævalism in religion, morals, philosophy, and science. I hardly need to add that this teaching had nothing in common with that practice of “free love” to which a Prussian minister recently chose to refer while characterizing the Russian “anarchists.”

<sup>12</sup> See chap. i.

A depraved imagination has never in the least been a fault of the Russian youth. While repudiating Christian asceticism, they introduced a new form of voluntary asceticism and self-sacrifice which did not lose anything by being qualified in their writings under the name of "utilitarian morals." That is why *The Kreutzer Sonata* of Tolstoy was not written for the Russian youth, and why it failed conspicuously to be understood by them. This was the psychology of "high life," and they were democrats by conviction. In the next generation they also became democrats by birth. It was particularly at that time—*i. e.*, twenty years after Herzen had been reading St. Simon and Feuerbach—that the most typical "nihilism" appeared in Russia; and it is sufficient to read its Bible—the novel *What to Do*, by Mr. Cherneshevsky—or the *Memoirs* of Sophie Kovalevsky, in order to know what sort of thing Russian "free love" was, and with what chaste and touching feeling it was really associated.

But, in accordance with the plan formulated at the beginning of this chapter, we shall not stop to consider this side of the movement—the "emancipation of the flesh"—any more than the emancipation of the other sides of personality. This individualistic phase of Herzen's doctrines was greatly emphasized and differentiated by Mr. Pissarev, the literary critic of the next generation. We omit it from our exposition and pass on to the other aspect, which is the most important for the general development of public life in Russia—Herzen's socialism.

Here, as well as in his theories concerning the emancipation of personality, Herzen was not at all free

from the current doctrines of his time, independent as he might have felt himself to be from the European tradition. His early impressions were connected with Moscow—his birthplace—and with the thirties—his years of study. This was the time, as we have seen, when, after the suppression of the December conspiracy (1825), of political life in Russia there was virtually none. Intellectual interest drifted toward philosophical questioning, and the philosophical nationalism of the “Slavophiles”<sup>13</sup> was born. Now, side by side with this nationalistic movement appeared a radical movement.<sup>14</sup> Both movements later on became bitterly opposed to each other, and have grown irreconcilable since the era of the “Great Reforms.” But their starting-point and their fundamental idea were the same: the idea of the people and of the people’s glorious destiny in the future. They originated in the same atmosphere of feeling and thought, and they developed in the closest contact during the quieter period of the thirties and the first half of the forties. Says Herzen in his *Memoirs*:

We and the Slavophiles represented a kind of two-faced Janus: only they looked backward and we looked forward. At heart we were one; and our heart throbbed equally for our minor brother, the peasant—with whom our mother-country was pregnant. But what for them was a recollection of the past was taken by us as a prophecy for the future.

It is impossible to state in a clearer way what were the original surroundings in which Russian socialism was born. It sprang from the social stratum of the highly educated and finely developed men of the Rus-

<sup>13</sup> See p. 52.

<sup>14</sup> See p. 260.



sian gentry. The peasants really were for them their "junior brothers." Their feeling was all philanthropy and enthusiasm for these "junior brothers." Their thought was all anticipation of the people's great destiny and glorious future. Herzen and his Slavophil friends were likewise agreed as to the main foundation for this future glory of the Russian people. They found it in the Russian rural commune. But their ideas as to the spirit of this rural institution ran wide apart. The Slavophiles appreciated the commune chiefly as a national expression of the Christian spirit—the spirit of love and of humility.<sup>15</sup> Herzen, however, by his university studies in the natural sciences, and by his later readings of Feuerbach and the younger Hegelians, had been brought to disbelieve in Christianity and religion in general. Soon the idea dawned on him—particularly during his subsequent travels in Europe—that the Russian commune was destined for quite another rôle in the future; namely, that it represented in germ the socialistic society.

The impressions which fixed the mind of Herzen upon this idea were the same as those that influenced Proudhon in the framing of his theory. Similar negative conclusions were drawn by each of them from the events of 1848–52 in France, which disappointed them equally on the subject of political revolutions and democratic radicalism. In close touch with Proudhon, whom he particularly admired, Herzen adopted also his positive advices as to the possible outcome for the working masses. But concerning the probability of bringing about this result in western Europe Herzen

<sup>15</sup> See p. 55.

allowed himself a free course of thought. In this particular point he "shared in the doubts" of his European friends, while "their beliefs left him cold." He simply did not believe in the possibility of a socialistic overthrow in Europe. Had it not already been foretold by his Muscovite friends, the Slavophiles, that nothing whatever was to be expected for European civilization, and that the only thing that remained for it to do was to die the natural death of exhaustion? Herzen's personal observations—and he was an extraordinarily keen observer—supported him in his opinion that no radical change was to be immediately expected in western Europe. And so he was not nearly so positive in his anticipations as in his criticisms of the existing state of things.

We have now come to a point in the theory of Herzen where the results of keen observation are closely interwoven with elements of hypothesis and of theoretical construction. An accidental impression received in his youth seems to have given him the key to his explanation of the present and to his construction of the future of European civilization. It was not a study in history or in sociology nor a philosophical system, but a picture and a comparison, which, very early, converted him to his system. He found this picture in a novel, *Arminius*, whose author he even forgot. It was a glowing description of the ancient society of decaying Rome, which Herzen, with so many others before and after him, found most astonishingly like the decadent "society" of our modern civilization. And as for socialism—was that not to have the selfsame significance for this society in

decay that Christianity had had for the self-conceited and arrogant civilization of the "Eternal City?" Here again numberless analogies presented themselves to the mind of Herzen, and he was never tired of referring to this double contrast: the ancient world and Christianity—the new world and socialism.

But where were the Barbarians, to give the ancient world its *coup de grace* and to start the new?

Here it was that the very realistic—not in the least mystic—disposition of Herzen's mind yielded to temptation. As a keen student of the natural sciences, he was particularly anxious not to take ideas for facts and aspirations for possibilities. No action without an actor; no "abstract idea" without its embodiment; no "logical series" taken for "material series"—such were the chief principles of his reasoning in history as well as in politics. But this very disposition played a trick on him. No Christianity without "Barbarians" to back it—was not that principle applicable as well to the new Christianity, to socialism? If, according to the terminology of the late disciple of Hegel, western Europe had "outlived" its own "idea," and thus "gone out of the circle of things possible for her," then, evidently some "Barbarians" were needed for history to be carried on. And why should not the function of these "Barbarians" be performed by a people whose fundamental principle of material life—the commune—so closely correspond to the prevailing "idea" of the new Christianity?

And, indeed, was it not the central idea of Proudhonian anarchism that communes should appropriate the state functions and perform them on the principle

of mutual and voluntary agreement? "The political function" of society would thus, according to Proudhon's scheme, "be reabsorbed in the industrial, and in that case social order would ensue spontaneously out of the simple operation of barter and exchange." This was the new way shown to humanity, though unlikely to be grasped by such portions of it as lived all their lives under the law of the state. Now, the Russian commune was just the thing wanted to inaugurate this new historical movement. The Russian communes had already preserved their members from dealing with the state directly and from thus recognizing its laws. The Russian peasant, of course, always submitted to the outward force of the state and its officials; but he never felt formally obliged to obey anyone other than his own Mir and its elected authorities. The Russian peasant is thus, as a member of the village community, a socialist (we should now say a "communist") by birth. He needs only to be allowed to say his own word ("word" = *слово* in Slav, is supposed to be of the same root with the ethnic term "Slav"); and this will be the new word which will regenerate the civilized world. This is the missionary work which Russia has to do for the blessing of humanity: to show humanity that social, and not political, revolution is what brings salvation. And, indeed, if a new social order is to come as a result of private "barter and exchange" carried on by "each particular citizen and by each particular commune and corporation" for their proper use, then the task of bringing about a social revolution becomes quite easy. There is no longer a need of proceeding by the long,

roundabout way of political reform, of constitution, of central representation, or even of direct legislation by the people. These methods of a political delegation of power—even in its most democratic shape—will never lead to the desired aim. The political form of the state is of no consequence; the state itself is to be removed and supplanted by a free federation of socialistic communes. Now, the Slavs never liked the state, never even founded one by their own wish or resources; their state is foreign to them;<sup>16</sup> it shall be annihilated by the very triumph of ethnic freedom, and the commune is already there, ready-made, to take its place.

Such were the views and theories which Herzen developed in a series of articles during the first two years after he left Russia. In 1850 he re-edited them for the foreign public in his books, *From the Other Shore* and *Letters from France and Italy* (in German translations). Owing to the nationalistic elements which they contained, they could hardly have expected to meet with unmixed approval. In the eyes of a European—and, particularly, a German—reader, this was Panslavism: an appeal to the conquest of Europe by the “Cossacks;” and the *exaltation* of the rôle of the Russian commune seemed to be identical with the defense of the serfdom of the peasants. These were the reasons why Marx declared himself against Herzen without ever having met him personally. We shall soon observe some further consequences of that feud.

In Russia, however, the impression produced by Herzen's writings was all the greater in that he was only building on the philosophic foundations laid by his

<sup>16</sup> See p. 55.

own generation, and in that, in his beautiful and energetic style, he advocated views and feelings already very popular in Russian public opinion. The followers of Herzen were recruited among such people as had already been prepared by a Belinsky in the periodical press, and by a Granovsky from a university chair. The very fact that, in Herzen's teaching, criticism and apprehension of coming evil prevailed over any definite theory or positive program contributed much to the universal influence of the "Russian Voltaire," as Bakoonin, one of his best friends, called him. Soon the influence of Herzen reached its climax, when the bitter disappointments of the Crimean War roused public opinion in Russia. Herzen then started his *Bell*, the first free utterance of political opinion, unhampered by the Russian censorship, and the influence of which was powerfully supported by the brilliant literary talent displayed by the editor.

And yet this influence did not prove lasting, owing to the same quality of indefiniteness which aided it in its initial success. The positive program formulated by Herzen consisted of only three points: freedom of the peasants from servitude, freedom of the press from censorship, and freedom of the individual from corporal punishment. With the emancipation of the peasants by the government the most important point of Herzen's program was realized, and the question now arose, whether this emancipation ought to be regarded as a stepping-stone to the realization of the socialistic aspirations proper, and what were the means most appropriate to bringing about that result. We shall soon see what answer the new generation of Rus-

sian socialists gave to that question. But first we must examine what this new generation was, in order the better to comprehend why the direction which it took was entirely different from that of Herzen, and why he finally fell behind the movement which nobody had done more to foster than himself.

Indeed, we are now—in the era of “the great reforms”—as far as possible from the beginnings of Russian socialism in the forties. The new generation which then appeared on the political stage made quite a new departure in the intellectual and political life of Russia. There is a wide gulf between this generation and its predecessors. They were discordant in everything—in habits and views, in modes of living and methods of thinking, even in dress and food; in every detail of social customs. Those who have read Tourguenev’s renowned novel, *Fathers and Sons*, know well what I am speaking about.

The action of this novel arises from the clash between the two generations of Russians above mentioned: between the “fathers”—the “men of the forties,” to whom the generation of Herzen and Bakounin, as well as of Tourguenev himself, belonged—and the “men of the sixties,” the “nihilists” proper, whose early type was represented by Tourguenev in his hero, Bazahrov. The novelist reaped the highest reward that fiction can bring: his characters were discussed as living persons; and for this reason the discussion was all the more vivid. Neither generation had reason to find that its respective representative was not fairly treated by the novelist, while, as a matter of fact, the older generation had perhaps the better

grounds for getting offended. Characteristically enough, Tourguenev vented his personal feeling toward the younger generation, without at the same time refusing to give them due credit. And, indeed, it was a very complex feeling which he cherished for the Russian youth of the sixties. To him and his contemporaries of the forties they were entire strangers; he felt that in their inmost hearts they were hostile to his generation; he was personally hurt in his *amour propre*, as in his æsthetic sentiment, by their whole appearance and behavior; and yet he could not help feeling their inner force and realizing their influence on what was then called "young Russia." When he was asked to tell his real feelings toward the hero of his novel, Tourguenev answered as follows: Bazahrov is

the triumph of democracy over aristocracy. . . . If the public will not like and appreciate him just as he is, with all his ugliness, it is my fault; it means that I was unable to master the type I have chosen. . . . The difficulty was to make him a wolf and yet to justify him.

Tourguenev had hit it. The struggle of the two generations was really a struggle between aristocracy and democracy—between the home breed, well fed and fostered, and the gray wolves of the country side, all hungry and shabby as they were. Herzen was, with the exception of his friend Bakoonin, the most advanced of the older generation; and yet Herzen himself, with all his enthusiasm for revolutionary ideas, with all his great talent of observation and all the brilliancy and *élan* of his literary style, did not escape being classified as an old-fashioned aristocrat by



the men of the new generation. And he in his turn did not remain in debt; he uttered flame and daggers in his mordant and venomous characterizings of the new generation, and he was as far as possible from the artistic equilibrium of Tourguenev.

But what was the matter? What was it that roused to such a degree the demi-gods of the older generation?

Tourguenev was again right. It was democracy in its proper person that now appeared on the scene in life and literature, and brought new criteria, new sympathies and aversions, having nothing in common with those habitual to the generation of the "fathers."

Not yet quite *the* democracy, of course; but by all means it was a democracy, which was sometimes very near to the real one.

Tourguenev, Herzen, Bakoonin, the Slavophiles—in short, all the writers and publicists—had been up to this time, with one or two exceptions, men of the ancient gentry. There came now to the foreground new men—the so-called "men of mixed (*i. e.*, lower) ranks," the *raznochintsee*; and they took the lead. A nobleman felt rather awkward in their midst. It was no fault of his, Herzen argued, that he was born of noble parents and educated accordingly. He could not help being refined in all his feelings and doings. But, from the new point of view, all this was mere "romanticism," "æstheticism," and "sentimentality," which were to be thrown away and supplanted by ascetic simplicity in manners and "naturalism" in theoretical views. And after some few years the advanced nobleman surrendered. He grew ashamed of being a nobleman, and his predominant feeling became that of a

“repentant.” “Repentant nobleman”—this was the very nickname given to this type by the late Russian critic, Mihaylovsky. His sin was the great sin against the people whom he had held in bondage for so long a time, while getting refined and enjoying art and higher culture at the people’s expense. He had to pay the people this enormous “debt” contracted by himself and his forefathers. His atonement was to be a self-sacrifice for the weal of the people.

To be sure, a “gentleman” was making now but a poor figure in literature. The real host was the *raznochincx*, the son of a priest, if not yet of a peasant. His was the best monthly in St. Petersburg (the *Contemporary*), from which Tourguenev was soon relegated to Katkov’s *Roosky Vyestnik*, whose contributor he remained until the moderate liberal *Vyestnik Evrope* was started in 1866. At the *jours fixes* of the *Contemporary* (*Sovremennik*) the uncouth son of a priest—its chief critic, Cherneeshevsky—would appear in his long black coat at the side of Tourguenev in his fashionable suit; and the hostess, the democratic wife of an aristocratic editor, Panayev, would offer Cherneeshevsky a simple porridge, while gastronomic meals were served for such a connoisseur as Tourguenev. And the young plebeian, fresh from his undergraduate school, would not be in the least abashed by the presence of the classical writer; moreover, he would commence some very learned talk and would cut short the story-telling of the finely educated gentleman. He would be annoyingly self-conscious and bluntly sure of his opinion; not a trace of the worldly skepticism or literary flimsiness or artistic disguise;

everything flat and plain, clear and concise — and desperately prosaic.

Facing such “sons,” Herzen would not surrender nor feel repentant. The objections he had against them may be reduced to three chief points.

First, they were not so new and original, these “nihilists” of the sixties, as they pretended to be. Herzen claimed a share in “nihilism” for the preceding generation — that of the “Decembrists,” that of his own, that of the socialists of 1848, the “Petrashevtses.” In this larger meaning nihilism is, according to him, “an unconditional surrender before experience, an unreserved acceptance of all the consequences, whatever they may be, resulting from observation and claimed by reason.” We know that he saw the root of that disposition of the Russian mind in its freedom from all conventionality and tradition. And he was right when he claimed this priority of nihilism for the former generations of the Russian advanced “intellectuals.”

In the second place, what was really new and original in the particular nihilism of the sixties Herzen proclaimed to be nothing but a studied pose or attitude, purposely and deliberately assumed in order to form a contrast with that of the previous generation.

You were hypocrites — we shall be cynics; you were moral only in your utterances — we shall profess crime; you deferred to your superiors and trampled upon your inferiors — we shall be brusque to everybody; you bowed to the people, though you did not respect them — we shall elbow and will ask no pardon; your sense of dignity was reduced to outward honor and conventionalities — our honor will consist in contemning all decencies and despising all “points of honor.”

Here again Herzen was right so far as actual facts were concerned. But in his wrath and anger he failed to recognize the entire significance of the fact—pointed out by Tourguenev—that it was the first form of the victory of democracy over aristocracy.

But then, in the third place, Herzen did not wish to admit that it was democracy which spoke through the mouth of the new generation. They were, indeed, the “men of mixed ranks,” but not of the rank of real peasants.

At every word and every move we recognize in them the servants' chamber, the barracks, the scribe's office, the clerical seminary. . . . Their systematic uncourtliness, their cross and insolent way of speaking, have nothing in common with the inoffensive and single-minded plainness of a peasant, while it has very much in common with the ways of a clerk or a “counter-jumper” or a footman. To the *real* people they were as foreigners, representing the lowest stratum of their hostile camp—the destitute idlers, the Jacks-at-all-trades, the “alien” Russians.

Even this time Herzen was not entirely wrong, and— from a purely sociological point of view— his observations were excellent. But he really did not know what he was talking about; otherwise, he would not have contested the rôle of advocates of real democracy in the first beginners of the Russian “populist” literature: a Pomyalovsky, a Leveetov, not to speak of a Cherneeshevsky and a Dobrolyobov.

And here it was that Bakoonin set in with his rejoinder. Of the whole generation he was the only one who felt entitled to play the part of mediator, and he finally forsook his former position to resume a new one. Thus Bakoonin forms a most important link between the forties and the sixties, and transmits the

legacy of Herzen's anarchistic socialism to the first Russian revolutionaries of the sixties.

In one of his letters of 1867 Bakoonin writes :

No, Herzen! Whatever the wrongs of the present young generation are, it is infinitely above your Katkovs and Tourguenevs — so much above them that in denouncing it these latter only do it greater honor. Ten or even five years ago, when you were looking forward and leading so boldly and did not care a whit about what people of short-sighted reasoning and of semi-official opportunism would say, . . . you would not pronounce such frightful words — frightful for you because they are senile. . . . True, there is much in individual members of the new generation, taken separately, that is unpleasant, disorderly, even unclean; which, however, is very natural, since their old morality, which was founded upon religion, has been destroyed forever, and new morals have been anticipated only, and are as yet far from being reconstructed. All this is doubly felt in the *milieu* of our poor inexperienced refugees, owing to that emigrant disease which you have in such masterly fashion studied and described in your *Memoirs*. But all this must not prevent us from seeing important — nay, even great — qualities in our young generation — their real, not artificial and not hothouse-bred, passion for equality, justice, freedom, and reason. Some ten of them have already been brought to death by that passion, and hundreds have taken the way to Siberia. There are many braggarts and coiners of phrases, but also some heroes among them. . . . No, you may think as you like, Herzen! In my opinion, these uncouth, ugly, and sometimes very vexatious pioneers of a new truth and a new life are a million times higher than all your respectable ghosts.

And in a long and very remarkable letter of July 19, 1866 — which I regret not to be able to quote at length — Bakoonin draws a line of demarkation between himself and Herzen in his last years; which is, at the same time, the line that separates peaceful opposition from revolutionary movement in Russia. While objecting

to Herzen's repeatedly addressing and sermonizing the Tsar (in his *Bell*), Bakoonin admits that some few years ago he himself had addressed the Tsar with projects for the convocation of a *Zemsky Sobor*; but, aside from a general desire for a constitution,<sup>17</sup> which he pleads as an "extenuating circumstance," he now professes never to have believed in the possibility of a constitution. Every attempt at a transaction with the government and the Tsar, every hope for democratic reforms at the hands of the monarchy, he now denounces with the same fervor with which "Bonapartist tendencies" were at that very time prosecuted and exterminated by his European colleagues in the "International"—by the legatees of Proudhonian anarchism. He pleads for a definite and fundamental separation of the cause of socialistic democracy from any alliance with the bourgeois elements. He repudiates state socialism as a disguised alliance of this kind; just as he during the same years opposed the state socialism embodied in Marx's teachings and in those of his party in the "International." A democratic Tsar, representative of the *Zemstvo*, is an impossible fiction—if even this Tsar were Herzen himself. It is the institution itself that is wrong and not the person; to abolish the institution, the state itself, and not to compromise with persons—this is the only real, the only worthy, aim of the struggle.

I know you detest the word "revolution;" but there is nothing else to do; there is no forward step possible without revolution. In order to be practical, you formulated an impossible theory about a social overthrow to be accomplished without

<sup>17</sup> See p. 278.

any political overthrow.<sup>18</sup> But at present it is as impossible as a political revolution without a social, while both go hand in hand.<sup>19</sup>

Perhaps the line here drawn was, as often happens, clearer to the plaintiff than to the defendant. There was no idea in Bakoonin's reasonings which was not at the same time that of Herzen; and almost always the idea was borrowed by Bakoonin from Herzen's writings — sometimes in his own words. But Bakoonin wished Herzen to be consistent and to draw conclusions from his own premises: "Logic is the only thing that is powerful," he said. "Let us be logical and we shall be strong, if not for the present, at least for the future, which may be nearer at hand than seems to us." Now, for Herzen, besides his logic of ideas there was also a logic of facts; and he was not so sure to subject the second to the first; and thus he accused Bakoonin of confounding both according to the dictates of his temper. As for Herzen himself, he was now determined "to march only one step in advance of society, never two steps;" while Bakoonin to the end of his days stuck to the idea that the people — of course, not "society" — was at any time ready to embrace the last word of his own anarchism and to "federate from below upward" at the first flourish of a revolutionary trumpet.<sup>20</sup>

To be sure, the central idea of Bakoonin — that of a coming overthrow — was already found in the writ-

<sup>18</sup> That was as we know Proudhon's theory; see his criticism of "revolution" in his letter to Marx.

<sup>19</sup> This is the position taken by Bakoonin in his struggle against Marx, accused of striving for a political revolution alone, which was looked upon as treason against the workingmen's interests.

<sup>20</sup> See his part in the uprising of the Commune at Lyons, 1870.

ings of Herzen. But it took there the form of a gloomy foreboding, on the part of an observing historian, of a universal cataclysm looming up in a future more or less remote. For Bakoonin it was an idea, not to threaten with, but to be considered more closely in the light of contemporary events; moreover, it was an aim to be striven for. Thus from his first appearance on to be striven for.

Thus from his first appearance on the political stage in 1848, we see Bakoonin assuming this position. He then tried to bring into action the "Barbarians" of Herzen's prophecies; he was busy bringing about a revolution among the Slavs of Austria and Germany, and thus he laid a solid foundation for Marx's accusation against the Panslavism of him and his friends. After all this, he disappeared entirely for some twelve years, having been arrested, twice sentenced to death, and then thrown into the St. Petersburg fortress on a sentence of life-imprisonment. Eight years later, however, he was exiled to Siberia. From Siberia he fled to America, whence he reappeared in Europe with this same dream of a Slav uprising as the beginning of, and the signal for, a general European cataclysm (1862). The Polish rebellion was then in preparation, and Bakoonin did his best to connect it with the first revolutionary attempts in Russia, while endeavoring to draw Herzen also into this desperate undertaking, in spite of the latter's internal conviction that it was foredoomed to complete failure. It was his share in this rebellion that so disheartened Herzen as to make him discontinue his chosen line of political action. After having gone too far to preserve the



allegiance of his former moderate friends, he now shrank from going far enough to gain the unreserved adherence of the younger generation. As a consequence, he was forsaken by both. Before the end of 1863 the circulation of the *Bell* decreased from 2,500 to 500 copies. The "old friends" mostly became conservative, and the new friends were revolutionary. The former followed Katkov and Aksakov; the latter, Bakoonin and Cherneshevsky.

In that critical moment Bakoonin succeeded in preserving his influence, and thus did manage to outlive himself. He threw overboard his Slav dream, and even temporarily repudiated his belief in the Russian commune. After some few years of obscurity, he emerged again as the organizer of a new international conspiracy for attempting an immediate social revolution; and, absorbed as he was in his struggle against the social democratism of Marx, and in instigating now and then some local uprising, he succeeded in grasping two other chances to influence the young revolutionary movement in Russia: Nechayev's conspiracy and the "go-to-the-people" movement of 1873.

Thus it is that, while speaking of Bakoonin, we are already so deep in the Russian movement that we cannot pursue our narrative and remain within the limits of the emigrant literary propaganda. To see the results of that propaganda, and to witness an actual revolutionary agitation, we must return to the Russia of the beginning of the sixties.

The ideas of socialism had for a long time been no novelty in Russia. When Herzen, in 1834, was exiled from Moscow upon the accusation of holding to St.

Simon's doctrines, he was by no means the only one to share these doctrines; he belonged to a circle of university youths who worshiped the memory of the "Decembrist" conspirators and enthusiastically embraced the ideas of social reform. In 1848 another circle of young literati, school-teachers, and officers was discovered by the police, the "Petrashevtsee," so called after their leader Petrashevsky. They contemplated some political activity, but meantime studied and discussed the new productions of the European socialistic literature; they planned the emancipation of peasants and dreamt of the application of Fourier's *falanstères* to Russia. Under the impression of the February revolution in France, they were severely punished by the government, and paid with prison and deportation for their mere talk. In another connection we have seen that, while averse to "politics," they were not unconditionally hostile to the government; and, indeed, some of them later became nationalists and reactionaries (for instance, Daneevsky and Dostoyevsky). Now, the generation of 1860 was made of entirely different stuff. They, too, clung to the idea of a social, in preference to a political, revolution; and thus they also repudiated liberalism for socialism. But they spoke of the socialism of former generations as Proudhon (and after him Marx) would speak: they condemned it as utopian. And their reasons for condemning it were the same as in France in 1848. Social revolution was to be accomplished, not by philanthropy, but by the actual force of such social strata as were personally interested in it. This new turn, which the accession of the "proletariat" had given to European

socialism, was in Russia caused by the emancipation of the peasants.

And, indeed, had not Herzen already, and after him Bakoonin, exalted the Russian peasant commune as a prototype, as an organic cell or structural unit, of the future socialistic reconstruction of society? Was not the Russian peasant, so to say, a socialist by birth, being a member of the village commune? Of course, the Russian commune had not yet learned to be quite socialistic: the members did not work, nor did they use the product of their work, in common. But these methods were to be learned in a short time, since the commune already had adopted the fundamental principle of socialism: collective ownership of the land—the chief instrument of production in agriculture. Agricultural co-operation was confidently expected to evolve by itself, as a result of the coming ruin of the isolated small farm and of the triumph of farming on a large scale—which carried with it the necessity of using co-operative methods.

Facing these bright prospects, the task to be performed by the younger generation seemed to be quite clear and definite. This task was also pointed out by Herzen and emphasized by Bakoonin. Russian socialists did not have to imitate the “liberators” of European radicalism by starting a political revolution. Neither did they have to act as “utopistic” socialists, by imposing upon the people their own scheme of a future organization. The Russian commune alone was to decide everything for the future social order; the only task left to the educated classes was, by the mere work of destruction, to pave the way for the free action

of the people. It was universally understood that the old building of the state was to be swept away; the only doubt was as to whether the people should supplant the old state by "federating from below" in free communes, or whether they should send their representatives to an "assembly of land."

The excessive expectations to which the possibility of active participation by the "people" in the movement planned by the Russian radicals of the sixties gave rise, may seem childish and incomprehensible, and, of course, were chiefly due to their extreme lack of experience. But the fact is that not only revolutionaries indulged in these illusions. The Russian government itself believed in the possibility—if not in the success—of an agrarian revolution in Russia. The explanation of that general belief must thus be sought in the exceptional circumstances of the time. The excitement caused by the emancipation of the peasants just then had reached its climax, and a revolution was being prepared in Poland. The general state of mind may be characterized by a quotation from a contemporary pamphlet, entitled *The Great Russian*, being one of the first productions of the Russian clandestine press published within the limits of the empire.

The pamphlet suggests to the Russian intellectuals that they sign a petition to the Tsar (we have seen that there was an epidemic of petitions at that particular time) asking him to summon representatives of the people for the preparation of a constitution. Then the pamphlet proceeds as follows:

We shall see what impression our proposal will produce on the educated classes. But when we shall have seen that they do

not dare to act, then no choice will be left: we shall be obliged to act upon the plain people, and to them it will be necessary to talk another language and to discuss different subjects. We can not long postpone our resolution; if the educated classes will not form a peaceful opposition, one that shall force the government to eliminate the reasons for rebellion before the spring of 1863, the people will rise in the summer of that year. The patriots will not be able to avert this rising, and their only duty will be to take care that the upshot of it shall be most profitable for the nation.

What was then to happen in the spring of 1863? In order to understand this, we must enter into some details regarding the emancipation of peasants.

When in 1857 the question of the emancipation of the peasants was first brought on the carpet, the Russian radicals—with Cherneeshevsky, the critic of the *Contemporary*, at their head—put forth two necessary conditions for a profitable solution: (1) that the peasants should be freed with their land, and (2) that for their allotments they should be charged as little as possible, or not charged at all—the landowners in either case to be paid by the state. They wished the redemption of land to be made obligatory, on the principle of state expropriation for common utility. This, however, was considered too radical, and the emancipation was carried out on the principle of voluntary agreements between the landlords and their tenants. The state regulated only the minimum and maximum size of allotments to be redeemed by the peasants in each locality. Even this solution was denounced by the gentry as “demagogical” and socialistic.<sup>21</sup> As a matter of fact, the proprietors succeeded in giving to

<sup>21</sup> See p. 266.

peasants as little as possible, and in charging for that little as much as possible.<sup>22</sup>

The radical advocates of the people did not need to wait for the publication of the Emancipation Act to see their hopes deceived. Men of the stamp of Millyoutin—the “demagogues” in the government—were looked at by the radicals as mere “trimmers” and office-seekers; and, however much they did to defeat the claims of the landowners, they were unable to satisfy the democrats. Even Cherneeshevsky now wished the attempt for liberation to be postponed, rather than to have it accomplished on the proposed lines. Meanwhile, the draft of the law was passing all stages of legal procedure and was converted into a law. The last and supreme tribunal was then the people themselves. Would the people accept?

Cherneeshevsky and his party were sure they would not. The state of mind of the liberated peasants seemed to confirm the expectation of the radicals. The peasants kept silence while the law was in preparation, but after its promulgation they were, as has been seen, very much disappointed, and the anticipated agrarian troubles really began. There was some bloodshed.

It was not, however, as yet the kind of agrarian revolution that the radicals looked for. They explained this delay in the general rising by reference to a special clause of the law, according to which the former relations between landlords and peasants were to be kept stationary for two years more. This “temporary state” of things would end in the spring of 1863; and so it was that the signal for the popular uprising,

<sup>22</sup> See pp. 448 f.

originally to be given in 1862 on the occasion of the fête at the millennial anniversary of the Russian state (862-1862), was postponed by the radicals until 1863. Meantime, the coming revolution was to be prepared and helped along by the educated classes; and for this reason the secret organization of the "Great Russian" was addressing to them the above-quoted lines.

The appeal was answered chiefly by the young people, most of them students in higher institutions of learning. The long series of student uprisings, never interrupted since then, was inaugurated in 1861 by demonstrations in the universities of St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Kasan. Students of both sexes at once began a large socialistic propaganda, addressed chiefly to men of the lower classes: workingmen, soldiers, and peasants. The best way of meeting those people was through the popular school. Regular schools for the lower classes had just been established by the *Zemstvos*; but the immediate need was supplied by numerous Sunday schools for adults, opened by young enthusiasts in the chief cities. Closer relations with the working-people were provided for by opening workshops of various kinds, on the principle of association. Free libraries were founded in order to direct the people's reading. Circles for self-culture and self-help were founded, in order to promote the intellectual development and material well-being of the young propagandists themselves. At first there existed no formal organization for achieving these purposes; the general enthusiasm aroused by the emancipation among the Russian youth, and directed by radical periodicals, was strong enough to lead the activity of the young genera-

tion into a uniform channel. But very soon the most active elements began to combine and form secret circles. Their early activity is very little known, but it seems that their programs were rapidly progressing in radicalism and definiteness. Constitutional strivings for a "Zemskays Dooma" (such was the very name of one of the secret societies) gave way to a more advanced scheme, which we quoted from *The Great Russian*, and this scheme again led to the very revolutionary program of the "Land and Liberty" organization immediately aiming at an agrarian uprising. The members of that organization gave out their numbers to be some hundreds in St. Petersburg, and about three thousand in the provinces; but Herzen, perhaps rightly, took these figures for what they were worth — a mere "bluff." "Some first foundations of an organization were indeed being laid in Russia," he observed; "out of these filaments, threads, and knots a solid texture might have been built with time and silence; but, as a matter of fact, no texture was yet there, and so every hard knock might burst the warp and spoil the whole work for a generation." These apprehensions were loudly announced when the Polish revolutionaries entered into communication with the "Land and Liberty" society, in order to make it serve their own ends. A number of officers belonged to the society, and they promised to make one with the Polish rebellion.

Herzen, however, wished that the Polish leaders should wait a while, until the looked-for Russian revolution should have been started. But, in spite of the exertions of Herzen, the Poles did not wish to wait.



They stated that "the tendency of the 'Land and Liberty' society was to spread their ideas among the people by means of literary and oral propaganda, in order thus to attain their aim, were it even after decades of work." For themselves, they were quite determined not to wait so long as that; and they seem to have found sympathy among certain members of the "Land and Liberty" society — at least with Bakoonin, who wanted an immediate rising, and so threw his personal influence into the balance. And, indeed, next year (1863), while Bakoonin was leaving for his naval expedition (via Stockholm), an attempt was made in Russia to raise a general insurrection of peasants in the region of the river Volga—a place which was considered as particularly fitted for the agrarian movement, because here all former peasant rebellions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had taken place.

A proclamation was therefore issued, taking the form of an imperial manifesto. We have seen how the emancipated peasants were convinced that such a manifesto existed, but they believed it to be concealed by the officials and the nobility. This manifesto, which reminds one very much of those by Poogachov,<sup>23</sup> proclaimed full freedom for the members of all classes; and to the peasants it granted full property rights to their lands, without any payment. The army was to be dissolved, and the soldiers permitted to go home, where they were promised free allotments from the state lands. The capitation tax and conscription were proclaimed to be abolished; district and government officials were to be elected by the people. Lastly, the popu-

<sup>23</sup> See p. 358.

lation was authorized to rebel should the local authorities resist this order of the Tsar. Four members of the plot, all officers of the army, journeyed through six governments, scattering copies of the forged manifesto in the villages. At the same time, four other officers were to raise a revolution in Kasan, the chief city of the middle Volga, take possession of the stores of arms and gunpowder, the treasury, and then, by the only means of locomotion, the steamers on the Volga and the Oka, establish communication with the region of propaganda and organize a people's army at the remotest corner of the rebellion, in the neighborhood of the Urals (at Perm and Vyatka). The scheme was as daring as it was naïve; but the theoretic axioms mentioned above stood for success, and the plan was brought into execution in connection with the contemporaneous rebellion in Poland. The propagandists, however, were caught by the police within the first week of their missionary journey, and four members of the plot suffered for their enthusiasm by capital punishment.

This did not, however, stop the activity of the academic youth in the university cities of Russia, particularly in Moscow and St. Petersburg. In various student circles the question of social revolution in Russia was eagerly discussed, and generally the orators took one of two views, the same as we have seen existing in the "Land and Liberty" organization. Some wished to attain their aim by a gradual training of the people in the ideas of socialism, in order that revolution might come by itself; others, who thought that no training was needed, wanted an immediate

revolution, to be brought on by the educated advocates of the people's interest, even by way of violence.<sup>24</sup> A formal "Organization" was formed (1865) to further the plans of the former group, which formulated the following program of action:

(1) A propaganda among the peasants, with the nationalization of land as the leading principle. (2) A stirring up of the peasants against the proprietors, the nobility, and the authorities in general. (3) The founding of schools, associations, and workshops (for bookbinding, sewing, and so on), as a means of getting into touch with the people. (4) Free libraries, free schools, and different societies in the provinces, on the principle of communism, as a means of attracting and of training new members; all these to be directed by the central society in Moscow. (5) The spread of socialism among the people through school-teachers and students of theological seminaries (secondary schools). (6) Propaganda on the Volga, using the facilities of river communication — there being at that time no railways except from St. Petersburg to Moscow.

Some of the members of the "Organization" wished to go to a different part of Russia as early as the spring of 1866, in order to start a peaceful propaganda. They had no time, however, to bring their plans into execution, because they were superseded by the other group, ready to use terroristic means.

In the minds of leading government officials there existed a strong suspicion that some definite action tending toward terrorism had been planned by the society after it had received the news of a "European committee" having for its aim the killing of all the monarchs in Europe. This absurd suspicion may

<sup>24</sup> Thus the two chief currents of Russian socialism appear already in the sixties; later on we shall see the further development of each.

have been founded upon a real fact: namely, that one of the leaders of the group, the student Hoodyakov, journeyed abroad in 1865 and made the acquaintance of Bakoonin and other refugees. The "European committee" may have been one of the two "alliances" founded by Bakoonin in Italy (very probably that of the "International Brotherhood"), which he himself considered as the precursors of the "International." At all events, the attempt by one member of the society, Karakozov, to assassinate the Tsar, on April 16, 1866, seems to have been made entirely upon his personal initiative, without the consent, and even against the wish, of the other members.

As a result of that attempt, the society was discovered by the government, thirty-four members were tried, and the majority of them sent to Siberia. With the officers mentioned above, these were the first victims from the new generation — those whom Bakoonin mentioned in his letter to Herzen.<sup>25</sup> But they were by no means the last.

Soon after the trial of the "Organization" (it is often called also the "Circle of Eshootin," after one of the student leaders) there was a new political trial where the accused were still more numerous — eighty-four. These likewise were, nearly all of them, students at different higher institutions of learning in St. Petersburg and Moscow. Their leader himself was a student and a teacher — a man of strong will-power, Nechayev. Bakoonin, who thought for a time that here was the man he wanted, characterizes him as a person "with great ambition, reckless of himself and

<sup>25</sup> See p. 379.

of others;" a man who identified the revolution with himself, and who therefore did not hesitate to betray and to sacrifice anybody, including Bakoonin, at any moment, just as he thought his purpose required; a fanatic, but not merely "a commonplace egotist." To the enemies of Bakoonin his alliance with Nechayev served as a good weapon, by dint of which Marx defeated him in the International. What use they made of Nechayev will be easily understood from the following program, wherein Nechayev carries to the extreme the theories of Bakoonin:

The only aim of the society is the complete liberation and welfare of the people. But as the society is convinced that this can be attained only by a sweeping popular revolution, it will use all possible means to develop and spread such evils as are liable to exhaust the patience of the people and necessitate a general uprising.

Popular revolution is understood by the society not as a regulated movement on the European classical pattern. This is not a movement that would stop before property and the traditions of the social order; it will not be satisfied by the destruction of a certain political form with the single purpose of substituting some other form and of establishing the so-called revolutionary state. A revolution can be salutary for the people only when it extirpates all the elements of the state, and eradicates all tradition of state order and all social classes in Russia.

The society, therefore, does not intend to engraft on the people any organization from above. A future organization will doubtless evolve from the popular movement and from life. But this is the task of coming generations. Our own task is a terrible, thorough, ubiquitous, and pitiless destruction.

Therefore, while approaching the people, we must first and foremost unite with such elements among them as from the times of the foundation of the Muscovite state never desisted from protest against everything connected with the state, either directly or indirectly; against the nobility, against officialism, against the

priesthood, against guilds and usurers. Let us unite with the wild world of robbers, the only true revolutionaries in Russia.

To consolidate this world into one irresistible, all-crushing force—this is the whole of our task, our organization, our inspiration.

We must add that all these horrors were not to be relegated to a remote and obscure future. They were to be perpetrated within one year, namely in 1869.

In May, 1869, the activity of the best men must be concentrated in Petersburg and Moscow, as well as in other university towns. During this period a protest must be prepared and carried into effect in the higher institutions of learning, claiming the right of meeting. From May onward the activity must be transferred to the provincial and district cities, and chiefly concentrated among the lower middle class, theological students, etc. From October onward the propaganda must be carried on among the people by the united strength of the provincial and St. Petersburg members.

Lastly, on February 19, 1870, the anniversary of the emancipation, the social revolution was to break out. At that date the remaining obligations of the peasants toward their former landlords would expire according to the emancipation law, and the mass of the people would rise by their own initiative. The society must be there ready to help; and its help would consist in destroying everything and everybody that might jeopardize the success of a spontaneous popular revolution (the supposed enemies of the revolution were called the "imperial party"). Meantime, toward the middle of 1869, Nechayev went abroad, and, upon his assertion that everything was ready for a revolution in Russia, received, through the intermediacy of Bakoonin, a fund deposited with Herzen by a Russian emigrant for revolutionary purposes. In September he returned and

organized, among its few followers, a Russian branch of the "International." In the last days of November he forced his disciples, under the hypnotism of his strong will, to kill one of their colleagues, Ivanov, the only one who resisted the moral influence of the leader. For this murder the members of the circle were arrested. Nechayev fled to Switzerland, from where, after some two years, he was extradited by the Swiss government as a common criminal.

Thus ended the revolutionary movement in the sixties. The revolutionaries of that decade played a great game, and staked their lives upon one throw of the die; but the game was dangerous only to themselves. The contrast between reality and their appreciation of it was so great and so obvious that only their youthful inexperience, their enthusiasm, and their theories concerning the "innate" socialism of the Russian peasant and his readiness for the social revolution could help them to bridge the gap. The Russian revolution was as yet in its swaddling-clothes. It was, however, born; and presently we shall study its growth. At all events, its prehistoric period came to its close with the plot of Nachayev.

The "inexperience" and the "enthusiasm," to be sure, were destined to linger in the following period. But the "axioms" were, later on, superseded. The very exaggeration of Bakoonin's anarchism in Nechayev's program, by way of reaction, made all further movements somewhat more socialistic. Nechayev's program was imposed on his disciples only by the strength of his personality. Their depositions during their trial show that many of them cherished quite

different views as to the progress of the Russian revolution. We have seen these moderate views to be present already in the secret organizations of 1862-63 and 1865. Now, with the failure of Nechayev's enterprise, these undercurrents rose to the surface in the form of new theories.

The naïve belief that the social revolution was to be immediately achieved by the people themselves, and that nothing but "clearing the way" was expected from the educated class, did not stand the test. New theories had now to be tried, therefore, taking for their starting-point either the people or the educated classes. The former movement is connected with the name of Lavrov; the latter is known as that of Tkachov. Both endeavored to solve the problem imposed by the failure of Bakoonin's anarchism and Nechayev's Jacobinism. Both agree, as the result of the dismal experience of the sixties, that social revolution is impossible at present. But they lay stress on different parts of this conclusion. "Social *revolution* is impossible," Lavrov says; "let us then make a social *propaganda*." "No," Tkachov retorts; "*social* revolution is impossible; let us then make a *political* revolution."

Different as these points of view may seem, it is not difficult to recognize in both the powerful influence of Marx — Bakoonin's uncompromising enemy. Proudhon's influence was now upon the wane. Marx's theory was to take its place in the minds of the leading revolutionaries.

With the ascendancy of Marx's theory, its two central ideas, which had met with such strong opposition from Bakoonin, were accepted. The first idea was



that the new order of things is to evolve from far more powerful springs than any secret conspiracy can control, being rooted deeply in the very development of the present capitalistic order; and the second idea, that the overthrow is to be accomplished by means of political power previously appropriated by the workingmen; and thus political reform is to precede economical and social. But, as the former idea was as yet too new to be grasped and fully understood at once, and the second idea until then had been considered a most dangerous heresy, "Marxism" could not be accepted in its full significance. Instead, different elements of Marx's theory were borrowed by two opposing doctrines and developed in a way which made both one-sided and irreconcilable. The idea of a political overthrow previous to the social revolution was framed into a new variation of the old "Jacobinism" by Tkachov. The idea of a spontaneous development of a new social order was appropriated by Lavrov, but strangely intermixed with the still prevailing "Bakoonism" of the current "populist" doctrine. Of course, Lavrov was opposing Bakoonin, but the result of his opposition was to make of his own doctrine a sort of compromise between current opinions and the more daring criticism of Tkachov; though, as time went on, he was forced in larger measure to accept the opinions of the latter.

Tkachov, who in the sixties had been one of Nechayev's circle, still thought that a revolution was to be brought about "now if ever." He shared Cherneshevsky's apprehension of the growth of capitalism in Russia, and he thought the only means of preventing

it was to overthrow the government by means of a conspiracy and to inaugurate a new era of social reform from above. But "that is the way of political revolution, which relegates to the second plane the aims of the people, the task of socialism," Lavrov rejoined. And he solemnly asked the growing generation of Russian youth

whether they would like to follow the same path as those constitutionalists who also may form a conspiracy in order to limit the imperial power by an all-Russian representative assembly, requesting nothing but liberal checks and guaranties; or whether they forgot that the people were always cheated whenever an alliance between the popular party and the bourgeoisie was concluded; or whether they thought that there was anything in common between a social revolution and a revolution for a liberal constitution? No [he proceeded to answer his own question]; whether the time has or has not come for a revolution; whether this time comes before a bourgeoisie shall have been formed in Russia, or after that time<sup>26</sup> . . . the revolution we look for must be popular and social; it must be directed not only against the government, and its aim must be not only to deposit the power in some other hands, but it must at once overthrow the economic foundations of the present social order.

And, for fear of a "Blanquist" overthrow, Lavrov shrank back to the initial assertions of pure anarchism. "The state power, with whomsoever it rests, is hostile to the socialistic state of things," and "only such persons may become members of the socialistic organization as will fight against the government with a view to facilitating the popular uprising, in order that the state may be directly transformed into an autocracy of popular communes, popular gatherings, popular bands."

<sup>26</sup> A possibility which, according to Lavrov, had been demonstrated by western Europe.

The mere idea of "centralism" was abhorred by that generation; "federalism," which Tkachov thought to be a utopia, still prevailed among them.

And yet, while clinging to the old errors of doctrine, Lavrov could not possibly cling to the former errors of revolutionary practice. His previous activity, as professor and writer on sociology, prevented him from being too sanguine on the subject of a Russian revolution. He could not possibly think that the only task of the Russian revolutionaries was to proceed to the immediate extirpation of the "imperial party," and to the general destruction of existing institutions. To "secure" the victory, a long period of "preparation" and training had first to be traversed, and it was not fair, according to Lavrov, to call the plain people out upon the barricades to risk their lives at random. If it were true that whatever was to be changed had to be changed by the people themselves, then the people must first learn to change themselves; they had yet to be made socialistic, since it had been proved by experience that they were not what they were expected to be—socialists by birth. Now, these views resulted in a complete change of opinion as to the rôle of the "intellectuals"—namely, the socialistic youth—in the coming revolution. Their rôle was no longer to be confined to a few months of introductory agitation or to the mere process of "clearing the way" for the impending outbreak. They had to come into closer and more systematic contact with the people themselves, instead of working among the educated classes or undermining the ruling social strata. And first they had to study deeply all about that "Great Unknown," the people;

they were to learn from them who they were, in order better to perform the subsequent task of teaching them what they already knew themselves—the social ideals of the future.

Subsequent experience made Lavrov modify his theory by introducing such elements of “centralism” as at first he had stubbornly repudiated. He at length came to understand that a closer organization and a stricter discipline are necessary for any revolutionary organization than were consistent with the current theory of “federalism.” He even admitted that, so far from destroying the state, it would be necessary to preserve it, even “the other day of the revolution;” and he postponed indefinitely the anarchist reduction of the state to naught. But all these concessions to the hated “centralism” were so many heresies, not to be justified even by the theory of the state as a “necessary evil,” which Lavrov now resorted to. In fact, Lavrov again reflected in his periodical, the *Forward*, what was really the new and current doctrine of the day. And thus we must look to the actual revolutionary events in order to understand how this gradual change in Lavrov’s views had come to pass.

A sort of idyllic prologue to the thrilling drama of the Russian revolution of the next decade was acted in 1872–73 at Zurich. There the Russian youth—particularly the girls—gathered in large numbers, owing to the difficulties of study in the Russian universities and the entire impossibility of women securing in Russia a higher education. The two chief leaders of revolutionary thought—Lavrov and Bakoonin—also came to Zurich; and an animated exchange of views

took place, followed by publications which extended the discussions to the Russian universities as early as the autumn of 1873. Lavrov here defended his thesis that a previous training for revolutionists and a preparatory propaganda among the people were necessary. This thesis was vividly discussed, but mostly repudiated by the enthusiastic youth, all too impatient to get at the main work of making a social revolution. The experience of the former generation did not exist for them, and mere theories could have no influence upon them. To Lavrov's assertions that, as the social revolution was to be achieved by the village communes, it must come as a result of a thorough propaganda in these communes, and not as a result of immediate popular riots, founded on the supposition that the Russian people were already socialistic, the "Bakoonists" retorted that "riots" too were one of the best means of propaganda—and they thought them to be the best introduction to a general revolution. At any rate, one central idea was out of the question; namely, that the revolutionaries had to work among the people, and that for that purpose they had to learn to know the people better. They had to "go to the people," whether they intended to organize "riots" or to make a peaceful propaganda of socialism; whether they were "Bakoonists" or "Lavrists." Even the few who were "Jacobins," with Tkachov, made no exception.

In harmony with the views of the "anarchistic" and "federalistic" elements among the adherents of the theory, there existed no central organization for the movement. The movement was, as had been the case ten years before, quite spontaneous. Its nucleus

was formed out of isolated circles, scattered over the whole of Russia. These circles of intimate friends had been in existence for some time when the movement began, and they had in different ways promoted the socialistic propaganda. The Petersburg circle of "Chaikovtsee," for instance, began with providing useful books for home reading and self-culture. The Moscow circle of Dolgooshin attempted to found a secret press and to distribute leaflets among occasional acquaintances from the people. The southern circles of Odessa and Keejev were from the beginning more radical, and they were the first (1871) to try direct agitation among the workingmen in the factories. This method was, however, very soon (1872-73) adopted also by the Petersburg revolutionary youth, and, some few years later (1874-75) by the Moscow circle of friends just returned from Zurich. This isolated activity was now turned into one channel of the "going to the people" movement of 1873-74.

The *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*, by Peter Kropotkin, reveal the fact that some organizing work had been going on in the winter of 1873-74, preparatory to the renowned crusade of the summer of 1874. Kropotkin, Stepnyak, and some other members of the "Chaikovtsee" circle had a large share in the preparatory activity of establishing communications between the St. Petersburg circle and the provincial organizations mentioned above: the writing of leaflets for the people; the printing of them abroad and the smuggling of them in; the conducting of a large correspondence with a hundred centers spread over thirty-eight provinces of European Russia; and at the same time the carrying on of an

extensive propaganda among the St. Petersburg workmen meeting in four different branches. Kropotkin also wrote a memoir formulating the leading principles of the new movement. Social revolution — *i. e.*, the overthrow of the existing social and economic state institutions — was kept in view as the only possible aim of Russian revolutionary socialism. Propaganda among the peasants and workmen was held to be the best means of preparing such a revolution. Only such youths as had severed all connection with the life of the educated class — not only theoretically, but practically, by repudiating all the habits of educated life and casting their lot with the working-people — only such were regarded as fitted for carrying out the propaganda. Local “riots” were acknowledged to have only “educational” significance, and people were dissuaded from organizing them for fear of losing sight of their chief aim, which was the general uprising. For all these purposes an organization was considered necessary; but it was to be founded on the strictly “federalistic” principle of equality of members and publicity of procedure, with absolute exclusion of everything like Nechayev’s methods — of all subjection, deceit, and violence. No existing secret organization (including the International Association of Workingmen) was to be taken in, since it was held that the Russian revolutionary party had to develop spontaneously amid the Russian people themselves.

With so little of preparation and so loose an organization a widespread movement was started. One of its leading men — Stepnyak — says :

Nothing similar has been seen before or since. It was a

revelation rather than a propaganda. At first the book, or the individual, that had impelled this or that person to join the movement could be traced out; but after a while this became impossible. It was a powerful cry, which arose, no one knew where and whence, and which summoned the zealous to the great work of the redemption of country and humanity. And the zealous, heeding this cry, arose, overwhelmed with sorrow and indignation over their past life, and, abandoning home and family, wealth and honors, threw themselves into the movement with a joy, an enthusiasm, a faith, such as are experienced only once in a lifetime, and which when lost are never found again.

I will not speak of the many young men and young women of the highest aristocratic families who labored fifteen hours a day in the factories, in the workshops, in the fields. Youth is proverbially generous and ready for sacrifice. The most characteristic feature of the movement was that the contagion spread even to the people, advanced in years, who had already a future clearly worked out and a position won by the sweat of their brows — judges, physicians, officers, officials — and these were not among the least zealous.

Yet it was not a *political* movement. It rather resembled a *religious* movement, and had all the contagious and absorbing elements of such a one. People not only sought to obtain a distinct practical object, but also to satisfy an inward sentiment of duty, an inspiration, so to speak, leading them toward their own moral perfection.

With the spring of 1874 all discussion abruptly ceased among the circles of the revolutionary youth. The time for talking was over: actual "work" was in contemplation. The working-people's gear — boots, shirts, etc. — were hurriedly being prepared. Short greetings and laconic answers were heard: "Whither?" — "To the Urals," "To the Volga," "To the South," "To the river of Don," and so on. . . . There were warm wishes for success, and robust squeezings of hands. . . . "The spring is ending; it is high time." . . . And so, like an electric spark, that cry "to the people" ran through the youth; sure of themselves, daring and wide-awake, though unarmed and unorganized, they dashed in full sight of the enemy, into the storm.



The number of these propagandists which became known to the police was from one to two thousand; the number of sympathizers and helpers was many times larger. The aims and means of by far the greatest number of them, however, were uncertain and floating. They expected everything to become clear at the first contact with that people with whom they were longing to "melt into one." They were fully aware of their utter ignorance of the Russian peasants, and they approached them with feelings of deference and humility. They expected to be taught and enlightened by the people themselves—to learn the people's wisdom, rather than to teach them their own knowledge. It was not at all the necessity of concealing themselves from the police that caused them to appear among the peasants in peasant attire. They thought this the best way to be understood and to win the confidence of the people. And, besides, they were much afraid of being taken for the people's enemies, the "landlords." Their disguise was thus as much a means of propaganda as a moral necessity. They even preferred to dress as the lowest among the villagers, in order to look like tramps and paupers, and they sometimes professed to be illiterate.

Under these conditions, the result of the first contact of the propagandists with the people proved a bitter disappointment both to the peasants and to themselves. Of course, the peasants were not satisfied with the conditions of their emancipation; they looked for a "new freedom." But they did not think of fighting for it; rather, they patiently expected the new freedom to be given at some future time by the Tsar himself,

when at last "he should know the truth" about them and about the noblemen's concealing from the people their "freedom." To be sure, they cherished the hope of a general partition of the land; and they eagerly listened to a propagandist as long as he would talk about the "land." But as soon as he began speaking about socialism proper, they listened to his talk as something of no concern to themselves, and simply did not understand. All their strivings were rather individualistic than communistic. "What will you do," one of the propagandists (Shellyabov) asked a peasant whom he thought already entirely converted to the socialist doctrine, "if you should get some five hundred rubles?" "Well, I will open a saloon," the peasant answered.

A few months, and sometimes even a few weeks, of such experiences were sufficient to convince the young men that their propaganda in the village was quite hopeless. Both "propagandists" and "rioters," therefore, were disappointed: the former, to find the real people so ignorant; the latter, to find them so unwilling to adopt the road of action. The socialists expected to find the people unprepared for an *immediate* social revolution; but now they saw clearly that even a preparation for a social revolution in the future was much more difficult than they had generally realized. To lay hold of the people, a much more realistic method evidently was needed.

But what were these more realistic methods of propaganda to be? The answer differed, according to the difference in the doctrine. The "propagandists" or the "Lavrists" (improperly so called) now began

to realize that so long as communal property existed it was useless to hope for any movement whatever on the part of the peasantry, and that the workingmen alone were able to understand the pure socialistic doctrine. But that group formed only a small circle in St. Petersburg. They called themselves "Lavrists" because they had helped Lavrov to start his periodical *Forward*; but we know that Lavrov, after having emigrated, developed a doctrine much more like the current one, and he soon resigned the editorship on the ground of being at variance with the circle. The great majority of the revolutionists were with Lavrov (and Bakounin) against the "Lavrists." They were not prepared to denounce their former faith in the commune and to forsake the peasantry. The only lesson they derived from the failure of 1873-74 was that in order to come into closer contact with the people they must change their methods of treating them. If the people could not be raised up to their level of "pure socialism," then they must descend to the level of the people's understanding. Mr. Shellyabov stated this view thus:

The short period of their going to the people has proved that their strivings are nothing but book-wisdom and mere doctrinarianism. But, on the other hand, the same experience has shown that there are many aspects of the popular consciousness which must be given careful attention. Considering, therefore, that under the existing difficulties created by the government it was impossible to make the people's mind entirely socialistic, the socialists have become "populists." . . . They have resolved to act in the name of the interests acknowledged by the people — not in the name of the pure doctrine; and thus they would keep to the firm ground of actual life and of the people's conscious strivings. From metaphysical dreamers, then, they have become positivists.

From the new point of view, the methods of the propaganda of 1874 were simply infantile. "The times have passed," one of the revolutionists then wrote, "when every stripling and every damsel scarce out of their teens could dream that they might become useful factors in the village, and that they could promote the popular cause by merely changing their fine linen and their European dress for homespun duck and a peasant's coat." And another revolutionist says, while characterizing the propaganda of 1873-74: "I am very sorry to have to acknowledge that our propagandists were merely flying through Russia; they did not settle anywhere; and they offered as excuse that they had chanced to drop into uncongenial surroundings. Living an idle life among working-people, they at the same time thought themselves to be doing something sensible. They spent thousands of rubles for their democratic outings, but all to no avail."

The only practical inference to be drawn from these criticisms was that mere "outings" in rags and disguise could never bring the "intellectuals" into close contact with the people, but only steady professional work in the people's midst: the work of the smith, the miller, the carpenter, the midwife, the teacher, and the physician. To attain this aim, permanent settlements were to be founded in the villages.

Another inference drawn from the experience of 1873-74 was that with the loose organization of revolutionary circles in "federated communes" no systematic and lasting work was possible, and that therefore a system of closer connections was to be founded, more likely to secure secrecy and unity of action. Lacking

that concertedness and secrecy, nearly all the propagandists of 1874, and of the two or three following years, were at once detected by the authorities.

Thus, the establishing of permanent settlements of educated propagandists in the villages, and a centralized direction of their activity, were to be the main features of the new method, and necessitated the upbuilding of a new organization. This organization was started in the autumn of 1876, under the characteristic name of the "Land and Liberty" party—a popular formula already used by the Russian revolutionists some fifteen years before. This name emphasized the central axiom of populism, that "the foundation of every really revolutionary program must be the ideals of the people, as they are formed at a certain time and in a certain place." "We do not believe," the program of the new party emphatically stated, "that it is possible by means of any propaganda to form in the people's minds ideals different from those developed by the whole previous history of the people." "Revolutions are the work of the masses as a whole. Revolutionaries cannot correct anything. They can only be a weapon of history, the recorders of the strivings of a people."

And these popular strivings the populists believed to be twofold: (1) "the appropriation of the *land* by those who till it"—an idea which corresponded more or less to the real historical tradition of the Russian agriculturists; and (2) "*Liberty* for everybody to dispose his own affairs"—an ambiguous formula which transformed the former popular wish for "freedom" (as opposed to "serfdom")

into a principle of Proudhon and Bakoonin. This formula made it possible for the populists, on the one hand, to preserve their former belief that a new order of things would evolve by itself "out of those elements of socialism already built up in the minds of the people;" and, on the other hand, in their quality of real "positivists," quietly to leave this "future to the future," while choosing for their present task "the acceleration of the coming agrarian revolution." And this next step was to be brought about by such means as were thought to be accessible to the people even in their pre-socialistic state of mind. Stenka Rahzin and Poogachov — two leaders of the popular uprisings of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries — remained the heroes of the populists. The more sanguine among them were ready to resort to the methods of these heroes and to lead the people to revolution in the name of the Tsar. Indeed an attempt to rouse the population by a forged manifesto had actually been made in southern Russia (in Chighireen); and an article — which remained unpublished — seriously discussed the usefulness of nominating a Tsar impostor who should start a popular revolution, and then complete it by a formal abrogation of the tsardom. But the great majority of the party rejected charlatanism and mystification as a means of political action.

Mystification, however, was the necessary consequence of the new attitude toward the peasants. To indorse the ideals and the strivings of the people just as they were formulated in the people's mind, and to sacrifice to them — although only temporarily — the ideas of the "intellectuals," was inherent in their very

idea. Thus a sort of mental and moral disguise took the place of the physical disguise of the propaganda of 1874; but it did not succeed any better than the latter. Naturally enough, the eagerness of the revolutionaries for their work in the village cooled just in proportion as it became clear that the "people's ideals" were too peculiar to be used as a basis for an agitation or a propaganda. And gradually as their resolution to work in the villages weakened, the whole activity of the party took another direction.

Along with the permanent settlements in the villages, the members of the "Land and Liberty" society had also to organize settlements in the towns and cities. The activity of these latter settlements was to be merely subsidiary and administrative. They were to secure the relations between the village settlements, to serve as temporary places of refuge, to keep the money, to procure forged passports for the revolutionists, and to recruit new members among the students of the universities and among the workingmen of the factories. The genuine "populists" looked down upon the activity of the city centers. In their program, to be sure, they admitted the possibility of other forms of revolutionary work than their own activity in the villages. But the same program considered any concentration of the militant forces of the party upon these "secondary" lines of action—a propaganda in the cities, and a direct struggle with the agents of the government—as a "contradiction" of the chief aim of the "agrarian revolution." Now that the agrarian movement had proved to be impossible without a forgery, the city group of the revolutionists gradually took the lead in the whole movement.

The revolutionists ought to have been aware that, while their propaganda in the villages could not strike root at all, the propaganda in the cities was always successful. The workingmen proved much more receptive toward "pure socialism" than the peasants of populism; and the only complaint against the intellectuals on the part of the factory workers was that they did not pay enough attention to the revolutionary elements among the latter. The most advanced workingmen found the pamphlets spread by the revolutionists among the peasants too elementary and too childish; they asked for more serious reading. "We are not plain peasants," they asserted—to the utter horror of their populist leaders, in whose eyes a workingman was merely a bad sort of peasant. And though in the villages the propagandists vainly tried to provoke an agrarian movement, yet in the cities a strike of the workingmen always came before the propagandists were ready to draw full profit from it. In a word, if for the villages the propagandists were too socialistic, in the cities they proved to be not socialistic enough. And last, but not least, the propagandists were against *political* demands and in favor of a mere economic program; while the workingmen began to feel that political reform was necessary for themselves as well as for the liberals. In 1879 a "Northern Alliance of Workingmen" was organized—an organization from which the intellectuals were formally excluded. Its central demand was for political reform as a necessary step to the further advance of the labor movement. The fact that this organization stuck to its political demands loses nothing of its significance even though it be



proved that one of the founders was an adherent of Tkachov, whose theories he brought directly from abroad. The "Land and Liberty" periodical protested against the heresy; but the protest merely served to emphasize the significance of that heresy, without being able to change the mind of the advanced workingmen of St. Petersburg.

Moreover, it soon became quite clear that more important dissensions of the same kind existed within the "Land and Liberty" party itself. The city members of the party had decidedly forsaken the tradition of populism, and had struck out a new line of activity which entirely contradicted the dogma of populism.

This group had the most to do with the government prosecution; and, quite imperceptibly to itself, it was driven from a neutral position toward the government into overt defensive actions, and from a passive defense to active struggle of a quite political character. The necessity for "self-defense" already was acknowledged in the program of the party. Very soon, beginning with the assassination of spies, it culminated in a deliberate and systematic struggle against the higher representatives of the government.

In the beginning, the terroristic acts of the revolutionists were due chiefly to psychological and personal motives. Besides the necessity of self-defense, they soon felt entitled to avenge on the government the death and exile of their friends. But then they could not remain unaware that, while all their propaganda and agitation were lost without any visible result, their attempts to oppose force with force produced a deep impression both on the government and on Russian

educated society. Terrorism proved to be a most effective means of political struggle. One of the first attempts of this kind, though a quite personal one and unconnected with any party organization, was the attempt of Vera Zasoolich upon the life of Trepov (the father of the present governor-general of St. Petersburg), February 6, 1878.<sup>27</sup> The jury, with the general approval of public opinion, acquitted Vera Zasoolich. This, then, was a struggle for human rights, not for a theoretical social revolution; and the revolutionaries soon felt that they had with them the sympathies of educated Russian society. They ended by forming a nucleus of members, under the name of the "Executive Committee of the Socialist Revolutionaries," which undertook to wage a systematic war on the government.

Now, as a system, terrorism stood, of course, in flagrant contradiction to the theory of populism. Not that the terroristic acts themselves were condemned; but they meant a *political* struggle, for a political reform; *i. e.*, for the aims of the liberals. In the view of the terrorists themselves,<sup>28</sup> terrorism was only an incidental feature—one of the means of the struggle. The chief question was whether or not the struggle must be political or economic. And this question it was, rather than terrorism, which brought dissensions in the "Land and Liberty" party.

The current opinion on this matter was that a political revolution alone would be not only ineffective,

<sup>27</sup> See p. 191.

<sup>28</sup> See, *e. g.*, the depositions of Quaitkóvskee and Sherayev in their trials.

but also dangerous to the people, since it would give power to the liberals—the bourgeoisie and the middle class. A constitution, the populists thought, would rather delay than accelerate the advent of the social revolution, and, furthermore, it would compromise its success. The only means for bringing about such a revolution were the propaganda and the “riots;” and these must be used continuously until the socialistic consciousness should be generally spread abroad and the reign of socialism inaugurated.

But since both the riots and the propaganda had proved unsuccessful, the revolutionists realized that they must change their tactics. If the state of mind of the peasants could in some degree account for their lack of success, the other—and practically the only important—cause of the failure was the impossibility of influencing the lower classes, owing to the severe measures taken by the police. They found that they had not sufficiently appreciated the obstacles put in their way by the complete absence of legal forms for any political propaganda in Russia; and they, as well as the workingmen, came to the conclusion that such elementary forms of political life as are secured by a constitution were as necessary for themselves as for the Russian liberals. Mr. Shellyabov, one of the most prominent leaders of the new group, advocated the new policy on the following grounds:

The party does not strive to attain political reforms. This task should belong entirely to the men who call themselves liberals. But these men are entirely powerless in Russia, and, whatever the reasons are, they have proved incapable of giving Russia free institutions and guaranties of personal rights. However, such institutions are so necessary that no activity appears to

be possible without them. Therefore, the Russian socialistic party is obliged to assume the duty of crushing despotism and of giving Russia those political reforms under which a struggle of opinions will become possible. That is why we must take for our immediate goal something which will lay a solid foundation for political liberty, and which will unite all the elements more or less capable of becoming politically active.

Now, that "something" had to be chosen in such a way as not to abandon entirely the accepted theory of Russian populism. And so the adherents of the new program have adopted for their political platform a "constitutional convention," freely elected by a general vote. It was understood that at least 90 per cent. of such an assembly should consist of peasant delegates, and that these should be ready to lift up their voices for an agrarian revolution. With this argument the conscience of the Russian populists was quieted; for, though they were now struggling for political freedom, they still remained true to their former aim of an agrarian revolution.

Nevertheless, it was not easy to reconcile the great bulk of the populists to this problematic argument of a socialistic convention, through which the "will of the people" should dictate its decisions. The populists were also opposed to such measures of political warfare as were resorted to by their more advanced friends. They said that the partisans of the "will of the people," while concentrating all their forces on terroristic acts, forgot the real people. Thus activity in the villages, owing to the enforced measures of the police, became entirely impossible; and as only a few might share in the plots of the terroristic group, the remaining majority of the populists were doomed to remain inactive,

mere idle observers, which necessarily must result in cooling off their revolutionary ardor. And, supposing that the aim of terrorism should be attained, who would then prepare the people to vote for the populist candidates? And when would the people get their preparation? If unprepared, would not the people be obliged to give way to the liberals and the middle classes the day after the political revolution? Would it not come to the same old and inefficient scheme of making a social revolution by means of changing a government? These arguments were irrefutable. Evidently there was no way of reconciling the two views. The populist party of the "Land and Liberty" was split in twain. The advocates of a political struggle in the summer of 1879, at a private meeting in Lippetsk, formed the germ of the new party, chiefly out of former "rioters" or of new recruits. Nearly all of them belonged to southern Russia, where the movement was the most pronounced, and where the northern organization of "Land and Liberty" never had much influence. In the autumn of 1879 the new party of the "Will of People," terroristic and political, formally proclaimed its independence, and resumed on a larger scale the terroristic activity of the "Executive Committee," which culminated in the regicide of March 13, 1881. It is impossible to recount here the facts of the struggle, which have so often been described, as our chief aim is to trace the theory of the movement.

So far as this theory is concerned, the difference between the new and the old party was not so great as might have been expected. The same Shellyabov, whose arguments for a new policy we have quoted,

admitted in private that practical necessity alone had forced him to assume a new position, for his heart remained entirely on the side of his opponents. His own letter, published by Mr. Dragomanov in the *Free Word* in 1881, shows this pretty clearly :

So queer is the position of things that, though you begin with the real interests of the people and profess their economic liberation to be the most essential boon, you make political demands your first aim; and though you see salvation in changing the empire into a federation of independent parts, you demand a constitutional convention! It is no great merit to keep intact your social ideal, after the manner of an ascetic. We preferred, anyhow, to remain laymen.

Even for the terroristic measures which it resorted to in its struggle the new party was inclined to apologize, and to prove their necessity, not by any theory, but by the conditions of time and place. Russian terrorism was often, particularly abroad, understood to be the application of an anarchistic theory. We have seen, however, that the anarchistic elements were gradually being eliminated from the Russian socialistic theory; and the very appearance of the "People's Will" party was one of the most decisive steps toward a definitive rupture with the anarchistic origin of the theory. We have seen that during their trials the members of the party expressly emphasized that in their view the only important feature of their policy was political struggle, and that terrorism was only a temporary and accidental means. And Shellyabov, in his defense before the court, formally repudiated the accusation of "anarchism" which was formerly, in a sense, acknowledged by certain defendants in earlier trials (*e. g.*, in the speech of Bardena). "This is an

antiquated accusation," Shellyabov said. "We are for the state, not for anarchism. We recognize that the government will always exist, and that the state must necessarily remain so long as there are any public interests to be served."

Thus the terroristic acts of the "People's Will" party, whatever opinion one may hold about them, have nothing in common with the theory of anarchistic "propaganda by deeds." The difference between the two cannot be defined more clearly than was done by the "People's Will" party itself upon the occasion of the assassination of President Garfield. The Executive Committee of the party, while expressing deep sympathy with the American nation,

also protested, in the name of all Russian revolutionaries, against such violent acts as the assault of Guiteau. In a country where the liberty of the individual makes an honest struggle of opinions possible, and where the free will of the people determines, not only the law, but even the personality of the rulers, political assassination, as a weapon, is only an expression of the same spirit of despotism the destruction of which in Russia we consider to be our task. Despotism of an individual is equally as despicable as despotism of a party; violence can be justified only when it is directed against violence.

The terroristic activity of the Executive Committee has entirely thrown into the background the "village group" of the old "Land and Liberty" party. After the secession of the terrorists in the autumn of 1879, it was mutually agreed that the former party title should no longer be used; and the remaining members of the former "Land and Liberty" party adopted a new name, the "General (or Black) Land Partition." This again was a term very popular among the Russian

peasants, meaning a kind of "nationalization of land." The title emphasized the fact that the bulk of the populists, though their former doctrine had been entirely undermined by their practical failure, remained true to it. With them as with their antagonists, their heads were in discord with their hearts. Their heads were for their theory, while their hearts were with the actual strugglers. With the terrorists quite the opposite was the case, their hearts still clinging to the old theory, while their heads favored a change in the practical means to this end. The populists, then, though keeping to their principles, remained inactive; while the terrorists preferred to be active and inconsistent. The position of both parties was inconvenient and could be only transient. The necessity of reconciling the theory of the socialistic movement to its practice was evident to everybody; but for the terrorists at least, who were in the heat of the struggle, there was no time to reconsider fundamental principles.

Their opponents, the pure populists, however, had more leisure to discuss their points of divergence. While the terrorist leaders were one by one ferreted out and either hanged or imprisoned for life, the leaders of the "Black Partition" group fled abroad (1879-80) and embarked upon a lively literary campaign. As the activity of the terrorists was becoming "political," and so suspected of "liberalism," the pure populists found themselves in the profitable position of defenders of socialistic principles. Thus they were drawn nearer to that group of pure socialists who were more "Lavrist" than Lavrov himself, and who, not



believing in revolutionary measures, remained inactive.<sup>29</sup>

The transition from pure populism to pure socialism was accomplished so much more rapidly by the "Black Partition" group for the reasons that this group was comparatively small in number, was much less bound by the tradition of the "Land and Liberty" party, lacked the practical experience of the "People's Will" party, and relied more upon new forces from the younger generation. In short, the party was much more inclined toward socialistic theory than toward revolutionary practice.

The point of view of "pure socialism" — the same as now prevails in the Socialist Democratic party — had been formulated very early. Thus we found it in the circle of St. Petersburg "Lavrists;" and as early as 1880 we can see it again formulated by Mr. Axelrod, one of the leaders of the new group.

The statement of Mr. Axelrod runs as follows:

All nations have passed through the stage of the collective ownership of land; all have once fought a desperate fight for its preservation; and yet finally it perished everywhere. And, indeed, Karl Marx proved, by the theory of organic development of human society, the internal necessity of that terrible process of expropriation of communal property, to pave the way for the civilization of the bourgeoisie. Russian life contains also material enough to prove that the destruction of the village community and the expropriation of the peasants are unavoidable. In the face of this evidence, a serious question presents itself to every conscientious man: If it is so, is it worth while to spend effort upon a thing doomed to perish? Is it not more rational to search elsewhere for support? The revolutionary thought turns to the workingmen. To be sure, this class is as yet too small in number

<sup>29</sup> See p. 409.

for a successful struggle; they have not yet grown conscious of what are the conditions of their existence, and therefore it is difficult to expect that they should at present become a center of a socialistic revolutionary movement. But if we consider the labor movement in western Europe, with its quickly developing theories and ideas, it will help the imagination to anticipate even for Russia an impending movement on the part of the workingmen, on socialistic lines. And even if there should be no hope of achieving in the immediate future any serious results by transferring revolutionary activity to the circles of workingmen, still this will be better than that labor of Sisyphus, the agitation among the peasants, whose economic organization is doomed to destruction, and who are unable to adopt the socialistic point of view because they cling to their ancient habits and because their ideas are so limited.<sup>30</sup>

It was a long journey from pure populism to this view of orthodox Marxism. The road was, however, traversed in a comparatively short time by Mr. Plehanov, the former editor of the *Black Partition* periodical. Mr. Plehanov's articles in the *Black Partition* were, with some very slight alterations in the argument, quite populist. But after the arrest of the elder members of the party, and his own flight abroad, and particularly after the ultimate defeat of the "People's Will" party, Mr. Plehanov's friends tried to rally the retreating army of revolutionaries; and, as a theoretical rallying-point, Mr. Plehanov developed a doctrine in which he tried to solve the difficulties and contradictions of populism by socialistic arguments. The first document pointing out the change is the "Program of the North-Russian Society of Land and Liberty," published in 1880. But here the change does not go

<sup>30</sup> See the *Jahrbuch für Socialwissenschaft und Socialpolitik* (edited Dr. L. Richter), Vol. II.

beyond a mere juxtaposition of the populist "agitation" for land partition, the socialistic "propaganda" of purer principles among the workingmen and the "minority" of peasants, and a terroristic "political struggle." A more thorough reconstruction of the theory was undertaken three years later, in 1883, when the group under Mr. Axelrod and Mr. Plehanov re-appeared under a new name: the "Group for the Liberation of Labor." Here we have to do with a deliberate attempt to introduce into Russia the teachings of the German Social Democratic party. This, as we have seen, had been tried by Lavrov, and it had failed because of the many concessions which he made to the ancient theory, which had preserved its fascination for the Russian revolutionists. The "Black Partition" still united both theories, the anarchistic and the socialistic—a union which found its characteristic reflection in the very name of the party, "Federalist Socialists." This time Mr. Plehanov's group took definite leave of the last survivals of anarchism and started a genuine social democracy in Russia.

It is well known that the doctrines of Marx represent a synthesis of the ideas of economic emancipation and political struggle; and it was just such a synthesis that the revolutionaries of the "People's Will" party needed so badly, but which at the same time, they could not attain until their centralistic practice became at variance with their "federalistic" theory. Marx's starting-point, as well as theirs, was that economic emancipation can be achieved only by the workingmen themselves; but Marx wanted the workingmen to unite for this purpose in a large political party and to fight

their battles of class interest, not by way of small riots in isolated villages, but by the large, centralized organization of a labor party whose aim should be to come into possession of political power. These were also the principles laid down for the reconstruction of the Russian socialistic doctrine in the pamphlets of Mr. Plehanov, *Socialism and Political Struggle* (1883) and *Our Variances* (1885).

In these pamphlets, however, Mr. Plehanov was far from adopting the point of view of Marxism as stated by Mr. Axelrod in 1880. He did not yet break away from the populist view as to the general scheme and surroundings of the coming social revolution. According to him, the revolution was still to be an agrarian one; and he even admits, on the authority of Marx himself, that the Russian village community may form a short-cut for attaining the socialistic stage. "We do not hold to the view," he says for both himself and his friends, "a view which is falsely ascribed to the school of Marx, that the socialistic movement cannot be supported by our peasantry until the peasants shall have been transformed into landless proletaries, and until the village communities shall have been dissolved by capitalism. We think that, in general, the Russian peasantry would accept with sympathy every measure by which the so-called 'nationalization of land' is intended." Yet, at the same time, Mr. Plehanov strongly objected to the delusion that the change could be brought about immediately by that impossible scheme of gathering 90 per cent. of the socialistic deputies in the next constitutional convention, and he was very far from thinking that the advent of a social-

istic government was at hand in Russia. Instead of being discouraged by this delay, Mr. Plehanov insisted all the more on the necessity of a political struggle for economic emancipation; and he emphasized the fact that, in this struggle, "for the first time all attention must be concentrated upon the industrial centers," and that a central organization was necessary for carrying out such a struggle. Says he:

The only aim of the Russian socialists that is not phantastical can now only be, first, the attainment of free political institutions, and, second, the preparation of the elements for the building of a future socialistic party in Russia. They must put forth a demand for a democratic constitution which would secure for the working-man the "rights of a citizen" together with the "rights of man," and give him, by means of a general vote, the possibility of taking an active part in the political life of the country. Such a program, while it would frighten nobody by a "red specter" which is far off as yet, would evoke sympathy for our revolutionary party from everybody who does not belong to the systematic enemies of democracy; and, furthermore, it could be indorsed as well by socialists as by very many representatives of our liberalism . . . . In this case the interests of the liberals would make them combine with the socialists in a common action against the government. . . . At the same time, those liberals who are less timid and more judicious would cease to regard revolutionaries as unpractical youths who devise utopias. This . . . view would yield to another, and society in general would not only admire their heroism, but also have regard to their political maturity.

These words reveal a conciliatory spirit quite uncommon in the later writings of Mr. Plehanov, but very characteristic of the general state of opinion after the collapse of 1881 and during the following decade of political stagnation. "Allies of today and enemies of tomorrow"—the liberals were now looked upon

more as friends than as enemies, since "tomorrow" appeared likely not to come immediately. Some of the socialists even were ready to admit that the very collapse of the revolutionary activity and the complete failure of the terroristic struggle of 1879-81 might have been avoided had the revolutionaries been able to secure — not mere sympathy, which they had possessed — but the active help of the educated classes of "society."

The "alliance" with that "society" was now planned on an enlarged scale. For this purpose the socialists had to emphasize the fact that they were no longer indifferent to the political form of government; that they appreciated political freedom as well as the men of "society;" and that a "constitution" was their first and foremost aim. All contemporary writings of revolutionary socialists bear witness to this disposition. That was the time when Stepnyak was trying to lay stress upon the political and constitutional side of the revolutionary movement,<sup>31</sup> and when another populist, Mr. Debagoree-Mokreyavich, accused his colleagues of having neglected the "political idea" in their program. The new organ of the socialist revolutionaries, the *Self-Government* (1887), had printed the letters of different — and discordant — revolutionary leaders admitting that they considered political freedom the chief and the next aim for the Russian movement. Another revolutionary organ, *Free Russia*, went farther and proclaimed, in 1889, that "political freedom" was not only a temporary aim, but "a boon in itself;" that "other than political aims cannot now exist in Russia;"

<sup>31</sup> see pp. 320 ff.

and that "it was high time to cease from classifying people as 'liberals' and 'revolutionaries.'" The editors were ready to welcome the introduction of the *Zemsky Sobor*, even were it formed out of the representatives of the Zemstvos, instead of those of the people.

But this plan was too much for a socialist, and immediately a reaction set in. This reaction, however, very characteristically began by an attempt at conciliation among the socialists themselves, since it was impossible between the socialists and the liberals. In June, 1889, the first and only issue of a new revolutionary organ appeared in Geneva, under the significant title of *Socialist*. Leaders of both factions of Russian socialism—the socialistic revolutionaries of the passing two decades and the socialistic democrats of the coming decades—tried to unite on this common ground, in order to oppose the too peaceful disposition of *Free Russia* toward the liberals. The names of Lavrov, Tarasov (pseudonym), and Serebryakov were to be seen side by side with those of Plehanov and Axelrod. They all agreed that the socialistic character of the movement was to be retained, without abandoning its nearest political aims. They likewise agreed that the political struggle was to be carried on by the working classes themselves; and the help of the liberal "constitutionalists" was to be made even more effective by keeping it distinct from the socialistic movement proper. Concerning socialism itself the editorial tried to formulate a policy which might conciliate both socialistic factions, but which was, as a matter of fact, a surrender of the earlier views of the populists:

Considering the social economy of Russia, radical changes are in progress in the very foundations of Russian life. Capitalist production gains more and more ground, destroying domestic economy and pushing it along the line of money exchange. Production in factories is ever on the increase. In domestic industries the so-called "domestic system of capitalistic production" is observed to prevail. The landed property reveals an undoubted tendency toward concentration. The agricultural population is losing its homogeneous composition, and is differentiating into social strata of varying economic strength. In consequence of the dissolution of the landed community, an agricultural proletariat is being born; and, driven by pressing needs, the peasants swell the ranks of the proletariat in the cities. All this persuades us that Russia has entered upon the same course of social-economic development which western Europe too has traversed. The ever-increasing influence of international commerce forces us to borrow from the more advanced countries such means and forms of production as have been reached elsewhere only through a slow and gradual evolution.<sup>32</sup> This connection of our economy with that of the world makes any prediction as to the possible limit of development for our capitalism even in the remote future quite impossible.<sup>33</sup> We can only say that when the hour shall have struck for the abolition of capitalistic property in western Europe, and the "expropriation of the expropriators" shall have begun, it will be necessary for our production also to be reorganized in accordance with socialistic principles.

Meanwhile, "the common aim of the Russian revolutionary socialists is the same as that of the socialists of all countries: " socialization of the means of production

<sup>32</sup> This statement makes allowance for the populist view — the possibility of a briefer evolutionary period for Russia; *i. e.*, a certain originality in the Russian mode of development.

<sup>33</sup> This is another compromise between populism and social democracy, both of which, knowing surely what would be the future of capitalism in Russia, held quite opposite views as to that future.



as an aim, social revolution by the people as a means, and the socialistic labor party as a necessary weapon. But the necessary condition for forming a labor party — namely, a “democratic constitution” — is lacking in Russia, and it must first be won. The “actual force” for this struggle is in Russia, again, the same as abroad — the proletariat. But, since at present the *rural* part of the country is not easily accessible to propaganda — owing to a comparatively low degree of culture, as well as to dispersion and isolation from the intellectual, political, and industrial centers — our chief attention must be given to the proletariat in the cities — to the workingmen in the industries. In their midst revolutionary circles have to be started, which shall form the nucleus of a future labor party, and, “united to socialistic circles of the intellectuals,” shall form what we call “the socialistic-revolutionary party.” In these last two phrases the new point of view of the future “socialistic democrats” is being reached without entirely abandoning the former point of view of the populists.

Such was the state of feeling and doctrine in the socialistic camp when, some few years later, the new period of struggle began. Any attempts at reconciliation were at once forgotten. Both factions of Russian socialism reappeared, each with its characteristic doctrines and methods of action, and fighting and competing with each other more bitterly than ever before. But these quarrels were by no means a mere repetition of the old ones. We shall see how new dissensions were brought about by new and important practical

issues; and how a new step forward was taken by Russian *socialism*, though its stage of political education is still far from complete.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>34</sup> See chap. vii, pp. 481 ff.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE CRISIS AND THE URGENCY OF REFORM

WE now know what the social forces are, and the political schemes and theories, that condition the coming reform in Russia. Some of these social forces — namely, those of the higher social strata — we have seen to be too weak to force reforms upon the government through their social influence. The other forces — namely, those inherent in the lower social strata — we have found to be as yet too little organized. Therefore, should any reform commend itself by virtue of its intrinsic usefulness and urgency, there would be imminent danger of its being indefinitely postponed — as has actually been the case up to the present time. The chances for the immediate realization of reform being too small, it was only natural for us to find the very schemes for reform unsuited for such immediate realization, either because they were not definite enough for practical purposes — which was generally the case with the liberal programs — or because they were too definite; *i. e.*, abstract and extreme. Of course, this would be changed at once, if some impelling force could be found to bring the lethargic social elements and the torpid political schemes into action. It now remains for us to investigate whether some such force really exists; and, if it does, to weigh its possible consequences.

There are two chief agencies which will make political action effective — the growth of material want and the growth of political disaffection; and these will

render reform unavoidable. Material want, growing more and more acute, finally takes the shape of a general crisis—agricultural, industrial, and financial. Political disaffection, becoming permanent, forms an atmosphere of social unrest which finds expression in individual or combined violent action. A political condition which has not only proved to be powerless against the crisis and the social unrest, but which has even notoriously contributed to the former and fostered the latter, has by this shown itself to be incompatible with the gratification of the most elementary social needs. This order of things is thenceforth doomed. And it writes its own sentence when, in the very midst of a crisis and a state of social unrest, it is driven, by no one's fault but its own, into an unsuccessful war.

These agencies, not unmentioned in our previous exposition, must now be studied more closely. What is the Russian crisis? And what is the Russian social unrest? An attempt to elucidate these questions is not an act of indiscretion toward my countrymen. The crisis is now being chirped about even by the sparrows on the roofs, and is being studied by government committees and discussed in hundreds of publications. The social unrest cannot be too strongly emphasized before an audience that enjoys the privilege of being well informed by a free press, and of thus knowing much more about it than many an average citizen of my own country can ever hope to know. Unhappily, it is not from knowing too much, but from knowing too little, that we suffer in Russia; and the danger is not for those who know that a position is untenable, but for those who hesitate to surrender an untenable position in time to prevent their own destruction.

# The Changes in Peasant Prosperity in the Period 1861-1900



Deterioration

Amelioration

The average change

In the slight degree

Greater

Greater

The greatest

The greatest



We begin, then, with the agricultural crisis, which lies at the bottom of all other crises in a country such as Russia. Rapid as has been of late the development of Russian industry, Russia still remains an essentially agricultural country. About 80 per cent. of her inhabitants are peasants and support themselves by husbandry. Nearly the same figure expresses the share of the rural products (grain, cattle, poultry) in Russia's export trade. Any important change in this export may seriously affect the balance of trade, and thus strengthen or ruin the country's finances. The large industries depend chiefly on the village customers, and bad or good crops bring with them prosperity or stagnation to manufacture. Taxation, *crédit*, marriages and increase of population, and what not, depend on the state of agriculture.

Now, everybody in Russia knows that the state of agriculture is extremely unsatisfactory. The map, which gives a general idea of it, summarizes a long and voluminous investigation of that subject, just published by the government. It represents the changes in the prosperity of the peasants during the forty years (1861-1900) which have elapsed since their emancipation. The neutral (yellow) tone represents the local change which coincides with the average change for the whole of Russia. On each side of that neutral tint, three bright (red) and three dark (blue) colors, progressively deepening, represent the three increasing degrees of amelioration or deterioration in one or another particular province of Russia. Let us first observe that even the average figures for the whole of Russia often testify to a state of decay. Thus: (1)

The size of the landholdings allotted by the commune to each member has shrunk, in comparison with 1860 (the figure for the latter year being taken for 100), to 54.2 per cent. (2) The crops of grain and potatoes have since 1861 diminished to 94.4 per cent. (3) The number of cattle on a unit of arable land has since 1870 diminished to 90.7 per cent. (4) The consumption of alcohol has since 1870 diminished to 67.7 per cent. (5) Arrears of taxes, which formed 22 per cent. of the yearly payments in 1871-80, have increased to 117 per cent.; or, taking the first figure for 100, to 532 per cent. (6) In 1886-90 the average emigration was 178 to every 10,000 of the natural growth of population; in 1896-1900, 972; or, taking the first figure for 100, an increase of 546 per cent.


Let it be remembered that these figures represent the average changes for the whole of Russia, coinciding with those marked on the map in the yellow tint. Much more ominous ones meet us when we examine conditions in the provinces colored blue, as shown in the following table:

	Maximum	Minimum
1. Allotments diminished from 100 to.....	51.3%	35.6%
2. Crops diminished to.....	88.2	62.3
3. The number of cattle diminished to.....	83.3	50.8
4. The consumption of alcohol diminished to....	63.2	37.5
5. Arrears of taxes increased from 22 per cent. to 172-444 per cent., or from 100 to.....	782.0	2,015.0
6. Emigration increased from 17.8 per cent. to 126.1-360.1 per cent., or from 100 to.....	708.0	2,023.0

Besides these conditions, common to all Russia, two others may be mentioned which are particularly unfavorable in these decaying regions, while the aver-



# The Present State of Peasant Prosperity (1900) Compared with the Average State for the Whole of Russia



Lower than the Average Higher than the Average

Coinciding with the average for Eur. Russia

Slightly

In a greater degree

Greatest



age for the whole country is rather favorable, or not positively unfavorable :

	Maximum	Minimum
7. Agricultural wages (average increase, 108.3 per cent.) decreased since 1871.....	100%	64.3%
8. Inner migrations — permissions for temporary change of residence — in order to find employment (average increase, 5.5 times since 1861) increased .....	8 times	23.9 times

All these figures refer only to the agricultural population — the peasants of the Russian villages. But why, one may ask, should particularly the agriculturist of southeastern Russia be suffering from this deterioration, while the provinces of the other half of Russia shine in bright colors, testifying to their comparative prosperity? In reply to this question I must first point out that the prosperity of the northern peasant is only comparative; *i. e.*, his condition has not grown much worse — or has grown a little better — than it had been in the beginning of the period to which the map refers. But already by that time (1861) it was not at all satisfactory. On the map showing *absolute* degree of welfare in 1900 will be noticed another distribution of colors: the northwest of Russia is not so bright, and the southeast is not so dark — with the exception of the black spot in the south-central part — as on the former map. This means that the northwestern peasant, in spite of a general amelioration of his condition in the last forty years, is yet not well off; whereas the southeastern peasant, in spite of the general deterioration of his state, still possesses some resources for living; and the peasant of the south-central portion bears the full

weight of the crisis, as in his case the lowest level of present well-being is combined with the highest degree of deterioration during the last forty years. The explanation of all these differences must be sought in the fact that the Russian crisis, is first and foremost an *agricultural* one. The northwestern peasant knows how to make both ends meet, because he has long been accustomed not to rely upon his agricultural work alone. The southeastern peasant, on the other hand, lives exclusively on the products of the soil; but in his case agriculture gives some profit, because the natural productivity of the soil is not yet exhausted; while the peasant of the south-central regions, still depending on the produce of agriculture alone, lives from hand to mouth, because his soil is already exhausted.

We shall still better understand the deeper reason for the differences just stated, if we remember that they nearly coincide with the differences arising in the process of the settlement of Russia.<sup>1</sup> Northwestern Russia is the region of the most ancient colonization; the south-central districts were settled later (after the middle of the sixteenth century); and the southeastern part still later (in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries). As a result, in the northwestern portion the agricultural stage of economic development has long since passed, giving place to the industrial stage; while in the south-central territory it is only now passing away, and in the southeastern part it has not yet passed. The richer any of the three parts is in natural resources, the poorer it is in human industry, and *vice versa*; and, of course, the situation is most acute in the intermediate

<sup>1</sup> See chap. i.

strip of land, where the natural resources have been exhausted, while industry has not yet had time to develop.

The situation was rendered particularly acute by the increased rapidity of this transition from the agricultural to the industrial stage. The causes of this increased rapidity of transition from the so-called "domestic economy," or "natural," stage to that of "exchange economy" in Russia are many, and they are pretty complicated. The most important causes are the demands of the rapidly growing state, and the situation of Russia among the economically more developed nations with which she has had to compete in the international market.

Briefly stated, the agrarian crisis in Russia is the necessary consequence of two agents: the elementary state of public economy, and the increased strain exerted on it by the demand of the state and by the changed conditions of life. As a result, private expenditures have greatly increased, while private incomes have remained the same as before, or have even diminished, owing to the exhaustion of the natural resources, the increase of population, the condition of the foreign market, etc. Hence the balance between revenue and expense has been quite disturbed. This is the crisis reduced to its simplest terms. Let us proceed to a more detailed explanation.

Prior to the emancipation of the peasants, forty years ago, economic life in Russia still preserved its mediæval character. It was based on home production for home consumption—at least so far as peasant life was concerned. The outlay for food, lodging,

clothing, fuel, and light—in short, for all the chief items of the family budget—was practically naught. A man paid nothing for his own hovel; he fed on the products of his own field and garden; he was amply supplied with homespun clothing made of the wool of his own sheep and of the fiber of his own flax; he did not spare the wood to keep hot the old-fashioned, enormous oven which filled a quarter of the house, and which during the long winter months turned it into a bathhouse; nor did he spare his eyes, for he lit the interior of the hut with thin chips constantly renewed in a stand of prehistoric shape, during the long winter evenings while the women spun threads on their distaffs and spindles. Now, however, all this has changed. Wooden chips have given way to a kerosene “smoker;” homespun linen has been superseded by calicoes, while woolen stuffs have disappeared without a substitute; fuel has become very scarce and expensive. Food—which consists of vegetable products alone—is insufficiently supplied; too often it has to be bought by the grain-producers themselves; in fact, so often that the question has seriously been raised, and has been answered in the affirmative by a body of learned economists, whether it is not better for the Russian producers to have low grain prices.

Why have the conditions of life thus changed? In Russia you may sometimes hear the explanation, on the part of the former landlords, that it is because the Russian peasant has become lazy; that he is now a spendthrift, since nobody is there to take care of him. This is adduced as a reason why the peasant prefers the factory products to those of his own making. The fact

is that the peasant now is too poor to utilize his and his family's work for himself; and, at the same time, he has no more raw material for his home industry. He can no longer have his clothes prepared by the women of his own family, because he has no more wool or linen to spare. His new expenses for the factory calico are certainly not inspired by any taste for fancy articles, but by mere necessity; and his purchases are generally cheap and of inferior quality. He can hardly be accused of lavishness on the ground that he has to buy some food in the market, since the fact is that on an average his yearly consumption is still below the necessary minimum. He gets only about twenty-three to twenty-six Russian *poods*<sup>2</sup> of grain, and sometimes even as little as fifteen, while the soldiers are entitled to not less than twenty-nine *poods*. Moreover, the Russian peasant does not eat wheat, which he produces for sale only, but rye or, more frequently, potatoes. While the production of grain in general is now only 88 per cent. of what it was forty years ago, the potato crop is more than three times as large. Thus, his buying of grain in the market only shows that the Russian peasant is obliged to sell the better sorts to cover other necessary expenses; or that he is compelled to sell at one time in order to buy at another (and this at a loss, as we shall soon see); or that upon his holdings he is unable to produce even the necessary minimum of food. To be sure, he will not be found buying meat, because on the average he eats meat only four times a year. If he still finds money to buy alcohol—the famous *vodka*—it is not because he is a drunkard, but because *vodka* is con-

<sup>2</sup> A *pood* is thirty-six English pounds.

sidered by the Russian to be as necessary for social entertainment as soda and whisky in the American clubs. And yet the consumption of alcohol is lower in Russia than in any other civilized country, and, as we have seen, is still decreasing.

Thus, such purchases in the market as we have enumerated are absolutely compulsory. The increase in the peasant's cash expenditure for food, clothing, light, etc., does not at all signify any rise in his standard of life or any enhancement of his material well-being; on the contrary, it is a symptom of the deterioration of his condition. This will become still more evident upon a closer examination of that most important item of the peasant's expenditure, the one which conditions all others; namely, his payment of taxes.

If the Russian peasant has no time to work for himself; if he is fatally underfed and underclothed; if he needs money badly, it is, first and foremost, because he is compelled to perform his functions as a taxpayer. He does his best to pay his taxes; and if, in spite of all his exertions, he accumulates arrears upon arrears, it is not because he will not, but because he cannot, pay. In the decade 1883-92, while the population increased 16 per cent., taxation increased 29 per cent.; *i. e.*, nearly twice as much; and in the following decade, 1893-1902, while the growth of the exhausted population still further fell off, the increase being only 13 per cent., taxation took an unheard-of upward leap, showing an increase of 49 per cent., or nearly four times as much. No wonder then that, while in 1871-80 every *dessyatin* (2.70 acres) of the land owned by the peasant owed to



the state 19 cents in arrears, in 1881-90 this debt had increased to 24 cents, and in 1891-1900 to 54 cents. We must add that ordinarily the authorities collect the taxes by compulsory sales before allowing the arrears to accumulate. Thus the peasantry is reduced to a state of chronic insolvency, and finally grows quite apathetic. As a writer says:

Any further diminution of the property of the peasants in the middle provinces would hardly seem possible, because nothing is left that can be sold [by the authorities, to pay the arrears]. Thus the peasants' contribution to the exchequer has decreased, not by law, but by the force of circumstances. The peasants now pay only what they can, not what they ought to; for the whole amount of taxes can in no way be collected. The worst of it is that, being insolvent, the peasants are anxious not to save anything that may be sold for taxes. This hopeless state of poverty, unavoidable and unalterable, takes away every wish to save or to raise the standard of life, even if a possibility presented itself. The practical sense of the peasants permits them to improve nothing but the buildings, because these, whether they are good or poor, cannot be sold for arrears. And so the peasants do not strive to earn money for any other purpose of private economy, and if they acquire some, they very sensibly prefer to squander it rather than to hand it over to the collector.

This is by no means an exaggerated view of the situation. The words quoted are the testimony of an agrarian and an old-style landlord, Mr. Bekhtayev — a man who thoroughly knows the Russian village, and who is determined to tell the truth, which can no longer be concealed. Below we cite another opinion, taken from the official minutes of a committee appointed by the Tsar to inquire into the real state of things, and presided over by the present minister of finance, Mr. Kokovtsev. At one of its meetings (October, 1903),

the following statement was made by one of the foremost authorities on that subject, Mr. Schwanebach:

As a result of the overtaxation of the last decade, from the nine central and eastern governments of Russia the exchequer received only 407 million rubles, instead of the full amount of 450 millions due. Thus the arrears made up more than 15 per cent. of the assessed sum. It is evident that the population was actually unable to pay more than it really did. In fact, they did not even pay this sum, because at the very time the government was obliged to spend about 203 millions for feeding the same population. Thus the exchequer was able to keep only half of what was paid, and its real loss was 44 per cent. of the amount assessed. The overcharge in taxation is evidently aimless, and it would be better to leave the money with the population.

Things having come to such a pass, the government was obliged to intervene and to abolish such part of the taxation as it was powerless to collect. The unsatisfactory state of rural economy was acknowledged as early as 1873, by a government commission. Ten years later, at the initiative of a liberal minister of finance, Mr. Bunge, an attempt was made to alleviate the burden of direct taxation. First of all, the heavy redemption tax (for land bought from the landlords by the peasants, with the pecuniary help of the state) was somewhat reduced, the northern half of Russia profiting most by the reform. Then the antiquated capita-tion tax, introduced by Peter the Great, was abolished. The general decrease of the direct taxation from 1882 to 1885, caused by these reforms of Mr. Bunge, was about 50 millions, or from 150 to 100 millions. Thus, at present the amount of direct taxes forms only two-thirds of what it was before Mr. Bunge's reform. But under Mr. Bunge's successor, Mr. Veeshnegradskee,

the policy of the government was abruptly reversed. To meet the deficit in the budget, a large increase in indirect taxation was resorted to, which took back from the peasantry more than had just been granted them. The excises and customs paid into the treasury (1885-95) a valuable yearly addition of 309.8 millions; *i. e.*, six times as much as had been taken from it by Mr. Bunge's reform. The successor of Mr. Veeshnegradskée, Mr. Witte, went still farther. He not only retained and enlarged the system of indirect taxes, which he found to be paid "voluntarily" and "fairly to correspond to the paying powers" of the population, but he made it his leading maxim "not only to satisfy the current demands of the state out of the yearly income, but to collect a certain free surplus." Mr. Witte indeed succeeded in collecting as "free surplus" more than one billion rubles in eight years (1893-1900),<sup>3</sup> which he brilliantly spent in the protection of the large industries and the introduction of the gold standard, while at the same time he was obliged to feed the starv-

<sup>3</sup> During the period of 1895-1900 the yearly surplus of the "ordinary" receipts over "ordinary" expenditures was 188.5 millions a year, while for the seven antecedent years, 1888-94, it was only 83.7 millions, and in 1881-87 there had been a yearly deficit of 24.5 millions. These surpluses of 1895-1900 were swallowed up by "extraordinary" expenses, which for the six years 1895-1900 amounted to a yearly sum of 221.2 millions over and above the "extraordinary" revenues, while in 1888-94 they were only 59.8 millions, and in 1881-88 (the period of the ministry of Mr. Bunge) there remained an annual balance of 25.7 millions. Thus, by his ingenious device of secreting "free sums" from the regular budget, Mr. Witte formed an "extraordinary" budget of his own, much more pliant to his personal policy than would have been the "ordinary" budget duly distributed among the chief central offices of the state. What this personal policy was will be shown later.

ing rural population and to deal with the enormously increasing arrears. For the first purpose 275 millions have been spent by the treasury, and 314 millions more were lost through the remission of unpaid arrears. The population, though unable to pay direct taxes, still contributed to the treasury by buying liquors, tea, sugar, matches, kerosene, and the products of the protected industries: iron, cotton manufactures, etc. The real, the financial, crisis was to begin only when that buying power was exhausted and the Russian peasants had to curtail their expenses. Unhappily, this is now the case.

We have seen that the consumption of alcohol has considerably decreased. This cannot be explained by any spread of temperance, as there are no teetotalers in Russia, and the temperance societies are not permitted to interfere with this revenue. The government made some fruitless attempts at increasing the rate of excise, and thus gaining in higher price what it was unable to gain by increased sales. As the consumption was still continuously diminishing, the government at last resolved to take the sale of intoxicants into its own hands; *i. e.*, to introduce a state monopoly, in order to save the revenue.

The consumption of sugar is slowly increasing (from 8 pounds per capita in 1890 to 13 pounds in 1901), but it is yet far behind that of other civilized countries (in Germany and in France, 27 pounds; in the United States, 69; in England, 79). However, the increase in consumption cannot keep pace with the protected production of sugar. The surplus, therefore, is permitted to be exported—at a lower price, of

course, than that commanded in the interior market. But this loss is made good by the premium paid to the exporter by the government. Thus a Russian customer pays \$1.34 for the same quantity of sugar that is exported at the price of 65 cents — just one-half. There is a current saying in Russia, that English pigs enjoy the privilege which is refused the Russian peasant; namely, that of being fed on Russian sugar. There is the same difference in price, to the detriment of the Russian customer, in the case of tea, iron, and a dozen other articles of prime necessity.

All of the foregoing leads to one unavoidable conclusion: that the necessity of buying and spending has greatly increased, while at the same time the prices of products and the rates of taxes have likewise risen enormously. Thus a large portion of the peasant's expenses has to be met with money. On the other hand, we know that he is short of money and cannot meet this increased demand. But we cannot realize how great his distress is until we inquire into the sources of his income, as we have already done in the case of his expenditures.

The chief, if not the only, product which can be raised and sold is grain; and thus we return to the condition of Russian agriculture. We shall soon see that, while the expenditure has increased, this basis of the peasant's income has materially weakened. The only question is as to what extent agriculture and the sale of grain constitute the sole basis of the peasant's budget. And this question, as we have already seen, is differently answered in the case of northern and southern Russia.

In the northern half of Russia the peasant long ago learned how to derive from additional sources what his unfruitful soil refused to yield him. As early as the eighteenth century, and even earlier, he began to find subsidiary employment in transportation, in the building and home industries, or in petty trade. Thus, before the emancipation, a Russian peasant from the middle Volga out of every dollar earned did not receive more than 12.37 cents from husbandry. For the remaining 87.63 cents he had to depend on subsidiary industries. That is why, after the liberation, he did not find himself entirely lost under the new conditions of life, but, in spite of the enormously increased demand for money, still found means to cover his expenses.

With the peasant of the southern half of Russia it turned out quite differently. He did not know so well how to earn money and relied entirely on tilling the land, which was much more fertile here, in the "black-soil" region, than in the northern country of clay and sand. His landlord, even in olden times, did not permit him to go to town or abroad in search of employment. As a rule, he kept him upon the manor, not even giving him any allotment for private tilling, as was the general practice in northern Russia. Thus the peasant was obliged to pay his lord in kind, by manual labor, much more than he might have had to pay in specie.

Now, when the hour struck for liberation, the northern landlord was ready to sell to his peasant as much of his unproductive soil as the latter might desire, provided that the peasant redeemed himself by paying for his holding more than the soil was worth. At the

same time, the southern landlord withheld from his field laborers as much blacksoil land as he could, doling out to him as small a lot as possible, for which, however, the peasant had to pay a very high price. Thus poorly equipped, the southern peasant went out to meet the new era. The demands on him were the same as on his northern brother. He had to get money—as much as he could—since there was no landlord to pay his taxes. But, unlike his northern brother, he had nothing to sell besides his grain. And the conditions for producing and selling grain had grown decidedly worse.

In the first place, the per capita area on which grain may be sown had greatly diminished throughout Russia. The average peasant allotment in 1860 was 6.21 acres, while forty years later, owing to the increase of population, it was only 3.51 acres. Yet even this amount would not have been entirely insufficient, if an intensive system of agriculture could have been resorted to. But with the three-field system in use—one-third of the arable land always lying fallow, while the other two-thirds are badly tilled and worse manured—the productivity of this small lot is not, on the average, sufficient to yield enough food for the laborer and his horse. The average crop is 16.6 *poods* of grain per inhabitant, while not less than 20 *poods* are necessary to feed him; and the average yield of oats is 23.6 *poods* per horse, while not less than 40 *poods* are needed. The returns are thus 17 and 41 per cent., respectively, less than they should be in order that men and animals may not be underfed, let alone the possibility of sale and export. At the same time, on this small lot, under

the system of tillage in vogue, the working power of man and horse cannot be used to its full extent. Every laborer can till about 39 acres, yet he actually does till only 8—*i. e.*, nearly five times less; and thus 79 per cent. of his working capacity remains unemployed upon his plot of land. A horse can till 10–11 acres; yet its labor is generally employed on an area one-third of that.

The insufficiency of food is thus in a strange way associated with an abundance of working power. To find additional food and to spend additional work in producing it, two methods are possible: either to increase the productivity of the given plot, or to increase the plot itself. But the productivity of the soil cannot be increased without new investment of capital, if even we admit, what many writers do not grant, that such increase is possible at all on lands in communal ownership and in precarious possession of the single cultivator. Now the peasant in distress does not possess any capital, and rural credit for improving land does not exist in Russia. The other, and, under existing conditions, the only possible, method, is to buy or rent additional plots of land. This has always been the most ardent desire of the peasants, and a real struggle for buying or renting land has been going on during the whole period under consideration. Owing to the large number of estates of nobles offered for sale,<sup>4</sup> and also to the material help of the Peasants' Bank (since 1883), the agriculturists have succeeded in increasing the property of the peasant communes since 1875 by 10 per cent. But even though we add such land as has been purchased by individual peasants, independently

<sup>4</sup> See p. 240.



of the communal allotments, which would increase the amount by another 13 per cent., this general increase of 23 per cent. does not prove equal to the increase of the peasant population during the same period, which was 48 per cent., or more than double. As a result, the holdings have constantly decreased,<sup>5</sup> and it became necessary to rent neighboring land. This necessity has been so great, and opportunities for renting land have been so comparatively few, that rent has risen enormously. Contrary to the laws of classical economy, the rent has not only reached the amount of the "unearned increment," but has far exceeded it, swallowing up the profits and, very often, the very wages of the tenants. Instances are numerous where tenants pay as rent one, three, or even five dollars more per *dessyatin* than the land would yield as net profit, if tilled by hired labor.<sup>6</sup> Such exorbitant rent may be compared to what is known to have been the case in Ireland before the great famine of 1846-47, when the competition among the tenants "reminded one of a struggle for food in a besieged city or on a ship in open sea." The same kind of competition is going on among the Russian peasants,

<sup>5</sup> See pp. 436 f.

<sup>6</sup> For instance, in all but two of the districts in the province of Nishnee-Novgorod the rent is higher than the net profit would be, sometimes being one and a half to three times as high; *e. g.*, rent \$1.43 and net profit only \$0.47 from each *dessyatin* (district of Gorbatov); \$1.76 and \$1.01 (Ardatov); \$2.97 and \$2.14 (Sergach); \$1.45 and \$0.86 (Nishnee-Novgorod); and so on. In the province of Orel the same *dessyatin* that would yield \$4.38, if tilled by hired labor, may be rented by indigent peasants for \$7.60. In the province of Voronash the difference in some districts is \$5.23 (net profit) to \$7.26 (rent), or \$8.01 to \$9.26. In the five districts of the province of Poltava the difference is sometimes \$3.72 to \$5.61.

owing to the absolute insufficiency of their plots for mere subsistence. Of course, no profits are looked for from such renting, the only aim of the peasants—and the only economic explanation of the possibility of such a rent—being to apply their own and their horses' gratuitous labor to produce some more grain for their sustenance. Otherwise this possibility of subsidiary work would be lost, and both man and horse must starve. No wonder that they count their work as nothing.

The acute character of this competition in the renting of land shows of itself that the chance for renting is slim, and that all the needs cannot be supplied from that source. The average proportion of leased land to the communal allotments is very small, not exceeding 17.4 per cent. for the whole of Russia. In the southern half, where the allotments are particularly small and the rent is particularly high, the want is especially felt.

What, now, remains for the peasant after the land for sale or for lease has been exhausted? The only thing left for him to do is to leave his home village and to look for other employment for that working power which he cannot utilize within his own neighborhood. And here again the great difference between the south and the north of Russia manifests itself. Men go away from both; but they go in different numbers, for different purposes, and with different results. In 1900, 14.2 million peasants of both sexes left their villages in search of employment, or 32 per cent. of the whole adult population. This proportion rises to more than 50 per cent.—more than half of the whole laboring

population — in the old industrial regions of the north; while it descends to less than 25 per cent. — one-fourth — in the agricultural regions of modern settlement. We do not speak, remember, of emigrants, but of people who merely went away for a few weeks or months, and then returned with their earnings, thus supplying the lack of money in their families which had remained at home. The average amount brought home from their wanderings was about \$38 for every laborer who had left his home (there being, on an average, one such member in each family). But the share of the north and the south in this additional earning was different. On the whole, the work of the northern wandering laborer was better paid and better placed. The difference in the employment will be clear from the following table, where two typical provinces — one from the northern, the other from the southern half — are compared as to the vocations chosen by the wandering laborers:

Vocations	Province of Tver (north)	Province of Voronash (south)
Employed in factories, trades, or personal service.	57.6%	8.3%
Employed in handicrafts (as carpenters, shoemakers, smiths, fullers, etc.) . . . . .	34.5	16.1
Employed in agriculture and rural work . . . . .	7.9	75.8

From this it is seen that the order of frequency of the supplementary vocations of the peasants in the two types of provinces is reversed. While such occupations in the older portions of Russia prevailingly are factory work and the trades, in the younger provinces it is rural work that predominates. This difference brings

with it a difference in earnings, as factory work is the best paid. Those who are fortunate enough to secure such employment bring home on an average \$84, while but \$46 is brought back by such as can be employed at rural labor only.<sup>7</sup>

But it is not so much the smaller pay that makes agricultural labor less profitable away from home, as it is the greater uncertainty of obtaining such work. The supply of wandering farm hands is not regulated by demand. Occasionally the demand may happen to be large, and then the wanderers are made welcome and are liberally paid. But again it may happen that there is no demand; in which case the laborers, who early in the spring may have left places where hands were greatly needed, run the risk of returning in the autumn as beggars. Mere rumors of good wages from provinces where crops happened to be good the year before may direct the current next year in increased numbers to the same places, where this time the returns may be zero. A round million of rural laborers from southern Russia every year incur the peril of being ruined by this blind play of chance.

From everything that has so far been said about the sources of income of the peasant it might be concluded that no grain is sold in the village, and that all money comes from outside work and wages. Such a conclusion would not quite correspond to the truth. It is, indeed, a fact that Russian peasants have nothing to

<sup>7</sup> The least profitable, of course, are the home industries, for the same reason that make renting land unprofitable; namely, that the work is done at home, and that only such leisure time is taken for it as cannot be put to other use; — and that thus it is not rewarded at its full value.

sell from their own farm products, which do not suffice for their own need. Yet it is also true that grain is sold, because the money brought home by the wandering hands is not sufficient to cover the necessary expenditures for rent and taxes. Great as is the value in use of this part of the peasant's budget, we must consider its value in exchange.<sup>8</sup> We must also consider the production of grain for sale for the further reason that the peasants are far from being the only producers. There are many private estates—such, for instance, as those belonging to the nobility and to private proprietors of the other classes—that rely entirely on selling grain. These are not troubled with an insufficiency of allotments nor with a surplus of human and horse power in need of employment. And yet they, too, are affected by the general crisis, thus bearing witness to other causes for the distress than those already described—those due to special conditions of the peasants' rural economy. Let us now inquire into such causes of the crisis as are common to all producers of grain to members of communes and to private proprietors alike.

The fact is that the production of grain for export is on the verge of becoming unprofitable in Russia, as it cannot stand foreign competition, first, because the productivity of the soil under the given conditions of tillage is too small, and, secondly, because the prices

<sup>8</sup> It must be borne in mind that only a very small part of the crops is sold abroad. In 1890-94 the amount of grain exported was only 15.1 per cent. of the average harvest. Of this amount, wheat constituted 34.3 per cent.; barley, 30; oats, 10.1; rye—the chief nourishment of the people and numerically predominating over the others—only 3 per cent.

of grain have fallen too low to cover the expense of production, and particularly the cost of transportation, which in Russia is very badly organized.

The average harvest returns in Russia are lower than those of other grain-producing countries. The following table shows the figures (in *poods* from one *dessyatin*) :

	Wheat	Rye	Oats
Russia .....	28.2	32.8	39.0
United States .....	60.3	42.0	63.1
Canada .....	62.3	62.0	97.7
Germany .....	77.0	56.4	73.9
Sweden .....	100.2	75.9	83.2

The price of exported grain (chiefly wheat) is steadily falling, as can be seen from the following figures :

	1881	1886	1894
Grain exported (in thousands of <i>poods</i> ) . . . . .	202,709	278,546	617,242
Money earned (in thousands of rubles) . . . . .	242,281	233,350	369,383
Average price per <i>pood</i> (in rubles) . . . . .	1.19	0.84	0.59

It would take too long to explain why these figures are what they are, and what should be done to change the unfavorable position of Russia in the international grain market. Let us only observe that of the two symptoms of inferiority just mentioned, the second—*i. e.*, the price of grain—is absolutely uncontrollable. The Russian producer cannot control the prices, because he cannot wait. He must sell at any price, there being no facilities for storage, not even for the landlord, let alone the peasant, who often is obliged to sell

at a very low figure in the autumn only to buy again at a higher price in the spring. The former symptom—the low productivity of the soil—of course, can be changed, but only in the long run, and by greatly increased governmental activity and private initiative. As a matter of fact, however, governmental activity is headed in the opposite direction—that of protecting industry, not agriculture; and private initiative is checked by the political system for the self-defense of autocracy.

The productivity of the land must be increased—this is the general cry in Russia. But when it comes to the question of how to do it, opinions differ widely. Some few people think that it is the private proprietors—the nobles—and not the peasants of the communes, that must be relieved first, as it is on their estates that new systems of tillage are tried, and as it is they who produce grain for export and not for their own consumption. The peasants will then of their own accord follow the example of the large owners. But even the Russian agrarians admit that the difficulty is widespread and is felt particularly by the peasantry. On the other hand, they must admit that, as far as they themselves are concerned, the crisis cannot be relieved by the easy means of borrowing government money at low interest, as they invariably have insisted upon doing in the past. The most stubborn among them are beginning to understand that this method of repairing the “great injustice” of having forced them to liberate their peasants, forty years ago, is not at all the right way out of the crisis. Even such writers as sym-

pathize with the agrarians (Mr. Goorko, for instance) are compelled to acknowledge that cheap state credit has only helped to consummate their ruin. The credit they now desire is for agronomic amelioration alone, subject to a strict control by the state. Another of these writers (Mr. Bekhtayev) points rather to the organization of the trade in grain by the state, by tariffs, elevators, cheaper transportation, trade conventions and facilities.

But all parties are agreed that these are far from being the best methods of dealing with the problem. When, about seven years ago, this question was raised by a private committee of agrarians, it immediately became clear that the crisis was universal, and that no measure would do which failed to take into consideration the condition of peasant agriculture. It is the purchasing power of the chief taxpayer that is to be raised—by raising his selling power; his only product is to be increased in quantity, if it is not to be raised in price. But this is not to be achieved without a complete overthrow of all his antiquated habits of tilling the land. Can this be accomplished without previously educating him? Can it be accomplished within the limits of his ancient form of owning land by communes? Can it be left to his own initiative, or must the state take the lead? What are the means for promoting the peasant's initiative? Is this initiative to be permitted entirely free play, or rather are the interests of the whole to be protected by special legislation against private encroachments? These are a few of the many questions which arise in connection with the idea of a radical change, and which are being eagerly



discussed. What is the position of the government in the face of these discussions?

For a better understanding of this question, we must pass to the consideration of another side of the crisis: the crisis in the industries which are more especially protected by the government, and which now follow agriculture in the general collapse.

We have seen that the protection of industries proved one of the most important causes of the agricultural crisis, since it considerably increased the prices of commodities without creating a corresponding increase in the purchasing power of the customers. So long as this purchasing power was thought to be practically unlimited, the Russian government was always on the side of protection, in order to secure for itself a favorable balance and large custom revenues. Of course, the theoretical argument—of “developing the productive forces” and “organizing production upon a national basis”—has never been wanting. As a result, many branches of industry have been fostered which were unable to exist—or to thrive—without artificial help from the state. Claims for the protection of manufactures have been very strongly supported by the influential circles, and protectionist legislation has gone on increasing since time immemorial. It began with the foundation of Russian factories by Peter the Great, and, with the two temporary interruptions of 1819 and 1857 (the “free trade” tariffs having been immediately repealed), it reached the present phase of enforced protection beginning with the “gold customs” of 1876 and culminating in the prohibitive tariff of 1891. The following figures are

officially given by Mr. Witte as indicating the growth of manufactures (in millions of rubles) :<sup>9</sup>

Industries	1877	1887	1892	1897
	Millions	Millions	Millions	Millions
Textiles .....	297.7	464.2	581.6	946.3
Food products .....	17.0	37.9	47.9	95.7
Animal products .....	67.7	79.6	72.6	132.0
Wooden products .....	16.8	25.7	33.3	102.9
Paper products .....	12.7	21.0	25.5	45.5
Chemical products .....	10.5	21.5	35.5	59.6
Ceramics .....	20.4	29.0	32.3	82.6
Metallic products .....	89.3	112.6	162.3	310.6
Other industries .....	8.6	10.4	19.5	41.0
Total .....	541.0	802.0	1,010.0	1,816.0

Or, to show the average yearly increase :

1878-87 .....	26.1
1888-92 .....	41.6
1893-97 .....	161.2

Thus it is under the administration of Mr. Witte that the development of Russian industry has reached its climax. The mighty leap to the last figure of 161 millions—four times as much as the average yearly increase of the preceding decade—could not have been performed by the efforts of the Russian capitalists alone. To achieve that, Mr. Witte had recourse to foreign capital. How much the share of foreign capitalists in Russian undertakings has increased of late may be seen from the following data, which were compiled by a Russian author (Mr. Ole) in a book destroyed by the Russian censorship :

#### YEARLY SUPPLY OF FOREIGN CAPITAL

	Rubles
1851-88 .....	1,561,000

<sup>9</sup> The figures (in millions of rubles) given by Mr. Witte for single branches of industries are as follows (see his report to the Tsar of 1900) :

	Rubles
1889-94 .....	5,306,000
1895 .....	21,070,000
1896 .....	52,490,000
1897 .....	39,726,000
1898 .....	97,770,000
1899 .....	93,391,000

In forty-four years (1851-94) taken together the supply of foreign capital (91,250,000) was not equal to the influx of each of the last two years (1903-4).

Some people may have cherished the hope that foreign capital would introduce with it the European régime of competition, thus lowering the prices of commodities for the benefit of the Russian customer, and by and by accustoming the Russian capitalist to be satisfied with smaller profits. But foreign capital was attracted to Russia by the opposite hope of profiting by the existing high rates, and it adapted itself admirably to the Russian conditions of production protected by prohibitive customs. The Russian customer, who was already paying a tariff on imported merchandise — nearly three times as much as he had to pay before the last era of protection began (about 13 per cent. *ad valorem* before 1876, and about 34 per cent. after the tariff of 1891 = about 170 millions in specie) — had also to pay all the dividends of the new enterprises. For instance, the cost of cotton manufactures amounted to about 123 million rubles yearly over and above what they would have cost without protection; that is, an increase of 28.5 per cent. In another branch of manufacture which particularly attracted foreign capital, the metal industry, the output was intended to cover the direct orders of the government. Here the divi-

dends were not less than 40 per cent. To support the new enterprises in that branch, government railways were built on a large scale. The population again had to pay — this time in the form of increased taxes. The minister of finance then argued that “one must not be hindered by a temporary strain on the paying power of the population, which would be amply rewarded by the respective accretion of means for the further increase and development of this very power.” The phrase may sound well in a handbook of political economy; unfortunately, it was used in a report to the Tsar, and it served to cover the fiasco of the whole system — which had become too evident, even to the naked eye.

Just then, at the close of the nineties, the “paying” and the “purchasing” power of the population proved to be so exhausted that the protected industries themselves began sorely to feel the consequences. The crisis had come; industry had to face (relative) overproduction. Even government orders for rails and rolling-stock could not be secured indefinitely. The railway mileage was doubled in ten years (from 28,800 versts in 1892 to 53,000 versts in 1902). The expense to the exchequer for building this network amounted to more than one billion (1,005 million rubles). The financial result was a corresponding increase in the Russian indebtedness and almost yearly deficits in the operation of new railways; the whole loss amounting in twenty years to 600 million rubles — or 30 millions a year — without counting the interest and amortization of the corresponding part of the public debt. The economic result, instead of an increase in the “paying power” of the ruined peasantry,

was that the railways brought to the markets cheaper grain from newly broken fields in the extreme eastern parts of European Russia, and thus served still further to deteriorate the condition of the producer in the central provinces by the additional hardship of home competition.

Under these conditions, the government found it difficult to support, on the former large scale, metallurgic enterprises started under its auspices. The comptroller-general, in his confidential report to the Tsar for the year 1902, stated that, besides facilitating the conditions of loan and discount to meet the crisis, the National Bank had been obliged to advance funds to support the metal industries, though by its statutes it was not permitted to do so. These advances were 41 million rubles in 1900, 75 million in 1901, and 100 million in 1902. Out of the sums advanced in 1901, 9 millions were already considered as lost to the bank, and more losses were feared. The comptroller-general's conclusion was that, "though the crisis was not at all without issue, it was doubtless the result of a too rapid and too artificial growth of industry, which had far surpassed the absorbing power of the interior market." To expand the interior market, and for this purpose to improve the condition of agriculture, was the comptroller's advice to the Tsar. And, indeed, the ministry of finance tried to sermonize its moneyed clientele, advising them to look for petty purchasers in the home market, and to abandon the hope of further aid from the treasury. Big orders were stopped. Of course, the capitalists who had invested their money in the metal industries became utterly dissatisfied.

They did not intend to cater to the retail trade, and petty purchasers were few—not because the peasants did not want iron, but because they were unable to pay for it, at least unable to pay two or three times the prices paid in England. Thus, without even attempting to organize production on the new basis of peasant demand, many foreign investors preferred to go out of business and transfer their money elsewhere. The general cry abroad now was: “There are no customers in Russia but the government.” This was the result of the government’s attempt to increase the “paying power” of the peasant by means of making him pay more for supporting the industries.

In countries enjoying a higher degree of industrial development the device would have been to look for foreign markets. But this is not possible for the Russian manufacturers, for the reasons noted above. Russian industry is conditioned by that régime of protection which brought it into existence. With its high cost of production, its still higher profits, and an inferior organization of the whole mechanism of exchange, it cannot bear competition, and thrives only behind “closed doors.” No commercial conquests have been possible for it—except some neighboring markets in central Asia, where Russian trade has been at home for two centuries.

The “foreign market” thus afforded no outlet for Russian industry in times of crisis. In the end the idea of mastering their home market must dawn upon the Russian manufacturers, since protection alone has proved insufficient to secure for them the domestic customer. Up to this moment the interests of agri-

culture and industry have been supposed to be antagonistic. Now that the purchasing power of the Russian customer has been exhausted, the mutual interdependence of the two has for the first time become clear. The question of expanding the home market by other means than a constant increase of the prices of commodities forces itself upon our attention. Can and will Russian capitalists solve this question themselves, or must they receive an additional impulse, such as might come from the loosening of the grip of protection? In 1899 Mr. Witte gave this optimistic answer:

Protectionism—as a means, not as an end in itself—can have only temporary importance, until the aim is reached for which it was intended. The natural death of protectionism will come when a sound national industry has been created and an effective competition has been originated within the realm. The logical consequence of protectionism is its self-annihilation.

There are, however, some people who doubt whether this optimism of the former minister of finance was well founded. His own financial policy certainly did not tend to pave the way for the result which he predicted. As a political philosopher he may have successfully foretold the development of competition and the self-annihilation of protectionism; but as minister of finance he did everything in his power to invigorate its decaying vitality—by protecting syndicates, paying premiums on exports, etc.; thus maintaining high prices in spite of overproduction, and eliminating that free play of competition which in his eloquent scheme was to act as a destroying force upon protectionism. It was Mr. Witte's merit, however, to bring the question of protectionism to an acute stage

by dint of the industrial as well as the agricultural crisis. Protectionism, indeed, must result in "self-annihilation," or enforced annihilation, in a measure at least, if the home market were to be won—in the interests of industry itself.

The financial policy of Mr. Witte was consistent—not with his eloquent schemes, but with his ministerial policy as protector of the great industries. The Russian Necker—Mr. Bunge—had inaugurated the era of deficits; the Russian Calonne had come to prove that Russia possessed credit—by constantly borrowing and enormously increasing the public debt; and also to prove that the Russian nation had money—by increasing taxation, and by letting the starving population pay a billion of "free surplus" into the treasury.

It now remains to consider the financial crisis in Russia. The agrarian crisis is already there; the industrial crisis, owing to protection, is less acute, but is nevertheless present. The financial crisis, happily, has not yet come, though all its elements are surely at hand. It will be fairer, however, to consider the financial policy of Russia, not from the point of view of its consequences, which may have been disastrous, but first from the point of view of its aims, which were intended to be beneficial. In America it is more fully realized than anywhere else that the currency question, more than any other, may be solved in a way which seems to some people beneficial, while others will find the same solution disastrous. This question has been a vital one to many generations of Russian financiers, and it was the merit of Mr. Witte to solve it by substituting the gold standard for the depreciated paper



currency. Thus public confidence was restored and the Russian standard of value made permanent. This is certainly a merit. But everything has its drawbacks; and the negative side of Mr. Witte's achievement was its result of throwing us—to use the terms of President Walker—from “irredeemable and fluctuating paper currency—that alcohol of commerce” into “the fast-tightening folds of the contracting money supply.” Thus one more element of confusion was added to the general—and particularly the agricultural—crisis.

In olden times Russia had a steadily expanding silver currency. The supply of money was constantly growing, owing to the invariably favorable balance of trade; and this increase of silver coin was felt the more since the original supply in former centuries had been insufficient. Thus the purchasing power of silver fell very rapidly. It is now from fifteen to eighteen times less than it was four hundred years ago, and from three to four times less than three hundred years ago. The prices of commodities rose accordingly. But since the time of Peter the Great silver has been only the legal, or nominal, standard. Credit money formed the actual currency, owing to the military expenses of the government, which could not be met without resorting to credit, while no credit abroad existed, and no contracting of a public debt was possible at that time. Thus in the period from Peter to Catherine II. copper money made up the currency, and silver disappeared. Then Catherine II. introduced national paper money (the “assignats”), which rapidly depreciated as new issues were resorted to, to meet the expenses of the wars with Turkey and—during the reign of Alex-

ander I. — with Napoleon. An attempt was made (in 1843) by a minister of Nicholas I. (Kankrin) to do away with this inconvertible paper money by redeeming it at its (depreciated) market value, three and a half times less than its face value in silver. But even at the price of this partial state bankruptcy, the government did not succeed in restoring the silver currency, as the new state notes (one for each three and a half of the former ones) were kept convertible only until the next (the Crimean) war; whereupon they again became a sort of forced state loan without interest and without any guarantee as to their redeemability at their face value. As a result, confidence was again lost, and, owing to unlimited issues, the new bank notes depreciated.

That such a currency was quite unworthy of a civilized country; that by its fluctuations it greatly hampered trade and commerce — particularly that with foreign countries; that it made the circulation of money an object of speculation, and thus brought Russian finance into dependence on foreign bankers and stock exchanges — all these objections to the paper currency were only too well justified and made its reform most desirable. What was elsewhere said by economists in defense of the principle of paper money — its elasticity, as far as the expansion and contraction of its volume are concerned; its convenience; its representative function as a medium of exchange, if honestly and wisely managed; its capacity for serving as a stepping-stone to a “scientific currency” — all these arguments could hardly be applied to the traditional Russian method of dealing with the paper currency.

But certain class interests were closely interwoven with the working of the old paper currency, and these were to suffer from the coming reform. They were the same as those represented by the People's Party in the United States when this party advocated bimetallism and the free coinage of silver.

In Russia, too, if the moneyed classes want an unvarying, theoretically superior standard, the producing classes want specie, first and foremost; they want money to be present and to be abundant, not to be theoretically reliable. If it is "cheap money," so much the better. Scarcity of money and falling prices on agricultural products—these we have seen to be the chief plagues of the Russian village, and of Russian country districts in general. They want more money—an expanding currency, likely to raise the prices. Coin is good; but paper is better, if only it may be had in abundance. That is why there has existed a small agrarian party ready to defend the old currency, unsatisfactory as it was from the point of view of theory, and from that of the manufacturers as well.

But the latter did not wait for a reform of the currency to come to protect their interests. They made the government—just as American industrialists did in 1862—protect them, particularly by the "gold customs" (1876), against the fluctuations of the paper currency. In Russia as in the United States this was the first step toward a gold currency. But the Russian industrialists did not need any further steps, as every facility for foreign trade and capital—which a gold currency was sure to bring with it—threatened them with increased importation and competition.

The gold duties on imports were also, as we have seen, the signal for an enormous advance in the industrial field, which reached its climax with the introduction of the prohibitive tariff of 1891. This latter marked the second step toward the introduction of the gold standard—the more important one, because its direct aim was to store up the gold reserve by securing a favorable balance of trade and a large customs revenue.

Then came the critical year of 1893—the year of the silver crisis and of the repeal of the Sherman Act of 1890. The fact that brought about the victory of the monometallists in the United States—namely, the decision of the Indian government to stop the free coinage of silver—also gave the signal for the first Russian measure of the same kind, made public a month later (July 28) by Minister Veeshnegradskee. Free coinage of silver was stopped in Russia by an executive order, which did not attract public attention, just as was the case in America with the surreptitious codifying order of 1870. The remaining steps leading to the introduction of the gold currency were also taken almost without opposition. Russia had no “Greenbackers,” no “Farmers’ Alliances,” no “People’s Party,” to defend the interests of the producers. Some few agrarian publicists, of course, now decided to abandon their advocacy of the paper currency and tried to recommend the “cheap money” in the guise of a silver currency. But they came too late (not until 1895), and were too much suspected of “landlordism,” to carry public opinion with them; and moreover, they found the public mind too ignorant on questions of

currency to side with them. The professional economists and professors of political economy were mostly on the side of gold, and were not to be deterred by low prices in agriculture, which they—in a collective work published by the ministry of finance—even tried to prove profitable. Thus the gold standard was definitely introduced in 1895.

While introducing it, the ministry of finance scarcely foresaw the many exertions and sacrifices required to keep the machinery of the new currency in perfect operation. It was not sufficient to hoard up an enormous mass of gold in the treasury. It proved necessary constantly to be on guard lest the country be drained of the much-coveted metal. Keeping up the gold reserve became thenceforth the chief object of financial solicitude; all other aims were made subservient to it; and the administration thus became slave to its own reform.

The task was by no means easy. With a favorable balance of foreign payments a gold reserve is easily kept up; but this condition has never existed in Russia. It is true that our balance of trade, owing to the prohibitive duties, is generally in our favor; *i. e.*, the exports exceed the imports. But even this surplus has become noticeably smaller during the last decade—just after the prohibitive tariff of 1891. It seems, indeed, that protection has already done what it could, and that no further increase of duties can diminish the demand for foreign merchandise. Thus, in the five years following the introduction of the new currency the average surplus of exports was no more than \$48,000,000. This could by no means cover the Russian

expenses abroad. Twice this amount of gold, or about \$93,000,000, is wanted merely to pay the interest upon foreign loans. And then the annual expenses of Russian tourists (whose number in the same period, 1895-1900, has increased from 112,000 to 195,000) reach \$30,000,000, as a minimum. Some \$10,000,000, at least, must be paid to the foreign investors. The expenses of the government abroad (for the Russian marine, for instance) cannot be less than \$8,000,000. These items—though certainly attenuated—raise the excess of Russian expenses abroad beyond the profits from foreign imports to the considerable sum of \$93,000,000 a year. To pay this balance out of the gold reserve of the treasury would be impossible without compromising the currency. The only sound means would be to increase the exports. But that would mean—protection for agriculture, which alone does the exporting. Any other remedies would be mere palliatives, or worse: they would be very much like wasting funds to pay interest—temporary stop-gaps inefficient in the long run.

The government first tried to attract foreign gold by inviting investments; and it was successful, as we have seen; but only for a short time, and only by offering exceptionally good terms and securing high dividends to the investors. That this meant increased taxation has already been pointed out. Increased taxation, however, had its limit. This limit was reached, when any further increase proved impossible. Even if taxation should have proved more efficient than it actually did, it would have been unable to procure gold; and it was gold that was wanted. The only means

available for getting gold was to contract foreign loans, and to sell Russian bonds and securities abroad. The government was obliged to resort to these means, if for no other reason than to clear the balance. But this was moving in a circle, since every new loan, by inflating the public debt and the interest to be paid on it—in gold—increased the balance to be cleared. The Russian public debt has already reached the unheard-of figure of more than three billions, with an interest of more than a hundred and twenty-five million dollars. Our budget in the ten years 1893–1903 has doubled (from \$500,000,000 to \$1,000,000,000). Taxation has doubled, too, with the result that, after having eaten up the net profit of the population, it is eating into the very core of its subsistence. The question has naturally arisen: Where is all this going to end?

Before the writer lie the minutes of a plenary session of the State Council, December 30, 1902, met to discuss the budget for 1903. The report does not say a word about the skeleton in the closet. Currency, clearing balance, foreign loans, financial crisis, industrial crisis, agricultural crisis—not a hint is given of these unpleasant things. It discusses solemnly the necessity of economy in every branch of the administration. It reminds the chiefs of the central bureaus that they must not increase their demands too rapidly; that the government, “which has not yet had time to rise to the proper level of the economic welfare,” is “powerless” to face such public needs as the “reorganization of the conditions of life of the peasant” or the “assistance of the agricultural industry.” It even dares to admit that the money spent for construct-

ing railways might have been used to better advantage. But there is one thing about which even these prudent state councilors think it useless to keep silence. And this is the plain and simple truth that the "paying power" of the population

has its limit, which it is impossible to transgress without imperiling the economic welfare of the country, on which not only the national finances, but also the internal force and the international importance of the state, are founded. . . . At the present moment direct and indirect taxation has reached the extreme limit of strain. A further burdening of the taxpayers would appear to be, not only an unproductive measure, but even hardly admissible under the existing economic conditions. The aim of a sensible financial policy must be to find means for gradually alleviating the burden of taxation; and, first of all, to reduce the rate of the direct taxes, particularly the redemption tax, with which the poorest and most numerous class of the population is burdened.

Evidently, these councilors are fully aware that a reform must be commenced at the bottom, not at the top, if it is to be a serious reform. The agricultural crisis is at the bottom of the other crises, and the diminution of the purchasing power of the peasant is at the bottom of the agricultural crisis. They know all that—but they talk palliatives. Is there anybody who can put the question adequately? As a matter of fact, there are as many as you please. Let me quote a writer, Mr. Goorko, not at all a radical—not even a liberal, as liberalism is understood in Russia. The following lines may serve as a summary of what has been said in the preceding:

We are facing three threatening conditions: first, periodical famines and chronic underfeeding of the whole peasant population in the central and eastern parts of the agricultural region;



secondly, manufacturing industries which are threatened with ruin for lack of a market for their products; thirdly, an annually increasing deficit in covering the international balance, to the amount of the payments due for our securities placed abroad—payments which can be covered only by new foreign loans.

The first symptom can be cured only by increasing the local earnings of the population, which again can be accomplished only by raising the productiveness of agriculture. The second possibility can be averted only by increasing the paying power of the population, which again can be achieved only by increasing the profitableness of the rural economy. The third problem can be solved only by increasing the value of our exports, which again is possible only by raising the productiveness of our estates.

This is entirely true, and we perfectly agree with the *ceterum censeo* of Mr. Goorko; namely, his central idea that the methods of Russian agriculture must be improved, and that without such improvement no lasting betterment in the condition of Russian finances and commerce is to be expected. The author, like so many others with him, is not deficient in schemes for hundreds of measures likely to improve the technic of the tillage of land, the transportation of products, the sale of grain without the middleman, the technical knowledge of agronomy, and so on. And yet there is something essentially wrong about their reasoning. For the technical improvements to be applied, there must be a man who would and could apply them. For agriculture to be ameliorated, there must be an agriculturist to enjoy his work of amelioration and to secure the profits of it for himself. For agricultural knowledge to be widely disseminated in the Russian village, the conditions for spreading any knowledge must first be created. And thus from the sphere of mere technical theorizings we are at once transferred into the only

sphere where practical solutions are sought: the sphere of general politics. Here we meet with views and schemes for solving the difficulties which are entirely different from those recommended by Mr. Goorko and his adherents.

Mr. Goorko advocates what we in Russia should call a conservative view. This view is predominant with our agrarians. Let us now see what is the position of Russian liberals and democrats on the same question.

Happily enough, the answer of Russian liberalism is given, not in the form of a private address, a newspaper article, or a special study, but in that of a nearly unanimous declaration by hundreds of local assemblies summoned in 1902 by the government itself to express their opinion on the burning question of the agricultural crisis. This was the inspiration of Mr. Witte, whose initiative was then intercepted and appropriated by Mr. Plehve, the late minister of the interior. Mr. Plehve substituted himself for Mr. Witte as president of the central commission which was to summarize the discussions of the local assemblies, and he did everything possible to curtail the activity of these assemblies, to threaten them, and thus to spoil their work. Nevertheless, the work was done. It is represented in a stately collection of fifty-eight volumes published by the ministry of finance. The assemblies that were authorized to deliberate were not the district Zemstvos; but they had very much in common with them. The presidents of the Zemstvo assemblies (the marshals of nobility who preside at the Zemstvo meetings *ex officio*, not by election) were entitled to compose these assem-

blies to their own liking; and many of them used their right to summon, not only all the representatives of their local Zemstvos, but also, in many cases, such elements as are not represented adequately in the Zemstvo assemblies; *i. e.*, the peasants and the "intellectuals." There were about eleven thousand members who thus deliberated in more than four hundred districts of Russia. Thus composed, the "district committees" answered the question concerning the needs of agriculture in a way which may be characterized by the motto which one member quoted from Montesquieu: "Les pays ne sont pas cultivés en raison de leur fertilité, mais en raison de leur liberté." They found that, "in order to be economically active and enterprising, the rural population must secure for itself certain rights, which would guarantee its work against encroachments, and it must also know that it is entitled to defend its rights." Instead of that, the peasant is now powerless against the whims of the local authorities; his economic activity is under strict control; his person, his property, and his family are dependent upon the arbitrary decisions of the Mir (the community); he may at any time be arrested and flogged; although, since then, the manifesto of 1904 has abolished flogging in Russia.

Life in the village will find its normal course only when the personality of the peasant shall have been lifted up; when all distinction shall have been abolished between the village inhabitants who are subject and those who are not subject to the payment of taxes; when the equality of all the social orders, so far as their personal rights are concerned (which is a principle proclaimed by Alexander II. in his reforms) shall have been carried into real life.

Concerning the technical education suggested by the government, the district committees answered that it was to be preceded and made possible by a wide diffusion of general education, which was hampered by the government control of the Zemstvo schools and of the people's reading.<sup>10</sup> They added that overtaxation and over-protection must first be reformed before any agricultural improvements would become possible. As a general result, they rejected the government's program of "technical reforms" as insufficient, and asked for a share in the legislation in matters concerning the villages. Two of the members, who had formulated this last demand in the most explicit way—*i. e.*, as a demand for central political representation—were immediately sent into exile by Mr. Plehve, and some others were removed from their (elective) offices. But the general state of mind was now quite clear: the members of the committees were ready to help the government, but only upon certain conditions, and did not wish to pledge their influence in favor of such minute reforms as the government wished to suggest. The formal conflict between the government and the country had begun.

It was, however, merely a beginning, and the consensus of opinion was not then nearly as strong and as uniform as it has since become. The views expressed by the committees were pretty discordant, and side by side with liberal statements, as formulated above, many voices from the agrarians in the committees were also heard; a still larger number of members were uncertain and wavering. But the example set by the more

<sup>10</sup> See pp. 212, 213, and 199-203.

determined proved decisive. Many a member who until then had been clinging to antiquated views and old panaceas here learned to know better; many a trimmer was by the predominant current driven into a more resolute line of action; many a young man received his first lessons in political education in the sittings of the committees, or here first tried his hand at public work. Thus the enthusiasm for the coming reform has grown enormously owing to the activity of the committees, and the interest in public affairs has been widely spread all over the country. Yet the result of this whole preparatory work might have been lost, had it not been powerfully instigated and supported by the general state of political disaffection, which soon found expression in the increased activity of the revolutionary parties. Let us now study this part of our subject.

We have already seen that the revolutionary movement of twenty years ago left two leading ideas as an inheritance to its successors. The one was that the aim — I mean the next aim — of the movement should be a direct political struggle with the autocracy. The other was that this struggle had to be conducted in the first instance by workingmen, the proletariat *par excellence*. However different the shades of socialistic opinion may have been, these two points were beyond dispute. Now, we have seen how the events subsequent to the struggle of 1879–81 only tended to fortify the opinion that autocracy was the first obstacle to be overcome before any serious reform could be inaugurated. The same trend of events actually brought the Russian workingmen to the front. The artificial growth of manu-

factures and their rapid collapse were just the conditions needed for the launching of a labor party. Of course, some workingmen have even before that time, from the very beginning, shared in the revolutionary movement; but, to a certain degree, when they became revolutionaries they ceased being true representatives of their own class. The socialist propaganda made them "intellectuals." The necessary conclusion drawn by the socialists from this circumstance was that it was not a "propaganda" among the best and most developed, but rather an "agitation" among the masses, that was wanted. And events soon came to the support of this practical conclusion.

In June, 1896, St. Petersburg was roused by a startling movement of workingmen, the like of which it had never before seen. The workers in twenty-two cotton factories of the northern capital, numbering more than thirty thousand, organized something like a general strike. There were no visible signs of any preparatory propaganda by the socialists, and no "intellectual" leaders made themselves prominent. All the proclamations and other papers published during the strike were written by the men themselves, in a plain, half-educated language. To be sure, small circles of workingmen, reading socialist pamphlets under the direction of young students, had always existed. But these were few, and could by no means account for the large spread of the strike. The socialists themselves vowed that they were taken by surprise, and they bitterly upbraided themselves for not having been better prepared to take advantage of the opportunity. The demands formulated by the strikers were of a

strictly professional — *i. e.*, economic — character: a reduction of their day's work to twelve hours (one and a half hours for dinner included) — from 7 A. M. to 7 P. M.; wages to be slightly increased and to be paid regularly; the machines to be cleaned during working hours; etc. The demands were so moderate and sensible that immediately after the strike became known the minister of finance ordered the owners of the manufactures to remedy the most crying abuses. The methods employed by the strikers were quite peaceful; no violence was resorted to, and the chief means of protest was simply staying at home. The movement was at once so unlike a "revolutionary outbreak," as the Russian police was accustomed to represent it, and so imposing that it could not fail to produce a deep impression on both the government and the revolutionaries. The former for a few moments was panic-stricken; the latter renewed their efforts and remodeled their theories in accordance with the apparent requirements of this newly revealed force of organized labor.

The socialistic movement of the nineties has often been compared with the movement of the seventies. Its initial stage — the predilection for professional strikes — particularly reminds one of the initial period of the former movement, the so-called "going to the people." Indeed, the new movement might have gone through all the phases of the previous one. It might have had its serene period of naïve self-assertion, brought about by the inexperience of the younger elements; then another period might have followed — that of embitterment and of growing skill in conspiracy, ending in a desperate fight of violence by some

few survivors. We have seen how pacific was the start, and we shall have to witness a further warlike experience. But, in spite of this general similarity, the new movement still has a character all its own. First, it is a movement on a much larger scale than the former. The Russian "masses," up to that time voiceless and silent, appear now for the first time on the political stage and make their first attempt to speak in their own name. Their vanguard—the workingmen in the larger factories—have already made a beginning, and now the people in the villages are trying to imitate their example. Of course, the latter hardly know how to spell their claims and have scarcely begun to organize. But their misery is great, and there is always an abundance of inflammable material in their midst. Thus the new revolutionary movement has gained enormously in strength and is infinitely more dangerous to the government than it has ever been before.

We shall later return to the question as to how far the present revolutionary movement is supported by the general disaffection of the masses, but for the present we must draw attention to another feature which gives to the movement its complicated character. This feature is the rôle which the surviving representatives of the former movement have played in the present one, while impressing their own intellectual stamp upon the new generation of revolutionary beginners. The democratic socialists of the "Group of the Emancipation of Labor," who had been the last to appear in the former movement,<sup>11</sup> were the first to start a new one. They were the "orthodox Marxists," proud of

<sup>11</sup> See p. 425.



having hoisted the banner of "pure socialism" repudiated by the former generation of "populists." Their program—that of a political struggle for the "dictatorship of the proletarians"—seemed to be the logical consequence of the complete failure of their opponents' scheme for a "social revolution by the peasants." The fact was that the struggle of the workingmen against autocracy was of itself coming to the front; and such a struggle offered the best chance of success to a theory which had always taught that this was the only kind of struggle which led directly to the advent of socialism, in strict accordance with the teachings of "scientific socialism."

The young generation grown up in Russia in the eighties had, however, its own views, and—what is more—its own temper, which made it impossible for it at once to adopt the whole program of the refugees of 1880. This new generation grew up in the period of political reaction, and it was quite lacking in that political training which generally is gained only in periods of political struggle. There were no bracing elements, no strengthening influences, in its personal experience. Any faith in social action was lost by the men of that generation; instead, they lived at a period when schemes for individual self-improvement were most popular, and when Tolstoy's ethical anarchism was making numerous converts. Thus, when that dull decade of 1881-91 had come to its close, and a new political movement set in, the reformers of the eighties hailed it in a most remarkable spirit. They were quite delighted to find ready at hand a theory which relieved them of the burden of carrying out the reform by their

own efforts, the general trend of events being made responsible for the final success of that reform. Social revolution was now safely expected to come as an unavoidable result of an organic and spontaneous material evolution; and people in possession of that "scientific" prognosis looked down with contempt upon their predecessors, who were shortsighted enough to rely upon a weak individual effort. "The materialistic explanation of history" satisfied their taste for facts, for positive data, and justified their disbelief in the "rôle of personality," in "ideology," and in every sort of "utopian" conception. Thus the "historical materialism" of Marx became a revelation and a sanction for such of them as now emerged from the passivity of the eighties to the more active disposition of mind of the first half of the nineties.

The development of Russian capitalism at this very time seemed entirely to harmonize with the theoretic explanations of Marx, and it warranted the final success of socialism. The strikes of 1896 and 1897 definitely persuaded the young generation of revolutionists that the evolution of socialism would take place all by itself, and that the *facts* must give direction to the *theory* of the revolutionary propaganda.

The consequence was that, in spite of the influence of the elder Marxists, the active and individual—the political—element in the revolution was disregarded, and the chief attention was drawn to the passive and spontaneous—the economic—side of the movement. Strikes of workingmen—their struggle for better wages—were to become the main, if not the only, object of the socialistic propaganda and agitation. The

young reformers took particular pains to emphasize the peaceful character of the new movement, as the best proof of its spontaneity and omen of its final success. Even the advent of capitalism—so much feared by the “populists” of the former generation—was now hailed as the longed-for symptom of an approaching social catastrophe. The precapitalistic forms of Russia’s economic history, such as the village community and the home industries, so much idealized in the schemes of the populists, were now relentlessly criticised and repudiated as an obstacle to the socialization of the means of production. The Russian peasant, who in the former scheme was to accomplish the social revolution, was now proclaimed a petty bourgeois in embryo; and the workingman was to be the hero of the coming cataclysm. Every interest in the village was lost, and the factories and workshops became the exclusive field of activity for the young revolutionists of the new generation. For some five or six years the revolutionary youth reveled in their discovery of the close harmony existing between the theory of Marx and the corresponding facts of actual life in Russia. But this stage of the movement did not last long, and the old Marxists were the first to dispel the charm. They sharply censured the youths for not being right, or “orthodox,” Marxists; they proclaimed themselves opposed to what they termed the one-sided “economism” of the new movement; they argued that the movement thus directed was drifting toward “trade-unionism” and away from socialism. Not strikes on professional lines with demands for a shorter workday and better wages, but direct political demands for the

destruction of autocracy; not local work, but party work on a large scale—such was now the watchword of socialistic democratism. A new literary organ of the “orthodox” Marxists was founded (*The Spark*), and it carried the day against the inexperienced “economism” of the younger generation.

It is necessary to add that the actual conditions of life had contributed much to this first victory of a more pronounced revolutionism. According to Russian law, no strike on purely professional lines is possible. The very fact of a strike—independently of its causes, its character, or its demands—constitutes a crime; and the authorities are obliged immediately to intervene—not in order to satisfy the manufacturers or the workmen, but to re-establish “public tranquillity.” They generally choose the shortest road to this goal, which is to support the stronger side—not always that of the manufacturers. Thus neither side is satisfied with the too vigorous intervention of the authorities, always violent and too often untimely for one or the other contesting party. This one result is certainly attained: the strike from a professional contest becomes at once a political demonstration—before even the workmen themselves have had time to realize it. Thus they generally begin with a protest against the manufacturer, but invariably finish by protesting against autocracy; and very often the manufacturer himself, in his inmost heart, feels inclined to join them.

There is one other point in which orthodox Marxism found itself at variance with the generation of the nineties—and where it likewise came out victorious. It was at that very time that the German movement

for a "revision" of the Marxist theory became known in Russia. The "revisionist" movement proved very tempting to some deeper thinkers, and a stage of "criticism" of the Marx theory set in. Now, the position of "revisionism" and of Bernstein's theories was indeed quite different in Russia from what it was in Germany. There, as we already have seen, the Social Democracy celebrated parliamentary victories and formed a great political party. "Revisionism," therefore, psychologically corresponded to a certain tendency—so often denounced by the left wing of the party, and yet existing and increasing—to adapt the revolutionary doctrine of Marx to the conditions of a peaceful parliamentary struggle.

In Russia, on the other hand, there existed no such reasons for moderation. The party was just then in the process of formation; its political rôle was necessarily revolutionary, not reformistic, and everything that might tend to make it drift from revolution toward reform was quite unacceptable: it interfered with the socialism of the party and threatened to keep a door open for the most heterogeneous elements. It was then quite natural that, for the sake of self-preservation, the party had to steer clear of "revisionism," whatever might be its theoretical value. The clash between revisionism and orthodoxy has become still more acute owing to the fact that revisionist tendencies have found their way into legal literature, and thus have enjoyed large circulation, while orthodoxy has had to defend its position by means of the underground press. Again, the chief literary leaders of legal Marxism—who turned to be "revi-

sionists" — made themselves suspected of liberalism; and, indeed, some of them soon changed their party for another and a more moderate one. All this prevented the large spread of "revisionism" and made the Russian Social Democracy uncompromising and "orthodox." That is why the Russian representatives, together with those of some smaller countries recently converted to socialism, unswervingly give their support to Marxist "orthodoxy" at the international congresses of the Social Democratic party.

Thus far, the activity of the leaders, while directed toward the elimination of the "opportunist" currents of "economism" and "revisionism," was progressing very satisfactorily. This success is easily explained by the fact that their tendency coincided with the ascending line of the whole movement and was powerfully supported by the whole trend of the increasing revolutionism of the Russian socialists. Less successful, however, was the attempt of the leading group to assure its victory and to perpetuate its teachings by means of an entire reconstruction of the party organization on the principle of strict centralization. The antiquated tradition of "federalism," to be sure, had received a serious blow from the Social Democratic doctrine, which postulated international unity of the "proletaries of all countries," in their struggle against the international bourgeoisie. But, on the other hand, "federalism" has been powerfully enforced by the fact of there being in existence some strong Social Democratic groups, composed chiefly or entirely of Poles, Jews, Armenians, and other national elements, combining their struggle for national independence with

the social struggle. An attempt at unification of the whole Social Democracy of Russia was, however, successfully carried through at the second congress of the Social Democratic party (1903), under the strong protest of a dissenting minority, accused of "separatism" and of "federalist" tendencies. A series of independent organizations did not wish to submit to the strict control planned by the leading group, since it would mean their dissolution and their descent to the subordinate position of local committees; and so they seceded from the reorganized Social Democratic party. The independent association of the Jewish *Bund* took the lead in this secession.

But, besides those separate "nationalistic" organizations, there was a large branch of socialists that from the very beginning preferred to go its own way, and which never shared the doctrines of "pure Marxism," whether "revised" or "orthodox." This was the old "People's Will" party, whose surviving members soon made their voices heard. Their resurrection came quite unexpectedly, since they were supposed to have been "wiped out" by the heavy artillery of triumphant "Marxism." But, as the legal (the "economist") Marxism was soon on the wane, they began to dispute with "orthodox" Marxism the honor of reviving the *political* career of Social Democracy. Soon they found such gaps in the program and the political activity of the predominant party as to give them an opportunity to pursue their own revolutionary work without competition, and even to become most dangerous competitors of the Social Democrats themselves. The explanation again is that they adopted the same

policy toward the Social Democrats as the latter had adopted toward the "economists" and the "revisionists;" namely, they represented increasing revolutionism, while the Social Democrats played the conservatives.

Indeed, the "orthodox" current, in spite of its repudiation of revisionism and economism, was in its turn handicapped and fettered by the traditional scheme of Marx; namely, by the theory of the "class struggle." In strict harmony with this theory, their activity was to be confined to organizing the masses for the coming social revolution; and the "masses" they were to organize were confined to the comparatively small circle of Russian "proletaries;" *i. e.*, producers who owned none of the means of production. Meantime, the survivors of the "People's Will" party proved more adaptable to the local conditions of time and place. They were ready to enter upon immediate revolutionary activity in whatever form it should present itself at the moment; and they enlisted their followers wherever they found them—workingmen or petty farmers, "proletaries" or "intellectuals."

Yielding to the pressure of the general trend of opinion, the Social Democrats went one step farther, in that, besides strikes and peaceful demonstrations, they admitted *armed* demonstrations as a possible form of their active struggle against the government. The Social Revolutionaries (such is the official name of the revived "People's Will" party) felt free to go farther, and to resuscitate the most formidable—the terroristic—method of revolutionary activity. They organized the "fighting branch" of the party, which soon be-



came particularly known through a series of political murders, such as the assassination of the ministers Bogolyapov, Sippyagin, Plehve, and others.

This was, however, not only, nor even the chief, distinction between the old and the new socialism in Russia. As a matter of fact, terrorism was the most important feature so far as revolutionary practice was concerned; but the successors of the "People's Will" party were never satisfied with mere practice without a corresponding theory. They always considered systematic terrorism as a sort of transient and temporary expedient necessitated by the dire conditions of the present struggle; but so far were they from believing that individual action could essentially change the present state of things, that they even went farther in the opposite direction than did the Social Democrats. They still stuck to their former idea that the *whole* people, and not workingmen and proletaries alone, had to bring about the socialistic overthrow; *i. e.*, they believed that the real social revolution in Russia must be made by the peasants. Contrary to the new Marxist current, they never forsook that belief in the peasantry as "a tremendous force upon which the realization of the economic reconstruction of society depends in the future."

But for some time they thought this future to be far off,<sup>12</sup> and in their new program, published in 1898, they renounced any "systematic activity among the peasants," on the assumption that they were too ignorant and downtrodden. Like their adversaries, they preferred to operate in the more intelligent stratum of

<sup>12</sup> See p. 417.

the workingmen of the cities. But they did not idealize the workingmen as the only chosen people of the socialistic state, and relied upon their more developed vanguard only for the same reason that they relied upon the "intellectuals;" both were to work for the time when the peasants would be able to advocate for themselves the cause of the social revolution. Some two years later, the agrarian riots in southern Russia and the unexpected facility of the propaganda among the peasants made the Social Revolutionaries reconsider their decision as to the part to be played by the peasants in the general movement. They organized a particular branch of the party—the so-called "Agrarian League"—which was to begin direct work in the villages. Here again, as well as in their terroristic activity, they met with no competition from the Social Democrats.

But the determined position of the Social Revolutionaries in the villages obliged the Social Democrats likewise to formulate an agrarian program. It is well known that the agrarian question forms the weakest point in the genuine theory of Marx; and such it remained in the Russian reproduction of the theory. But the candid followers of Marx in Russia were not satisfied with a mere reproduction of the German lacuna; and they tried conscientiously to fill up the gap. Their theory is that, since the Russian peasantry still lingers in the precapitalistic age, it must first be brought to capitalism. To this end communal property must be supplanted by private property, and then the natural process of "proletarianization" (*i. e.*, the separation of the producers from their means of pro-

duction—the land) would be carried out. In that theory, as we have seen, the part of Russian socialism was to help the Russian peasants to become bourgeois and to dispossess their weaker members. This position was queer enough—to work for capitalism in order to bring about socialism in the Russian village. The Social Democrats, however, made the position still more awkward by proposing, instead of the general socialistic scheme—the nationalization of land—a specific Russian scheme for giving back to the peasants only such plots of land as had been withheld from them by their landowners forty years ago, at the time of their emancipation.

Out of the two agrarian programs, that of the Social Revolutionaries is, of course, more acceptable to the Russian peasant, since it tries to engraft new demands on his own ancient craving for land. The attempt of the Social Democrats to organize the “proletaries” of the village separately, and to oppose them to the owners of petty landholdings (as bourgeois), is certainly possible only on paper. But, at the same time, the Social Revolutionaries are supporting only a social utopia, while the Social Democrats are swimming with the current of actual life; the former, by trying to preserve and to impregnate with the socialistic spirit the landed commune; and the latter, by acknowledging the predominant tendency toward the destruction of the commune and the coming ascendancy of private property in the village.

Thus a desperate struggle and a very acute competition exist between the two currents of socialism in Russia. The Social Democrats are aggressive, if only

because they pretend to possess a universal and international—a cosmopolitan—doctrine. The Social Revolutionaries are holding their own—and are even growing in influence and in number, since they much more fully represent the local aspect of the movement, such as is determined by particular conditions of time and place. To an outside observer it is perhaps much clearer than to the participants in the struggle, that the two currents, so far from being mutually exclusive, rather complement each other. Of course, the more profitable part—that of representing the theoretical, the ideal, side of socialism—falls to the cosmopolitan doctrine, while the local current has to bear all the sins of an inadequate realization of the former in the actual conditions of life in Russia. While the Social Democracy is most anxious to preserve “the clearness of party lines” and the “purity of doctrine,” and thus prepare itself for the work of the future, the Social Revolutionaries adapt themselves as well as they can to the dirty work of the present. That is why all the revolutionary blows which have essentially determined the change in the political situation during the last three or four years have been struck by Social Revolutionaries.

But the Social Democrats meantime violently charged their rivals with acting contrary to the best-established maxims of scientific socialism, and thus making common cause with the bourgeois. They themselves confidently made their preparations for the time when a “class struggle” by the “proletariat” should become possible. By the very trend of events, however, they were thrown from their preparatory

work for the "organization" of a labor party into an active, and a revolutionary, struggle. Their strikes, at first purely economic, soon became political, and their mass demonstrations from peaceful became armed. The psychology of the revolutionary movement has decidedly outgrown the stage marked by "orthodox Marxism;" and though the "Social Democrats try to keep clear from any suspicion of making common cause with "nationalistic" and "revolutionary" socialists, they practically work toward the same end of a political, and not a social, revolution. The whole movement is thus much more united in its practical activity than in its theoretical foundations. Thus it is that, in order to appreciate the real strength and political importance of the movement, we must not confine ourselves to a study of party doctrines and of mutual party criticisms.

These variances between the two parties might have more importance if there were any real chance for an application of programs and schemes drawn up on paper. But, as things now are, the chief requirement of a program is that it correspond to the degree of the revolutionary disposition of the public mind, and that it be plausible enough to make converts. That is why, in spite of the profusion of bitter words and accusations exchanged by the leaders of both parties in the literary organs of their central organizations (the palm, however, being carried off by the Social Democrats), we shall find much less exclusiveness and less "clearness of party lines" if from the centers we descend to the rank and file of the revolutionists in the country. Social Democrats and Social Revolution-

aries very often side with each other; and their *negative* work certainly is the same. The chief question is *how much* work is done; and only in finding an answer to this can we appreciate how widespread is political disaffection in Russia.

For the first five years of the movement (1895-1900) a report was presented by the Social Democrats to the international congress in Paris. This report contains the history of the nine large local organizations which united in forming the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in 1898 (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Ivanovo-Vosnessensk, Keeyev, Yekaterenoslav, Harkov, Odessa, Nikolayev, and some organizations in the Urals; not to mention smaller ones in eight minor local circles). The story is always the same: A group of "intellectuals," mostly young men from the universities and other higher institutions of learning, conduct a socialistic "propaganda" among local workingmen, and for this purpose organize several private circles for self-culture. The most intelligent among the pupils soon join their teachers in forming a local committee, which starts an "agitation" on a large scale for an "economic" struggle in the factories and workshops. As a result, a more or less successful strike follows. Then the attention of the authorities is drawn to the local group, and after some few months of existence the committee is ferreted out by the police and the members are sent to prison. A short interval ensues, after which the committee is re-established. Then a larger group of workingmen is "organized." The local center becomes steadier, and its existence less dependent upon the occasional raids

of the police and discoveries of the spies. Thereupon its activity is enlarged. Some kind of manifolding-machine or a printing-press is acquired, and a local publishing center is established. It begins with reprints of small leaflets, and it sometimes ends with a regular periodical. The "literature" is spread among the workingmen, and thus a larger circle of sympathizers is secured by the central nucleus. This makes possible periodical political demonstrations on a still larger scale. The first and the most regular of these demonstrations is the international Labor Day—the first of May. The ideal aim is a general strike, on political lines.<sup>13</sup>

The numerical results of these various kinds of activity by the Social Democrats, for the first five years, 1895–1900, are as follows: The strikes numbered about 220; the total number of strikers was more than 200,000; out of 160 cases of known results, 120 were successful; three-fourths of the strikes were in the cot-

<sup>13</sup> In spite of its being composed of both workingmen and "intellectuals," a Social Democratic Committee has not yet lost its prevailing "intellectual" stamp. "Our party has not yet become a class party of proletaries, in the true sense of the word: . . . there exists only an organization of Social Democrats, and, at its side, an unorganized mass of proletaries, which from time to time manifests itself in revolutionary outbursts. We feel a certain isolation between the intellectual summit and the proletarian downs; and, in spite of all the eagerness of the latter to melt into one with the former, they have not yet succeeded. The mass has remained incredulous toward all the appeals of the intellectual Social Democrats . . . . We cannot carry the mass with us. Our generals remain without an army. . . . Only on the very last occasion the mass began to manifest that confidence for which our vanguard looked for so long a time." This quotation is taken from a letter by a workingman published in *The Spark*, January 7, 1905.

ton and the metal manufactures; of periodicals (published in six different places) thirty numbers were issued;<sup>14</sup> persons arrested, 5,942. As a person arrested generally remains in prison at least six months waiting for a trial — during which time a “preliminary inquiry” is supposed to be going on — the aggregate time “previously” passed in prison, for the period in question, amounts to seven hundred years of solitary confinement.

These figures, of course, do not represent the results of the whole socialistic movement over the whole of Russia. They refer only to the activity of the groups united in 1898 under the general name of the Social Democratic Labor party. If we now turn to the other chief branch of Russian socialism — the Social Revolutionaries — we can quote new figures, referring chiefly to their editorial activity. At the end of 1901 all local groups of the Social Revolutionaries united in one party organization; two other large organizations joined the party in 1902; and now it numbers more than forty-nine committees and groups scattered throughout Russia. Their literary organ, *Revolutionary Russia*, was started in December, 1900; and the number of copies published has steadily increased. The first issues were of only 1,000 copies; but as more and more were needed, the number of copies printed gradually increased to 2,000, 4,000, 5,000, 7,000, and 10,000 in subsequent issues. Besides, some forty-three leaflets were published (1902), amounting to 317,000 copies and more than 1,000,000 sheets of

<sup>14</sup> One must keep in mind the difficulties and dangers with which printing in underground printing-offices is fraught.



printed paper. In the following year (1903) there were distributed 2,000,000 sheets and 395,000 copies. And yet the local committees always complain that the literature forwarded is insufficient, and that the supply lags far behind the demand. The editorial activity of the "Agrarian League" of the party is not included in these reports. As has been mentioned above, it is chiefly in the villages that the party has carried on its work during the two past years (1903-4).

Besides the two socialistic organizations described, there exist in Russia other national organizations—some of them older, better organized, more widely extended, and more influential in the regions of their activity.

Two Polish socialistic parties are first to be mentioned, the difference between them reminding one of that existing between the two Russian parties. The one is purely "Social Democratic" and cosmopolitan; the other, local and, as a result of local conditions, intensely nationalistic. It professes to work for the political independence of Poland. The latter is particularly active and aggressive; the rôle of the former up to the present time has been mostly defensive and secondary. Thus their mutual relation and comparative importance are just the opposite of what we have seen in the case of the corresponding Russian parties. Since the nationalistic branch of Polish socialism has been predominant, the results of its activity are particularly interesting. These results are published in the report on *The Present Revolutionary Movement in Poland*, printed in London in 1904, in the name of the party (the "Polish Socialist Party," or P. P. S.).

Below we quote some figures from the report, showing the publishing activity of the party :

Year	Published in Poland	Smuggled in from Abroad	Total Number of Copies
1895.....	12,700	16,767	29,467
1896.....	26,900	21,381	48,467
1897.....	25,980	19,887	45,212
1898.....	55,350	29,402	84,752
1899.....	63,475	36,397	99,872
1900.....	31,950	55,560	87,510
1901.....	25,300	67,750	93,050
1902.....	41,640	47,660	89,300
1903.....	103,600	74,260	177,860

In spite of this steady increase in the number of printed copies, the report admits that the party "falls short of satisfying the awakened demand for revolutionary literature, although special attention is directed to this branch of its activity." The report states that regularly "every one of these pamphlets goes from hand to hand until it is completely worn out and illegible." The number of victims of police persecution for the same period, 1895-1903, is given as 717. This figure takes account of those only who were sentenced to hard labor, prison, or exile; slighter punishments and "previous detention" not being included.

For Russia proper a far more significant movement is that among the Jews. The particularly hard conditions of existence created for the Russian Jews during the last twenty-five years by the restrictions and prohibitions of the law have prepared the soil for political agitation, and at the same time made necessary a formation of a separate party organization on strictly national lines. Many socialistic groups united for that purpose in September, 1897, and formed "The General

Jewish Workingmen's Alliance for Russia and Poland" (better known under its shorter title, the "Bund"). The activity of the "Bund" among the workingmen and petty craftsmen in western Russia was particularly fraught with consequences. For the first three years alone the "Bund" was able to present the following figures as a result of its agitation: strikes, 312; number of strikers in 156 known cases, 27,890; of the 262 cases where the result was known, 239 (91 per cent.) successful and 23 (9 per cent.) lost. As a result, the general position of the workingmen in that region has been conspicuously improved: wages have been raised 30 to 100 per cent., and the working-day has been shortened by two or three hours. Of printed papers in Yiddish (the Jewish jargon), 82,000 copies were distributed. And here again we meet with the assertion in the party report that the demand is much larger than the supply. The number of readers during the following year increased to two or three times the number in 1897.

In its next report, for 1901-2, the "Bund" gives the following figures: printed papers (periodicals, leaflets, proclamations), 398,150 copies; strikes, 172; out of 95 whose result was known, 80 won, 3 partly won, and 12 lost; street demonstrations, 30; manifestations in synagogues and theaters, 14; political strikes, 6; secret meetings, 260, with 36,900 participants. The governor of Wilna, Pahlen, in his confidential memoir of October, 1903, stated that "this political movement is undoubtedly a result of the abnormal position of the Jews, legal and economic, which has been created by our legislation. A revision

of the laws concerning the Jews is absolutely urgent, and every postponement of it is pregnant with most dangerous consequences."

The same reasoning can on equally good grounds be applied to the position created by the measures of the Russian government dealing with two other nationalities, inhabiting opposite borderlands of Russia—Finland and the Caucasus. Previous to the famous manifesto of 1899, which violated its constitution, Finland was an unusually law-abiding country. Of course, the local national movement was very strong; but it was not at all inconsistent with feelings of profound loyalty such as perhaps never existed in Russia proper. Years of arbitrary rule enforced by the brutality of the Russian police were needed to extirpate the last vestige of that loyalty and to rouse that peaceful population—generally characterized by a phlegmatic, though stubborn, temperament—to the utmost hatred and anger toward everything Russian. I do not know of any more striking or dramatic incident in history than that of a loyal young man, in the rôle of a modern Harmodius, killing the tyrant, and then in the next moment killing himself, and yet signing himself as a "loyal subject of his majesty" in a posthumous letter in which he implores the Tsar's mercy for his people and his country. Up to the very last moment these Finnish people forebore turning to the side of the opposition; up to the very last limit of endurance the opposition remained passive; up to the very last possibility the opposition, when finally turning to active resistance, still tried to remain on the ground of legality and right. And yet they were bound from peaceful

to become oppositionary, from a passive opposition to become active, from legal to turn to illegal and violent activity; in short, while beginning with most humble petitions, they were bound to end with conspiracy and murder. If there were any need of proving that autocracy breeds revolution, the proof is furnished by Finland.

In the Caucasus—a country whose inhabitants possess a southern temperament—the same political change took place in a much shorter time, and violence was much more quickly returned with violence. Some few years ago the Armenian revolutionaries on Russian territory were planning schemes for the liberation of their compatriots in Turkey. Now, the situation on the Russian boundaries in the Caucasus does not differ in any respect from that in the worst-governed provinces of Turkey. I have seen their leaders, and have heard them use language such as I had heard elsewhere only in Macedonia; and, as in Macedonia, they have on their side the best of conspiracies to back them and to defend them against Russian persecution: the conspiracy of hatred of the whole population toward the common oppressor. What produced this enormous change in the situation? Again it was Mr. Plehve's policy—his device to take from the Armenians the last refuge of their nationality, their supreme hope in a better future: their national school and the material resources of their national church. No wonder that they bite the foot that tramples on the most delicate flowers of their national life.

We see that the policy of the government toward the annexed borderlands created new enemies for the

autocracy, and thus further complicated the task of its "self-defense." And, at the same time that disaffection was spreading wide over the Russian confines, it struck deep and deeper roots in the soil of Russia proper, and penetrated to such social strata as had never before been touched by it. The universities and factories are quite honeycombed with political agitation. Our youth, year in, year out, makes sacrifice of itself for the cause of the liberation of Russia, with the ardor and the readiness for martyrdom of a religious conviction.<sup>15</sup> No regular work is possible now for the Russian professor or student, as every December the political tide mounts high, and it does not ebb away

<sup>15</sup> In order to characterize the disposition of mind of our youth, I translate here a letter of a very young girl student, which may serve to introduce American readers into the moral and mental atmosphere of a Russian street demonstration, and to show why these protests will never cease, in spite of all the barbarous cruelty of armed force, so long as that disposition and the causes which provoke it shall exist. "The demonstration was ordered for December 11 [1904, St. Petersburg]. Then a rumor was heard that it had been postponed, owing to some theoretical variances and to the solicitations of the 'minority.' But as early as Saturday morning I knew that the demonstration would take place. And we began to prepare ourselves. I went with a pure, unburdened heart, all joy; and I was not the only one. We all—all my friends and I—came out expecting death, and we did not hope ever to come back to our homes. We took leave of each other, and we were shining with joy. No clouded face, no word of sorrow. At noon we were at the Nevsky. I was instructed that the banner would be hoisted at the corner of Nevsky and Mihailovskaya, and naturally we tried to keep close to that place. As the hour struck one, we heard shouts: 'Come here, friends!' We clustered about the bearers of the banners (they were two), singing the 'Marseillaise.' We moved on down Nevsky, whence the cavalry with drawn swords was already charging against us. In two seconds a part of the demonstrators lay scattered over Nevsky, and the rest were locked in some shop. . . . Now I can quietly speak

before April: In January, 1905, about four hundred professors from all the Russian universities and other higher institutions of learning signed a declaration in which they stated that no educational activity, no study of science, is possible so long as politics has not been granted its proper channel of political representation, and that no independent work in acquiring or imparting knowledge can be done until guaranties of personal rights have been given and educational institutions have been relieved of their rôle of police organs in the system of self-defense of the autocracy.

Political disturbances similar to those endemic in the Russian universities have now become a permanent feature of factory life. The workmen always fra-  
(but not think) of what followed. I can forget everything, all the joys and sorrows of my life, but I shall never forget *that*, especially the horrible moment when, with my body writhing, I lay down and saw the horse's shoe swing over my head, and saw my friends struck and wounded, and heard their cries and groans. Of our own party, my friend has suffered: she was severely beaten by two policemen, and is still being treated. Other people escaped with trifles: some were pulled by the hair, others had their legs struck, and some their teeth damaged. In all, they say, four were killed, of whom two are girl students. And one more died terror-stricken. . . . In the evening we arranged a feast of the Social Democrat party. It was at the hall of the students of technology. There were many speakers, and a resolution was carried; then we cried: 'Long live the International and the Russian Social Democracy!' We sang the 'Marseillaise,' and with flying banners we entered the concert hall, where the other part of the public, after music and song, wished to dance. But we did not allow them to do so. There came to our assistance some students from a meeting held in a neighboring room, and with our whole force we expelled the 'bourgeoisie' from its legal grounds. The meeting was resumed. We spoke, we sung, we shouted again. Poor Social Revolutionaries! They tried to say something, but did not succeed; they proposed a demonstration for the 13th, but it was declined."

ternize with the students and unite with them for common political action against the autocracy. A few years ago May 1 (Labor Day) and February 4 (the anniversary of the emancipation of the peasants) were chiefly chosen for the demonstrations of the workingmen, but now the disturbances are likely to stop the operation of the factories at any time, and they are gradually becoming better organized, more simultaneous, and more conscious of their political significance.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Here is the list of demonstrations of workingmen beginning with the autumn of 1901 and ending with the spring of 1902 (the dates are given according to the old style of reckoning): Kishinev, September 11; St. Petersburg, September 19; Moscow, November 8; Kharkov, November 29 and December 2; Ekatherinoslav, December 15 and 16; Keeyev, February 2 and 3; Mocow, February 9; Ekatherinoslav, February 17; Rostov upon the Don, February 18; Odessa, February 23; St. Petersburg, March 3; Krasnoyarsk and Rostov upon the Don, April 18; Bakoo, April 21; Sormovo, May 1; Saratov, May 5. The following list of strikes for the period from May, 1903, to January, 1904, will complete the picture: May 1: a series of demonstrations in western Russia, the Caucasus, Taganrog, Youzovka, Mareopol, Tomsk; strikes in St. Petersburg, Irkootsk, the government of Tver; Kostroma, May 5-23; St. Petersburg, May 31-June 5; other strikes in May: Nikolayev, the governments of Moscow and Cherneegov; Oofa; July: Moscow, Tomsk, Ivanovo-Vosnesensk, Borisoglebsk, Tiflis, and Bakoo (general strike); Odessa (partly with the help of the government), Keeyev, Nikolayev, Batoom, Elisavetgrad, and some others; August: Ekatherinoslav, Cherneegov, Berdeechev, Kerch, Simpheropol; September: Tomsk, Bryansk, Keeyev, Moscow, Odessa, Grodno; October: St. Petersburg, Lodz, Rovno, Rostov upon the Don, Youzovka, Taganrog; November: Tiflis, Soovalkee, Warsaw, Kamennee Brod, Byalystok; December: *ibidem* (general strike), Grondno, Krasnoyarsk, Eerman mines, Parichee, Ekatherinoslav; January: Minsk, Riga, Berdeechev, Bakoo. Strikes without dates during the same period: Arkhangelsk, Vilna, Veetebesk, the government of Kherson, Neekopol, Warsaw, Shlobin, Mozyr, Bakhmoot, Toolsha, Pogachev in Volhynia, Moosni-kee, Mohilev, Pinsk, Sebastopol, Vyazni-kee.



These two elements—the students and the workingmen—are the chief, but by no means the only, classes disturbed by the tidal wave of the revolution. We have already mentioned the village. Even to such people as have never visited Russian villages it is clear that some new element is now found there which tends to make life unpleasant for the former landlords. One of our chief dignitaries recently made the statement that nearly every day complaints are lodged with him by members of the landed gentry. Just what their grievances are is not always easy to determine; but this indefiniteness in itself is very characteristic. It is not only agrarian crimes and trespasses, but the whole demeanor of the peasants, that makes them uneasy. The peasant has assumed new airs which are as far as possible from the subservience and humility of olden times. Some call it insolence and effrontery; others call it self-consciousness and self-assertion; but the fact itself of the existence of this new spirit is beyond dispute. How did it invade the village? Different reasons are given in different cases. In one place it is a workingman from the “organized” Labor Party, who, sent by the government into a remote village—his birthplace—acquainted his fellow-citizens with the current topics of general politics. At another place it is a student who scattered among the peasants a few revolutionary leaflets which he brought with him for his holidays—or perhaps his place of exile—in his native country. But more often it is one of numerous vagrants who, returning to his village with a few dollars in his pocket and some new ideas in his head, is always welcome, if he brings home some indefinite

rumors about new land to be granted by the state. From whatever source, the spirit of the new time pours into the village through every chink left open; and the more so because all normal avenues are stopped up. And while entering the village, not by the large channel of general enlightenment, but by clandestine ways of hear-say evidence, the modern spirit only too often assumes a distorted shape in the minds of the peasants and manifests itself by unsystematized outbreaks of violence. Local outbreaks of this kind are traditional in the Russian village. From time to time they will spread over more or less extended regions, like prairie fires, and as quickly die out, leaving only ashes and devastation.<sup>17</sup> One of the latest agrarian uprisings of this—almost spontaneous—type occurred in May, 1902, in the governments of Poltava and Harkov. Eighty estates of the local gentry were ransacked by the peasants, who did not assail the owners, but “peacefully” took from their barns grain, hay, and potatoes. Their excuse was that they had nothing to eat (there being a local famine), while the landlords had more than was necessary. Afterwards the Cossacks were sent to the villages, where they behaved themselves as if they were in a conquered country: the peasants were scourged and flogged, their wives and daughters were violated, and a contribution of \$400,000 was levied by Mr. Plehve on the starving population, without discriminating between the guilty and the innocent, and without previously determining the amount of damage suffered by the landowners.

We know that at the same time an “Agrarian

<sup>17</sup> See p. 359.

League" was formed by the Social Revolutionaries, with the direct aim of systematizing the agrarian movement and of organizing the disaffected elements among the peasants. In July of the same year (1902) the provincial governors received from the department of police a secret communication, that

in various parts of Russia there appear some unknown young men, who pass by in railroad trains or carriages, or on horseback along the by-ways, or even walk afoot through the villages; and all these people throw from the car windows or carriages revolutionary leaflets, or distribute them among the peasants passing by. . . . Sometimes these publications are surreptitiously thrust into houses or yards; sometimes they are openly placed in the peasants' carts at the time of public fairs.

Up to this point the government communication may remind us of the methods of propaganda used some forty years ago and disclosed by the political processes of that time. But this is what is new:

The leaflets mentioned are willingly read by the peasants, and they pass from one reader to another; sometimes they are even publicly read before a crowd of peasants. And, after having made themselves acquainted with the contents of that literature, the peasants begin to look for a coming division of the landlords' estates among themselves; and their relations with the neighboring landlords become more or less strained.

This epic report of the police evidently does not overstate the success of the agrarian propaganda. And, indeed, in two years the "Agrarian Branch" of the Social Revolutionary party published about a dozen leaflets, in 120,000 copies; and it spread them, together with other publications, in forty-four governments; *i. e.*, nearly over all Russia. The contents of the pamphlets do not quite correspond to the impression which they make upon the peasants — if we are to

believe the government communication. To be sure, the "division of land" remains the starting-point of this propaganda; and it is certainly the most interesting part of it for the peasants. But the Social Revolutionaries try to build upon that desire of the peasants a whole system of policy. Their aim is to give to the agrarian movement the same character as has already been assumed by the other currents of the revolutionary movement; *i. e.*, a political character. They suggest to the peasants that their chief enemy is the Tsar, and that their desire for the "partition of land" cannot be realized without political representation on the principle of universal suffrage.<sup>18</sup> They do not expect the peasants to be able themselves to bring about a social revolution; and, while organizing their most advanced followers in a series of circles or committees of a "Peasants' Alliance," they seem to confine their rôle in the general revolutionary movement chiefly to the refusal to pay taxes and to serve in the army. This is very far from the "riots" of a quarter of a century ago; but to change the mind of the peasants is much more difficult than to change the mind of the revolutionaries; and if an agrarian movement on a larger scale is to come at present, it is more than probable that the ancient, not the modern, elements of the agrarian

<sup>18</sup>The Tsars Alexander III. and Nicholas II. themselves have contributed very much to dissociate in the minds of the peasants the ancient connotations of "autocracy" and "democratism." Both, in the beginning of their reigns, in speeches to the delegates of the peasants, disclaimed the popular expectations of a coming "general land partition," and advised the peasants to obey the marshals of nobility. A picture representing the Tsar pronouncing these words is officially placarded by the board of every village administration community.

program will receive the chief emphasis; so much the more as these—the “Poogachov”—points are also included in the program of the Social Revolutionaries.

The university, the factory, and even the village—these are more or less customary and habitual spheres of revolutionary agitation; and we have already met them at an earlier stage of the revolutionary movement. It is, however, of importance to mention that new groups are freshly invaded by the same feeling of disaffection at the present stage of that movement.

The teachers in the middle and elementary schools have joined in the revolutionary movement. They have organized an “alliance” which is formally affiliated with the Social Revolutionary party (1903). The students in the colleges and secondary schools soon followed their example. One would be loath to believe that things had gone so far, if there were not first-hand evidence. Let me quote from a confidential letter, addressed by the minister of the interior, the late Mr. Plehve, to the minister of public instruction, Mr. Sanger (May, 1903):

Among the papers confiscated on the occasion of the search of the home of a pupil of the seventh class of the St. Petersburg Third Realschule, Avel Rosenoer, a copy has been found of No. 2 of the periodical *To the Light* for the current year, reproduced by means of a mimeograph. The periodical is edited by the executive committee of the “St. Petersburg Organization for Middle Schools.” . . . The editorial discusses various forms for giving utterance to a protest against the present obstacles to free thought and free study, and it mentions the existence of the following anti-governmental organizations started on a more or less large scale: (1) the Harkov Alliance of Undergraduates; (2) the Keeyev Central Branch of the United Circles and Organizations of the Middle Schools; (3) the Southern Russian Group

of Undergraduates; (4) the St. Petersburg Organization of the Middle Schools. Besides these four main organizations, there exist secondary circles and groups in Moscow, Neeshnee, Pskov, Minsk, Irkootsk, Yaroslav, Novgorod, Penza, Orel, Toola, Kostromah, Serpooohov, Saratov, Cheeta, Byalostok, Wilna, Warsaw, Simbirsk, Samara, Kalooga, Vittebsk, and Yekaterinburg. They are all in constant correspondence with the St. Petersburg organization, and their final aim is to found an alliance for the whole of Russia. The editorial states that in one of the cities of central Russia the students of the colleges have founded a "fighting branch" for active opposition to the detestable school régime; in the south the circles of undergraduates have included in their program the study of socialism; several provincial organizations have started periodicals: in Orél, *The Word of Youth*; in Minsk, *Forward*; in Neeshnee, *The Youth*. They now are anxious to start a periodical for the whole of Russia. Often the undergraduates have organized congresses in Perm, Moscow, Rostov, Keeyev, Saratov, and Warsaw, in order to discuss plans for further activity.

Another sphere of political propaganda formerly left untouched but now opened, is the army. Some organizations, as for instance the "Bund," carry on a systematic propaganda among the soldiers; others do it occasionally; and the result seems already to be important enough to render the government uneasy. The Russian underground press has published series of official "circulars" which state that revolutionary pamphlets are often circulating in the barracks; and cases of disobedience on political grounds are becoming more and more frequent.<sup>19</sup> In an official (secret)

<sup>19</sup> In August, 1902, General Kooropatkin, then minister of war, addressed the following secret message to the commanders of the military districts: "The attempts of political agitators to spread propaganda in the army, formerly comparatively rare, have in recent time become more prevalent, and are carried on so boldly that it is necessary to give serious attention to them. From the reports of

document from February, 1903, the success of the propaganda is admitted as a fact, and its possibility is explained by the change in the composition of the army. "In former times," the document states, "the term of service was much longer, the soldiers were recruited almost exclusively from the Russian population, and the officers mostly belonged to the gentry; that is why it was comparatively easy to maintain internal discipline. But now, with the military service made obligatory for all and the term shortened, with the soldiers coming from various ethnic groups and *their feeling of personal dignity ever increasing*, and with military commanders, and from communications of the ministers of justice and of the interior, the following facts appear: (1) In May 1901, proclamations were found in the barracks of the 116th Malsyaroslavl infantry regiment. (2) In the same month two leaflets of mutinous content, entitled *Politics and Officers* and *Abolition of Standing Armies*, were sent from abroad to the address of the staff-captain of the 141st Moshaysk infantry regiment. (3) In August all the officers of the twenty-seventh infantry division received from fictitious postmen proclamations 'To the Officers,' sent by the 'Social Democratic group in Vilna.' In these documents the officers were reproached because, in compliance with the orders of their superiors, they played the part of 'executioners of honest laborers,' and they were urged to give up that part. (4) A copy of that same proclamation was then (February, 1902) sent by mail to the officers of the Moscow garrison and to the officers' rifle school. (5) In January, 1902, an officer of the ninth Siberian regiment received a letter inviting all officers to resign from military service. (6) In the same month a manuscript was circulated among the soldiers of the sixty-fifth Moscow infantry regiment, the sixty-sixth Booteerkee infantry regiment, and the twenty-first White-Russian dragoon regiment; it was written by hand and lithographed in the regiments' chanceries, and it contained a revolutionary imitation of 'Our Father,' inviting the soldiers to revolt against their superiors. (7) In February and March proclamations were sent to the officers of the St. Petersburg garrison, inviting them to side with the students in their political demonstrations. (8) In April the officers of the Vilna garrison again

the body of officers of mixed origin, the task of preserving order is made much more complicated." This may explain why the "Cossacks" alone are considered entirely reliable, and are generally used to suppress disturbances, while other sections of the army have more than once demonstrated their aversion to that business, and sometimes have even refused to fire.

Owing to this enormous increase in political agitation during the last ten years, the task of the state police, as well as that of the organs of prosecution for political crimes, has become very burdensome. A large part of Russia is permanently kept in a state of siege in received by mail proclamations from the 'Russian Social Democratic Labor Party,' persuading them to join the 'general Russian revolutionary movement.' (9) In the same month a large number of copies of a proclamation from the 'Siberian Social Democratic Alliance' were thrust into the barracks of the Krasnoyarsk garrison, urging the soldiers not to raise arms against their brothers — peasants and workmen struggling for a just cause. (10) In April and May a proclamation was widely circulated among the soldiers of the thirteenth infantry division, who were invited to disobey the Tsar, and to throw off the authorities as lawless and unjust; whereupon attempts at propaganda among the soldiers were disclosed, and many agitators were found to belong to the mariners of Sevastopol. (11) In March, 1902, a well-organized propaganda among the soldiers of the Yekaterenoslav grenadier regiment was discovered. In this regiment the soldiers themselves functioned as propagandists, and at their head was a noble, who had given up his right to a shorter term of service for the express purpose of carrying on the propaganda. . . . Some soldiers helped him directly; others knew of the propaganda, but did not denounce it. Particular attention must be called to the fact that an officer of the 132d Simpheropol regiment took part in the agrarian disturbances which recently occurred in the southern provinces of Russia. These instances of propaganda in the army are by far not the only ones; there exist good reasons for believing that a great many other instances have remained undisclosed. . . ."



order the more closely to control political movements.<sup>20</sup> But the ordinary means of political control introduced by the "temporary measures" of twenty years ago have proved insufficient; and the state police have been obliged to organize, in the provinces, new centers of political observation, directly connected with the central, perfected system of espionage at St. Petersburg. After the murder of Mr. Sippyagin, new agencies were established in twenty provincial towns, and to many other places special agents were continuously dispatched. This greatly increased the expense, and the budget of the ministry of the interior for the purpose of secret political observation will give a fairly good idea of how much the oppositionary movement has grown. From 1883 onward the "secret fund" of the ministry was 952,712 rubles a year. Up to 1896—during the thirteen years of comparative rest of the oppositionary activity—this was more than sufficient. Thus a very large "sinking fund" was formed from the residues. Beginning with 1894, owing to "the increased activity of the anti-governmental societies, and to disturbances among the students, the workingmen, and the peasants" (as the official document from which we here quote states it), the yearly expenditure from the "secret fund" increased as shown in table on following page.

This increased expenditure compelled the ministry to resort to the sinking fund in order to cover the yearly deficits (growing from 82,596 rubles in 1896 to 1,197,154 in 1903); and, besides this yearly expense, another million (1,143,446), for unnamed purposes,

<sup>20</sup> See the map facing p. 188.

was borrowed from the same source. Thus, all the reserve funds having been spent (or embezzled), the ministry was obliged to ask for new credits — just at the time when all the other ministers were cutting down

	1894	1903
	Rubles	Rubles
For new agencies within the empire . . . . .	330,000	1,424,737
For the same purpose abroad . . . . .	64,000	178,665
For central boards (departments of police and separate corps of gendarmerie), aside from their ordinary budget . . . . .	170,000	454,636
Total . . . . .	564,000	2,058,038

their ordinary expenses in view of the Russo-Japanese war. The "secret fund" was increased from 952,712 to 2,135,189 rubles yearly.

Another — and not a less instructive — criterion of the growth of the oppositionary movement is the increase in the number of political criminals. Since, with a few isolated exceptions, there have existed, during the last twenty years, no regular procedure and no regular courts of justice for political crimes,<sup>21</sup> political criminals in Russia are such as are found guilty by the police, with the obliging connivance of the state prosecutors. The result is that the office of public prosecutor is generally considered as having nothing to do with the idea of justice; and the position is shirked by every man of honor. Political crime is considered by public opinion to be no crime at all; and to be branded as a political criminal by the police is a mark of distinction, gradually becoming a quite necessary qualification for everybody who claims to advocate liberal public opinion.

<sup>21</sup> See pp. 189-92.

The number of persons yearly receiving this preliminary qualification is growing at a very rapid rate, as may be judged from the following table:

	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899	1900	1901	1902	1903
Foreigners sent away from Russia.	5	6	1	11	2	11	1	9	10	31
Sent to Siberia.....	21	42	53	117	47	49	49	38	115	910
Exiled to remote parts of Euro- pean Russia.....	34	66	42	79	110	105	85	51	77	592
Put under "open surveillance"....	244	219	218	767	440	308	618	486	193	1,268
Punished by imprisonment.....	156	104	102	148	162	108	57	203	362	332
Arrested.....	29	20	16	92	88	195	102	141	217	845
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>489</b>	<b>457</b>	<b>432</b>	<b>1,214</b>	<b>858</b>	<b>776</b>	<b>912</b>	<b>928</b>	<b>974</b>	<b>3,978</b>

But large as is the number of qualified political criminals, the number of candidates for that honorable distinction is still greater. In Russia there exists no "habeas corpus," and thus candidates are always welcome to a "preliminary confinement" likely to last many months and to end, not in acquittal—because there is no acquittal where there is no legal procedure—but in exile by the police (as proof that the police cannot be wrong). Below we cite the official figures of the number of persons accused of political crime:

1894.....	919	1899.....	1,884
1895.....	944	1900.....	1,580
1896.....	1,668	1901.....	1,784
1897.....	1,427	1902.....	3,744
1898.....	1,144	1903.....	5,590

But we have now sufficient proof as to how acute is the present political situation in Russia. The particular difficulty of this situation is that in proportion as the revolutionary movement grows stronger and more dangerous, the gap between the revolutionaries and the government also widens. The only hope for a peaceful

issue rests with such elements as, either by their social position or by their political views, are intermediate between the rulers and the revolutionaries; *i. e.*, which are oppositionary without being revolutionary. The political importance of this group depends chiefly upon this intermediate position, and grows in proportion as the rôle of intermediators is required by the general political situation. The program of the group also depends largely upon the general state of public opinion at a given moment, being more or less advanced according to the more or less pronounced radicalism of this opinion. It thus reflects public opinion; with public opinion it stands or falls. Accordingly, the possibility of a peaceful outcome for the Russian political unrest depends entirely upon the circumstance whether or not it will be possible for this political group to influence the government without becoming untrue to the public opinion which is the only source of its power. It remains for us to consider what are at the present juncture the aspirations of this group, and how these aspirations are met by the government; and then we shall be able to form an opinion as to whether or not any peaceful issue is possible in the immediate future.

The present state of public opinion has had its share of influence upon the Russian liberals—the political group of which we shall now speak. The work begun by them twenty years ago they are now pursuing with renewed vigor and much greater determination. They have again their political organ abroad—the *Emancipation (Osvoboshdaneya)*, since 1902 edited by Mr. Struve, formerly in Stuttgart, and now in Paris. This new organ reminds one of the *Free Word* pub-

lished by Mr. Dragomanov twenty years ago, but it keeps in much closer contact with Russian liberalism within the empire, and is much more strongly supported by the latter, thus being better entitled to the name of party organ. The *Emancipation* is backed by an organized group of the "Alliance for the Emancipation," which, like the socialistic parties, has its committees in all important cities of Russia. The alliance in its turn is supported by a much larger circle of sympathizing adherents, who, if circumstances are propitious, will form an actual political party.

Such a party, of course, cannot represent Russian liberalism of all shades, because the shades are too various, and because everybody in Russia is liberal at a moment like the present. But it will form the left wing of Russian liberalism, and its political program will correspond to the name by which many of its members call themselves now: "Democratic Constitutionalists." They are and will remain constitutionalists, because they want the constitution to be a real thing, not a fiction. They are decidedly opposed to any half-measures and governmental tricks such as "Loris Melikov's constitution." They also no longer speak of the re-establishment of the ancient Russian *Zemskoe Sobor* — the consultative assembly of the Muscovite state. They wish a real political representation such as every civilized country all the world over now possesses; they want given to the Russian people the right of legislation, of voting the budget, and of control over the administration. Within these limits there still remains much room for important differences of opinion, and some of the disagreements are discussed in the

pages of the above-mentioned periodical. The results of this discussion are to bring different views closer together, and thus to bring about a still greater uniformity of opinion within the limits of organized liberalism. Thus, *c. g.*, universal suffrage, which formerly was not generally accepted by the party, now constitutes one of the chief features of its political creed—the feature which gives it the right to call itself democratic.

If we compare that program with what we know to have been the state of liberal opinion twenty years ago, we at once see that of the five different schemes for political reform which we then enumerated,<sup>22</sup> only two are seriously discussed, while the other three, characterizing the extreme right and the extreme left of old-time liberalism, seem to have been entirely abandoned.<sup>23</sup> An attempt is being made to combine these two schemes. The plan for a four-storied representation of the people by the deputies of the provincial Zemstvo assemblies is still clung to by the more moderate liberals for the upper house; and this plan is also the last vestige of the formerly so popular “federalism.” But even under this plan the fundamental idea is that the lowest stage of representation—that of the district Zemstvos—is to be founded upon a general vote in the townships. The partisans of that view admit that there must be another—a lower—house of representatives elected

<sup>22</sup> See pp. 306 ff.

<sup>23</sup> This was written before the events of 1904-5, which discredited the government to such an extent as to make the liberals indorse the demand for a “constitutional convention,” originally claimed by the socialists. The expectations of the two groups from a freely elected constitutional convention of course remain quite different.

by universal suffrage. A draft of a constitution worked out on these lines has recently been circulating in Russian political circles, and, as was to be expected, it met with opposition on the part of the more democratic elements of the party.

The arguments of the adherents of the bicameral system are chiefly two. In the first place, they argue that there must be an upper house to represent the local interests of the provinces, side by side with the representation of the people at large. To this their opponents object that there are no local units in Russia proper corresponding to the American states or the French provinces before the Revolution, and thus far no elements of "federalism," the existing Russian provinces being of purely administrative origin. Furthermore, such provinces—of a historically independent origin—as Poland and the Caucasus<sup>24</sup> would not be satisfied with a representation in the senate or upper house, as their chief claim is for more or less extended self-government.

The other argument advanced in favor of an upper house is that it will represent a higher stage of intelligence—and, therefore, perhaps more liberalism. This argument is founded upon a double apprehension; namely, that the general vote may be misused either by absolutism, by the pressure of bureaucracy, or by "demagogues" from the extreme parties. Indirectly, this is an argument against the general vote, and its point is that the people of Russia are not yet ripe for universal suffrage. The argument is not new, as it has

<sup>24</sup> Finland is not mentioned here, as it has its own political representation.

always been used by reactionaries of all countries against every decisive movement in the line of progress. This was, indeed, the argument of the defenders of American slavery and of Russian serfdom. The answer of the democratic liberals is, that there is no essential difference between the Russian people and many others who are enjoying the privilege of universal suffrage without endangering the social order and with great profit to the social peace; that there never was a people that was "ripe" for a constitution when that constitution was first introduced; and that the establishment of free political institutions is the only way to educate a people for political life. No restrictions of the franchise are possible in Russia without spreading a feeling of great injustice, and thus disseminating the germ of further internal struggle, because there are no marked differences between the various strata of Russian society. On the other hand, there is no ground for apprehension that the first Russian parliament will be a "Parliament of Saints or Levelers," and that it will end in the dictatorship of a new Cromwell. On the contrary, one may hope that the actual practice of general suffrage will do more than anything else to disillusionize the socialists and to free them from one more of those utopias preserved by their theoreticians from the earlier stages of their political education. The mere existence of an upper house will serve to prolong the period of theoretic struggle in politics, as it will always be suspected of defending class interests, and its introduction will undoubtedly be considered as treason to the principle of direct and general representation.



Which of the two views will prevail and form a foundation for the coming reconstruction depends chiefly on the general political situation. This situation has changed much since the beginning of the struggle of the liberals with the government, and the longer any concessions are withheld, the more radical becomes the liberal program. We have seen the liberals suspected of "landlordism" and aristocratism by the more advanced public opinion, when they first appeared as a distinct political group in the sixties; and we have seen that this deprived their political program of any moral influence either on the government or on public opinion. In the second period of their struggle, in the seventies, the liberals were much more strongly supported by the public opinion of the educated classes; but the revolutionists remained opposed to them, and they in their turn were ready to help the government against the revolutionists. Since then both groups have learned better than to fight each other while opposing the common enemy. We have seen the socialists and the revolutionists confessing that their failure is to be partly explained by insufficient support from the educated classes.<sup>25</sup> At the same time, the liberals have come to realize that no partial compromises with the government are capable of guaranteeing the concessions given, and thus of establishing a permanent state of social peace.<sup>26</sup> Thus, the revolutionists having become more practical, and the liberals more democratic and more advanced in their demands, a direct agreement between the two groups has become possible.

<sup>25</sup> See pp. 276 ff.

<sup>26</sup> See pp. 293 ff.

In December, 1904, a very interesting document setting forth this agreement was published in a number of newspapers. It is a "declaration" founded upon the minutes of the conference held at Paris by the representatives of the three oppositionary and five revolutionary organizations, announcing their intention of uniting their efforts in combined action. The three oppositionary parties are the Finnish, the Russian, and the Polish Constitutionalists. The revolutionary groups are chiefly the local and the national ones, since the cosmopolitan Social Democrats declined participation in any co-ordinated action with the bourgeois, largely for the reason that they had here a good chance of proving that their rival—the local and national socialistic organizations—are nothing but the bourgeois in disguise. The revolutionary groups present at the Paris conference were the Russian Revolutionary Socialists, the Polish Socialist Party (P. P. S.), the Georgian Revolutionary Socialist and Federalist Party, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, and—as an only exception—the Lettish Social Democratic Labor Party.<sup>27</sup> These parties mutually agreed that the political situation in Russia is so serious, and the chances for political reform are so great, that an attempt must be made to find a common ground for, if not "combined," at least "co-ordinated," action. The result of their discussions is formulated in their "declaration," as follows:

None of the parties represented at the meeting, in uniting for concerted action, thinks for a moment of abandoning any point of its particular program, or of the tactical methods of the struggle,

<sup>27</sup> This party, however, accepted the decisions of the conference only *ad referendum*.

which are adapted to the necessities, the forces, and the situation of the social elements, classes, or nationalities whose interests it represents. But, at the same time, all declare that the principles expressed below are recognized by all of them :

1. The abolition of the autocracy; revocation of all the measures curtailing the constitutional rights of Finland.

2. The substitution for the autocracy of a democratic régime based on universal suffrage.

3. The right of every nationality to decide for itself; freedom of the national development, guaranteed by the law; suppression of all violence on the part of the Russian government, as practiced against the different nationalities.

In the name of these fundamental principles, the parties represented at the conference will unite their efforts in order to hasten the inevitable fall of absolutism, which is equally incompatible with the realization of all the ulterior purposes pursued by each of the parties.

There is no ambiguity in the first paragraph of this statement, which is chiefly negative. The suppression of the autocracy is thus universally recognized as a common aim of all political groups, oppositionary as well as revolutionary. We have seen that a long development of political struggle was needed to reach this unanimity. In the same paragraph the exceptional position of Finland is generally recognized. It is interesting to note that the real initiative of the Paris conference belonged to "a few members of the Finnish opposition," which heretofore had been much averse to making common cause with the Russian revolutionaries. It is likewise interesting to note that these Finnish members signed in the name of the "Party of Active Resistance," which name, if I am not mistaken, appears here for the first time, thus testifying to a new step achieved—or a new group formed—by the Fin-

nish opposition, which formerly had always adhered to the methods of passive resistance.

The second paragraph of the declaration is couched in consciously ambiguous terms. "A democratic régime" is understood as a constitutional monarchy by the moderate parties, while a republic is the only régime consistent with the socialistic claims. But as a step toward the realization of their own program they may be more ready to admit, as a matter of fact, a constitutional monarchy than to accept, even temporarily, a constitutional formula. Another ambiguity in the second paragraph it has in common with the third. The "régime" is evidently understood by some of the Poles as meaning that of political independence of Russia, while the rights of national freedom recognized in the third paragraph according to the more moderate view, do not go so far as political separation from Russia. But for the great mass of the Polish opposition the idea of the re-establishment of a free Poland is as necessary as is the idea of a direct democracy for the socialists; and both are ready to make such concessions to actual conditions as they would not admit in their theory or in their formal declarations.

Still another characteristic feature of the agreement is that it does not mention economic reforms. This does not mean, of course, that the Russian liberals are opposed to economic reforms; on the contrary, their party published a declaration (simultaneously with the agreement just quoted) by which "the defense of the interests of the working masses" is proclaimed to form one of the integral parts of their program. The Russian "intellectuals" thus remained true to

their tradition. But their formula is at variance with that of the socialists, which is "the defense of the interests of the proletarians by the proletarians." The "intellectuals" of the *Osvobshdaneya* may be classified as "social reformers;" and it is well known that social reformers are violently repudiated by the revolutionary socialists of all countries: Germany, France, Italy, England. And, indeed, harmonization is hardly possible between a program that tries to "sharpen" and one that aims to "blunt" the social contradictions. One works for "social peace," while the other aims at "social revolution;" one is rather humanitarian, while the other is a strictly class doctrine; one is "opportunist" and works through compromise, while the other is uncompromising and works through social struggle. Competition is always strongest among the closest rivals; that is perhaps why no article in the *Osvobshdaneya* was ever more strongly denounced by the socialists than that on agrarian reform, which not only demanded that "the state shall contribute toward the passing of the land into the possession of the working masses," but even admitted, as one of the possible means, the "compulsory expropriation" of landowners.<sup>28</sup>

Now, under these conditions it would evidently be hopeless to discuss a common platform for economic and social reform. This is tacitly admitted by the silence on the subject of such reform of the document of the Paris agreement. So long as political reform remains the first and chief reform to be achieved, it is obviously not considered necessary to discuss matters

<sup>28</sup> See *Osvobshdaneya*, No. 9 (33), and *The Spark*, No. 54.

likely to bring about divergences instead of "coordinate action." As soon as that political reform shall have been attained, a radical change of party lines will take place. Very likely the question of economic reforms will serve as one of the reasons for such rearrangement. Some of the liberals will become bourgeois or "agrarians;" others will remain "intellectuals" and "social reformers;" while others again may join the socialists, among a similar differentiation between the more moderate and the more radical elements will be caused by the conditions of freer political life. But until this political freedom comes, they all — as a matter of fact or as a matter of formal agreement — will make common front against the common enemy; and their unity of action will continue to increase in the future as it has been increasing in the past.

The "declaration" of the oppositionary and revolutionary parties certainly marks the climax of the political movement in Russia. Its practical result is to isolate the government in its struggle with the Russian opposition. This, indeed, is the most notable feature of the present situation. Let us see what are the recent facts and events which go to prove this assertion.

The members of the Zemstvos, taken as a whole, are not at all identical with the "Emancipation Party." Yet so powerful is the present current of liberal public opinion that their program, recently formulated in the petition presented to the Tsar, is that of the "Emancipation." We have seen that as early as 1902 voices were heard in the local committees advocating the introduction of a constitution. But these voices were indistinct, and such as had a more positive ring

were stifled, and their possessors sent into exile. The cry was, however, raised again—this time not by three or four isolated individuals, but by fully a hundred; and it was not in the local assemblies legally summoned in the districts, but in a semi-official meeting of the members of all the Zemstvos, first invited by the minister Svyatopolk-Mirskee, then forbidden, and finally tolerated to meet at St. Petersburg.

This was the first meeting in Russian history which represented the Zemstvos as a whole, and which summarized the opinion of the Zemstvos, not about local and economic, but about general and political questions. This meeting formulated a demand which was much more positive than that of the few exiled members of 1902. In its petition it enumerated all the fundamental rights of the individual and the citizen: the inviolability of the person and of the private home; no sentence without trial, and no diminution of rights except by judgment of an independent court; liberty of conscience and of belief; liberty of the press and of speech; equal rights—civil and political—for all social orders, and, as a consequence, enfranchisement of the peasants; a large measure of local and municipal self-government; and last, as a general condition and a guaranty for all the preceding rights, “a regular representation in a separate elective body, which must participate in legislation, in working out the budget, and in controlling the administration.” Of the ninety-eight members present, seventy-one voted for this last clause as a whole, while the minority of twenty-seven was satisfied with its first half; *i. e.*, the most conservative asked for

a "regular representation in a separate elective body, which must participate in legislation;" and they found this reform "absolutely necessary for the normal development of the state and of society." In the last paragraph of their petition the members of the Zemstvos requested that the anticipated reform be carried out with the assistance of the "freely elected representatives of the people;" *i. e.*, demanded the convocation of the "constitutional assembly."

This degree of unanimity in the St. Petersburg assembly has surpassed the boldest expectations even of those observers who have closely followed the latest events in the political life of Russia. "The Petition of Rights" of November 19-21, 1904, will remain a beautiful page in our annals; and whatever be its immediate practical consequences, its political importance cannot be overestimated. It was the first political program of the Russian Liberal party, openly proclaimed in an assembly which had full moral right to represent liberalism throughout the empire. Moreover, this petition of the Zemstvo men from all Russia was officially handed to the Tsar, and a deputation of the assembly was received by him. The pacification of Russia depended at that moment on the satisfactory answer of the Tsar to the petition. This answer seemed to have been more or less determined upon in advance; otherwise there would have been no political sense in permitting the assembly to gather in St. Petersburg, and in receiving the petitioners in a formal audience. All Russia was in a state of feverish expectation; and meanwhile all social groups—writers



and journalists, professors and men of science, lawyers, engineers, individual Zemstvos, provincial circles of intellectuals, workingmen, students, learned societies, the general public in the street, each in his own way, in demonstrations, banquets, resolutions covered with thousands of signatures, etc., etc. — hastened to indorse the petition of the Zemstvos. No more united and “co-ordinated” political action has ever been witnessed in the history of the country. To be sure, socialistic publications drew a sharp line between their own demands and those of the liberals, and tried to introduce workingmen speakers into all the assemblies of the liberals, proposing to include in their resolutions a more positive demand for a “direct, equal, and secret” general vote, freedom of strikes and a constitutional convention, as well as for the immediate cessation of the war. In many cases these demands were agreed to, as practically they did not contradict — and often were even implied in — the demands of the liberals themselves. The freedom of discussion and the boldness of speech in these assemblies surpassed everything that Russia had ever before seen; and the same spirit pervaded the press. Conservative newspapers — as *Novoya Vrainya* — became liberal; liberal newspapers became radical; and two new daily papers were started in St. Petersburg to advocate the claims of the more advanced public opinion. Though severely censored, they used a bold, open language, which, with perhaps two exceptions — at the beginning of the era of the “Great Reforms” (1859–61), and in 1881 — was unprecedented in the history of our press. Public manifestations in the streets, though peaceful, were

treated with relentless cruelty.<sup>29</sup> Policemen and "janitors"<sup>30</sup> in groups of four or five fell upon single unarmed students and girls, beat them with their fists, and struck them with drawn swords, until the poor disabled victims lost consciousness. Some of them died; others were maimed for life. Evidently this was a deliberate and systematized attempt, intended to inspire horror. Instead, it only inspired hatred and a feeling of revenge.

At the same time the question of reform was under discussion in the Tsar's palace, Tsarskoya Selô; and in a cabinet session on December 15, under the presidency of the Tsar, it received a fatal solution which, instead of ending the conflict, hopelessly enlarged the gulf between the Tsar and his people. Mr. Mooravyov, the minister of justice, who was the first to speak, tried to prove that the Tsar had no right to change the existing political order. Mr. Pobedonostsev attempted to prove the same proposition by arguments from religion. He thought—in his own peculiar language—that Russia "would fall into sin and return to a state of barbarism," if the Tsar should renounce his power; religion and morality would suffer, and the law of God would be violated. It was such arguments as these which for a time decided the fate of Russia. Mr. Svyatopolk-Mirskée tried in vain to prove that the minister of justice talked nonsense; and Mr. Witte grimly concluded: "If it should become known that the emperor is forbidden by law and religion to intro-

<sup>29</sup> See p. 504, footnote. The same is true of the demonstrations of December 18-19, 1904, in Moscow, stifled by Mr. Trepov and Grand Duke Sergius.

<sup>30</sup> See p. 194.

duce fundamental reforms of his own will — well, then a part of the population will come to the conclusion that these reforms must be achieved by way of violence. It would be equivalent to an actual appeal to revolution!" Mr. Witte played the prophet.<sup>31</sup>

As a result of this discussion, the manifesto of December 26, 1904, was published. It began with the declaration that "when the need for this or that change shall have been proved ripe, then it will be considered necessary to meet it, even though the transformation to which this change may lead should involve the introduction of essentially new departures in legislation." The meaning of that solemn declaration was, however, ludicrously contradicted and narrowed by the opposite affirmation some few lines previously: "the undeviating maintenance of the immutability of the fundamental laws must be considered as an established principle of government." Such innovations as would interfere with that immutability of the fundamental laws were deliberately classified — and in advance — by the manifesto as "tendencies not seldom mistaken, and often influenced by transitory circumstances." These introductory principles were enough to annihilate any further concessions in the manifesto. All the demands of the Zemstvos, except political reform, were mentioned in the manifesto, but the promised changes were stated in such evasive and ambiguous terms and

<sup>31</sup> According to other reports, however, Mr. Witte advocated the theory of a "Democratic autocracy;" *i. e.*, he was of the opinion that concessions to the lower classes — peasants and workingmen — would save the autocracy from the political demands of the liberals. Both versions may be true, thus characterizing the political rôle played by Mr. Witte in these days of crisis.

accompanied with so many "limitations," "possibilities," and other restrictions, that the impression produced was just opposite to what had been expected.

The immediate measures of the government still further increased the contrast between promises and good intentions, and the dire reality. While the manifesto promised to reconsider the "temporary" and exceptional regulations taken in its self-defense, as a matter of fact the government found itself obliged to resort to enforced measures of repression, domiciliary searches, arrests, imprisonments, etc. While it was promising to stop arbitrariness and to enforce a régime of "legality," in Nishnee Novgorod a crowd of policemen made a raid on a local club and treated the members of a party which they found in the clubroom just as they did the political demonstrators in the streets: they struck them with drawn swords—and the feat remained unpunished. The manifesto promised to free the press from "excessive" repression; and there was a shower of repressive measures against the press: in three weeks of December there were doled out seven warnings, two prohibitions of retail sale, one "severe reproof," and two periodicals were stopped for three months. The manifesto answered, and tried to comply with, a political demand by the men of the Zemstvos; and at the same time an order was issued that no political demands should be permitted to be discussed in the Zemstvos. The Tsar promised to make more effective his promises of religious freedom given in an earlier manifesto of 1903; and at the same time the Holy Synod, led by Mr. Pobedonostsev, made public an address to the clergy which sounded very much like

a disavowal of the Tsar and invited the priests to pray God to give the Tsar more power and wisdom.

In short, it was not pacification, but increasing irritation, that ensued from the publication of the manifesto. Its only positive result was to state that there were good reasons for the complaints and demands of public opinion, and at the same time to show that concessions formerly had been withheld by the government, not in consequence of any systematic plan of wise statesmanship, but simply because there was no urgency in the demand for reform. Evidently, the *onus probandi* now rested upon public opinion. Public opinion had to show that the need for this or that change was "ripe," in order that the government should "consider it necessary to meet it." Instead of diminishing, the tension thus further increased.

An outbreak must come. It was openly spoken of in private and in public, with apprehension by some, anticipated by many, foretold by all. Quotations from the time of the great French Revolution were on everybody's lips. Prince Troubetskoy, the Moscow marshal of nobility, informed the Tsar, in a classical expression, that what he saw in Moscow was "no more a revolt, it was a revolution" ("ce n'était plus une émeute, mais une révolution"); and the grand duke Vlodeemir, in an interview with an American journalist, quoted Napoleon—I guess it was another classical phrase: "Il faut mitrailler cette canaille."

Now, as it often happens, the apprehension has helped to conjure up the danger apprehended. On January 22, 1905, the St. Petersburg authorities, nervous as they were, repeated on a larger scale, in the

clearness of a sunny day, what Admiral Roshdestvenskee did in the darkness of night to the Hull fishermen. They fired on an unarmed crowd of workmen who tried to see the Tsar in his Winter Palace in order personally to present a petition asking for the amelioration of their lot. To complete the parallel, the authorities attempted to justify their fear by semiofficial allegations—laid at the door of the grand duke Sergius by the European and American press—that the St. Petersburg disturbances were brought about by English and Japanese money.

The idea of presenting a petition to the Tsar was anything but revolutionary. It was rather traditional; and though there have been in our history instances of meeting the demands of the people as they were met on January 22 (the Tsar Alexis, for example, in the seventeenth century made his soldiers slaughter the crowd that came to his palace in Kolomenskoya), there have also been instances of a different reception. A quarter of a century ago (1878) a deputation of workmen was quietly received in the Anichkov Palace by the then heir-apparent (Alexander III.). This time the petitioners had even better reason to believe that the Tsar would listen to them, as the initiative belonged to the "Society of St. Petersburg Workmen," organized a year ago by the government itself, in order to form a government party among the workmen and oppose it to the revolutionary organizations of the socialists. Father George Gopon—the first hero of the Russian revolution—was the president of this society, started under the benediction of the same archbishop of St. Petersburg, Antonius, who excommuni-

cated him on the "red Sunday." And the whole aspect of the procession, with the "ikons" and crosses, with the portrait of the Tsar borne by a priest in full vestments, had nothing in common with the red banners and the "Marseillaise" of the socialistic demonstrations.

Yet the crowd of January 22 was doubtless revolutionary. Such was the general tension that in less than a week of preparation the movement from purely trade-unionistic had really become political. The police watched the developments; but, instead of preventing the movement, they chose to give the plain people a bloody lesson — *in anima vili* — just as they had given it to the students of St. Petersburg and Moscow on December 11 and 18-19.

The trade-unionist origin of the movement is closely connected with the evolution of the "Society of St. Petersburg Workingmen," protected by the police. At a certain juncture the police became aware that the workingmen of the society took too seriously the promises of the government. The society was widely extended, and had eleven branches in St. Petersburg; it felt itself strong by its own power, and became aggressive in its dealings with the employers. Then the police withdrew their protection from the "independent" workingmen, and the manufacturers, having met in December, decided to dismiss the "union men" from their factories. This served as a signal, and the first demands — purely unionistic — were formulated by the society as early as January 15. But the very next day Social Democratic speakers appeared at the workingmen's meetings, and the movement very soon reached its second stage, in which the professional

demands of the union was exchanged for the minimum program of the Social Democracy. The third stage immediately followed, in which the socialistic demands were supplemented by the political demands which were just then being put forth by all classes of society, and were willingly indorsed by Father Gopon — “the Russian Lassalle.” In a few days all industrial St. Petersburg was on a strike. In a few days more a political strike had spread to every part of Russia, and became particularly acute in the Polish provinces and in the Caucasus. There were many people in Russia during these days who seriously believed that a civil war had begun.

But the fear, as well as the hope, proved exaggerated. It was, indeed, the greatest political outbreak Russia had ever seen. Hundreds of victims fell dead, and thousands were wounded. The movement was, however, stifled in blood. Comparative and temporary quiet had been re-established. But it was evident to everybody that for the Russian government it was a Pyrrhus victory. Its moral authority had been drowned in the blood of the wretched victims of January 22. Educated Russian society, in its public gatherings and assemblies, by silently arising paid homage to the memory of its martyrs, as it had done in honor of Mr. Sazonov, the “executioner” of Mr. Plehve. Far from having ceased, the struggle is sure to become more virulent. Nothing short of speedy concessions — much more extensive and much more deliberate than those of the manifesto of December 26 — is likely to prevent further disasters. Facing that urgent need, what is the position of the government?



Unhappily, it is as uncertain and vacillating as ever. Possessing no program of their own, the authorities are trailing in the rear of public opinion; and when they finally decide to grant some unimportant concession, it is always too late, and the public demands are far ahead.

And, indeed, how can they have any program for important reforms, as long as they are handicapped by their theory of national immutability? We know how inefficient and rudimentary that theory of "official nationalism" was at its first appearance. Some seventy years ago it was derived from Slavophilism by depriving the latter of any deeper sense and any liberal interpretation. The present epigoni of "official nationalism" do not even keep up to the level of this simplified and distorted nationalistic theory. The theory of "official nationalism" had to justify the system of "self-defense" of the autocracy which had been deliberately applied since that time.<sup>32</sup> But then the policy of "self-defense" itself became a tradition, and its theoretical justification somehow seemed no more necessary. It was now an axiom, and its wisdom was admitted, not upon arguments discussed, but upon some precedents quoted. An "example" set by a "predecessor" was always at hand to take the place of any sociological, political, or even strictly practical reason. The only semblance of theoretical argumentation was that displayed by Mr. Pobedonostsev,<sup>33</sup> and we have seen that that was merely negative. The mere holding in check and destruction of everything new and fresh, the mere "freezing out" of everything that was alive

<sup>32</sup> See p p.180-82.

<sup>33</sup> See pp. 61, 62.

—that for the last forty years has been the only doctrine of the state. It may fairly be called “government nihilism.” The supreme stolidity of such a conception was equaled only by its serene self-reliance. The “fatherly” power of the state stubbornly persisted in treating its “subjects” as children or minors. It claimed to be alone in the possession of science, of statesmanship, and of a superior wisdom inaccessible to the “limited understanding of the subjects.”

Naturally enough, when it met with certain demands on the part of public opinion, it did not think of treating them seriously. Instead, it alternately tried ineffective persecution and unsatisfactory concessions. The only possible peaceful solution—to rule *with* public opinion, and not *against* it—was never tried. Accordingly, there was neither system nor sincerity in the concessions, because only such were granted as could be wrung by force from the government, and then only to those who could force them, and not until they could. As soon as there was nobody there to watch them, they were gradually withdrawn. Such is the whole story of the “great reforms” granted by Alexander II. Such is also the story of our factory legislation. The laws of 1882–86, 1897, and 1903 were all passed after large strikes and disturbances had occurred, and then explained away by subsequent “instructions” when the difficulty was over. During the last few years, when public dissatisfaction became particularly acute, a systematic policy of falsifying public opinion was resorted to. There were mass meetings to congratulate the government and to thank it for the paternal care it bestowed on its “subjects”—such,

for instance, as that of March 4, 1902, organized by the Moscow police for Grand Duke Sergius. There were "trade unions" started by the gendarmes and spies, protected by the police, and winning a strike here and there; while regular strikes remained forbidden by law and were severely punished. There were deputations of workingmen to the Tsar, organized by the police and repudiated by their supposed constituents. There were, side by side with these "independent" workingmen, some "free-acting" students, organized and protected by the authorities. There were even some attempts to organize a government party in the Zemstvos. Government protection was given to certain "Russian" societies and assemblies formed in various cities, composed of government officials and people dependent on government favors, to make a show of nationalism and jingoistic patriotism, to speak in the name of Russian educated society, and so to represent Russian public opinion. There is in Russia a special name to designate all these governmental attempts to falsify public opinion. They are called "the work of Mr. Zoobatov" — *Zoobatovchecna* — from the name of an ingenious detective who inaugurated the system upon the advice of a renegade from the revolutionary People's Will Party, Mr. Leo Tikhomeerov.

But all these and like attempts proved miserable failures. Instead of helping the government out of its difficulties, they only increased its embarrassments. This was particularly the case with the sham "trade unions," which awakened class consciousness among such workingmen as the socialists had not yet been able to reach with their propaganda, and thus served to pro-

mote the cause of the latter. Far from fooling anybody, the government was only fooling itself.

But there was another danger for the government beside that of being lulled into the illusion of making internal peace, while actually it was breeding increased dissatisfaction. A much greater danger inherent in that policy of deceit arose from the fact that all faith in the sincerity of the government was gradually disappearing; so that when the time came for making real concessions, nobody could rely upon the sincerity of the promises. The imperial manifestoes, like those of March 11, 1903, and December 25, 1904, only contributed to this general skepticism. As a result, now even the moderate elements of public opinion are ready to unite with the more radical in their demand that the work of the coming reforms shall be done—not by the government boards; not even by such institutions as the Council of Ministers, which has always been a weapon in the hands of the reactionaries; not by the Council of State, which is a body of officials mostly relegated there from the higher offices on account of senility, incapacity, or a too reactionary disposition<sup>34</sup>—but by the freely elected representatives of the people, in a special constitutional convention. This is also the only way of bringing new men into politics. The present composition of our official class is exceedingly unsatisfactory, owing to that system of eliminating the talented and the independent, and of promoting the

<sup>34</sup> The former scheme is now used by the government; the latter was recently proposed by the marshals of nobility, who, however, wished the Council of State to be completed by representatives of the existing self-governing bodies. Both schemes are unable to satisfy public opinion.

obsequious and the "trimmers," which is just the reverse of "natural selection," and results in breeding incapacity and dishonesty as the most fitting qualities for the civil service.

The necessity of a radical change in the methods of administration cannot but be painfully felt by the government itself. After the ministry of deceit and violence of Mr. Plehve followed the ministry of "benevolent autocracy" of Prince Svyatopolk-Mirskce. The program of the latter, however, proved even more impossible than the former. The saddest thing is that the government does not seem to have learned by experience, and is now again going to try deceit and violence. The scheme of summoning a *Zemskie Sobor* will certainly be understood as a further piece of deceit by the irritated society, unless it be done on the lines demanded by all. But, then, there is no use of calling the future assembly a *Zemskie Sobor*<sup>35</sup>—a term gener-

<sup>35</sup> It was generally expected that on March 4, 1905, the anniversary of the liberation of the peasants, a promise to summon the *Zemskie Sobor* would be made public. On the morning of this commemoration day, however, instead of the expected promise appeared a manifesto of another sort, couched in terms implying political notions generally known as those of M. Pobedonostsev. In this manifesto the "ill-intentioned leaders of the seditious movement" were severely censured for their "audacious assaults upon the foundations of the Russian state—foundations sanctioned by the Orthodox church and by law." Further, these leaders were charged with "intending to destroy the existing political order and of substituting a new rule uncongenial to our country." "All Russians who held sacred the obligations of our national antiquity" (a class of whom there are extremely few) were invited to unite in defense of the throne. Soon, however, it transpired that this manifesto was as great a surprise to the ministers as the manifesto of 1881 had been to Loris Melikov, although this time the reactionary advisers of the Tsar failed to outwit the ministry. A stormy meeting followed, held

ally discredited as implying a certain amount of political sham.

And as to violence—it has never stopped. The nomination of Mr. Trepov and Mr. Booleghin, to succeed Prince Svyatopolk-Mirskée, can but be taken as a threat of violence and a provocation. Everybody knows that these men belong to the same set as the late Mr. Bogoleppov, minister of public instruction, and Mr. Zvairev, recently dismissed from the post of chief censor. They all received their preparatory training in politics at Moscow, under the auspices of Grand in presence of the Tsar. The minister of justice—the guardian of official legality—threatened to resign if the manifesto were not immediately withdrawn. As a result, another rescript to a quite opposite effect was published on the evening of the same day. In this document the latest petitioners—virtually the same persons as the “ill-intentioned leaders of the seditious movement”—were now thanked for their loyal feelings on the occasion of their congratulations on the birth of the heir-apparent; and their demands for political representation were in a vague way brought into connection with the wise examples of the royal “predecessors” who gradually yielded to the “ripe” necessity of reform. The “rescript,” though it urged the difficulty of carrying out the reform under the condition of preserving unshaken the fundamental laws, finally gave the craved for promise: henceforward, with God’s help, to admit the most deserving ones, those invested with the confidence of the people, their elected representatives, to share in the preparation and discussion of the drafts of laws. Of course, such a promise, coming immediately after the solemn declaration of that most obsolete of formulas, lost nearly all its effectiveness. Through its obscure terms and straggling, confused definitions, however, one thing was clearly to be perceived: autocracy is to be preserved at any cost, and the rôle of the representative assembly is to be the same as in that one planned by Loris Melikov. The fact that the writers forbore to use the term *Zemskie Sobor*, implies, under the circumstances, not an increase of rights for the coming assembly, but rather their diminution. A study of the “rescript” shows that no time for convoking the assembly was set, no definite scheme for the franchise was

Duke Sergius.<sup>36</sup> It is also known that the policy of the latter is that of unswerving reaction. The sum of statesmanship for him is condensed in the advice "to be firm."

What does this advice really mean? Has not experience abundantly proved that to be "firm," in the sense in which the grand duke employs the phrase, is, not to be "strong," but to be blind and deaf; that it is to try to resist an avalanche with two bare hands? Beating drums in order to prevent the eclipse of the sun is a much wiser policy than this; because beating drums does not harm anybody, whereas standing "firm" against an avalanche means provoking a catastrophe.

History has known few examples of such voluntary blindness. The civilized world looks with amazement and horror at the sad spectacle presented by Russia, and cannot comprehend how it is possible that people do not see what is so self-evident to all outsiders. How can anyone, unless he be a lunatic, persevere in so dangerous a game, and one which he has so little hope of winning?

To be sure, the persons responsible for that spectacle are not suffering from any mental disease. But they are, nevertheless, monomaniacs. They are the *utopists of autocracy*.

mentioned, and that previous to putting the promised assembly into operation, the whole proposition—even as to its possibility—is to be discussed by a special committee under the presidency of the minister of the interior, Mr. Booleeghin, an official of the late Grand Duke Sergius. Under these circumstances it will be clearly seen how illusory the promise must be; and the fact of its being set forth in such a form as this merely adds one to the long series of political mistakes already mentioned in this text.

<sup>36</sup> When the manuscript was in the hands of the printer the telegraph brought news of the assassination of Grand Duke Sergius.

## CHAPTER VIII

### CONCLUSION

THE reader who has come as far as this may feel that the multitude of details in this book is so great that at times he has nearly or quite lost his way; or, at least, that the cogency and effectiveness brought to the conclusion of the argument by this mass of detail have been partly lost by a dissipation of attention. It may now, therefore, be well to leave a clue—to summarize the most important points, and to indicate the essential relation existing between the different parts of the book.

We began with the obvious consideration that in every aspect of her life Russia is in process of change. To this observation we added that she changes very rapidly; that in some respects, indeed, she cedes priority in this matter only to the United States. We then glanced at Russia's past history, and saw that she has ever been changing; in fact, we might have added, as the result of a deeper historical study, that in Russian history there is no single half-century just like the one succeeding or the one preceding, and that always the changes have been quite essential.

Just here, however, we met the opposite assertion: that Russia, at least in certain aspects of her life, has never changed. We reviewed the history of this assertion, proffered by our nationalists, and came to the conclusion that this theory of the immutability of Russia is itself a product of change; that even as a theory this idea had no existence until a certain, quite recent,



time; and that, when it appeared, it was not the result of a deep scientific study of Russia's past, but rather the joint product of a romantic theory of nationality and the practical need of the present government for self-defense. Now, of course, such an origin does not say much in favor of the theory of the immutability of Russia. And the theory will appear to us still more objectionable if we consider that, in the view of some of its adherents, the only result of this presumed immutability is an extreme adaptability of the national type, and its aptness to be influenced by other national types. We did not decline to adopt this latter view, as far as it was founded on a true observation; and we found it fully supported by other, particularly by foreign, writers, who spoke from an entirely different point of view. We thus acknowledged the plasticity of the Russian type to be a real national trait; but, far from seeing in it anything inherent and essential to the national type, we recognized in it only a characteristic of an early stage of culture and of an incomplete social development.

Not satisfied, however, with this ostensible refutation of the theory of national immutability, we undertook to follow the historical arguments for this theory. And here again we had to put the same question, which this theory tries to answer in a positive way: Is the Russian historical tradition unchangeable? Is it even as firm and solid as the tradition of other countries which never claimed immutability? Then we reconsidered the case in the light of both the religious and the political tradition in Russia. So far as the religious tradition is concerned, the nationalistic theory laid par-

ticular stress on the immutability of Orthodoxy, as the chief foundation of the Russian national type; and as to the political tradition, autocracy was referred to as an immutable political form, likewise characteristic of the national type. In order to find the proofs for or against the thesis of immutability, we reviewed the history of Russian Orthodoxy, as well as that of autocracy; and we found always that the facts disprove the thesis.

In the matter of the religious tradition, it appeared that Russian Orthodoxy was rather a product than a factor of the national life. We saw that in Russian history a certain time had passed before this product appeared; and that there was another time when it ceased to be characteristic of the religious life. And while trying to explain why it was so, we found that the period in which Russian Orthodoxy, as a particular type, had no existence, occurred when the religious life was of an exceedingly low type—something like Shintoism in Japan—and when Christianity remained under the tutelage of the Greek missionaries who introduced it into Russia. Then we saw that the period in which Orthodoxy was no longer characteristic of the popular belief was when religious thought, becoming more advanced, could not be satisfied by the old type of faith. The new types of faith we found to be, in their essence, the same as in western Europe; or, as we called it, the evangelical and the spiritual Christianity. And what prevented the new religious movement from its timely spread was shown to be only restrictive measures and a system of religious persecution.

Orthodoxy, then, we found to be the national type

of religion, formed in the intermediate period of Russia's religious history, when religious thought was somewhere between its ebb and its flood. When this national type of religion was soon found by the government itself not to be upon the same level with the Greek tradition we saw that the authorities repudiated this production of the national creative genius as being too national. And ever since that time the religious life of the established church has been entirely paralyzed. Without a spark of life in its head or in any of its members, the church became secularized, and so was transformed into an institution of the state. What, then, could we conclude as to the firmness and solidity of the Russian religious tradition?

Necessarily we found that there was no such tradition as was able to stand by itself; that the living thread of tradition had been cut off by the authorities as early as the seventeenth century; and that the formal tradition is at present forcibly upheld, while a new living one is as forcibly prevented from forming. And yet this new and persecuted tradition appears firm and solid in comparison with the old and formal one, which stands in dire need of the support of the state.

Then, proceeding to study the Russian political tradition, we saw that nearly the same conclusions must be drawn from this study as from that of the religious tradition. First, we found autocracy to be the result of a long evolution, during which no autocracy existed. We noted many parallel processes of political evolution working themselves out upon the surface of the great Russian plain; but no tradition of autocracy appeared to be inherent in any of them up to the time

that autocracy was formed by the Muscovite princes at the end of the fifteenth century. We saw, too, that the process of political development in Russia followed the same lines as in western Europe; except that in the western and southern, and still more in the eastern and northern, parts it was delayed, as compared with the same process in the west of Europe. This postponement in political development was accompanied by, or rather closely connected with, the too slow growth of the native aristocracy, and the still slower growth of the cities, both these features again being more prominent in the northeastern part of Russia than in the southwestern. Then we noted how these differences in social composition helped bring about in northeastern Russia the development of a better and stronger system of military defense than the southwestern half could afford; and this difference in military power showed clearly how, in the struggle between these two types of Russian culture, the stronger prevailed, whereupon the system of autocracy immediately evolved itself in the northeastern half. Thus the case of autocracy is that of the survival of the fittest.

At this point a tradition of autocracy, which until then could not possibly have existed, may have sprung up. That autocracy was and remained, however, rather a fact than an idea was what our study showed. This lack of ideological elements, then, it was which, fatally reflecting itself in the political theory of autocracy, prevented it from becoming a real historical tradition. Autocracy had, therefore, no juridical basis other than a reference to the power of the "predecessors" of the Muscovite monarch, who in fact did not at all possess

this authority; and another reference to the sanction of God, which could be extended to any form of political power. But just as the national religion of the sixteenth century had proved unable to form a tradition, so neither the historical nor the theocratic claims of autocracy were fit to build up such a tradition on. They also were too national; they smacked too characteristically of the age which formulated them; and at that time no other — particularly no legal — claim, founded on any legal form of transmission of power or on the Roman elements of the Byzantine theory, was provided for. Thus, as more civilized times have come, autocracy has found itself under the necessity of providing some justification of a more modern character. But every one of the principles borrowed for this purpose from European jurisprudence proved contradictory to the very essence of autocracy and, if consistently applied, must have ended by transforming autocracy into a limited monarchy. The new arguments advanced for the justification of autocracy therefore had to be cast aside, while the old ones had long since been abandoned.

Thus, after a series of attempts at self-improvement, autocracy remained what it originally had been: a material fact, not a political principle. In the eleventh hour, and not till then, an attempt was made to apply the principle of the immutability of national life as an argument for the preservation of autocracy. But no serious proof for this argument has ever been submitted. And thus it is, even after centuries of existence, that no legal and moral tradition of autocracy can be found to exist either in institutions or in minds; and

so nothing is opposed to its overthrow except the mere fact of its being there, in full possession of power. As a matter of fact, however, during all the four centuries of its existence, autocracy had been changing from an institution inherited from the "forefathers" into a theocratic institution; even further, from a theocratic power on Byzantine lines into a bureaucratic monarchy on European lines; again, from a bureaucratic monarchy into a manifestation of the absolute "general will" of the people; still again, from that absolutism of Hobbes into a mediæval monarchy of Montesquieu, limited by the "intermediate powers" of the nobility and the bourgeoisie; and, finally, from this monarchy of mediæval orders—the *Standesmonarchie*—into a national institution sanctioned by the mere fact of its long existence and by the supposed quality of its being immutable.

If, now, we ask once more whether the Russian political tradition is firm and solid, we may answer that a real tradition here, just as in the sphere of religion, was broken by Peter the Great, and that since Peter's time no new tradition has sprung up, while the ancient one, having been entirely forgotten, cannot possibly be renewed. It is clear, therefore, that the existing political form, however firm and solid it may prove to be, owes its solidity not so much to any tradition as to the force of inertia, and to such multiform and numerous measures as the autocracy has been obliged to take in self-defense. And this very system of self-defense, whether from material violence or from public opinion, serves to prove how small are the resources of an ideal nature which may be relied upon by the autocracy.

This observation we found to have been made already by Speransky, about a century ago.

While these lectures were proceeding at the University of Chicago, many of my hearers may have listened to the eloquent words of Professor Iyenaga on the subject of the civilization of his native country, Japan. For myself, as a Russian, his course of lectures was particularly instructive. When Mr. Iyenaga spoke of the old spirit of the Japanese warrior class—their gentry, the *booshi*—a spirit which he said was still living in the present generation; when he exalted the spirit of self-sacrifice with which the Japanese noblemen parted with half of their feudal income in order to maintain the national unity; when he explained to us how the historical and religious claims of the central power at last overcame the opposing forces of the feudal elements; when he told us about the opposition of the popular religion to religious innovations, how the old popular belief kept on co-existing with the established church, and how the educated classes have recently grown irreligious—it seemed to me as if I were listening to the well-known melodies of a musical composition which in its *ensemble* was entirely strange. I think I have the key to the explanation of this similarity in parts and dissimilarity of the whole. The processes of “restoration” and “renaissance” which Professor Iyenaga described appear to have been the same as they were in Russia during the process of her political unification and Europeanization. But the tempo of these processes was quite different. Things that with us took centuries to pass away, in Japan appear to have been crowded into the short space of

some decenniums. Now, one of the consequences of this rapidity of process is that the ancient tradition of Japan, as it were, had no time to die out, and has kept enough of its vitality to be able to enter into some degree of combination with the elements of the new life and culture.

A like combination was dreamed of by Russian Slavophiles, but Russian history has provided us with ample evidence that no possibility of such combination between new and old exists any longer in Russia. The old tradition was too long a time in dying out, and elements of the new culture struck root too deeply. No living elements of the old historical tradition are now in existence. That is why some facts of Japanese life, as they were related by my brilliant colleague, may awaken in a Russian some reminiscences of a past never to be recalled, and may remind him of some aspirations long buried under new currents of life and thought.

But there is one discordant note in this comparison. Recent as is the new culture of Japan, and comparatively old as is our own new culture; heterogeneous as may be the mixture of the elements of old tradition and of new culture in Japan, and homogeneous as are the elements of progress with us, yet Professor Iyenaga appears to have had nothing to tell of any serious social or political struggle in his country, and it is chiefly with the elements of such struggle that I had to deal.

One explanation of the difference may be that society in Japan is not so much democratized as in Russia. It may be that it is not so much demanded by public opinion in Japan as in Russia. But another explanation is that much more is given. Japan enjoys



the elementary condition of progress—a free political life—which we are yet striving to attain. The statesmen that reformed Japan seem to have acted upon the same wise counsel as was given to Alexander I. by the greatest of Russian statesmen, Speransky, to the effect that patriotic battles should be permitted, not in the streets, not in the lecture-rooms of universities, not in annual sessions of Zemstvos, but within the walls of a national diet. The point of this advice was to keep in advance of public opinion. I do not know what Russian life would be like now, if, nearly a century ago, Emperor Alexander had yielded to the patriotic pressure of Speransky and had inaugurated an era of political freedom. It is quite possible that the political opposition would have taken a much more peaceful form; that the old spirit of the warrior class, so prominent at the time of Catherine II. and Alexander I., would have been preserved in a larger degree than it is now; that moderate elements would have played a much more conspicuous part in political life and in public opinion; that the struggle between the government and public opinion would not have taken the form of a continuous war between two different races, each possessing its own “patriotism” and its own “loyalty.” All this might have been, and something of it may still come, if political conditions are made more normal; but with the system of self-defense of the autocracy, the actual events of our political life took an entirely different direction.

From what has just been said it may be inferred that the Russian government had the possibility of a choice, and that it freely chose the line it now follows.

To be sure, this free choice would have been impossible had there been any social forces to compel the government to take another course. Thus the uncertainty of political issues is chiefly due to the absence of such social forces as would be able to determine these issues, in the same way as they have been determined wherever those social forces were present. Not satisfied, however, with this *a priori* inference, we reviewed the chief data of the social history of Russia, and found that the inference was true. The social orders in Russian history have always been subservient to the aims of the state. They have had no privileges, except such as resulted from their state duties and such as were given them by the state. This was the position of the social orders at the time when the Muscovite state was in process of formation, and particularly during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The ties between these classes and the government were somewhat relaxed when the most impending national military aims of the Muscovite state were attained: and an attempt was even made by the government of Catherine II. to transform the social orders of Russia into a kind of privileged orders like those of mediæval Europe. But this attempt to form a substitute for the missing social tradition came too late, and therefore proved a failure. For here, as well as in the realms of religion and of political institutions, the past had left no legacy of tradition to the present. And this conclusion, we saw, proved equally true, whether we studied the history of the nobility, of the gentry, or of the bourgeoisie.

The tradition of the Russian nobility was purposely and systematically discarded by the government itself.

We have seen how the ancient aristocracy of lineage was crushed by John IV. in the sixteenth century, and how the second aristocracy, that of state service, was democratized by the measures of Peter the Great. We know that the third aristocracy, that of the courtiers of the eighteenth century, was too dependent upon the government to form any real social force. Then we saw that the Russian gentry, though having moments of great brilliancy in its history, had little or no chance of ever becoming independent. This was, to be sure, the class most needed by the government to serve as military power and political support. In return for this service, the members of the gentry were actually granted whatever they wanted: lands and peasants, places in the state service, appointments by the Tsar. The whole peasant class was sacrificed to the pressing needs of the state. There was a time, in the middle and the second half of the eighteenth century, when it seemed as if the gentry would become interested in affirming their social position through the use of political privileges. But just then the government, having no more need of the gentry for military purposes, was ready to listen to the cry for freedom rising loud and louder from the oppressed peasantry. So, instead of political representation, the gentry were granted predominance in local government. This, however, they did not appreciate as a class privilege; they looked upon their local duties and rights merely as stepping-stones to the state service. Thus the chance for getting political privileges was lost, and when, some three-quarters of a century later, the gentry were dispossessed of their slaves, they claimed in vain the right of

voice in a reform which was to deprive them of a third of their income.

Little has been said about the Russian bourgeoisie, for the reason that until very recent times there was no bourgeoisie in Russia worthy the name. The dependence of the Russian trading and commercial class on the government was still greater than that of the gentry; and this could but be expected, since the cherishing and fostering of Russian industries are entirely due to state measures.

Thus we were obliged to conclude that there was on the stage no social force which could influence political life and take part in the development of political ideas. Nevertheless there *were* in Russia a political life and a political development. Who, then, were the representatives, and what rôle did they play in the history of Russian civilization?

We have seen that in the beginning these were men of the gentry, the first to become educated. The state itself was obliged to give them education, for the purpose of its own Europeanization. Their class feeling was weak, but this very weakness made them more sensitive to the ideal side of education. Thus, men of the gentry who, so long as they represented their class, were politically insignificant, became stronger and stronger after they began to represent general public opinion. With their political idealism they were undermining chiefly their class privileges, and the government was not entirely averse to this kind of public opinion. But then, after having attained the first great aim of their program — the liberation of the peasants — they looked to the second — political freedom. And

here their successes were for a long time checked by the self-defense of autocracy. What, now, are their means of attaining their second aim? Is it as yet the ideal force of public opinion alone, or are there other and stronger means at their disposal?

We must observe, first, that already, in attaining their primary aim, they used forces other than those of mere opinion. We had occasion to mention that the emancipation of the peasants was in a large degree the result of a social danger steadily increasing in proportion as serfdom was becoming unbearable. Not less important was it that the economic growth of the country was checked or impeded by the preservation of slavery; and thus economic reasons, together with social and philanthropic ones, tended in the direction of emancipation.

All these and other reasons may likewise have played a part in the second phase of the political struggle. What must be mentioned first is the enormous growth of the politically conscious social elements that make public opinion in Russia. The gentry still play a part among these elements, but are by far not the only social medium of public opinion, as they were before the emancipation of the peasants. Members of the ancient gentry are now found in all branches of public life: in the press, in public instruction, in the liberal professions, not to speak of the state service, and particularly the local self-government. But it would be impossible to say what is now the class opinion of the gentry. The fact is that the gentry are no longer a class; they are too much intermingled with other social elements in every position they occupy,

including that of landed proprietors. By this ubiquity the gentry have added to the facilities for the general spread of public opinion; but as a class they influence public opinion in an even smaller measure than in former times. The "men of mixed ranks," the *Rasnochintsec*, have enormously increased in all vocations; and the democratic spirit brought by them, and fostered by the liberal and radical press, is a distinctive feature of the educated class in present-day Russia.

Of course, this educated class is not politically homogeneous, and the political opinions cherished by its various representatives are widely different. We have distinguished the two chief currents; which we called the liberal and the socialistic.<sup>1</sup> Now, the predominant feature of political life in Russia, owing to its abnormal conditions, is that political opinion, instead of differentiating and splitting into small groups and factions, tends rather toward united and common action against the general enemy, which is represented by these abnormal conditions. This process of unification of public opinion is twofold. First, only such shades of political opinion as are more or less radical are represented. There being no "spoils," political opinion, having had no chance to back the private interests of any particular group or person, is disinterested, abstractly humanitarian, largely democratic, and thus naturally radical. That is why the scale on which a reconciliation and unification of public opinion are striven for is not so large as to preclude the possibility of such unification. In the second place, the scope of

<sup>1</sup> There is no real conservative opinion in Russia; there is only an official opinion, that of the government, which does not count here.

divergence among different shades of opposition is steadily diminishing just in the measure that political struggle is going on. In studying the history of the liberal and socialistic currents, we have found that the chasm existing between them at their inception was perpetually narrowing, so as to make possible at last almost an alliance, or at least concerted action for an aim which was admitted to be general. We have seen that the liberal current was gradually radicalized and democratized, and that it one by one eliminated from its program such elements as might have only a class interest. At the same time, as we have noted, the utopian element was slowly but steadily vanishing from the socialistic programs; and thus the way has been paved for the transformation of a revolutionary into a political party, and of its methods of struggle from oriental to European.

Political reform—this is now the general cry of all shades of political opinion in Russia. But is this only an opinion? Are there no interests, no organizations, ready to fight for political freedom? Are there no impelling forces to extort it from a reluctant government?

We have found the answer in the study of the present situation. Yes, the impelling forces are there, and they are twofold: the material crisis and the political disaffection. The picture here drawn, at any period before January, 1905, might have been considered an exaggeration; but now nobody can think it an overstatement. Russia is passing through a crisis; she is sick; and her sickness is so grave as to demand immediate and radical cure. Palliatives can be of no use;

rather, they but increase the gravity of the situation. To pretend that all is right in Russia, except for a few "ill-intentioned" persons who are making all the fuss, is no longer ridiculous, it is criminal. Upon quite peaceful and law-abiding citizens, who never shared in any political struggle and never had any definite political opinions, the feeling begins to dawn that the system of self-defense practiced by the government precludes general progress and the development of private initiative, just as, forty years ago, progress was precluded by the further existence of serfdom. Indeed, the development of private initiative is held by the government itself to be the chief need of the present time, and the chief remedy for the present industrial, commercial, and agricultural crisis which has become endemic in Russia. It would be presumption on the part of a historian to predict what, under these conditions, will be the probable result of the secular conflict between Russian opposition and alleged tradition, between public opinion and government. We must leave to history its whims, says Herzen. And we must acknowledge that there is a large scope for the whims of history in the situation as we have described it. Increased and united as they are, the forces of opposition are still not strong enough to replace the government by a violent overthrow. But they are strong enough to make the use of violence continuous, and by increasing this to preclude any further peaceful work of civilization. No form of government can survive, we may say with Speransky, which possesses no moral force and is obliged to carry all its orders into execution by mere material force. And if the only question that remains,



is, How long will the material force of the bayonets side with the government? then the position is desperate. Where thirty-five thousand policemen are sent to the villages, while no student of statistics is permitted to enter them, the condition of affairs must be recognized as utterly indefensible. And a good political strategist, if he will not surrender, ought to take thought not as to further defenses, but as to a more tenable position.

It may, of course, have been inferred, from what has been said in the preceding, what this tenable position is, in the view of Russian public opinion. Russia wants a political representation, and guaranties of what are called the fundamental rights of individuality; *i. e.*, freedom of belief and of speech, the right of association and of public meetings, liberty of the press, a strict régime of law, and the free course of justice, which implies the repeal of arbitrary edicts and regulations, the abolition of extraordinary tribunals, and last, but not least, a habeas-corpus act, *i. e.*, security from arbitrary arrest and domiciliary search. There is no general opinion as to the kind of representative institutions wanted, but a medium current may easily be found. Public opinion will not now be satisfied with a consultative chamber, and will not join the extremists who want a federative republic and a referendum; *i. e.*, immediate legislation by the people. The great majority will be glad to have what was once claimed by the liberals of Tver, *i. e.*, a constitution similar to that which was sanctioned in Bulgaria by the Russian Tsar twenty-five years ago. One must know that the Bulgarian constitution is consistently democratic, and

that it includes both of the features claimed by the democratic liberals of Russia; *i. e.*, universal suffrage and one chamber. The habitual argument of the conservatives, that Russia is not ready for a constitution, is cut short by this example of Bulgaria. The broad democratic basis of the constitution of that country did not correspond to the degree of political development of the Bulgarian people; but it proved highly valuable as a means of promoting their political education, and precludes for a long time any discussion about further changes in the form of government, which cannot fail to establish a good and durable political tradition, and to concentrate all struggle within the legal frame of guaranteed institutions.

Whether this example of political wisdom, which takes care, not only of the present, but also of the future, will be followed by Russian statesmen is an open question. But for a historian there is no question as to whether there will or will not be any political reform at all. History may have its whims, but it also has its laws; and if the law of Russian history is progress, as we have tried to demonstrate, political reform may not be avoided. To deny it is to despair of the future of Russia.

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